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Introduction
1.0. Subject of This Thesis
Aristotle, at the very onset of his bookDe anima (On the Soul), introduces psychology
as a discipline of the highest rank, both because of the dignity and wonderfulness of
its subjects and because of its exactness. But whilst he assigns such prominence to
psychology, Aristotle is more careful about its epistemological status: «to attain any
knowledge about the soul is one of the most difficult things in the world».1
The medieval tradition of commentaries on Aristotle’sDe animameasured itself
with such ambivalence between the exactness and nobility of psychology on the one
hand and the actual difficulty of knowing the soul on the other.2 As a matter of fact,
knowing the soul became evenmore difficult over the centuries and especially after
Aristotle’s teaching came in contact and had to be harmonised with Christianity.
Yet, it was probably because of the very efforts to determine an orthodox Chris-
tian view about the nature and destiny of the soul that two things about it became
clear. First, when the acts of the Council of Vienne (1311–1312) established that the
intellective soul of man was truly and per se the form of the human body.3 Sec-
1 Aristotle, De anima, in Jonathan Barnes, ed., The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford
Translation (Princeton 1984), i.1, 402a10.
2 Onmedieval discussions about the epistemic status of the science of the soil, see: SanderW. de Boer,
The Science of the Soul. The Commentary Tradition on Aristotle’s De anima, c. 1260–c. 1360 (Leuven 2013),
92–122.
3 The acts of the Council of Vienne, which were published by John xxii, condemned as heretic any-
one who denies that the intellective soul is truly and per se the form of the human body. The
Latin text of the condemnation reads as follows: «Porro doctrinam omnem seu positionem, temere
asserentem aut vertentem in dubium, quod substantia animae rationalis seu intellectivae vere ac
per se humani corporis non sit forma, velut erroneam ac veritatis catholicae fidei inimicam prae-
dicto sacro approbante concilio reprobamus, definientes, ut cunctis nota sit fidei sincerae veritas, ac
praecludatur universis erroribus aditus, ne subintrent, quod quisquis deinceps asserere, defendere
seu tenere pertinaciter praesumpserit, quod anima rationalis seu intellectiva non sit forma cor-
poris humani per se et essentialiter, tanquam haereticus sit censendus» (Aemelius Ludwig Richter
and Emil Albert Friedberg, eds., Corpus iuris canonici (Graz 1959), 1134). On the impact of the Council
of Vienne on fourteenth-century psychology, see William Duba, “The Souls after Vienne: Francis-
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ond, when the Fifth Lateran Council (1512–1517) stated that the Christian doctrine
of the immortality of the human soul could and should be demonstrated by means
of philosophical arguments.4
By the beginning of the sixteenth century, then, at least two ideas about the
human soul were known for a fact to Christian intellectuals: the fact that it was
the form, or animating principle, of the human body; the demonstrable truth that
despite being united to the body as its form, the soul could survive the body and
attain eternal life. It would have been all very well, were not it for the fact that
Christianity was about to change forever.
can Theologians’ Views on the Plurality of Forms and the Plurality of Souls, ca. 1315–1330”, in Paul
J.J.M. Bakker, Sander W. de Boer, and Cees Leijenhorst, eds., Psychology and the Other Disciplines. A
Case of Cross-Disciplinary Interaction (1250–1750) (Leiden 2012), 171–272.
4 The Catholic Church’s statement about the immortality of the soul is contained in the 1513 papal
bull “Apostolici regiminis” (by Pope Leo x), which reads as follows: «cum itaque diebus nostris
(quod dolenter ferimus) zizaniae seminator, antiques humani generis hostis, nonnullos pernicio-
sissimos errores a fidelibus simper explosos in agro Domini superseminare et augere si ausus, de
natura praesertimanimae rationalis, quod videlicetmortalis sit, aut unica in cunctis hominibus; et
nonnulli temere philosophantes, secundumslatemphilosophiamverum id esse asseverant; contra
huiusmodi pestem opportune remedia adhibere cupientes, hoc sacro approbante concilio damna-
mus et reprobamus omnes asserentes animam intellectivammortalem esse, aut unicam in cunctis
hominibus ethaec indubiumvertentes: cum illa non solumvere per se et essentialiter humani cor-
poris forma existat, sicut in canone felicis recordationis Clementis papae v praedecessoris nostrilin
generali Viennensi concilio edito continetur, verum et immortalis, et pro corporum quibus infun-
diturmultitudine singularitermultiplicabilis etmultiplicata sit. […] Cumque verumverominime
contradicat, omnemassertionemveritatis illuminatae fidei contrariam, omnino falsam esse defin-
imus, et ut aliter dogmatizare non liceat, districtius inhibemus: omnesque huiusmodi erroris
assertionibus inhaerentes, veluti damnatissimas haereses seminantes, per omnia, ut detestabiles
et abhominabiles haereticos et infidels, catholicam fidem labefactantes, vitandos et puniendos fore
decernimus. Insuper omnibus et singulis philosophis inuniversitatibus studiorumgeneralium, et
alibi publice legentibus, districte praecipiendo mandamus, ut cum philosophorum principia aut
conclusiones, in quibus a recta fide deviare noscuntur, auditoribus suis legerint, seu explanaverint,
quale hoc de animae mortalitate aut unitate, et mundi aeternitate, ac alia huiusmodi, teneantur
eisdem veritatem religionis christianae omni conatumanifestam facere, et persuadendo pro posse
docere, ac omni studio hiusmodi philosophorum argumenta, cum omnia solubilia existant, pro
viribus excludere atque resolvere» (Norman P. Tanner and Giuseppe Alberigo, eds., Decrees of the
Ecumenical Councils (London 1990), 605–606). About the Fifth Lateran Council and its statements on
the immortality of the soul, see: Daniel Price, “The Origins of Lateran v’s Apostolici Regiminis”,
Annuarium historiae conciliorum, 17 (1975), 464–472; Siro Ofelli, “Il pensiero del Concilio Lateranense v
sulla dimostrabilità razionale dell’immortalità dell’anima umana”, Studia Patavina, 1 (1954), 7–40.
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In 1517, Martin Luther, an Augustinian theologian teaching in the Saxon town
of Wittenberg, wrote ninety-five theses that would shake the European intellectual
world, with effects that are visible to our days. The ninety-five theses launched a
direct attack on many central doctrines of the Roman Church. Luther’s criticisms
stemmed chiefly from his new idea that man was saved by faith in Christ alone
(hence, not by good deeds) and that this message could only be known through the
revealed Gospel of God. This conception challenged the practice of church indul-
gences and in fact the very legitimacy of the Roman papacy altogether.
Luther’s new understanding of the Christian faith triggered themovement that
we know as ‘Reformation’ and that, through the so-called process of ‘confession-
alisation’, divided Western European Christianity into three main denominations:
Lutheranism, Catholicism, and Calvinism. As in the early sixteenth century Luther’s
ideas were gaining momentum, the reformer started to channel his fierce attacks
into numerous writings. In one such writing, To the Christian Nobility of the German
Nation (1520), Luther criticised, or rather ridiculed, many church doctrines. Some of
the ideas Luther derided concerned the human soul:
I nevertheless allow that the Pope may compose articles of his faith for his
faithful such as that the bread and the wine are transubstantiated in the
sacrament, that the divine essence neither begets nor is begotten, that the
soul is the substantial form of the human body, that he himself is the em-
peror of the world and the king of heaven and god on earth, that the soul is
immortal, and all those endless portents in the Roman dunghill of decrees.5
Luther’s irony here is directed at the authority of the Pope and the church doctrine
of the Eucharist; but Luther also mocks the official statements of the Council of
Vienne and of the Fifth Lateran Council, which determined that the human soul
was the form of the body and that the soul’s immortality could be demonstrated
philosophically.6 But – onemay very well ask – if Luther attacked such central points
5 Dr Martin Luthers Werke, kritische Gesamtausgabe, 63 vols. (Weimar 1883–1987), 7, 131.37–132.4 (hence-
forth: wa): «Permitto tamen, quod Papa condat articulos suae fidei et suis fidelibus, quales sunt,
panem et vinum transsubstantiari in sacramento, essentiam dei nec generare nec generari, ani-
mam esse formam substantialem corporis humani, se esse imperatorem mundi et regem coeli et
deum terrenum, animamesse immortalem, et omnia illa infinita portenta in Romano sterquilinio
Decretorum».
6 It is important to notice that Luther did not deny that the soul was immortal, but only that this
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regarding the soul, did he and those who embraced his new theology also devise a
new doctrine of the soul? In the wake of Luther’s criticisms, did there follow some-
thing like a Lutheranway of doing psychology?Were the soul-body relationship and
the philosophical demonstrability of the soul’s immortality the only two points on
which a good Lutheran should part company with the Catholics who wrote about
psychology? Did the process of sixteenth-century confessionalisation affect psychol-
ogy and if so, how exactly? In short, what was psychology like in the age of confes-
sionalisation?
Although these questions probably occur rather naturally to themind of anyone
who reads Luther’s ironical remarks, no systematic attempt has been made so far to
provide an answer to them. The present thesis aims precisely to make up for that.
The lack – or paucity, aswe shall see – of scholarship about thesematters is all the
more surprising when one looks at the way in which historians of philosophy and
science over the last fewdecadeshave looked at the relationshipbetween religion and
science in general.
In effect, ever since nineteenth-century narratives of ‘the conflict between reli-
gion and science’ or ‘thewarfare of science and religion’ stopped being the dominant
historiographical paradigm, historians have lookedmore favourably at the idea that
the history of philosophy and science and the history of religion are not necessarily
twomutually contrasting affairs.7 As a consequence, historians have explored either
the idea of apeaceful coexistencebetween the transformations of science and religion
or even highlighted the positive role of religion in the development of early-modern
philosophical and scientific endeavours.8
truth could be demonstrated by means of philosophical arguments. Luther rather thought that
the immortality of the soul could be known only through the Christian faith. This point has been
extensively demonstrated by Ittzés Gabor, ‘The Breath Returns to GodWho gave It’. The Doctrine of the
Soul’s Immortality inSixteenth-CenturyGermanLutheranTheology, PhDThesis (Harvard2008), 27–37.On
the “Unsterblichkeit der Seele aus theologischer Sicht” in Luther’s work, see: Sascha Salatowsky, De
Anima.DieRezeption der aristotelischen Psychologie im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert (Amsterdam2006), 67–69.
Scholars have also pointed out that Luther (at least during a first phase) espoused the doctrine of
the ‘soul’s sleep’. About this see: Paul Althaus, “Die Unsterblichkeit der Seele bei Luther”,Zeitschrift
für systematische Theologie 3 (1926), 725–734.
7 The two famous descriptions of ‘the conflict between religion and science’ and ‘the warfare of
science and religion’ were respectively used by JohnW.Draper,History of the Conflict betweenReligion
and Science (New York 1875), and by Andrew D. White, AHistory of the Warfare of Science with Theology
in Christendom (New York 1896).
8 About this point and for a list of publications that have proposed the ideas of peaceful coexistence
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Now, scholars who have looked at the way in which religion and science inter-
acted in the wake of the Protestant reform have not failed to notice that philosophy
and science in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries could be influenced by (or
could influence in their turn) the specific confessional context inwhich they existed.
As Rivka Feldhay has observed, both in the Catholic and in the Protestant world,
the key institution that channelled religious and political energy – that is, the key
institution involved in sixteenth-century confessionalisation – was the university.9
It is no wonder, then, that scholars have tried to assess the way in which specific
scientific disciplines taught at the university developed in institutions of differ-
ent confessional affiliations. What is surprising, instead, is that whilst this type of
work has involved awide array of disciplines – such as,metaphysics, physics, astron-
omy, astrology, medicine, etc. – the way in which psychology underwent multiple
transformations in the age of confessionalisation has hitherto been neglected. This,
despite the fact that, due to its obvious proximity to ideas of ‘immortality’, ‘freewill’,
‘sin’, and ‘grace’, psychology dealt with subjects of central interest for the confes-
sional controversieswhich ledWesternEuropeanChristianity to divide into (at least)
three main groups.
In this thesis, I set out to determine the way in which psychology transformed
in the age of confessionalisation, as well as the various ways in which the process
of confessionalisation interacted with psychology as a scientific discipline. Broadly
speaking, the present contribution may be seen as an answer to the following ques-
tions: how did psychology transform in the age of confessionalisation? Were there
psychological doctrines peculiar to one specific confessional group? Which was the
exact relationship between the development of psychological doctrines and the for-
mation of confessional groups in the sixteenth century?
When I started considering these questions, I was, perhaps too ambitiously,
determined to go along my work by comparing the way in which questions on the
soul were handled by authors of different denominations. Before long, I was con-
frontedwith an enormous amount of (sometimes obscure) commentaries on Aristo-
tle’s De anima and Parva naturalia, some textbooks, reports of innumerable disputa-
tions held weekly at sixteenth-century German universities, polemical pamphlets,
as well as correspondence between better- or less-known figures who dealt with
of science and religion, or the positive impact of the latter on the former, see: Rivka Feldhay,
“Religion”, inKathrinePark andLorraineDaston, eds.,TheCambridgeHistory of Science, 3 (Cambridge
2006), 727,728.
9 Feldhay, “Religion”, 735.
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psychology in the sixteenth century. In fact, I was looking at the vastness of a lit-
erary production that, in 1988, Kathrine Park and Eckhard Kessler described as ren-
dering any attempt to reconstruct Renaissance debates tentative, fragmentary, and
incomplete.10 After more than twenty years, our knowledge of the material regard-
ingRenaissance psychologyhas significantly improved; butwe are still far fromeven
having a fair estimate of the number of works that need to be taken into account
when one wants to consider Renaissance psychology.
But a swerve from my initial plans was motivated not just by the immense
amount of sources on the subject I had chosen, but by the very nature of sixteenth-
century confessionalisation. In effect, the idea of comparing psychological disputes
across different confessional groups is only possible provided that such groups ex-
isted. Surely, in a sense, they did: especially after the production of official state-
ments of doctrines, there existed some intellectuals who recognised themselves as
Lutherans, Catholics, and Calvinists. But the idea that sixteenth-century authors
who looked at the soul can all be clearly catalogued according to their confessional
affiliation is an illusion. This difficulty in cataloguing authors by confession may
in some cases very well be blamed on a lack of sufficient information on my part.
However, I think, in most cases it is due to the fact that the historical period cov-
ered by this study is one during which confessions were just forming and learned
men – even those who were more clearly involved in religious controversies – were
themselves not always clear aboutwhich party they belonged to.11Especially authors
working in the years following the Peace of Augsburg (1555) could change confession
during their lives, as they moved from university to university, hence across differ-
ent territories within the Roman Empire. The year 1555 marked the end of armed
conflicts between Catholics and Protestants in the Empire, when peace was enforced
also through the principle ‘cuius regio, eius religio’ (‘whose region, his religion’). When
Charles v accepted this principle, each state took on the religion of its prince, and
so did academics who moved across different states. This makes, in some cases, the
task of linking a given sixteenth-century author to a precise confessional part even
harder.
In spite of all these obstacles, I had to reconsider how to go about my work, in
order to achieve my aim to study the transformation of psychology in the context
10 Kathrine Park and Eckhard Kessler, “The Concept of Psychology”, in Charles B. Schmitt, Quen-
tin Skinner, Eckhard Kessler, Jill Kraye, eds., The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy
(Cambridge 1988), 453–463, 463.
11 For instance, see the case of Otto Casmann, infra, ‘Chapter 1’, 17–20 and passim.
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of sixteenth-century confessionalisation. I have decided to do it by considering one
specific tradition, or groupof authors,which lends itself to the identification of some
common features. Therefore, I have focused on the way psychology developed at the
hand of authors who looked at the books on the soul written by PhilipMelanchthon
(1497–1560) – the reformer and closest ally of Martin Luther at Wittenberg – as their
preferred intellectual platform to deal with psychology.
As a matter of fact, if it is true that the university was a key institution in the
process of sixteenth-century confessionalisation, it appears to be a sensible choice to
consider psychology as it developed at the university ofWittenberg, the very heart of
the early stages of the Reformation, and at other northern European institutions,
where professors of arts and medicine were inspired by the Wittenberg teaching
about the soul. As Feldhay correctly observed,
the sixteenth century saw a series ofwide-ranging reforms inuniversity edu-
cation thatweremodelled on the changes instituted at theUniversity ofWit-
tenberg by Luther’s collaborator and successor, Philip Melanchthon (1497–
1560). Melanchthon strengthened the control of teaching masters over stu-
dents andcharged theuniversity’s rectorwithenforcingLutheranorthodoxy.
He aimed to secure simultaneously the intellectual and the moral character
of graduates by imposing on them the Augsburg Confession (the Lutheran
profession of faith), by emphasizing the study of scripture, the works of
Augustine, and thehistory of church councils, andbymandating thepractice
of annual disputations over theses censured by the rector. Other Protestant
universities implemented educational reform on the Wittenberg model and
began to produce a new elite of professors, priests, and counsellors to princes,
who became the principal administrators in Protestant lands.12
Since Philip Melanchthon did not earn his title of ‘preceptor of Germany’ (praecep-
tor Germaniae) by chance, I have narrowed down my enquiry into psychology in the
age of confessionalisation toMelanchthon’s and some of his followers’ works on the
soul. As the views expressed by theseworks are also the result of doctrinal controver-
sies, and may in some cases be better understood in the light of the reactions they
provoked, this thesis also takes into account the writings of some of Melanchthon’s
and his followers’ opponents.
12 Feldhay, “Religion”, 735.
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Because in this thesis I address the categories of confessionalisation and psychol-
ogy, I have thought it opportune to consider texts that were produced between two
important moments for confessionalisation and for psychology. Therefore, because
it addresses the age of confessionalisation, this thesis takes Luther’s reform in 1517 as
its starting point. But due to the fact that the present analysis dealswith psychology,
I have decided to limitmyself to a context inwhich someunity in the variety of ideas
about psychology can be found. I have therefore taken 1640 ca., as the end term ofmy
work.
In effect, a number of factors are believed to have contributed to the erosion of
psychology, in the sense of the Aristotelian discipline that considered the soul as
a principle of life, sensation, and cognitive functions. Amongst these factors, the
spreading of the mechanist philosophy and the work of René Descartes, around
the 1640’s, profoundly shook the foundation of hylomorphic accounts of the soul
that had dominated medieval and Renaissance psychology. New philosophical and
scientific ideas contributed to bringing about a radically new way of looking at the
soul. Notably, they prompted seventeenth-century authors to stop considering the
soul chiefly as the animating principle shared by all living creatures and to identify
it instead with the human mind.13 However dramatic, this change surely did not
occur abruptly, and hylomorphic explanations of the soul lingered on well after
the 1641 publication of Descartes’Meditations on First Philosophy.14 Yet, given that the
diffusion of theMeditations triggeredmomentous changes in the landscape of early-
modernphilosophy, the scopeof thepresent study is limited to the transformationof
psychology during the century that preceded the dawning of Cartesian philosophy.
1.1. Melanchthon and Some of His Contemporaries
In the years preceding the dramatic philosophical changes brought about by Des-
cartes, very many professors of arts and medicine working in northern Europe had
already started innovating the field of psychology. Several of these intellectuals
thought thatPhilipMelanchthon’s books about the soul couldbe takenas the frame-
13 More details about this transformation and the different accounts it received in modern
scholarship may be found further in this introduction, 37–45, passim.
14 On this point see, Christoph Lüthy and William R. Newman, “Matter and Form: By Way of
Preface”, Early Science and Medicine 2 (1997), 215–226; Roger Ariew and Majorie Greene, “The
Cartesian Destiny of Form andMatter”, Early Science andMedicine 2 (1997), 300–325.
introduction 9
work within which psychological enquiries could fruitfully be pursued. Others,
both Catholic and Lutherans, opposed Melanchthon’s and his followers’ psycholo-
gies and rather sought to pursue a study of the soul that,whilst innovative elements,
remained faithful to Aristotle’sDe anima and its medieval commentaries.
Both parties produced important books about the soul, which I shall address
in this thesis. However, these books and their authors are much less known than
Descartes and the other great heroes of early-modern philosophy and science. For
this reason, before I proceed with my exploration into psychology in the age of con-
fessionalisation, I shall provide some information regarding the intellectual biogra-
phies of the main figures the reader will encounter along the way.
1.1.1. PhilipMelanchthon
Among the authors I will deal with in the following chapters, Melanchthon is cer-
tainly the best known.15 More details about his efforts of establishing Lutheran
orthodoxy in Saxony andof devising a theory ofman’s soul coherentwithhis Luther-
an faith will be provided throughout the present work. Here, I shall offer the reader
somemore general biographical information aboutMelanchthon,whichwill enable
us to better understand his intellectual journey.
In 1497,Melanchthonwas born in Bretten, to the armourer George Schwartzerdt
andBarbaraReuter, niece of thehumanist JohannReuchlin (1455–1522). ItwasReuch-
lin who gave Philip the erudite name ‘Melanchthon’, a Greek rendering of ‘Schwart-
zerdt’.
In 1508, Melanchthon entered the Latin school in Pforzheim. As early as 1511, he
obtained his bachelor of arts in via antiqua, from the University of Heidelberg. The
following year, he matriculated at Tübingen, where he obtained his master of arts
degree in via moderna, in 1514. At Tübingen he began his academic career by teaching
some courses. At the same time, he worked as a corrector there, for the press of
the humanist Thomas Anshelm (1470–1522/24), who also published some works of
Reuchlin’s.
15 The following biographical details are based mainly on the following texts: Charles H. Lohr,
Latin Aristotle Commentaries. ii: Renaissance Authors (Florence 1988); Neue deutsche Biographie /
herausgegeben von der Historischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wis-
senschaften (Berlin 1953–…); Sachiko Kusukawa, ed., Philip Melanchthon. Orations on Philosophy
and Education (Cambridge 1999); Peter Gerhard Bietenholz and Thomas Brian Deutscher, eds.,
Contemporaries ofErasmus:ABiographicalRegister of theRenaissance andReformation (Toronto 1985–
1987).
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About Melanchthon’s education we know that it included scholastic theology,
whilst it was to a large extent devoted to Latin. In fact, besides the statutory courses,
Melanchthon also read classical and neo-Latin poets, especially Angelo Politian. As
we shall see, Politian was involved in a humanist discussion with Johannes Argy-
ropulos, which concerned Cicero’s conception of the soul as ἐνδελέχεια. Cicero’s and
Politian’s views would later be accepted by Melanchthon and play a crucial role in
his works about psychology.16
Through his teachers, Melanchthon came to appreciate Aristotle’s dialectic; but
he also enjoyed Rudolph Agricola’s. A copy of Agricola’s Dialectica was donated to
Melanchthon by his friend, the theologian Johannes Oecolampadius (1482–1531).
With him Melanchthon would attend the important Marburg Colloquy (1529),
which attempted to solve Martin Luther’s and Ulrich Zwingli’s differences over the
real presence of Christ in the Eucharist.17
Melanchthon’s journey as an ally of Luther had begun ten years earlier, in 1518,
when he was appointed to the new chair of Greek at Wittenberg. On 28 August,
Melanchthon gave his inaugural lecture there, which was entitled ‘De corrigendis
adulescentiae studiis’ and made an extremely good impression on Luther.18 In effect,
the contents of the lecture were in consonance with the curriculum reform that had
recently been set inmotion at Wittenberg. Shortly after his appointment, Melanch-
thon would join not only the curriculum reform, but also Luther’s reform of theol-
ogy.
Melanchthon’s adherence to Luther’s movement is documented by the former’s
early courses. Melanchthon’s Greek lectures addressed the New Testament, and
when he was asked to substitute the Hebrew teacher, Melanchthon lectured on the
Psalms. Soon, in 1519, Melanchthon took the degree of ‘baccalaureus biblicus’, with a
disputation in which he defended theses based on the Reform programme.
His role in the Lutheran reform, however, would become much clearer in 1521,
when, it does not appear an exaggeration to say, he took on the leadership of the
movement started by Martin Luther. On 28 January 1521, Charles v commenced the
imperial Diet of Worms and summoned – through his spokesman Johannes Eck –
16 See: infra, ‘Chapter 2’, 86–106.
17 Luther’s and Zwingli’s disagreement on sacramental theology are analysed further in this
introduction, 79.
18 The text of Melanchthon’s inaugural lecture at Wittenberg is available in Robert Stupperich,
ed.,MelanchthonsWerke in Auswahl: Studienausgabe (henceforth: StA), 5 vols (Gütersloh 1963), iii,
29–42.
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Luther to renounce or reaffirmhis views. At theDiet, Luther was outlawed andwent
into hiding; the lot ofWittenberg and the Reformwas now inMelanchthon’s hands.
For Melanchthon, this meant two interwoven tasks: defining a Lutheran ortho-
doxy and organising Wittenberg education accordingly. The first of these tasks was
accomplished by Melanchthon through the publication of the Loci communes (1521),
the first systematic explanationof Lutheran theology, aswell as throughhis life-long
endeavour of disciplining Saxony according to his Lutheran faith.19 In the following
chapters, I shall present Melanchthon’s philosophy, especially his psychology, as an
integral part of these practical objectives. But Melanchthon thought that his role as
an academic too should serve the enforcement of Lutheran orthodoxy. For this pur-
pose, as I shall explain throughout the present work, Melanchthon devised a new
system of education and of university rules. His educational programmewas imple-
mented not only at Wittenberg, but also at other universities in the German lands,
of whichMelanchthon was thus deservedly recognised as the ‘preceptor’.
Interestingly enough, and despite Luther’s insistence and the Elector of Saxony’s
offer of a supplemental pay, Melanchthon always refused to teach in the theological
faculty. Melanchthon kept teaching at the faculty of arts, for two hundred florins a
year. He became rector there, in the winter 1523–1524 and despite the fact that he had
married Katharina Krapp in 1520. The university regulations, in fact, required that
the rector be celibate.
The 1520’s were enormous importance for Melanchthon career. It was indeed
between 1521 and 1525 that movements of social unrest (respectively the ‘Wittenberg
Movement’ and the ‘Peasants’War’)madeMelanchthon look at university education
as a means to enforcing social discipline in the Evangelic camp. This new under-
standing of his task as a university teacher is mirrored by Melanchthon’s composi-
tion of an oration entitledDe discrimine Evangelii et philosophiae (1527). In this writing,
Melanchthon redefines the role of philosophy vis-à-vis the Lutheran faith.With this
oration, and as I shall explain extensively further in this introduction,Melanchthon
tempered Luther’s initial rejection of philosophy as un ungodly type of knowledge.
According to Melanchthon, Luther’s understanding of the Christian faith needed
to be supplemented by man’s rational consideration of the natural and the social
worlds.20
19 Philip Melanchthon, Loci communes rerum theologicarum seu hypotyposes theologicae (Wittenberg
1521), in Carolus G. Bretschneider, ed., Corpus Reformatorum Philippi Melanthonis Opera quae
supersunt Omnia (Halle 1834–1852), 28 vols. (henceforth: cr), xxi, 81–227.
20 For a more detailed account of this oration, see further in this introduction, 64–74.
12 chapter 1
After attending the abovementioned Marburg Colloquy, as well as the Diet of
Augsburg (1530), for which he composed the ‘Confessio Augustana’, Melanchthon
started implementing his educational plans byworking on natural philosophy, first
and foremost on psychology. Melanchthon is known to have begun working on the
topic of the soul, as soon as 1533. The first result of this work would be his Commen-
tarius de anima of 1540.
Nine years after the publication of theCommentarius,Melanchthonpublishedhis
most comprehensive work in natural philosophy, which was entitled Initia doctrinae
physicae. He did it amidst a very tumultuous situation. In 1546–1547 clashes between
the forces of Charles v and the Lutheran Schmalkaldic league (Schmalkaldic War)
concluded with a defeat for Frederick of Saxony; Wittenberg and its university fell
under the rule of Frederick’s cousinMaurice. In 1548,Melanchthon advised the latter
to accept the ‘Leipzig Interim’, which entailed the possibility for Saxony tomaintain
Protestant doctrines under the cover of conservative rites. Melanchthon’s moderate
approach met with disapproval on the part of other Lutherans, as he was already
enduring other doctrinal criticisms coming from Matthias Flacius Illyricus (1520–
1575). Flacius believed that sinwas substantial andnot accidental tohumannature in
its post-lapsarian state.His followers – the Flacians (nowadays also knownasGnesio-
Lutherans) also saw themselves as the orthodox defenders of Luther’s doctrine of the
Eucharist, in a controversy which eventually led to a split-up between their party
and the Philippists (named after Philip Melanchthon).
Amidst all these troubles, or perhaps even because of them, Melanchthon still
found the strength to convey his new Christian faith through works on natural
philosophy. In 1552, hepublished anewandupdated versionofhis psychology,which
was entitled Liber de anima. As we shall see, this book had an extraordinary impact
on professors of arts and medicine who worked at Wittenberg and elsewhere in
sixteenth-century northern Europe.
In 1552, Melanchthon also composed the ‘Saxon Confession’ for the Council of
Trent. However, he could not be present in Trent, as his journey was impeded by
further warfare in the German territories. In 1555 he translated his Loci communes
into German. Melanchthon devoted the last years of his academic life to histori-
cal works, whilst he kept being an active leader of the Reformation: he attended
the Colloquy of Worms (1570) and helped reorganise several institutions, such as
Heidelberg University (later a Calvinist stronghold), in 1557. Melanchthon died on
19 April 1560, leaving to the world an immense amount of theological, pedagogical,
and philosophical writings, which would be impossible to mention here. What is
most interesting tous is thathisworks on the soul, andparticularlyhisLiber de anima
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lived long afterMelanchthon’s death. The Liber de anima came out inmore than sixty
editions between its first appearance and the end of the sixteenth century.21 Among
the authors who followed Melanchthon’s teaching about the soul some studied or
workedatWittenberg,whereMelanchthon’spsychology exercised its influencemost
directly.
1.1.2. Wittenberg Authors: Caspar Peucer, Bruno Seidel, and Gregor Horst
One of the authors who studied at Wittenberg in the sixteenth century was so close
toMelanchthon as to call him ‘father’. Caspar Peucer (born on 6 January 1525) became
indeed Melanchthon’s son in law in 1550, when he married the Melanchthon’s
daughter,Magdalena. But it is plausible think thatMelanchthonhadbeen a fatherly
figure for Peucer for years, as the latterwas agedonly fifteenwhenhebecamea lodger
at the former’s house.22
Since then, Peucer began his studies at Wittenberg, where he studied natural
sciences. In thewake ofMelanchthon’s 1545 reformof theuniversity curriculum, stu-
dents of natural sciences were expected to read mathematics, astronomy, medicine,
Pliny’s Natural History, Aristotle’s Ethics, and the Sphere by Sacrobosco. So did Peucer
too, who used the knowledge he had acquired as a student to write his first major
work, in 1553: Elementa doctrinae de circulis coelestibus et primo motu recognita et correcta.
The following year, Peucer became professor of mathematics at Wittenberg, but six
years later his academic life probably touched its peak.
In 1560, not only became Peucer professor ofmedicine, but hewas also appointed
rector ofWittenberg, asMelanchthonhaddiedduring that year.His good reputation
as a physician enabled him to become private physician to the Elector of Saxony, in
1570. During the sixties, Peucer wrote some medical works and kept teaching, with
TychoBrahe (1546–1601) amonghis students. Butmore importantly, he published the
Hypotheses orbium coelestium (1568), whichmade RobertW.Westman look at Peucer as
21 A publication history of the Liber de anima in the sixteenth century is found in Gabor, The
Doctrine of the Soul’s Immortality in Sixteenth-Century German Lutheran Theology, 88–89.
22 The following biographical details are mainly based on: Lohr, Latin Aristotle Commentaries. ii:
Renaissance authors; Neue deutsche Biographie; Paul Mengal, La naissance de la psychologie (Paris
2005);WolframKaiser andArinaVölker, ArsmedicaVitebergensis (Halle 1980); Robert S.Westman,
“The Melanchthon Circle, Rheticus, and the Wittenberg Interpretation of the Copernican
Theory”, Isis 66.2 (1975), 164–193; Jole Schackelford, A Philosophical Path for Paracelsian Medicine.
The Ideas, Intellectual Context, and Influence of Petrus Severinus: 1540–1602 (Copenhagen 2004).
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«theman largely responsible for consolidatingand institutionalising theWittenberg
interpretation» of the Copernican theory.23
Of great interest for the present thesis is the way in which Peucer used his
position as a rector of Wittenberg University to continue the strive for orthodoxy
pursued by Melanchthon. As a rector, Peucer sought to enforce his father-in-law’s
theological doctrines. He did so mainly by appointing only Philippists (as opposed
to Flacians) to the principal chairs.
Peucer’s engagement in theologywas then a story of power, but ofmisery aswell.
In 1574, he was accused of crypto-Calvinism and imprisoned near Leipzig for twelve
years. When he was released, in 1586, he became the private physician of the Prince
of Anhalt. Before his death in 1602 (Dessau), Peucer found time to see the publication
of his writing about the soul, which I shall consider in the following chapters: De
essentia, natura et ortu animi hominis commentatio, which appeared in the collected
volume Psychologia (1590), by the well-known Rudolph Goclenius (1547–1628).24
RudolphGocleniushimself studiedunder another protagonist of this thesiswho
studied at Wittenberg and followed in the footsteps of Philip Melanchthon: Bruno
Seidel.
Seidel was born in Querfurt around 1530 and matriculated in the arts faculty
of Wittenberg in 1546. After that, he pursued the career of a physician. For this
purpose, he attended one of the best medical courses in Europe: between 1557 and
1560, he studied at Padua and became doctor in medicine there under the great
anatomist Gabriele Falloppio (1523–1562). When he returned to Germany, he first
practisedmedicine in Arnstadt. He thenmoved to Erfurt in 1565 to teach physics and
medicine. Seidel died there in 1590.
Seidel years as an Erfurt professor resulted in twomajor writings. Seidel wrote a
Physica, which was published posthumously, with an appendix by Rudolph Gocle-
nius, in 1596.25 This work is divided into two books, which are respectively devoted
23 Westman, “The Melanchthon Circle”, 178. The full title of Peucer’s astronomical work is:
Hypotheses orbiumcoelestium, quasappellant theoricas planetarum, congruentes cumtabulisAlphonsini
et Copernici, seu etiam tabulis Prutenicis, in usum scholarum publicatae (Strasbourg 1568). According
to Westman, this work nicely illustrates the ‘Wittenberg interpretation’ in that it ranks
Copernicus’ work on the same level as Ptolemy’s and suggests that Copernicus’ model, albeit
with someminor changes, could in principle be transferred to a geostatic reference frame (see:
Westman, “TheMelanchthon Circle”, 180).
24 For this thesis I have used the second andmore complete edition of this text: Rudolph Gocle-
nius, Psychologia, hoc est de hominis perfectione, animo, et in primis ortu huius (Marburg 1597).
25 Bruno Seidel, Physica, cum supplement Rodolphi Goclenii (Frankfurt 1596).
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toDe physicae parte universale andDe physiologiae parte propria et speciali. The first book
addresses the definition and the subjectmatter of physics, as well as the explanation
of those principles that are common to all natural bodies (‘matter’, ‘form’, ‘move-
ment’, etc.) The second book is devoted to what Seidel considers to be the issues that
are customarily discussed in physics; that is, the natural bodies, simple (the sky, the
stars, and the four elements) and compound. The compoundbodies are either imper-
fect or perfect, and the latter group includes the inanimate (like stones and metals)
and the animate bodies. Of the animate bodies, the highest kind consists of bodies
provided with rationality, viz., human beings.26
To the human nature, Seidel devoted his other major work: Commentarius de
corpore animato (1594), which also includes a preface by Rudolph Goclenius. It is this
book thatmarks Seidel’s intellectual debt toMelanchthon, who is mentioned in the
full title of the Commentarius.27 Seidel, in fact,meant this book to be an explanation of
man’s soul and body based on Aristotle’s De anima. But in order to make Aristotle’s
book clearer, Seidel relied on Melanchthon’s psychology. Seidel’s book resembles
Melanchthon’s Commentarius and Liber de anima in its structure too. As I shall show
throughout this thesis,Melanchthondevoted largeparts of his psychology to a study
of man’s body, based on Galen’s and Vesalius’ anatomies. So did Seidel and so did
another protagonist of this thesis: Gregor Horst.
In 1578, Gregor Horst was born in Torgau, to the architect Georg Horst (1534–
1584) and Anna Bornitius. Gregor’s uncle was Jakob Horst (1537–1600), physician at
the University of Helmstedt and (as we shall see) an important influence in Gregor
Horst’s ideas about the soul.
Gregor Horst studied arts and medicine, first at the University of Helmstedt,
in 1597; then at Wittenberg, starting 1600. He travelled to Austria and Switzerland,
and became doctor of medicine in Basel (1606). After that, he returned to Germany
and became professor of medicine at the University of Wittenberg. However, as
early as 1608 he was appointed professor of anatomy and botany of the University of
26 See Seidel’s own diagram of the subjects treated by his Physica on the following page (the
diagram follows the table of contents at the beginning of Seidel’s book. See: Seidel, Physica,
4).
27 Commentarius didascalicus valde eruditus et perspicuus de corpore animato ac potissimumquidemde cor-
pore et anima hominis accomodatus ad faciliorem intelligentiam librorumAristotelis et interpretum eius,
ut et P. Melanchthonis De anima, itemque Galeni, Vesalii et qui de fabrica corporis humani scripserunt.
(Hanau 1594). The Commentarius went through three further editions, in Frankfurt, in 1596,
1606, and 1656.
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Seidel, Physica, 4.
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Giessen, which had been founded the preceding year as an anti-Calvinist Lutheran
stronghold.28
His activity there could be seen by everyone’s eyes. As an anatomist, Horst per-
formed public dissections (he was allowed a cadaver for a public anatomy in 1615);
as a botanist, he directed the university botanical garden. Horst must have cared
that nature could be seen, as one of his texts shows. In effect, all the authors who
did psychology in the framework designed by Melanchthon included large portion
of Vesalian anatomy in their works on the soul. However, only Horst among them
seems to actually have followed the use of anatomical plates that to our days con-
tributes to make Vesalius’De humani corporis fabrica (1543) a unique work.29 As I shall
explain more extensively in the following chapters, Horst thought his treatise De
natura humana should be accompanied by anatomical images.30
Except for the preface devoted to reconciling Vesalian anatomy and Paracelsian
medicine, Horst’s De natura humana follows much of Melanchthon’s psychology, in
terms of both structure and contents.31 As I shall show, this book bears witnesses
to the impact that Melanchthon’s Liber de anima still exercised among Wittenberg
students in the early seventeenth century.
Horst spent the last part of his life inMarburg, where hemoved in 1625 and then
in Ulm, as the city’s physician. In Ulm he died in 1636. His major medical work,
28 As Howard Hotson has explained, the University of Giessen was founded in 1607 to respond
to the Calvinisation of the nearby Marburg and to welcome Lutheran professors that had
been expelled from there. But Giessen also had to react to the spreading of Ramism in Mar-
burg, Kassel, and Korbach. The result was that Giessen combined a strong Lutheran element
with the adoption of Ramism in the curriculum. See: Howard Hotson, Commonplace Learning.
Ramism and its German Ramifications 1543–1630 (Oxford 2007), 95–96. On Ramism at Giessen see:
Joseph S. Freedman, “TheDiffusion of theWritings of PetrusRamus inCentral Europe, c. 1570–
c. 1630”, Renaissance Quarterly 46.1 (1993), 98–152, 124; Marco Lamanna, La nascita dell’ontologia
nella metafisica di Rudolph Göckel (1547–1628) (Hildesheim 2013), 28.
29 OnVesalius’Fabrica and its use of anatomical illustrations, see: SachikoKusukawa,Picturing the
Book ofNature. Image,Text, andArgument in Sixteenth-CenturyHumanAnatomyandMedical Botany
(Chicago 2012).
30 Gregor Horst, De natura humana libri duo, quorum prior de corporis structura, posterior de anima
tractat. Ultimo elaborati commentariis aucti figurisque nobis anatomicis aere incisis exornati. Cum
praefatione de anatomia vitali et mortua pro conciliatione Spagryricorum et Galenicorum plurimum
inserviente (Wittenberg 1626).
31 Thepreface, entitledDeanatomiavitali etmortua, hadalreadybeenpublishedas an independent
treatise fourteen years before the De natura humana appeared; see: Gregor Horst, De anatomia
vitali et mortua (Giessen 1612).
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Opera medica, was published posthumously, in Nürenberg, in 1660. The following
year, the book went through two further editions in the Netherlands: in Gouda and
Amsterdam.
1.1.3. BeyondWittenberg: Otto Casmann and Rudolph Snel van Roijen
As we have seen earlier, when looking at his life, Melanchthon was a humanist
professor of classics, a natural philosopher, and a theologian. But, Melanchthon also
spent a significant portion of his life dealing with pressing practical problems. In
fact, he sought to convey his Lutheran faith not only through his academic work
but also by travelling across the German lands, by dealing with local rulers, and
by helping reorganise several universities. It was probably also thanks to his active
engagement in disciplining theGerman territories according to Lutheran principles
that his work reached many intellectuals beyond Wittenberg. In this thesis I will
consider two such intellectuals, Otto Casmann and Rudolph Snel van Roijen (or
Snellius), whose works on the soul bear witness to the influence of Melanchthon’s
psychology and mark – I shall argue – important transformations of psychology in
the age of confessionalisation.32
Like Bruno Seidel, or even more than him, Casmann and Snellius had very close
bonds with the Marburg professor Rudolph Goclenius. The latter encouraged Cas-
mann and Snellius to work on topics regarding the soul and sponsored their works
by complementing themwith prefaces or appendices.
32 The following biographical details are mainly based on: Lohr, Latin Aristotle Commentaries.
ii: Renaissance authors; Neue deutsche Biographie; Paul, La naissance de la psychologie; Lamanna,
La nascita dell’ontologia nella metafisica di Rudolph Göckel (1547–1628); Uwe Kordes, “Otho Cas-
mannsAnthropologie (1549/96). Frömmigeit, EmpirieundderRamismus”, inMartinMulsow,
ed., Spätrenaissance-Philosophie inDeutschland 1570–1650. Entwürfe zwischenHumanismus und Kon-
fessionalisierung, okkulten Traditionen und Schulmetaphysik (Tübingen 2009); Dietrich Mahnke,
“Rektor Casmann in Stade: ein vergessener Gegner aristotelischer Philosophie undNaturwis-
senschaftler im 16. Jahrhundert”, Archiv für die Geschichte der Naturwissenschaft und der Technik, 5
(1913); Sachiko Kusukawa, “Between theDe anima andDialectics. A Prolegomenon to Philippo-
Ramism”, in Paul Richard Blum, ed., Sapientiam amemus. Humanismus und Aristotelismus in
der Renaissance. Festschrift für Eckhard Kessler zum 60. Geburtstag (Munich 1999), 127–139; Hotson,
Commonplace Learning; Mordechai Feingold, Joseph S. Freedman, Wolfgang Rother, eds., The
Influence of Petrus Ramus (Basel 2001); Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek, 10 Vols. (Lei-
den 1911–1937); Paul Freher, Theatrum virorum eruditione clarorum (Nürnberg 1688).
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Goclenius had an enormous influence as the first academic who reintroduced
the study of metaphysics in the Calvinist world, after it had been banned from
Protestant universities during the early phases of the Reformation. Goclenius, in
fact, worked at the Philipps-Universität of Marburg, the first Protestant university
ever founded (1527). In Marburg, especially the Pädagogium (viz., the pre-university
institution of the Philipps-Universität) had adopted a system of education based on
Melanchthon’s Schulordnung (1528), which had been enforced first by the Landgrave
Philipp, den Großmütige, and then by his orthodox Lutheran son Ludwig iv.
Before becoming professor of physics at Marburg (1581), Goclenius had been a
student there (1564). But Goclenius, after a period in Erfurt (1566–1568), also spent
some time in the veryheart ofMelanchthon’s educational reform,Wittenberg. There
Goclenius studied (1568) and taught (1571–1575). When he went back to Marburg,
Goclenius used his education for writing numerous works; two of them made him
into amajor source for later generations andattracted the attentionofmodern schol-
ars: the Isagoge in peripateticorum et scholasticorum prima philosophia (Frankfurt 1598)
and the Lexicon philosophicum (Frankfurt 1613).33 In effect, the Lexicon includes one of
the first occurrences of the term ‘ontology’ (ontologia).34 But Goclenius’ use of the
term ‘ontology’ is also linked to his more substantial contribution to the history of
metaphysics, as it surface in his Isagoge in prima philosophia. As is well known, Gocle-
nius relied on medieval authors (especially Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas), as
well as on the more recent metaphysical works of sixteenth-century Jesuits (viz.,
Francisco Suárez and Bent Perera) to give metaphysics a new disciplinary position.
According to Goclenius, metaphysics was positively distinct from ontology, as the
33 Among other works, Goclenius wrote the following ones: Adversaria: ad Exotericas aliquot Julii
Caesaris Scaligeri acutissimi Philosophi Exercitationes (Marburg 1594); Isagoge inOrganumAristotelis
(Frankfurt 1598); Conciliator philosophicus (Kassel 1609).
34 The first occurrence of the term is found in the Calvinist Jakob Lorhard’s Ogdoas scholastica
continens diagraphen typicam artium: Grammatices (Latinae,Grecae, Logices, Rhetorices, Astronomices,
Ethices, Physices,Metaphysices, seuOntologiae) (St. Gallen 1606). The first occurrence of ‘ontology’
in Lorhard’s text has been discovered in 2003 by Raul Corazzon, “Jakob Lorhard (1561–1609): The
Creator of the Term “Ontologia” (1606)”. See the website: www.ontology.co Thanks to more
recent research byMarco Lamanna, it has become clear that Lorhard’sOgdoas does not present
original contents, but it consists of a diagrammatic representationofClemensTimpler’sMeta-
physicae systematamethodicum (Steinfurt 1604). See:Marco Lamanna, “Sulla primaoccorrenzadel
termine ‘Ontologia’. Una nota bibliografica”, Quaestio 6 (2006), 557–570. On the creation and
first diffusion of the term ontology, see: Michaël Devaux and Marco Lamanna, “The Rise and
Early History of the TermOntology (1606–1730)”,Quaestio 9 (2009), 173–208.
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latter was the general science of being qua being (ens universale), while the former
dealt with themost eminent species of being (God, the intelligences, and the imma-
terial entities). The new articulation of metaphysics and ontology devised by Gocle-
nius became popular in sixteenth-century Schulmetaphysik and then turned into a
dominant paradigm through to the works of ChristianWolf and Immanuel Kant.35
Despite Goclenius’ claim to fame lies mainly in his metaphysical work, he was
also very keen on psychology. Goclenius’ own contribution to the science of the soul
is yet to be assessed.However, he certainly putmuch effort into promoting the study
of topics regarding the soul. As I have already mentioned, he edited a volume enti-
tled Psychologia, in 1590, in which opinions of different authors (including Caspar
Peucer’s) on the essence and origin of the intellective soul were collected. But Gocle-
nius also held numerous disputations, during which his Marburg students had to
address questions regarding the soul. His interest in psychology was so influential
at the by then Calvinist Marburg, that the Lutheran Christoph Scheibler (1589–1653)
at rival Giessen collected thirty disputations about the soul in one Collegium Psycho-
logicum (Giessen 1609).36
Now, two among Goclenius’ students, Otto Casmann and Rudolph Snellius, did
not limit themselves to university disputations about the soul (like many other
students of Goclenius’ did); but they brought their interest in psychology further,
by producing original texts on the soul. And they did so by following the teaching of
Philip Melanchthon, under the patronage of Goclenius.
35 Themost complete account ofGoclenius’metaphysicalwork andof its impact on later authors
I am aware of is: Lamanna, La nascita dell’ontologia nella metafisica di Rudolph Göckel (1547–1628).
On similar aspects and especially on the early history of ontology in the Calvinist context,
see: Joseph S. Freedman, “The Godfather of Ontology? Clemens Timpler, “All that is intelli-
gible”, Academic Disciplines during the late 16th and early 17th Centuries, and Some Possible
Ramifications for the Use of Ontology in our Time”, Quaestio 9 (2009), 3–40; Joseph S. Freed-
man, European Academic Philosophy in the Late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries: The Life,
Significance, and Philosophy of Clemens Timpler (1563/4–1624), 2 Vols. (Hildesheim 1988). On the
transmission of sixteenth-century Jesuit metaphysics (especially Suárez’s) in Protestant insti-
tutions, see the seminal work of Jean-François Courtine, Suarez et le système de la métaphysique
(Paris 1990). On the historiography and on the ‘baroque’ nature of this transformation, see:
Costantino Esposito, “Introduzione. Dalla storia della metafisica alla storia dell’ontologia”,
Quaestio 9 (2009), ix–xxxi; Costantino Esposito, “Le Disputationes Metaphysicae nella critica
contemporanea”, in Costantino Esposito, ed., Francisco Suárez,DisputazioniMetafisiche (Milano
2007), 747–812.
36 For the titles of these thirty disputations, as well as those presided over by Goclenius, see:
Lamanna, La nascita dell’ontologia nella metafisica di Rudolph Göckel (1547–1628), 305, 306, 207.
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Otto Casmann came to know Goclenius in Kessel, where the latter was the local
high school teacher there. Casmann was born in 1562, in Warburg (Westphalia), to a
Catholic family. However, as we shall see, his life bears witnesses to the confessional
mobility that, as I pointed out earlier, characterised in many cases the intellectual
biographies of academics working in the age of confessionalisation.
Although much of the documents containing Casmann’s biographical details
were lost in a fire in Stade (where Casmann was rector of the local Lutheran gymna-
sium from 1595), some information is still available. AsUweKordes noticed, a preface
entitled In vitam etmortem reverendi ac doctissimiD.Othonis Casmanni is attached to one
Casmann’s last works, Turpitudo.37 There we are told that he had a wife and three
daughters, that two of his writings (unfortunately the text does not say which ones)
were translated into French and English, and that several works of Casmann’s were
brought to Italian libraries. The same text states that Casmann was supported by
the Duke of Holstein, the Landgrave of Hesse and a certain Baron Carolus Zerotinus.
Besides the information found in the In vitam etmortemCasmanni, we know that Cas-
mannmoved fromWarburg to the Crypto-Calvinist Kassel, where Goclenius helped
his conversion to Protestantism “e tenebris Pontificiis”.38 Casmann then continued
his studies at the then still Lutheran Marburg, starting 1581. The following year he
moved to the Philippist university of Helmstedt, where he studied philosophy and
theology and obtained the title of ‘magister’. Consequently, he taught logic there.
Since 1591, Casmann was at the Gymnasium Illustre of Steinfurt, until he obtained
a post as rector of the gymnasium in Stade, where he taught logic and natural phi-
losophy until his death.WhenCasmann left Steinfurt, hewas succeeded by thewell-
known Clemens Timpler (1563–1624).
Especially Kordes andHowardHotsonhave emphasisedhowCasmann’s produc-
tion shows ananti-Aristotelian tendency (combinedwith aChristianunderstanding
of the world), as well as a preference for Petrus Ramus’ logic and conception of phi-
losophy as oriented towards utility. These aspects, in fact, do seem to emerge from
two of Casmann’s works: Philosophiae et christianae et verae modesta assertio (1601) and
the Logicae rameae et melanchthonianae collatio (1599).39 These texts have made schol-
37 Otto Casmann, Turpitudo omnium turpissima et nocentissima opprobrium christianorum. Exitum
infidelium et laqueus carnalis securitatis incidendus describitur (Frankfurt 1609). See Uwe Kordes,
“Otho Casmanns Anthropologie (1549/96)”, 196–197.
38 See: Mahnke, “Rektor Casmann”, 190–191.
39 Otto Casmann, Philosophiae et christianae et verae adversus insanos hostium eius, et nonnullorum
hierophantarum morsus et calumnias modesta assertio (Frankfurt 1601), 106: «Expultrix vitiorum
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ars consider Casmann to be a ferocious anti-Aristotelian and one who was linked to
the tradition of authors who tried to harmonise the teaching of Ramus and those
of Melanchthon, in a synthesis that is known as Philippo-Ramism. As we will see,
similar elements do surface in the work of Rudolph Snellius too.
However, in this thesis, I shall not consider Casmann and Snellius primarily as
Philippo-Ramists. True, some of their texts do mention the name of Ramus, and
Casmann and Snellius sometimes express their explicit intention to harmonise their
works in natural philosophy and logic with some of Ramus’ ideas. But it is one
thing to consider these indications as a call for a case-by-case study of the specific
ways in which Casmann and Snellius used Ramus’ doctrines, and quite another
to box these authors in the category of Philippo-Ramism.40 In fact, attempts by
scholars to determinewhat ‘Ramism’ indicates already seem to point to the fact that
categories such as ‘Ramist’ and ‘Ramism’ still remain very elusive; let alone the label
of ‘Philippo-Ramism’.41
eorum a quibus abhorrere et abstinere vere Christianus debet, neutiquam Christiano est
negligenda. Atqui philosophia vera est talium vitiorum expultrix a quibus iussu Dei omnis
Christianus et abhorrere et abstineredebet. Est enimuti iamasanaphilosophia exterminata et
expulsa vitia optavimus, expultrix idolatrias et apotheoseos Aristotelis hominis ethnici, docti
quidemadmiraculumatprofanipaganismorumet aliorumerrorum».Onpage 147of the same
text, Casmann describes his idea of ‘Christian physics’: «Physicae Christianae fundamenta tria
postulamus. Verbum sapientissimi naturae Architecti Dei, veram rationem, et non fallentem
experientiam. Expurgatas cupimus futiles et inutiles subtilitates, sublatos paganismos Dei
verbo contradicentes. Physica autem haec latissime patens, universum mundum conditum
sibi subiiciens, agit de rebus naturalibus, id est natura, hoc est, vi et facultate a deo rebus
creatis indita, praeditis. Haec autem qua generalis habet partes duas Pneumatologiam de
spiritibus creatis, adeoque Angelographiam et (qua specialis) Somatologiam quae explicat
corporum naturam …». The full title of Casmann’s book on Ramus’ and Melanchthon’s logic
is: Otto Casmann, Logicae rameae et melanchthonianae collatio et exegesis: seorsum accesserunt eodem
auctore ex logicis praeceptis practicae observationes, consilia et leges ad illorum lupraxian tradendam
utiles (Hanau 1599).
40 A systematic attempt to define the role of Ramus in Casmann’s and Snellius’ work has been
made by Kusukawa, “Between the De anima and Dialectics. A Prolegomenon to Philippo-
Ramism”.
41 ‘Ramism’ is oftentimes linked to someor all of the followingaspects: 1) anti-Aristotelianism, or
the attempt to adaptAristotle to aquicker andutility-oriented curriculumfor thehumanities;
2) an attempt tomake logic responsive to practical needs; 3) the division of logic into two rather
than into four parts, as in Aristotle’sOrganon; 4) the idea that logic was part of philosophy, as
opposed to the Aristotelian conception of logic as a ‘habitus instrumentalis’; 5) the ensuing idea
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I do not deny that an investigation into the role of Ramus’ thought inCasmann’s
and Snellius’ works may very well be fruitful. However, given the above-mentioned
difficulty in defining ‘Ramism’, I shall consider Casmann’s and Snellius’ works on
the soul mainly as a case of transmission of the ideas contained in Melanchthon’s
Commentarius and Liber de anima.
As far as Casmann is concerned, he addressed topics regarding the soul in his
best-known book: the Psychologia anthropologica of 1594. As I will explain on many
occasions in the following chapters, this book was conceived as the first part of the
discipline Casmann called ‘anthropologia’ (anthropology). Whilst Casmann thought
that the Psychologia should address man’s soul, he devoted the second part of his
anthropology to an explanation of man’s bodily parts. The result of this anatomical
research is the Somatotomia or Secunda pars anthropologiae, published in 1569.42 In
natural philosophy, Casmann also produced a Somatologia (1598), which differs from
the Somatotomia, in that the latter studies thehumanbody,whilst the former studies
the natural bodies in general, and it mainly coincides with physics.43
Besides the anatomy of the human body, Casmann also published a Christian
work on what he called ‘spiritual anatomy’: Homo novus, das ist geistliche Anatomey
oder Betrachtung deßMenschen (1606).44Moreover, he addressed the spiritual realm in a
treatise concerning all incorporeal created beings, which was entitled Angelographia
(1597). Other relevant books by Casmann are the Astrologia (1599), the Biographia sive
de vita hominis naturali (1602), as well as the Anti-Socinus (1612).45
that logic – due to its ontological commitment – mademetaphysics superfluous; 6) the use of
dichotomies and diagrams to describe the disciplines and their mutual relationship. About
Ramus’ thought and it influence on later generation of arts professors, see: Walter J. Ong,
Ramus.Method and the Decay of Dialogue (Cambridge, ma 1958); Hotson, Commonplace Learning;
Feingold, Freedman, Rother, eds., The Influence of Petrus Ramus (Basel 2001).
42 Otto Casmann, Psychologia anthropologica sive animae humanae doctrina, ApudGuilelmumAnto-
nium, impensis Petri Fischeri (Hanau 1594); Otto Casmann, Secunda pars anthropologiae; hoc est,
fabrica humani corporis methodice descriptiva (Hanau 1596).
43 Otto Casmann, Somatologia. Physica generalis seu commentationes disceptationumque physicarum
syndromus problematicus. i. De naturalium corporum in genere essentia et qualitatibus physicis, tum
manifestis tum occultis, quarum omnium methodicam adumbrationem in tabella exhibet versa pagina
(Frankfurt 1598).
44 Otto Casmann, Homo novus, das ist geistliche Anatomy oder Betrachtung deß Menschen, in welcher,
allein außGottesWort, die Vergleichungdeßnaturlichen Leibs unnd seinerGlidern,mit der Seel und ihren
Kräfften erklärt wird … (Bern 1606).
45 Otto Casmann, Angelographia seu commentationum disceptationumque physicarum prodromus prob-
lematicus de angelis seu creatis spiritibus a corporum consortio abiunctis (Frankfurt 1597); Otto Cas-
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Like Casmann, Rudolph Snellius thought that psychology and anatomy
should be combined so as to understand human nature as a whole. In doing so,
Snellius too followed the teaching of Philip Melanchthon. Snellius’ career, like Cas-
mann’s, seems to have been fostered by RudolphGoclenius, whomSnellius probably
met when studying far from home, inMarburg.
Rudolph Snel van Roijen was born in the Dutch town of Oudewater, in 1546. As
many students in his days used to do, Snellius also toured themost important Euro-
peanuniversities in order to pursue an academic career. In fact, he leftOudewater for
Cologne,Wittenberg andHeidelberg,wherehe studiedmathematics andHebrew.As
the plague spread in Heidelberg, he moved on to Marburg, where he studied from
1565. In Marburg he met Petrus Ramus (who was there between 1569 and 1570) and
after meeting Ramus, he taught “tota artium cyclopedia” (“the complete cycle of the
arts”). Among his students there also was another youth from Oudewater: Jacob
Hermansz (1559/60–1609), or Arminius, future professor of theology (in 1603) at the
recently foundedUniversity of Leiden (1575) and instigator of the latitudinarian cur-
rent of the Dutch reformed church that carries his name.46 Because we know that
Arminius’ stint in Marburg lasted from 1574 to 1575, we may reasonably think that
Snellius was still at the German university at that time. In effect, whilst it is known
that Snellius returned to Leiden in 1578, Snellius is reported to have travelled to Italy
(where he attendedmedical courses in Rome and Pisa) before going back to his home
country.
In Leiden, Snellius was appointed professor extraordinary of mathematics, in
1581. Amonghismost famous studentswereDescartes’ firstDutch friend IsaacBeeck-
man (1588–1637), as well as Prince Maurice of Nassau. Prince Maurice later availed
himself of Snellius’ advice for the foundation of the ‘Leiden Duitsche School voor
Mathematiek’, where courses were given in vernacular to educate army engineers.47
mann, Astrologia, chronographia et astromanteia (Frankfurt 1599); Otto Casmann, Biographia sive
de vita hominis naturali, quam homo vi animae suae viventis et corpus suum animantis naturaliter vivit
(Frankfurt 1602); Otto Casmann, Anti-Socinus. Tractatus ad diiudicandum controversiam theologi-
cam quae iam inter orthodoxos et socinianos, de corpore doctrinae christianae pene universo, agitatur
apprime utilis (Amberg 1612).
46 OnArminianismand the so-calledArminian controversy, as intertwinedwith the early phases
of theUniversity of Leiden, see: Christoph Lüthy,DavidGorlaeus (1591–1612). AnEnigmatic Figure
in the History of Philosophy and Science (Amsterdam 2012), 104–113.
47 As Theo Verbeek pointed out, Snellius gave Beeckman a list of authors to read for his mathe-
matical education. The list includes: Ramus, Euclid, Heron, Boethius, Ptolemy, Copernicus,
Hermes Trismegistus, Clavius, Comandinus, Regiomontanus, Vitello, Stevin, Oronce Finé,
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Snellius’ career as a teacher did not start too easily, as only one year after his
appointment his courses were the target of an official complaint issued by a group
of students and submitted to the academic senate. The complaint mainly addressed
the fact that Snellius had been basing his teaching on a compendium of physics
by the Ramist sympathiser Cornelius Valerius.48 The humanist students of Leiden
perceived ‘compendia’ like Valerius’ physics as ‘dispendia’, viz., a waste of time that
distracted them from the study of ancient texts. The complaint – which might
have been orchestrated by the anti-Ramist academic senate itself – forced Snellius
to stop using Velerius’ physics for his courses.49 However, it must be noted that in
1596, Snellius’ interest in Valerius’ physics was all but over, as Snellius published
an In Physicam Cornelii Valerii, to which some notes by Rudolph Goclenius, as well as
Snellius’ Pneumatologia, were attached.50
Although I amnot sure about the extent towhich the categories of ‘Ramism’ and
‘Philippo-Ramism’ are suited to grasping the nature of Snellius’ work, it must be
recognised that the Leiden professor used the works of Petrus Ramus and of Philip
Melanchthon as some of his main sources. Not only did Snellius publish notes on
Cornelius Valerius’ physics, but he also produced texts in which the figure of Ramus
was more clearly present: a Commentarius in Dialectica Petri Rami (1587), as well as the
Partitiones physicae methodi rameae legibus (1594).51 However, the clearest sign of Snel-
lius’ fondness forRamus’ ideas seems tobe the Snellio-RamaeumphilosophiaeSyntagma
(1596). This book was meant to use Ramus’ philosophy to provide knowledge about
all themain fields of knowledge, starting from ‘dialectica’ and climbingup to ‘physica’
and ‘psychologia’.52
and Pappus. See: Theo Verbeek, “Notes on Ramism in the Netherlands”, in Feingold, Freed-
man, Rother, eds., The Influence of Petrus Ramus, 39–40.
48 Cornelius Valerius, Physicae seu de natura philosophia institutio, perspicue et breviter explicata a
Cornelio Valerio (Antwerp 1567).
49 On the role of the academic senate in helping – if not manufacturing – the Leiden student
petition see: Hotson, Commonplace Learning, 54–55.
50 Rudolph Snellius, In Physicam Cornelii Valerii annotationes. Ad calcem adiectae sunt notae Rudolphi
Goclenii ad ipsum Physices contextum pertinentes; item Pneumatologia Snellii (Frankfurt 1596).
51 Rudolph Snellius, Commentarius doctissimus inDialecticamPetri Rami, forma dialogi conscriptus, in
quo artis praecepta cum exemplis analytice explicantur. Adiectae sunt ad finem utiles commonefactiones
et regulae Rudolphi Goclenii de ratione disputandi (Herborn 1587); Rudolph Snellius, Partitiones
physicae methodi rameae legibus informatae; exceptae olim ex dictantis eius ore in Schola Marpurgensi,
nunc primum in lucem editae (Hanau 1594).
52 Rudolph Snellius, Snellio-Ramaeumphilosophiae Syntagma, tomis aliquot separatis distinctum.Qui-
bus cont., 1. Generales sincerioris philosophiae Ramaeae informationes, 2. Dialectica, 3. Rhetorica,
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To psychology Snellius devoted also the book that I shall take into consideration
for this thesis. Snellius, in fact, wished to express his views about the soul in his 1596
commentary onMelanchthon’s psychology: In Phil.Melanchthonis de anima, vel potius
de hominis physiologia libellum commentationes.53 This book also included an appendix
Theses demateriis psychologiciswritten by Goclenius. As I shall point out in the follow-
ing chapters, this text shows that despite his sympathies for Ramus, Snellius never
abandoned Aristotle’s teaching about the soul, provided that Aristotle’sDe anima be
read through the lenses of Melanchthon’s Christian psychology.
1.1.4. On the Catholic Front: Franciscus Vallès and Veit Amerbach
Not all of the authors I shall consider in this thesis followedMelanchthon’s teaching
on the soul. Some of the works I will look at in the following chapters were written
in stark opposition to Melanchthon’s works on the soul; some others were, on the
contrary, the target of some of those authorswho did followMelanchthon’s psychol-
ogy. Yet some others were written by authors who, like Melanchthon, embraced the
Lutheran faith, but who thought that their new creed did not require considering
the soul as Melanchthon did.
Here I shall first provide some biographical details about two Catholic authors
whose texts concerning the soul will be examined in the present work: the Span-
ish physician Francisco Vallès (or Vallesius) and the Ingolstadt professor of natural
philosophy Veit Amerbach.54 I shall look at the latter’s work because it contained an
open critique of Melanchthon’s Commentarius de anima. At the same time, I will con-
sider thewritings of Vallesius too, for the simple reason that someofOttoCasmann’s
most important psychological conceptions resulted from a direct criticism of Valle-
sius’s ideas about the soul.
4.Arithmetica, 5.Geometria, 6. Sphaera, seuastronomia, 7.Physica, 8.Psychologia, 9.Ethica (Frankfurt
1596).
53 In Philippi Melanchthonis De anima, vel potius de hominis physiologia libellum commentationes
(Frankfurt 1596).
54 The following bibliographical details are mainly based on: Lohr, Latin Aristotle Commentaries.
ii: Renaissance Authors; Neue deutsche Biographie; José M.L. Piñero and Francisco Calero, Las
“Controversias” (1556) de Francisco Valles y la Medicina Renacentista (Madrid 1988); Marcial Solana,
Historia de la filosofía española, Tomo Segundo (Madrid 1941); Craig Martin, “Vallés and the
Renaissance Reinterpretation of Aristotle’s Meteorologica iv as a Medical Text”, Early Science
andMedicine 7,1 (2002), 1–29;Kusukawa,TheTransformationofNaturalPhilosophy.TheCase ofPhilip
Melanchthon (Cambridge, 1995).
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Despite the fact that Vallesius has received very little scholarly attention, he was
very popular in his days, both in Catholic Spain and in Protestant northern Europe.
Vallesius was born in Covarrubias in 1524. After obtaining his bachelor degree
from theUniversity of Alcalá in 1544, hemoved to theMadre deDios College, in order
to study medicine and languages. Ten years after that he was “master of medicine
and arts”, and according to some sources he was appointed to the chair of medicine
as early as 1557. However, it is possible that he obtained this post even earlier than
1557, as he is already mentioned as ‘professor of Alcalá’ in his 1556 first major work,
the Controversiarummedicarum et philosophicarum libri decem.55
As an academic, Vallesius produced several commentaries on the medical works
of Galen and Hippocrates. But Vallesius also wrote commentaries on Aristotle’s
Physics, on the forth book of the Meteorologica, as well as on the De anima (which
unluckily he never published).56 Yet, it was not until he quit his academic career
that Vallesius was able to put forward his own medical ideas. In fact, in 1572 he left
the university for the prestigious job of personal physician to King Philip ii. As a
physician at the royal court, Vallesius could set up and work in drug laboratories.
But his new job also allowed him enough time to write his most famous work:
De Sacra Philosophia of 1587. In this book, as its full title announces, Vallesius sets
out to give an account of those passages contained in the Holy Scriptures that are
relevant to natural philosophy.57 Among the things that the Holy Scriptures teach
about the physical world, Vallesius also found ideas regarding the human soul. This
book seems to have been very popular with authors working in northern Europe,
especially those belonging to the reformed faith. Among those who used Vallesius’
Sacra philosophia, the following authors may bementioned: Johann Amos Comenius
(1592–1670), Johann Einrich Alsted (1588–1638), and John Wilkins (1614–1672).58 The
55 Franciscus Vallesius, Controversiarum medicarum et philosophicarum libri decem. Autore Francisco
Vallesio Covarrubiano doctore et professore Complutensi (Alcalá 1556).
56 Vallesius himself says to have written a commentary on Aristotle’s De anima without ever
publishing it: «tametsi cum haec scribo, commentaria in libros de anima, scripta multis ante
annis, nondum sunt in lucem emissa» (Franciscus Vallesius, De Sacra Philosophia, sive De iis
quae inLibris Sacris physice scripta sunt, editio sexta, Lugundi, IoannisAntoniiHuguetan, etMarc.
Ant. Ravaud, 1652, 348). About Vallesius’ work on Aristotle’s Meteorology iv, see Craig Martin,
“Vallés and the Renaissance Reinterpretation of Aristotle’sMeteorologica iv as aMedical Text”,
1–29.
57 Franciscus Vallesius, De iis quae scripta sunt physice in libris sacris, sive de sacra philosophia (Turin
1587).
58 Reference to the works of the listed authors in which Vallesius’ Sacra philosophia is mentioned
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Sacra philosophia also went through a reprint in which a work by Levinus Lemnius
(1505–1568) was enclosed: Similitudinum ac parabolarum quae in Bibliis ex herbis atque
arboribus desumuntur dilucida explicati.59 It seems reasonable to say that Vallesius’ pop-
ularitywith Protestant authors is connected to the Lutherans’ emphasis on theHoly
Scriptures as the sole source of true knowledge as well as to the keen interest in nat-
ural theology among Reformed authors.60
Otto Casmann was among the several sixteenth-century Protestants who read
Vallesius. As we shall see, Casmann developed important aspects of his own con-
ception of man’s soul by criticising several passages contained in Vallesius’ Sacra
Philosophia. This book,whichwas produced at one of themain centres of Catholicism
inEurope, the court of Philip ii,was used byCasmann to put forward ideas about the
soul in a framework dominated byMelanchthon’s psychological teaching.
Among the authors whom I will consider in the following chapters, Veit Amer-
bach also wrote in a context characterised byMelanchthon’s Commentarius de anima,
albeit in a sense diametrically opposite to that in which Otto Casmann devised his
Psychologiaanthropologica. For, at somepoint inhis career, Amerbach came to consider
Melanchthon’s psychology as hismain polemical target. In effect, in amove contrary
to the curve that brought Casmann fromhis Catholic origins to the Protestant faith,
Veit Amerbach left Wittenberg when he realised that he trusted the Roman papacy
more than Luther.
Veit Amerbach was born inWembdinden in 1503. After attending his hometown
Latin school, he enrolled in theUniversity of Ingolstadt, and then in theUniversity of
Freiburg in 1521.However, hemoved toWittenberg the followingyear and startedhis
may be found in Ann Blair, “Mosaic Physics and the Search for a Pious Natural Philosophy in
the Late Renaissance”, Isis 91.1 (2000), 32–58, 37, 42, 43, 50.
59 Franciscus Vallesius, De iis quae scripta sunt physice in libris sacris sive de sacra philosophia. Liber
singularis cui, propter argumenti similitudinem, adiuncti sunt duo alii: nempe Levini Lemnii De plantis
sacris et Francisci Ruei De gemmis (Paris 1592).
60 As Ann Blair has pointed out, the eighteenth-century historian Jakob Brucker listed Valle-
sius, together with Casmann, Alsted, Comenius and Lambert Daneau (c. 1530–1595), already
among those who advocated a literalist use of the Bible. Blair refers to Brucker’s Historia crit-
ica philosophiae (Leipzig 1743), iv, 610–611. See Blair, “Mosaic Physics”, 35–36. On the relationship
between natural theology and natural philosophy in the Renaissance, see: Thomas Woolford,
Natural Theology and Natural Philosophy in the Late Renaissance, PhD thesis (Cambridge 2011).
About related topics, see: John Patrick Donnelly, “Italian Influences on the Development of
Calvinist Scholasticism”, The Sixteenth Century Journal, 7.1 (1976), 81–101; John Patrick Donnelly,
“Calvinist Thomism”, Viator 7 (1976), 441–455.
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studies of law, theology, and philosophy under Melanchthon. There he also appears
to have adhered to Melanchthon’s and Luther’s faith. In 1541, Luther himself sent
Amerbach to the Saxon Consistory of Wittenberg to take part in the government of
the church.
Yet, something seems to have gone wrong. As I shall explain in details in the
following chapter of this thesis, Amerbach started toquestionLuther’s andMelanch-
thon’s ideas concerning justification and the Roman papacy; Amerbach, in a word,
began to disagree on the core tenets of the Lutheran reform.61
After he obtained the degree of ‘magister’ in 1529, Amerbach started teaching
in the Wittenberg faculty of arts in 1530. His courses bear witness to the fact that
Amerbach’s differences with Melanchthon also regarded the latter’s physics and
doctrine of the soul, which Amerbach started to criticise during public lectures.
Eventually, Amerbach’s criticisms merged to form his Quatuor libri de anima 1542.62
This book, which was meant as a commentary on Aristotle’sDe anima, amounted in
fact to a rebuttal ofMelanchthon’s Commentarius on the soul. This was the last straw.
The situation rapidly escalated: Luther had a flyleaf affixed in Wittenberg, on
which Amerbach was condemned for his views about the soul. Amerbach, on his
part, was about to abandon the Lutheran faith for good. In 1543, he was welcome
with his wife Elisabeth and their eleven children in his erstwhile alma mater, the
Catholic Ingolstadt. There, Amerbach came just about in time to take the post that
used to belong to Luther’s and Melanchthon’s fiercest enemy, Johannes Eck (1486–
1543).63 Aside from his book about the soul (which seems to be his main claim to
fame), Amerbach published the Aristotelis enuntiationum sive categoriarum enarrationes
(Basel 1545). For the rest, Amerbach spent his years in Ingolstadt giving lectures on
philosophy and rhetoric, as well as writing poems. He died there in 1557.
1.1.5. On the Lutheran Front: Jacob Schegk and Johann LudwigHawenreuter
Of the Lutheran authors I will take into consideration in this thesis not everyone
thought that Melanchthon’s Commentarius de anima and Liber de anima indicated the
only way in which the soul could be studied. For instance, Johann Ludwig Hawen-
reuter and Jacob Schegk combined their Lutheran faithwith the idea that psychology
61 See: infra, ‘Chapter 2’, 100–104.
62 Veit Amerbach,Quatuor libri de anima (Strasbourg 1542).
63 On the theological controversies between Eck and Luther see further in this introduction, 61–
64.
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should be based on Aristotle’sDe anima and theMedieval and Renaissance commen-
taries on it.When compared to the intellectual biographieswehave considered so far,
Hawenreuter’s and Schegk’s lives appear to be characterised by higher institutional
and confessional stability, as well as by the production of numerous Aristotelian
commentaries.64
JacobDegen, or Schegk, was born in Schorndorf, near Stuttgart, on 7 June 1511. He
studied Latin, Greek, and Hebrew under Melanchthon’s great-uncle, the humanist
Johannes Reuchlin. In 1527, Schegk matriculated in the University of Tübingen,
which he virtually never left, until his death, in 1587.
At Tübingen Schegk obtained his bachelor of arts degree in 1528, as well as his
master of arts degree in 1530. Consequently, he studiedmedicine there, until 1534. In
the meantime, he started teaching logic and philosophy, in 1532. Very early he was
given important roles in the university, as he was the dean of the arts faculty in the
years 1537/38, 1541/42, 1549/50.
In 1539, Schegk was finally doctor medicinae at Tübingen. However, he had to wait
until 1553 to become professor of medicine there. In themeantime, he published the
Latin translation of Alexander of Aphrodisias’Demixtione (Tübingen 1540), aDe prin-
cipatu animae dialogus (Tübingen 1542), as well as an edition of Aristotle’sDe anima in
Greek, which also included excerpts from Simplicius’ commentary (Basel 1544). Two
years later, Schegk expressed his own ideas about the soul, in a commentary on Aris-
totle’sDeanima. Schegk’s In Aristotelis de animawas published as part of the Tübingen
professor’s broader commentary on the eight books of Aristotle’s Physics.65 As I shall
explain in more details in the sixth chapter of this thesis, Schegk’s commentary dif-
fered both in its structure and the topics it treated from the type ofworks on the soul
that were produced byMelanchthon and his followers.
64 The following biographical details are mainly based on: Lohr, Latin Aristotle Commentaries;
Sachiko Kusukawa, “Lutheran Uses of Aristotle: a Comparison between Jacob Schegk and
Philip Melanchthon”, in Constance Blackwell and Sachiko Kusukawa, Philosophy in the Six-
teenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Conversations with Aristotle (Aldershot 1999), 169–188; Sachiko
Kusukawa, “MediationofZabarella inNorthernEurope: thePreface of JohannLudwigHawen-
reuter”, in Gregorio Piaia, ed., La presenza dell’ aristotelismo padovano nella filosofia della prima
modernità (Rome 2002) 199–213; Melchior Adam, Vitae germanorummedicorum (Heidelberg 1620);
Oscar Berger-Levrault, Annales des professeurs des academies et universitiés alsaciennes 1523–1581
(Nancy 1892).
65 Jacob Schegk, In octo Physicorum, sive de auditione Physica libros Aristotelis commentaria longe doctis-
simanunc primum im lucem edita.Eiusdem Iacobi Schegkii Commentarius in AristotelisDe anima libros
tres, nunquam antea editus (Basel 1546).
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In his years as a medical professor at Tübingen, Schegk counted Andreas Planer
(1546–1606) andNicolausTaurellus (1547–1606) amonghis best-known students. Tau-
rellus called Schegk ‘princeps peripateticorum’, and rightly so, judging by his prolific
work as a commentator of many books of Aristotle’s.66
Of a very different opinion was Petrus Ramus, who published aDefensio pro Aris-
totele adversus Jacobus Scheccium (Lausanne 1571). This writing was the conclusion of a
bitter exchange of letters between Schegk and Ramus, which regarded the nature of
logic and its relationship to the arts. In the wake of the correspondence with Ramus,
Schegk published theHyperaspistes responsi, ad quatuor epistolas Petri Rami contra se aed-
itas (Tübingen 1570), which Ramus sought to rebut in the abovementionedDefensio,
claiming that his views were also Aristotle’s.
After the polemical exchange with Ramus, little timewent by before Schegk was
involved in a new controversy; this time with Simone Simoni (1532–1602). The con-
troversy – judging by Simoni’s Antischegkianorum (1570) – concerned several themes,
both philosophical (including metaphysical, logical, and physical topics) and the-
ological. The theological part of the controversy seems to have centred on issues
of Trinitarian and sacramental theology, such as the presence of three persons in
the divine essence, the personal union of two natures in Christ, the exchange of
attributes (communicatio idiomatum) between these two natures, and Christ’s pres-
ence in theEucharist.67 Schegk replied to Simoni in several texts:Prodromusantisimonii
66 Taurellus’ praise of Schegk as the ‘princeps peripateticorum’ has been noticed by Lamanna, La
nascita dell’ontologia nellametafisica diRudolphGöckel (1547–1628), 27. Lamanna refers to:Nicolaus
Taurellus,AlpesCaesae,hoc est,Andr.Caesalpini Italimonstrosa et superbadogmata,discussa et excussa
a Nicolao Taurello (Frankfurt 1597), 4r. See further for a list of Schegk’s commentaries on works
by Aristotle.
67 Simone Simoni, Antischegkianorum liber unus (Basel 1570), 33–35: «tota haec confutatio duabus
partibus absolvitur. In prima pro meo praecipuomunere primariaque vocatione quaecunque
ad philosophiam Aristotelicam magis pertinere videbantur tractavi copiosius. […] Secunda
pars diviniorem philosophiam, id est sacrosanta theologiam continet. Quoniam autem in
tam coelesti disciplina novas doctrinas probabiliter inducere nefas sit, ipso etiam Platone
teste, et ubique recto cognitio facilime obliquum cognoscitur ut Aristotelis dixit, idcirco de
unionepersonali duarumnaturaruminunaChristi persona, de communicatione idiomatum,
quae ratione unionis utrique naturaein ea persona coneniunt, de sessione Christi ad dextram
patris, de tribus personis in una essentia divina subsistentibus, simpliciter omni verborum
prolixitate concisa, obscuritateque sublata, sententiam integram, veram, germanam (ut puto)
ex optimis quibusque scriptoribus scholastici deproimptam aperui». For details about these
theological issues during the early phases of Luther’s reform, see further in this introduction,
75, 77–82.
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(Tübingen 1571), Anatome responsi Simonii (Tübingen 1573); Antisimonius (Tübingen
1573).
As a matter of fact, Schegk had been actively engaged in a philosophical defence
of the Lutheran doctrine of the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, at the behest
of Duke Christoph. Schegk thus intervened in a debate that had started in 1561
and in which Jacob Andreae (1528–1590) and Johannes Brenz (1499–1570) attacked the
Genevan reformer Theodor Beza’s (1519–1605) symbolic interpretation of the Eucha-
rist. The result of Schegk’s contribution to the debate was a book in which he
defended the real presence by means of Aristotelian logic: De una persona et duabus
naturis Christi sententia Jacob Schegkii D.medici et philosophi clarissimi, professionis Scholae
Tubingensi ex fundamentis quidam Scripturae Sacrae, analysis autem philosophica et pie et
erudite explicata (Frankfurt 1565).68
Schegk’s poor eyesight appears to have worsened around 1570, until he had to
leave the university in 1577, as he had gone completely blind. Despite all this, he
managed to publish several further commentaries on Aristotle’s books; besides the
texts I alreadymentioned, Schegk wrote the following ones:
– Commentaria in iv librosMeteoron (Basel 1550);
– In x libros Ethicorum annotationes (Basel 1550);
– Explicatio Analyticorum Posteriorum (Tübingen 1560);
– De demonstratione libri xv in ii Posteriorum Analyticorum libros (Basel 1564);
– Explicatio in ii libros Primorum Analyticorum (Tübingen 1565/7);
– Commentaria in Organi partum analyticam (Tübingen 1570);
– Commentaria in viii libros Topicorum Aristotelis (Tübingen 1584).
Aside from his Aristotelian work and as he was a physician, Schegk also published
medical treatises. In this thesis, I shall look at Schegk’s De plastica seminis facultate,
which was published when Schegk was already blind, in 1580.69 Despite the fact that
the De plastica seminis facultate is a treatise about embryology, it contains impor-
tant ideas about the soul and its origins. In the following chapters I shall combine
Schegk’s psychological views as they are found in this text, as well as in Schegk’s
commentary on Aristotle’s De anima. The consideration of Schegk’s psychology will
68 See: Sachiko Kusukawa, “Lutheran Uses of Aristotle: a Comparison between Jacob Schegk and
PhilipMelanchthon”, inConstanceBlackwell and SachikoKusukawa,Philosophy in the Sixteenth
and Seventeenth Centuries. Conversations with Aristotle (Aldershot 1999), 180–181.
69 Jacob Schegk,De plastica seminis facultate libri tres (Strasburg 1580).
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shed further light on the fact the fact that Lutheran authors who addressed topics
about the soul did not necessarily look at Melanchthon’s psychology as their pre-
ferred research framework. This point, in its turn, will help us better understand the
relationship between psychology and Lutheran theology in the age of confessionali-
sation.
As we will see, Schegk’s embryological treatise enjoyed a broad readership in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Although Schegk is not counted among the
heroes of the history of philosophy and science, he was very popular at his time. His
books and his 40-year career at Tübingen attractedmany Lutheran youth, who were
interested in natural philosophy andmedicine.
Among the ambitious young Lutherans who wanted to study under Schegk, I
will take into account Johannes LudwigHawenreuter. Hisworks about the soul, like
Schegk’s, also testifies to the way in which some Lutherans thought that Aristotle’s
De anima, more thanMelanchthon’s, provided the ideal platform to study the soul.
Hawenreuter was born in Strassbourg, on 1 August 1548, to the physician Sebald
Hawenreuter (1508–1589). Sebald had studied at Wittenberg, where he heard lec-
tures by Melanchthon’s, between 1531 and 1535, before moving to the University of
Tübingen, from which he obtained a doctorate in medicine. Finally, Sebald settled
in Strasbourg as the city physician and medical teacher of the city’s Academy. His
son, Lohannes Ludwig became ‘magister’ of philosophy in the same city, in 1574.
In Strasbourg, Hawenreuter studied under Schegk’s former student Andreas
Planer. Hawenreuter then began teaching physics there from 1574 and until 1578,
whenhe became professor of logic and physics of theUniversity of Strasbourg. At the
same time, Hawenreuter went to Tübingen, apparently against his father’s will.70 In
1586, he became doctor medicinae there. At Tübingen he also remained for three years,
as a professor of logic, physics, and medicine. He returned to Strassbourg to teach
physics andmetaphysics, from 1589 to 1596.71 From 1596 he retained only the chair of
physics, until his death in 1618.
70 Adam, Vitae germanorummedicorum, 443: «verum, cumunicus ipse esset filius, et familiae quasi
columna, paterni animi solicitudo, quae ad omnia etiam tuta trepidare solet, ut longius eum
a se dimitteret, impetrare a se non potuit».
71 Hawenreuter’s teaching of metaphysics later resulted in the publication of a Commentarius in
libros Metaphysicorum vi priores (Frankfurt 1604). Both this book and Hawenreuter’s teaching
are probably one of the first cases in which metaphysics was reintroduced in Lutheran insti-
tutions, after Luther had targeted it as one of the worst things that scholastic philosophy had
produced, as well as an obstacle to the enforcement of Lutheran faith.
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Among others, Hawenreuter published the following works:
– Disputatio de natura et essentia ratiocinationis, ex libro i Priorum Analyticorum (Strass-
bourg 1578);
– Thesesdeprogressionedemonstrationis ex libros iPosteriorumAnalyticorum (Strassbourg
1585);
– Theses dialecticae ex libro i sophisticarum reprehensione (Strassbourg 1588);
– Disputatio de natura logicae (Strassbourg 1591);
– Commentarii in libros viii Physicorum (Frankfurt 1604);
– Commentarii inMeteorologicorum libros iv (Frankfurt 1605).
Among his publications, Hawenreuter could also count a preface to the Basel 1594
edition of Jacopo Zabarella’s popular Opera logica.72 As scholars have explained, this
preface wasmeant to tune Zabarella’s logical ideas to a public of northern European
authors in need of philosophical tools for their confessional controversies. As such,
the preface to the Opera logica has been considered to be Hawenreuter’s main claim
to fame.73 Despite this consideration, however, someone as important as Rudolph
Goclenius saw thatHawenreuter alsopresented interesting ideas forwhat concerned
psychology. For this reason, Goclenius publishedHawenreuter’s sentence on the ori-
gin of the soul (Sitne animus nobis ingeneratus aDeo necne. Concluditur negate) in his 1590
Psychologia, which I mentioned earlier. As a matter of fact, Hawenreuter published a
Psychologia of his own, as early as 1591. This book was only a short collection of ques-
tions regarding themost important problems addressed byAristotle in hisDeanima.
However, Hawenreuter decided to give much more space to psychology, in his long
In Aristotelis philosophorum principis,De Animo et ParvaNaturalia dictos libros (Frankfurt
1605).
AlthoughHawenreuter has so far been considered only for his work in logic and
for writing a preface to Zabarella’s Opera logica, he also devoted much attention to
psychology. In this thesis, I shall look at Hawenreuter’s contribution to psychology
in the age of confessionalisation.
72 Jacopo Zabarella,Opera logica, editio tertia, pref. Ioannis Ludovici Hawenreuter (Basel 1594).
73 Sachiko Kusukawa, “The Preface of Johann Ludwig Hawenreuter”, 200. Additional informa-
tion about the reception of Zabarella’s work in northern Europe can be found in IanMaclean,
“Mediations of Zabarella in Northern Germany, 1586–1623”, in Piaia, ed., La presenza dell’ aris-
totelismo padovano, 173–198.
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1.2. Status Quaestionis on Renaissance Psychology and Confessionalisation
Few studies have hitherto been devoted to the works on the soul written by the
authors whose intellectual biographies I sketched above.Moreover, few studies have
addressed specifically the interaction between psychology and theology in the age of
confessionalisation.
Despite this paucity of works about psychology in the age of confessionalisation,
some very valuable scholarship about this topic does of course exist. Before we ven-
ture on to our analysis of psychology in the years between Martin Luther’s reform
and Descartes’ Meditations, let us look at what we already know about the subject.
This will also help us better determine the scope of this thesis.
Very few scholarly works have hitherto focused specifically to the study of the
interaction between psychology and the process of confessionalisation in the six-
teenth century. Of course, studies about Aristotelian psychology have not failed to
highlight the presence of theological, or even confessional, aspects involved in the
science of the soul in theRenaissance. At the same time, cultural and intellectual his-
tories devoted to the sixteenth-centuryReformation andCounter-Reformationhave
touched upon themes connected to psychology (e.g., the immortality of the soul, or
the freedom of man’s will) in the historical process that determined the emergence
of threemain confessionswithinWestern Christianity. Because the available knowl-
edge regarding the relationship betweenpsychology and confessionalisationhas not
received a systematic treatment but rather rests on scattered, if valuable, informa-
tion in works devoted to the history of psychology, the present status quaestionis
is arranged as follows. I shall first provide an account of some major studies about
psychology in the Renaissance; after that, I shall look at the few available scholarly
works that have devoted some more specific attention to the interaction between
psychology and confessions in the sixteenth century.
Let us then turn to a critical overview of some the most influential accounts of
psychology in the Renaissance that have been produced so far.
1.2.1. Psychology in the Renaissance
Whilst the link between psychology and confessions has not received enough atten-
tion, a fair number of studies, over the last two decades, has addressed several other
themes and problems that appear to have characterised the science of the soul be-
tween 1350 and 1650.
Two interrelated themes seem to have drawn the attention of scholars dealing
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with theDeanima tradition in theRenaissance; those are: debates on the immortality
of the human intellective soul and the disciplinary status of psychology.74 Is the
human soul incorporeal and immortal? If so, just to what extent can psychology be
considered to be part of natural philosophy? Is it not rather the case that some parts
of the human soul should be treated by a science, such asmetaphysics, dealing with
incorporeal substances? Scholars of the Renaissance have so far tended to focus on
these questions, whilst at the same time recognising that not only the intellective
soul, but also the vegetative power of the soul and its operations (such as digestion
and reproduction), as well as the higher powers of sensation and imagination also
were treated in sixteenth-century discussions on the soul.
For instance, the Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy devoted a section to
Renaissance discussions on the organic soul. In this study, Kathrine Park explains
that – contrary to the case of the intellective soul – Renaissance psychology showed a
broad consensus about the nature and functions of the organic soul.75However, Park
points out that despite a substantial agreement onmost issues regarding the organic
soul, Renaissance authors dealingwith the vegetative and sensitive souls introduced
important elements of innovation. More specifically, Park argues, they started look-
ing at the organic soul not simply as a form that was very proximate to its material
instrument (viz., the body), but as something in itself material.76 A very important
medical and philosophical tradition from antiquity to the Middle Ages had looked
at the organic soul as a form using a bodily substance in carrying out its operations.
This substance was called spirit (spiritus) and identified with a subtle vapour pro-
74 Surely, these are not the only themes that scholars of Renaissance psychology have studied.
Besides the ontological and methodological questions concerning the immortality of the
soul and the status of psychology, scholars have for instance devoted much attention to
themes concerning cognitive psychology. One important case amounts to the development
(and sometimes elimination) of the doctrine of the intelligible species in the Renaissance and
early-modern period. About this theme, see: Leen Spruit, Species Intelligibilis, From Perception to
Knowledge, 2 vols. (Leiden 1995).
75 Kathrine Park, “The Organic Soul”, in Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, Eckhard Kessler,
Jill Kraye, eds., The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy (Cambridge 1988), 464–484.
76 As Dominik Perler has pointed out, a conception of the organic soul as a “material form” can
already be found in thework ofWilliamOckham. See: Dominik Perler, “What Are the Faculties
of the Soul? Descartes and His Scholastic Background”, in John Marenbon, ed., Continuity and
Innovation inMedieval andModern Philosophy. Knowledge,Mind, and Language (Croydon 2013), 27.
Perler refers to Ockham’sQuodlibet ii, q. 10, Joseph C.Wey, ed., William of Ockham,Quodlibeta
septem, (=Opera Theologica 9) (St. Bonaventure/New York, 1980), 159.
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duced from the blood, which was capable of reaching every part of the body by trav-
elling through arteries and nerves. According to Park, sixteenth-century accounts of
the organic soul, especially those found in PhilipMelanchthon’s Liber de anima (1552)
and Bernardino Telesio’s De rerum natura (1586), differed from earlier psychological
discussions in that they showed a tendency to conflate the organic soul with this
spiritus, and to treat this bodily substance like a machine. Surely, Park does not fail
to recognise that authors who looked at the organic soul in these terms often added
that in humanbeings the bodily soul-spirituswas accompanied by a higher soul, viz.,
the intellective soul, which was considered to be incorporeal and immortal.77
Park is right in noticing thatMelanchthon considered the organic soul to be very
proximate to the bodily spirit and thought that each human being possessed not
only this organic soul or spiritus, but also an incorporeal intellective soul. However, I
think that, perhaps because of the limits imposed by the introductory nature of her
essay, Park does not sufficiently explain the way in which Melanchthon conceived
of spiritus and its relationship with the soul. Moreover, whilst Park’s observation
that the idea of machine is present in Melanchthon’s study of the soul is essentially
correct, her statements seem too generic. Park’s remarks risk to box Melanchthon’s
conception of the organic soul (together with Telesio’s) in the categories of ‘mecha-
nism’ and ‘materialism’, which I find inaccurate.
In this thesis, I shall show that, at least in the case ofMelanchthon, the idea that
the organic soul could be treated as a machine did not correspond to a full-blown
mechanist account of the soul, but was in fact harmonised with a specific type of
teleology based on Galen’s and Vesalius’ anatomies. Melanchthon’s psychology will
be showed to present a conception of the organic soul in which mechanism and
teleology could coexist.Moreover, I shall show thatMelanchthon conceived of ‘spiri-
tus’ in several (and sometimes overlapping) ways and that he thought that ‘spiritus’
could actually interact with God’s spirit in the process of salvation. In addition to
this, I shall argue that Melanchthon’s move to conflate the organic soul with the
bodily spirits does not stem from a materialistic conception, pace Park’s interpre-
tation, but rather depends on the epistemological and ontological consequences of
some aspects of his theology. In effect, I shall demonstrate that the way in which
Melanchthonconceivedof theboundariesbetweenphilosophyand faithdetermined
an epistemological distinction in his books about the soul, whereby some aspects of
the soul could be known by man’s reason, whilst some others could only be known
77 Kathrine Park, “The Organic Soul”, 481–484.
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by faith. Already in the context of the present introductory essay, I shall contend that
such an epistemological distinction wasmirrored, on an ontological level, by a divi-
sion between the organic (material and machine-like) and the intellective souls, in
Melanchthon’s psychology.
But before getting back to Melanchthon and his twofold conception of the soul,
let us resume our overview of the available scholarship about psychology in the
Renaissance. It is on Renaissance explanations of the nature and workings of the
intellective soul of man that most of this scholarship has focused.
In effect, for the same CambridgeHistory of Renaissance Philosophy, Eckhard Kessler
wrote an extensive overview of Renaissance discussions on the intellective soul.78
According toKessler, theperiodbetween 1490 and 1520wasmarkedby two tendencies
with regard to doctrines about the intellective soul. On the one hand, fifteenth- and
sixteenth-century accounts of the intellective soul ensued from the alliance between
Neoplatonism and the Catholic Church, which culminated in 1513, when, as I have
already mentioned, the Fifth Lateran Council declared that the immortality of the
intellective soul could be demonstrated philosophically. On the other hand, Kessler
argues, the growing pressure coming from the Catholic Church prompted a deter-
mined reaction on the part of the Aristotelians, which led to considering natural
philosophy as a legitimate way in its own right to look at the human soul. Kessler
links this development not only to Alessandro Achillini (1463–152) and AgostinoNifo
(1469/1470–1538), but also to the figure of Pietro Pomponazzi (1462–1525), and espe-
cially to the latter’s 1516 treatiseDe immortalitate animae.79
As is well known, in this treatise Pomponazzi stated that it was impossible to
show that the soul was immortal by means of philosophical arguments; whereas
the full truth about the immortality of man’s soul could only be grasped by means
of faith.80 Pomponazzi’s views were contrasting with those defended by the Catholic
Church andmet withmuch criticism. A number of treatises were published, which
78 Eckhard Kessler, “The Intellective Soul”, in Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, Eckhard
Kessler, Jill Kraye, eds., The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy (Cambridge 1988), 485–
534.
79 Eckhard Kessler, “The Intellective Soul”, 494–495.
80 Pomponazzi reached this conclusion especially by arguing against Thomas Aquinas’ view that
the intellect does not need the body as its instrument, but only as its object. In fact, Pom-
ponazzi argued that the intellect could be shown to be immortal only if it did not need the
body either as subject or as object. But according to Pomponazzi, no activity can be found
in the intellect that does not need sensory impressions to form concepts. Pietro Pompon-
azzi,De immortalitate animae, in Pietri PomponatiiMantuani, Tractatus acutissimi, utilllimi, et mere
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attacked Pomponazzi. For instance, Gaspare Contarini’s De immortalitate animae ad-
versus PetrumPomponatium (1518), AgostinoNifo’sDe immortalitate anima libellus adver-
sus Petrum Pomponatium Mantovanum (1518), and Bartolomeo Spina’s Tutela veritatis
de immortalitate animae contra Petrum Pomponatium Mantovanum (1519).81 Pomponazzi
reacted to the first two treatises respectively in his Apologia (1518) and Defensorium
(1519). According to Kessler, the result of the polemic triggered by Pomponazzi’s
work did not mean a strong reaffirmation of the 1513 Lateran Council’s decree on
the immortality of the soul, but quite the contrary: Pomponazzi’s idea that the
soul’s immortality could not be demonstrated bymeans of philosophical arguments
gained the upper hand. According to Kessler, in the years following the publication
of Pomponazzi’s De immortalitate animae, «philosophy would no longer be identi-
cal with Aristotle, nor Aristotle with St Thomas and the teaching of the church;
a philosopher could be a Thomist, an Aristotelian, a Platonist or anything else,
provided that his philosophy was conclusive and coherent».82 Of course, Kessler’s
remarks appear rather weak today. His notions of ‘conclusiveness’ and ‘coherence’
as criteria for good philosophy after Pomponazzi’s work fit the picture of Renais-
sance philosophy available now uneasily. Moreover, scholarship of the past three
decades has sufficiently showed that philosophy in theMiddle Ages and before Pom-
ponazzi formed a landscape much more varied than that of a plain correspondence
between philosophical thought and Aristotle, and between Aristotle and the teach-
ings of Thomas Aquinas and the Catholic Church.
peripatetici (Venice 1525), c.1., 45v.: «At quamvis intellectus humanus, ut habitum est, intelli-
gendo non fugantur quantitate, attamen, quoniam sensui coniunctus est, ex toto a materia
et quantitate absolvi non potest, quum nunquam cognoscat sine phantasmate, dicente Aris-
totele tertio De anima: “nequaquam sine phantasmate intelligit anima”. Unde sic indigens
corpore ut obiecto neque simpliciter universal cognoscere potest, sed semper universale in
singulari, ut unusquisque in seipso experiri potest». About Pomponazzi’s treatise, see: Jean
Céard, “Matérialisme et théorie de l’ âme dans la pensée padouane: le Traité de l’ immortalité de
l’ âme de Pomponazzi”, Revue philosophique de la France et de l’Etranger, 171 (1981), 25–48; Vittoria
Perrone Compagni, “Introduzione”, in Vittoria Perrone Compagni, eds., Pietro Pomponazzi,
Trattato sull’immortalità, (Florence 1999), v–ci; Jill Kraye, “The Immortality of the Soul in the
Renaissance: BetweenNatural Philosophy andTheology”, Signatures, 1 (2000), 2.1–2.24; Annalisa
Cappiello, Il problema dell’immortalità dell’anima nella Scolastica rinascimentale del sec. xvi. Tom-
maso De Vio Gaetano, Bartolomeo Spina, Crisostomo Javelli, PhD Thesis (Università di Bari 2013).
81 A detailed account of the reactions to Pomponazzi’s treatise is provided by Étienne Gilson,
“Autour de Pomponazzi. Problématique de l’ immortalité de l’ âme en Italie au début du xvie
siècle”, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire duMoyen Age, 28 (1961), 163–279.
82 Eckhard Kessler, “The Intellective Soul”, 507.
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What is more, Pomponazzi’s views did not stop attracting criticism even many
years after their first appearance. As Lorenzo Casini has recently pointed out, the
debate triggered by Pomponazzi’sDe immortalitate animae reverberated well into the
seventeenth century and throughout René Descartes’ lifetime. For instance, Pom-
ponazzi was still being targeted in 1635, when Antoine Sirmond – a Jesuit belonging
to the circle of Descartes’ principal correspondent Marin Mersenne – published the
treatiseDeimmortalitateanimaedemonstratiophysica etaristotelicaadversusPomponatium
et asseclas.83
It must be said that Kessler himself appears to have been aware of the fact that
philosophy after Pomponazzi was not an altogether new game that could be played
with no regard to Christian concerns. As a matter of fact, on the one hand, Kessler
argues that Pomponazzi’s philosophy appears to have paved the way for an exclu-
sively natural-philosophical account of the intellective soul of man. On the other
hand, Kessler observes that Pomponazzi’s work does not appear to have marked an
insuperable obstacle for thosewhoaimed toproduce aChristianphilosophyofman’s
intellective soul. On Kessler’s account, «as a consequence of the Pomponazzi affair,
we can observe not only a divorce of natural philosophy from Christian philosophy,
but also a rebirth of Christian philosophy in its own right. The latter was further
promoted by the religious quarrels of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation,
resulting in two corresponding Christian philosophies».84
Now, according to Kessler, the partnership between natural philosophy and
Christianity thathaddiedwith theworkof Pomponazzi cameback to life in thewake
of the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Counter-Reformation. As a conse-
quence of this observation,Kessler tries to account for theway inwhich the two rival-
ing confessions handled issues concerning the human intellective soul. According to
him, psychology in the Reformed camp was characterised by the intellectual move-
ment of ‘Protestant Aristotelianism’, and this movementmainly coincided with the
work of Philip Melanchthon. The latter is presented by Kessler essentially as the
Lutheran reformer who reintroduced Aristotle in Protestant education, in order to
makeup for the lack of theoretical basiswhich Lutheran theologyhadbeen enduring
as a consequence of Luther’s well-known dismissal of scholastic philosophy. Never-
83 Lorenzo Casini, “The Renaissance Debate on the Immortality of the Soul. Pietro Pomponazzi
and the Plurality of Substantial Forms”, in Paul J.J.M. Bakker and Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen,
eds., Mind, Cognition and Representation. The Tradition of Commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima
(Aldershot 2007), 148.
84 Eckhard Kessler, “The Intellective Soul”, 507.
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theless, as Kessler correctly explains, Melanchthon’s recourse to Aristotle wasmeant
to back an essentially Christian type of philosophy, according to which – more than
in the Catholic world – the philosophy of Aristotle was submitted to doctrines of
faith. One case inwhich this newway of looking at the relationship between natural
philosophy and Christian doctrine became particularly visible is indeed the defini-
tion of the soul thatMelanchthon defended in his Liber de anima (15452). In this book,
Aristotle’s definitionof the soul as ἐντελέχειαwas interpretedbyMelanchthon in the
way proposed by Cicero, viz., as ἐνδελέχεια, or continuousmotion. In Kessler’s opin-
ion, Melanchthon’s definition of the soul was consciously asserted in opposition to
natural philosophy;moreover,Melanchthon’s preference for Cicerowas the result of
his adherence to the humanist critique of scholasticism.85
Melanchthon’s Liber de anima was a Christian book on the soul, because it was
meant to acquire knowledge about God, by merging Luther’s teaching about the
soul with Aristotelian psychology, as well as with a physiology of the human body
based on Galen. The result of this endeavour, Kessler correctly observes, was not a
standard commentary on Aristotle’s De anima, but a comprehensive theory of man
or anthropology. Kessler points out thatMelanchthon’s Liber de animawent through
forty editions and eighty commentaries in the sixteenth-century, thus becoming the
standard psychology textbook for the Protestant lands.86 Unfortunately, the section
“Protestant Aristotelianism” of theCambridgeHistory ofRenaissance Philosophy focuses
exclusively onMelanchthon’s Liber de anima and does not examine the psychological
tradition started by Melanchthon’s work. In the present thesis, I shall try to make
up for this and to look at the way in which Melanchthon’s psychology impacted on
hisWittenberg students, on thosewho followed hiswork elsewhere inGermany and
the Low Countries, as well as on its critics.
Kessler’s account of the ‘rebirth’ of Christian philosophy for what concerns the
sixteenth-century Catholic camp is somewhat more substantial.
On Kessler’s account, the main promoters of this ‘rebirth’ were the Jesuits, with
their political and spiritual centres in Spain and Portugal. The biggest result of
this ‘second scholastic’ is according to Kessler the publication of the Commentaria
Collegii Conimbricensis, a collection of commentaries on Aristotle’s writings, which
was intended as a standard textbook for Jesuit students. The Coimbra textbook also
includes the commentary on Aristotle’s De anima by the Portuguese Emmanuel de
85 This theme has been extensively addressed in ‘Chapter 2’ of this thesis.
86 Eckhard Kessler, “The Intellective Soul”, 516–518.
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Goes.87DeGoes’ book consists of the Greek text of Aristotle’sDe anima, together with
a Latin translation and a commentary corresponding to rather short explanations
of the text. However, de Goes complemented thismaterial with a set of quaestiones at
the endof each chapter,which included somemore substantial philosophical details.
According to Kessler, these quaestiones were aimed at discussing psychological mat-
ters from a Christian point of view and such religious preoccupation resulted in the
statement, at the beginning of the commentary, of the Christian point of view about
the soul: the human soul was a spiritual substance created by God in each individ-
ual and informing the individual bodies. In a way different to the ideas proposed by
Pomponazzi’s De immortalitate animae, the Coimbra textbook on the soul defended
that a philosophical demonstration of the soul’s immortality was possible; this, to
the point that editor Balthasar Alvarez enclosed a separate treatise to the book that
addressed the separate soul of man and claimed that the immortality of the intel-
lective soul could be demonstrated according to Aristotle.88 Notwithstanding the
consistency of the Coimbra commentary on the soul with the decrees of the Fifth
Lateran Council, Kessler observes, Alvarez’s treatises «offered the hand of reconcilia-
tionwithPomponazzi’s ideas». In effect,whilst claiming that philosophy could show
the immortality of the soul, Alvarez pointed out that, in this life, thehuman intellect
might need some special illumination to recognise such truth.89
Similar aspects are also present in Francisco Suárez’s De anima (1621), which was
published after Suárez’s death, by Alvarez himself. In fact, Kessler explains, Alvarez
published this book as a supplement to Suárez’s commentary on Thomas Aquinas’
Summa theologiae, a policy which, on Kessler account, is justified by the fact that
Suárez had deemed Thomas Aquinas better than Aristotle with regard to an expla-
nation of man’s intellect.90
87 On the Coimbra commentary on De anima, see: Mário S. de Carvalho, “Between Rome and
Coimbra: a Preliminary Survey of two Early Jesuit Psychologies (Bent Perera and the Coimbra
Course)”,Quaestio, 14 (2014), 91–110.
88 Eckhard Kessler, “The Intellective Soul”, 512–514.
89 Eckhard Kessler, “The Intellective Soul”, 513.
90 Eckhard Kessler, “The Intellective Soul”, 514–516. On Suárez’s De anima, as well as on Suárez’s
own understanding of his work, in its relationship with the Scholastic and the Aristotelian
traditions, see: James B. South, “Suárez, Immortality, and the Soul’s Dependence on the Body”,
in Benjamin Hill and Henrik Lagerlund, eds., The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez (Oxford 2012),
121–136. In this last mentioned volume, more aspects of Suárez’s psychology are considered by
Cees Leijenhorst, “Suárez’s on Self-Awareness”, 137–153, andMarleen Rozemond, “Unity in the
Multiplicity of Suárez’s Soul”, 154–172.
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Suárez’s De anima and the Coimbra commentary on the soul are understood by
Kessler as two important testimonies to the ‘rebirth’ of Christian philosophy in the
years following thePomponazzi affair. Kessler seems to interpret these twokeyworks
aspresentingabalancedaccountof the intellective soul ofman,whichgrantsnatural
philosophy the possibility to demonstrate the soul’s immortality whilst at the same
time acknowledging that theological sources – especially Thomas Aquinas – and the
Christian doctrine are needed to fully recognise the notion that the soul will survive
the death of the body.
To recapitulate, according to Kessler, Pomponazzi’s treatiseDe immortalitate ani-
mae opened twodifferent options for contemporary and later authorswhodealtwith
psychology. Some of them developed their theories about the soul in the direction
of a purely natural-philosophical investigation, which considered religious matters
related to the soul as additional to and not as part of their psychological works.
Other authors, Kessler argues, reacted to Pomponazzi by reinvigorating a type of
Christian philosophy; or better still, two types of Christian philosophy. For, accord-
ing to Kessler, the ‘re-birth’ of Christian philosophy after the ‘Pomponazzi affair’
was characterised by the confessional split-up between Protestantism and Catholi-
cism. For this reason, Kessler considers some of the most important cases of books
about the soul produced by sixteenth-century Protestants and Catholics. Kessler
addresses Melanchthon’s Liber de anima as a representative of what he calls ‘Protes-
tant Aristotelianism’; and Suarez’s and the Coimbra commentaries on Aristotle’s
De anima, for what concerns the ‘re-birth’ of Christian psychology in the Catholic
world.
Now, both in the case ofMelanchthon and in that of Jesuit works about the soul,
Kessler succeeds in showing that Christian concerns were involved in sixteenth-
century theories on the soul thatweredeveloped in theCatholic and in theProtestant
worlds. However, whilst Kesslermakes it quite clear why the psychologies produced
by sixteenth-century Jesuit authors were Catholic ones, he does not seem to explain
in which sense the Aristotelianism ofMelanchthonwas Protestant. In effect, Kessler
shows that, on the one hand, Jesuit commentaries recognised that the immortal-
ity of the soul could only be grasp in its fullness by the Christian. On the other
hand, they were typically Catholic in that they did compel with the indications of
the Fifth Lateran Council: the immortality of the soul could and should be demon-
strated, to the best of his abilities, by the philosopher. Much less clear is the reason
why Kessler thinks of Melanchthon’s as a Protestant psychology. Besides the fact
that Melanchthon was obviously a Lutheran, no explanation of the denominational
nature of his Liber de anima seems to be supplied by Kessler.
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In this thesis, I shall put forward somearguments to confirmthatMelanchthon’s
psychology was indeed Lutheran. More precisely, I shall explain that the denomi-
national character of Melanchthon’s work on the soul does not lie in the fact that
his psychology was a logical consequence of theological doctrines; nor all Luther-
ans who dealt with the soul (including Martin Luther himself) did it in the same
way as Melanchthon’s. Instead, I shall argue that Melanchthon’s psychology was
Lutheran because Melanchthon looked at it as an integral part of his efforts to
form the Lutheran orthodoxy. Moreover, I shall demonstrate that psychology in the
Protestant world was not limited to Melanchthon’s (as Kessler seems to imply) but
developed intodifferent traditions. As I have already said in the openingof this intro-
duction, I shall address one of these traditions, and precisely that which looked at
Melanchthon’s work on the soul as its preferred model for doing psychology. Before
we get there, it is worth going back to the way in which scholarship of the past few
years has looked at Renaissance psychology.
For instance,DennisDesChene’sLife’sFormhas lookedat Jesuit discussions about
the soul from a somewhat different, albeit not incompatible, angle from that of
Kessler. Des Chene considers what he calls the ‘liberal Jesuit scholastics’ (Franciscus
Toletus, Franciscus Suárez, Petrus Fonseca, the Coimbran authors, and Roderigo
de Arriaga) as a group of authors who first and foremost looked at the soul as the
principle of life in plants, animals, and human beings. Therefore, Des Chene sets out
to examine sixteenth-century Aristotelian psychology in its own right, by avoiding
to «hasten towards the gripping issues of the time: immortality, unity of the intellect
and free will».91 According to Des Chene, and as the title Life’s Form suggests the De
anima tradition is to be considered chiefly as a case in the history of biology, which
addresses questions such as: what is the soul? What is the difference between living
and non-living beings? What type of relationship holds between the soul and its
powers? What kind of unity do soul and body achieve?
The science of the soul in the sixteenth century – Des Chene explains – formed
a varied landscape in which different intellectual traditions merged. However, the
study of the soul amongst Jesuit scholastics was essentially dominated by Aristotle’s
De anima. According to Des Chene, their claim to novelty lies, nonetheless, in the
fact that they remoulded the commentary onDe anima into a disputational format:
the structure of Jesuit works on the soul stopped following the order of the themes
about the soul as it was presented by Aristotle’s De anima, and consisted more in
91 Dennis Des Chene, Life’s Form. Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul (Ithaca 2000), 2.
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a series of disputations that could be treated almost as separate treatises in their
own right. These disputations included themes stemming fromAristotle’sDeanima,
but also entirely new questions that these ‘liberal Jesuits’ considered relevant to the
knowledge of the soul.92
Des Chene’s book is a very careful analysis of the main questions on the soul
as they are treated in sixteenth-century texts produced by Jesuit scholastics. A full
account of this study is beyond the scope of this introduction; nevertheless, it is
worth mentioning at least some broader ideas and conclusions put forward by Des
Chene. In particular, whilst he devoted a separate book – Spirits and Clocks – to the
development of psychology in the seventeenth century, his Life’s Form intends to
provide some background to the mechanistic revolution that was about to wipe
Aristotelianism away.93 According to Des Chene, texts on the soul produced by lib-
eral Jesuit scholastics were widely read through tomuch of the seventeenth century
and form the intellectual background against which the works of Descartes, Male-
branche, and Gassendi should be read. More specifically, the sixteenth-century sci-
ence of the soul differed from later Cartesian philosophy in that it was characterised
by a unity between cognitive and vegetative powers of the soul. This unity – Des
Chene concludes – is reflected by the absence of «any deep conceptual or disciplinary
division between what we would now call “physiological” and “psychological” sub-
jectmatters».94According toDes Chene, the sixteenth-century science of the soul – or
the biological study of the formof life – encompassed bothphysiological andpsycho-
logical phenomena, by tracing them back to one single subject, viz., the soul. It was
precisely when these aspects went their ownways (namely, in the wake of Descartes’
philosophy) that, on Des Chene’s account, psychology stopped being about the life’s
form and became the study of man’s cognitive powers.95
Whilst some of the conclusions reached by Des Chene’s Life Form are by now
widely accepted, some othersmight raisemore questions. On the one hand, it seems
arguably true that, as Des Chene contends, in the wake of Descartes’ 1641Meditations
on First Philosophy and Treatise on Man, psychology took on a new meaning: its sub-
ject was no longer the soul as the principle of life in plants, animals, and humans,
but the human mind and its cognitive functions. On the other hand, I think there
92 Dennis Des Chene, Life’s Form, 1–9.
93 The full title of Des Chene’s book on seventeenth-century psychology is: Dennis Des Chene,
Spirits and Clocks:Machine andOrganism in Descartes (Ithaca 2001).
94 Dennis Des Chene, Life’s Form, 200.
95 Dennis Des Chene, Life’s Form, 199–202.
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is a sense in which Des Chene’s view, according to which sixteenth-century psychol-
ogy witnessed a complete lack of reflection about its disciplinary status, is inaccu-
rate. Precisely because the science of the soul included, to use Des Chene’s terminol-
ogy, both psychological and physiological matters, many sixteenth-century authors
recognised the problematic disciplinary status of psychology and sought to give the
varied aspects traditionally treated by the scientia de anima a more precise position
within the Aristotelian distribution of sciences.
In effect, they observed that the concept of ‘soul’ had two differentmeanings: the
soulwasboth the sourceof life inall animatedbeings and theprinciple of intellectual
activity in human beings. To make matters worse, most sixteenth-century masters
of arts considered the intellectual operations of the soul tobe carried outnot through
a corporeal organ, but to be separable from the body and incorporeal. But how could
the study of these operations fall within the same discipline that studied the soul as
the corporeal form responsible for life?
In anarticle entitled “NaturalPhilosophy,Metaphysics or Something inBetween”, Paul
Bakker has analysed the way in which towering sixteenth-century figures answered
this question.96 Bakker points out that Renaissance questions about the disciplinary
status of psychologywere triggered and shapedby thediffusion of one passage found
in Aristotle’sDepartibus animalium, inwhich Aristotle had stated the following view:
the natural philosopher had to examine the soul insofar as it was conceived as the
source of motion (chiefly growth and sensation), but not insofar as it accounted
for intellectual activity. This passage had been hardly ever cited in medieval com-
mentaries De anima. Its increased popularity in the sixteenth century is due to the
fact that Simplicius mentions it in his commentary on De anima, which started to
exercise a major influence on the science of the soul from the late fifteenth cen-
tury onward.97 Simplicius’ commentary is particularly important because it adds
some elements to Aristotle’s exclusion of the intellectual soul from the disciplinary
96 Paul J.J.M. Bakker, “Natural Philosophy, Metaphysics or Something in Between? Agostino
Nifo, Pietro Pomponazzi, and Marcantonio Genua on the Nature and Place of the Science
of the Soul”, in Paul J.J.M. Bakker and Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen, eds., Mind, Cognition and
Representation. The Tradition of Commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima (Aldershot 2007), 151–177.
97 Here, I shall refer to the author of the work as Simplicius for the sake of convenience, whilst
it is opportune to mention that it has been discussed whether he was the real author of the
relevant commentary on Aristotle’s De anima. The authenticity of the work has been denied
by Carlos Steel, “The Author of the Commentary on the Soul”, in P. Huby and Carlos Steel,
transl., Priscian,On Theophrastus on Sense-Perception with ‘Simplicius’,On Aristotle On the Soul 2.5–
12 (London 1997), 105–140.However, the authenticity of theworkhas beendefendedby Ilsetraut
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realm of natural philosophy. According to Simplicius not only was man’s intellec-
tive soul beyond the scope of physics but it was in fact the business of metaphysics.
As a consequence, the science of the soul belonged to two different disciplines: it
was part of natural philosophy, because it looked at a corporeal form, viz., the soul
as a principle of life and motion in animate beings; but it was also part of meta-
physics, because it examined a substance such as the intellective soul, which was
separable fromthebody.AlthoughSimplicius thought that someparts ofpsychology
belonged to physics and some other tometaphysics, hemade it clear that the science
of the soul considered as a whole belonged to neither of these sciences. Therefore, he
concluded that psychology was an intermediary science between physics and meta-
physics.
Sixteenth-century discussions about this passage in Aristotle’s De partibus ani-
malium and its commentary by Simplicius bearwitness to the great attentionpaid by
Renaissance authors to the nature and place of psychology. The case study proposed
by Bakker considers the way in which problems connected with the disciplinary
status of the science of the soulwere dealtwithby three influential Renaissance com-
mentators on Aristotle’sDe anima: Agostino Nifo (1469/70–1538), Pietro Pomponazzi,
andMarcantonio Genua (1462–1525).
We have already seen that Pomponazzi doubted that natural philosophy could
demonstrate the immortality of the intellective soul. In his 1516 treatise De immor-
talitate animae, Pomponazzi judged that the immortality of the human soul could
only be shown by the Christian faith. In his commentary on Aristotle’s De partibus
animalium of 1521/24, Pomponazzi stated that not only the lower powers of the soul
(vegetative and sensitive), but also the intellect underwent change.98 In effect, the
intellect learns and forgets, hence it is inmotion. Although Pomponazzi preferred to
leave this problemopen, he suggested that the study of the intellective soul could fall
within the province of natural philosophy, the science that studies substances sub-
ject to motion. As a consequence, psychology as a whole was the business of natural
Hadot, “Simplicius or Priscianus? On the Author of the Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima
(cag xi): A Methodological Study”,Mnemosyne, 55 (2002), 159–199.
98 For Pomponazzi’s argument, see: Stefano Perfetti, ed., Pietro Pomponazzi, Expositio super primo
et secundoDe partibus animalium (Firenze 2004), 1. 8, 4360–68. On Pomponazzi’s commentary on
Departibus animalium, see; StefanoPerfetti, “ThreeDifferentWays of InterpretingAristotle’sDe
partibus animalium: Pietro Pomponazzi, Niccolò Leonico Tomeo and Agostino Nifo”, in Carlos
Steel and Guy Guldentops, eds., Aristotle’s Animals in the Middle Ages and Renaissance (Leuven
1999), 297–316.
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philosophy alone. In contrast with Pomponazzi, Nifo and Genua proposed analyses
that came closer to Simplicius’ view.
Bakker explains that Nifo looked at the disciplinary status of psychology in two
commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima, which were published in 1498 and 1520. In
both texts, Nifo appears to have conceived of the science of the soul as a middle
science (scientia media); however, this conclusion has different connotations in the
two commentaries.99 In his 1498 text, Nifo observed that because physics was the
science ofmotion andwhat is movable, it could not consider the human intellective
soul, which is immaterial hence not subject to movement. Nifo concluded, on the
one hand, that the science of the soul was a scientia intermedia split up across physics
andmetaphysics; on the other hand, because psychology as whole belonged neither
to physics nor to metaphysics, it could form a unitary science in its own right. In
his 1520 commentary, Nifo reiterated the idea that psychology was a middle science,
albeit in the sense of mathematical sciences; that is, sciences that examined entities
only partly bound to matter. Although the science of the soul belonged to natural
philosophy, it was more similar to mathematical sciences, hence a scientia media.100
The intermediary status of psychology seems even more strongly emphasised
by Genua. In his commentary De anima (1540s), he refers to a view put forward
by Pomponazzi’s De immortalitate animae, according to which the intellective soul
cannot work without sensible images and is therefore corruptible. Nevertheless,
Genua argued that natural philosophy was insufficient to grasp the human soul in
its entirety. This observation was inspired by the Averroist notion ofman’s intellect,
which led Genua to believe that the human soul involved two different aspects.
Each individual man has a cogitative soul (anima cogitativa), which is united to the
individual bodies and acquires knowledge by means of sensory images. But the
99 On Nifo’s conception of psychology as a middle science, see: Edward P. Mahoney, “Agostino
Nifo (ca. 1470–1538) on the Scientia de Anima as a ‘Mathematical’ or ‘Middle’ Science”, in Reijo
Työrinoja and Anja Inkeri Lehtinen, eds., Knowledge and the Sciences inMedieval Philosophy. Pro-
ceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy (s.i.e.p.m.), Helsinki,
24–29 August 1987 (Helsinki 1990), iii, 629–636.
100 As Bakker pointed out, the concept of ‘scientiamedia’ seems to have been introduced byThomas
Aquinas in his Physics, to indicate three forms of applied mathematics: optics, harmony,
and astronomy. See: Paul J.J.M. Bakker, “Natural Philosophy, Metaphysics or Something in
Between?”, 161, fn. 21. Bakker refers to Thomas Aquinas, In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis
expositio, edited by Mariano Maggiolo (Turin 1954), ii, l. 3, 84a-b, n. 164. On the same topic, see:
IanMueller, “Physics and Astronomy: Aristotle’s Physics ii.2 193b22–194a12”, Arabic Sciences and
Philosophy, 16 (2006), 175–206.
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human soul also has another aspect to it, namely the anima intellectiva: a unique
celestial intelligence, which is present in each human being in a non-local way and
assists the individual souls in their cognitive processes.
According to Genua, the Averroist view of the human soul is in complete agree-
ment with Simplicius’ conception of the nature and place of psychology: given that
the intellect is partly separate frommatter and partly dependent on it, both physics
andmetaphysics fail to grasp the soul as an intermediary being (ens medium). There-
fore, Genua argued that psychology should form a study in its own right. He calls
this study ‘scientia animastica’.
On the basis of the discussions conducted by Pomponazzi, Nifo, and Genua,
Bakker notices that, although Renaissance commentators on Aristotle’s De anima
were rather unclear about the nature, place, and the unity of the science of the soul,
their reflections brought about the idea of an intermediary science in its own right,
which contributed to the rise of psychology as an independent discipline.101 As Den-
nis Des Chene has noticed, sixteenth-century commentators did not look at psy-
chology as a discipline that was positively different from what we would now call
physiology. Nevertheless, the discussion presented by Bakker suggests that Renais-
sance authorswere not unaware of the fact that the study of the soul involved at least
two different aspects (the organic and the intellective soul), which might deserve
independent treatments or were in need of a deep disciplinary reorganisation.
The taskof findinganewdistribution for the subjects traditionally treatedby the
science of the soul appears to have occupied a number of sixteenth-century authors.
In his book The Sciences of the Soul, Fernando Vidal sheds light on the lively nature
of sixteenth-century psychology as a discipline and its capacity of accommodating
various approaches.102
Vidal’s book considers Renaissance psychology as one important slice of the his-
tory of psychology. More specifically, it seeks to show that a widely accepted view,
according towhich psychology became a discipline only during the last third part of
the nineteenth century, may be questioned. Vidal puts particular emphasis on fact
that psychology – or the science of the soul –was already a discipline in the sixteenth
century. As a consequence, he argues that eighteenth- and nineteenth-century psy-
chologies inherited their subject matter from a history that saw the transformation
101 Paul J.J.M. Bakker, “Natural Philosophy, Metaphysics or Something in Between?”, 177.
102 Fernando Vidal, The Sciences of the Soul. The EarlyModern origins of Psychology (Chicago 2011). This
book was originally published in French as: Fernando Vidal, Les sciences de l’ âme: xvie–xviiie
siècle (Paris 2006).
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of psychology from a science of living beings to a science of the humanmind, which
could in its turn be studied by looking at its empirical manifestations in the human
body. In order to trace such transformation, Vidal sets out to analyse the history of
the very term ‘psychology’.
OnVidal’s account, the term ‘psychology’ (psychologia)was firstused in sixteenth-
century diagrams on the organisation of knowledge and it started to circulate chiefly
inGermanProtestant universities for reasons of pedagogical convenience. According
to Vidal, ‘psychology’ was indeed only a neologism, which was not associated with
any particular new way of approaching the study of the soul.103 In Vidal’s opinion,
despite the fact that it did not substantially differ from earlier treatments of the
soul, the field of enquiry to which ‘psychology’ referred may be considered a proper
discipline, because it had a specificmethod and a specific subjectmatter. Psychology
was classified under both physics and metaphysics, and it treated the soul united
with the living body.104
Notwithstanding the fact that he does not consider the use of the term ‘psy-
chology’ to indicate a break with the medieval scientia de anima, Vidal appears to
grant sixteenth-century psychology some new elements. In particular, he observes
an increased use of anatomical knowledge surfacing in works on the soul produced
byanumberofRenaissanceProtestants. Vidal devotesparticular attention to someof
the authors I will deal with in this thesis: Philip Melanchthon, Rudolph Goclenius,
Rudolph Snellius, and Otto Casmann. He observes that term ‘psychology’ was of
common use within this tradition. What is more, Vidal considers sixteenth-century
psychology as a transformation that witnesses the emergence of forms of dualism
whereby the body was considered to possess a form of its own and came to occupy
a preponderant role in treatises on the soul. According to Vidal, more specifically in
the case of Philip Melanchthon and some of his followers, such as Johann Grün, the
study of the soul was accompanied by the anatomical account of the human body.
Anatomyandpsychology –Vidal explains – «together formed ananthropologywhich
was in harmony with Christianmorals and a Lutheran theology of sin».105
103 Vidal, The Sciences of the Soul, 29–30, 46. Marco Lamanna has determined the first occurrence
of the term ‘psychologia’ in the 1574 Quaestiones by the Calvinist Johannes Thomas Freig. See
Marco Lamanna, “On the Early History of Psychology”, Revista Filosófica de Coimbra 38 (2010),
301.
104 Vidal, The Sciences of the Soul, 3–20.
105 Vidal, The Sciences of the Soul, 43.
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To sum up, according to Vidal, from one point of view it has to be observed that
many sixteenth-century texts published under the heading ‘psychology’ amounted
to anthropologies, which described man in a more and more dualistic fashion, and
whichmade copioususe of anatomical knowledge todescribe thehumanbody. From
another point of view, Vidal concludes, the term ‘psychology’ was rarely defined
and its vague contours suggested a field of possibilities ranging from a science of
the principle of all animated beings to a study of the rational soul of man alone.
According toVidal, the increased focus on thehumanrational soul andanthropology
surfacing in sixteenth-century books on psychology became more dominant at the
end of the seventeenth century, when anthropology and psychology swopped places.
Because psychologywasmore andmore the science of the humanmind – as opposed
to the study of the animating principle in plants, animals, and men – psychology
became a branch of anthropology.106
As far as the present thesis is concerned, two of Vidal’s suggestions will be
accepted. First, sixteenth-century texts that used ‘psychologia’ in their titles will not
be considered as part of an altogether new project vis-à-vis the medieval science of
the soul. Inmany cases, Vidal’s observation that the term ‘psychology’was only a lex-
ical or stylistic novelty is correct. Second, the tradition of ‘psychologies’ that, as Vidal
correctly noticed, placed much attention on man’s body and man’s nature in gen-
eral was indeed a Protestant one and did try to produce anthropologies that strove to
promote some essential points of Lutheran theology. However, my study will differ
from Vidal’s in the following two ways. First, as I hope will appear throughout the
present work, the fact that the term ‘psychologia’ was not always linked to a new way
of looking at the soul is not enough to conclude that the science of the soul in the
sixteenth century did not present substantial differenceswhen compared to theway
in which the soul had been considered in the Middle Ages. Whilst this point will be
made clearer in the conclusions of this thesis, I can already mention the following
idea: true, some Renaissance ‘psychologiae’ were virtually standard commentaries on
Aristotle’sDeanima, whichmerely had anew fashionable title.However,many of the
‘psychologiae’ taken into consideration in this thesis shall be showed todiffer substan-
tially frommedieval commentaries on Aristotle’s books on the soul, in their subject
matter, aswell as in theirmethods and contents, and to an extent that inmy opinion
must not be overlooked. Second, Vidal’s link between some innovations in sixteenth-
century psychology and Protestant theologywill be explored inmore detail. Because
106 Vidal, The Sciences of the Soul, 57.
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the said link is in fact the very subject of this thesis, I shall show that some novelties
in part of the sixteenth-century science of the soul may be shown to have a strong
link to a specific version of Lutheran theology produced by PhilipMelanchthon. The
theological ideas proposed byMelanchthon that I shall show to be involved in a con-
siderable portion of sixteenth-century psychology will be described in detail later in
this introduction.107
In order to get there, it will be helpful to consider some scholarly literature that
has already looked at the link between religions and psychology in the Renaissance.
Let us then first summarise themost important ideas that emerged from the present
status quaestionis.
The scholarly literature examined so far shows that Renaissance authors dealing
with the soul brought about important changes. These changes regarded both the
lower and the higher operations of the soul. In fact, reflection about the vegetative
and sensitive powers of the soul resulted in an increased use of naturalistic and
mechanist explanations of the organic soul. Especially authors such as Bernardino
Telesio and Philip Melanchthon considered the soul’s lower powers to be machine-
like operations, which were either identical or very proximate to the body. Scholars,
however, have emphasised that Renaissance authors devoted particular attention
to the case of the human intellective soul and that their concerns – as epitomised
by the case of Pomponazzi’s De immortalitate animae – sprang from the difficulty of
harmonising a purely natural-philosophical psychology with Christian doctrines
about the soul’s immortality. What is more, debates about the human soul and its
immortal nature have been shown to have gained momentum in the wake of the
religious quarrels of sixteenth-century Reformation and Counter-Reformation.
Despite thesenewelements,most scholars agreeon the fact thatRenaissancepsy-
chology followed in the tradition ofmedieval commentaries on Aristotle’sDe anima,
Parva naturalia, andDe partibus animalium. Therefore its subject of investigation was
first and foremost the soul as the principle of life in all animate beings (including
plants and animals). The study of the human intellect was certainly of the utmost
importance to Renaissance authors, but it was nonetheless only a special instance of
their broader interest in the soul as the form of life. On this account, the scientia de
anima between 1350 and 1650 endured the absence of a clear disciplinary distinction
between issues that we would now ascribe to physiology and a study of the human
mind proper. It took the replacement of Aristotelian hylomorphism with mecha-
107 See further in this introduction, 59–85.
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nist physiology, as well as Descartes’ work, for psychology to consider exclusively the
humanmind as its subject matter.
Although generally speaking this view is by nowwidely accepted, recent scholar-
ship provides us with amore detailed picture of psychology during the decades pre-
ceding the transformations that were triggered by seventeenth-century mechanist
philosophy. More in particular, scholars have pointed to the livelihood of Renais-
sance debates on the methodology and disciplinary status of psychology. It is pre-
cisely because sixteenth-century professors of arts and medicine were aware of the
disciplinary ambiguity involved in the wide range of issues treated by psychology
that they sought to give their study a more precise place within the distribution of
sciences. In Italy and particularly at Padua, authors such as Agostino Nifo and Mar-
cantonioGenua recognised that the science of the soul treated issues thatwere partly
thebusiness of physics andpartlymore fit for ametaphysical enquiry. For this reason
they thought that psychology should be either amiddle science between the natural
and the metaphysical realms, or even a discipline in its own right, independent of
both physics andmetaphysics.
In northern Europe, notably in ProtestantGermany, reflection about psychology
as a discipline developed in the direction of an eclectic type of enquiry, which was
capable of encompassing natural-philosophical, medical, as well as religious doc-
trines. Scholars have studied the origin and first diffusion of the term ‘psychology’
(psychologia) in the German Protestant context and observed that, the term ‘psychol-
ogy’ did not indicate an entirely new science. On the other hand, the term was used
in treatises about the soul that bear witness to the following important innovation.
Authors working at Protestant universities in sixteenth-century northern Europe –
particularly those following in the footsteps of PhilipMelanchthon – devotedmuch
attention to the human soul, or better still, to humannature, from aChristian point
of view. Their efforts made psychology become part of a broader discipline: anthro-
pology.
The literature examined in this status quaestionis appears to ascribe great impor-
tance to the role that specific theological doctrines played in the development of
psychology in the sixteenth-century. But besides this rather predictable observation,
scholars seem to imply a more interesting point: the different types of psychologies
created during the Renaissance betray diverse confessional affiliations. For instance,
the use of the term ‘psychology’ has been traced back to a specific geographical, cul-
tural, and institutional context: German Protestant universities. Moreover, we have
seen how Kessler looked at psychology after the ‘Pomponazzi affair’ as either charac-
terised by a purely natural-philosophical way of looking at the soul or as bearing the
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effects of the ‘re-birth’ of Christian philosophy. On Kessler’s account, this ‘re-birth’
coincides with the needs of the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Counter-
Reformation, which resulted in «two corresponding Christian philosophies».
These suggestions notwithstanding, scholars have devoted surprisingly little
attention to the systematic study of the interplay between Renaissance psychology
and the process of confessionalisation. What do categories such as ‘Protestant Aris-
totelianism’ mean? Was there in fact any such a thing? Why did a certain way of
doing psychology emerged in Protestant Germany? Is the very notion of ‘Protestant
Germany’ helpful to explain determinate changes in the sixteenth-century science
of the soul?
The present thesis aims to give an answer to these questions; at least, in one
specific case: sixteenth-century works on the soul that in various ways followed
PhilipMelanchthonpsychology. This taskwill be pursued, however, by drawing on a
number of studies that have tried to lookmore precisely at the relationship between
psychology and confessional identities in theRenaissanceperiod, andwhich isworth
considering.
1.2.2. Psychology and Confessions in the Sixteenth Century
Here, I shall provide an overview of scholarly discussions about the way in which
Renaissance psychology developed in different confessional contexts. These discus-
sions appear tohave focused chiefly on the following three themes. First, on the intel-
lectual context in which psychology allegedly became a discipline in its own right;
second, on the use of anatomy in sixteenth-century works on the soul; third, on the
increased attention paid by Renaissance authors to questions concerning the origin
of the human soul. These three aspects of Renaissance psychology nicely illustrate
the interaction between theological issues and important transformations in the
sixteenth-century scientia de anima. For this reason, they have been given particular
consideration in this thesis. In order to have a first grasp of them, it is worth look-
ing at scholarly works that have highlighted the impact theological issues had on
Renaissance debates about the disciplinary status of psychology, the use of anatomy
in the science of the soul, and about discussions concerning the origin of the human
soul. Bydoing so,wewill alsobe able tobetter qualify some categories that are central
in this thesis, viz., ‘confessionalisation’, ‘confession’, and ‘confessional identities’.
When one looks at scholarly works that have considered the interplay between
psychology and sixteenth-century confessional identities, one cannot find a more
straightforward formulation of such interaction than that proposed by PaulMengal
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in his La naissance de la psychologie.108 Mengal is to my knowledge the most vocal
supporter of the idea that the sixteenth-century coinage of the term ‘psychologia’ is
an indication of the creation of a new discipline. In conclusion of his effort to study
the first occurrences of the term ‘psychologia’,Mengal states: «Point de départ denotre
enquête, la question de la première occurrence dumot psychologie demeure ouverte
mais qu’ importe après tout de repérer l’ inventeur dumot, pour autant qu’on puisse
jamais l’ identifier. Il nousparaît bienplus intéressantd’ avoir pumontrer que cemot
nouveau désigne une nouvelle manière de définir la science de l’ âme humaine et de
ses rapports avec le corps».109
According to Mengal, the most interesting aspect of the history of the term
‘psychology’ is not somuch the precise identification of its first author.What ismore
important is the observation that the first occurrences of the term in theRenaissance
are linked to a new way of defining the science of the soul and in fact to the origin
of a new science: «la psychologie est donc une science moderne car elle relève du
même paradigme que l’ anatomie de Vésale, la cosmologie de Copernic et de Galilée
ou encore la chimie de Robert Boyle».110
Contrary to the conclusions reached by Fernando Vidal’s The Science of the Soul,
Mengal argues that the term ‘psychology’ is notmerely a neologismused to indicate
an already existing discipline; instead, the sixteenth-century tradition of books on
the soul presents a type of novelty comparable to that of Vesalius’ anatomy, the
cosmologies of Copernicus and Galileo, as well as the chemistry of Robert Boyle. As
the title of the book La naissance de la psychologie eloquently suggests, psychology is
according to Mengal a modern science, which originates in the sixteenth century.
But the question is: which sixteenth century exactly? Interestingly enough, Mengal
traces the origin of psychology back to a specific intellectual context: «la psychologie
est fille de l’humanisme renaissant et de la Réforme».111
According to Mengal, psychology is the product of the joint action of humanist
and Protestant cultures. Humanism, Mengal explains, need not be taken in this
context as the attempt to retrieve ancient knowledge in its pristine form, but as
a movement pivoting on the centrality of human nature and developing in a way
consistent with the religious, political, and social changes brought about by the
Protestant reform. In the case of psychology, this transformation coincides with the
108 Mengal, La naissance de la psychologie.
109 Paul Mengal, La naissance de la psychologie, 353.
110 Paul Mengal, La naissance de la psychologie, 355.
111 Paul Mengal, La naissance de la psychologie, 353.
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‘déconstruction’ of the Aristotelian idea of the soul. More particularly, according to
Mengal, it coincideswith the end of the Thomist hylomorphic conception that looks
at the body and soul as two incomplete substances, whereby the former is made and
works for the sake of the latter. In the wake of the sixteenth-century Reformation,
Mengal argues, the dawning of a dualist type of anthropologymarks the end of such
Aristotelian-Thomist synthesis. Interestingly enough, the dualism Mengal has in
mind is not Descartes’, but that which surfaces in the work of Philip Melanchthon,
as well as in the books written by some of his followers whoworked inMarburg and
Leiden.
By drawing onGalen’s andVesalius’ anatomicalworks,Mengal argues,Melanch-
thon wrote a commentary on De anima that ascribed to the body operations that
had hitherto been assigned to the vegetative and sensitive souls. The Marburg pro-
fessor Rudolph Goclenius and Rudolph Snellius of Leiden drew on Melanchthon’s
ideas for their psychological views. By doing so, Mengal argues, they stopped look-
ing at human nature as a composite of matter and form and rather conceived of it
as a two-dimensional entity. As a consequence of this, they re-moulded their texts
on the soul into a new discipline called ‘anthropologia’ (anthropology), which was
in its turn divided into psychology (‘psychologia’: the science of the embodied soul)
and anatomy (‘anatomia’: the science of the body).112 On the basis of these observa-
tions, Mengal argues that this humanist-Protestant psychology was a new domain
of knowledge vis-à-vis the medieval science of the soul and that it differed from
the Aristotelian De anima tradition in that it was essentially dualist. According to
Mengal, this dualism nicely fits the intellectual context of Protestant Germany and
the Low Countries. This milieu, Mengal explains, was itself marked by a kind of
dualism: Germany and the Low Countries were characterised by the presence of
many different confessions, a heterogeneity that was tackled by means of a distinc-
tion between church and state, as well as between the public and private spheres of
human life. Interestingly enough, Mengal sees so much dualism in the psycholog-
ical texts produced at the Reformed university of Leiden as to claim that Descartes
very probably read them during his stay in the Low Countries. Unfortunately, Men-
gal does not provide textual evidence for this claim. On the contrary, he argues that
112 That Rudolph Goclenius looked at psychology in the terms described by Mengal is question-
able. As Lamanna has more recently showed, Goclenius did not produce the same type of
psychology as Snellius, nor did he devote substantial parts of his psychology to the anatomical
consideration of the human body. See: Marco Lamanna, La nascita dell’ontologia nella metafisica
di Rudolph Göckel (1547–1628), 302–303.
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the very attempt to find traces of the Leiden tradition on the soul in Descartes’
work is vain: the allegedly dualist authors who worked at sixteenth-century Leiden
were close to Jacobus Arminius (1559–1609). Arminius, who taught theology at Leiden
and became the leader of the Remonstrants in Holland, was accused of pelagianism
(the theological theory according to which human nature was not affected com-
pletely by the original sin). Therefore, Mengal argues, Descartes could not possibly
quote his Leiden sources without risking to be associated with Arminius’ undesir-
able theology.113
To sum up, Mengal looks at sixteenth-century psychology in northern Europe
not simply as just anothermoment in thehistory of theAristotelian scientia de anima,
but as a point of rupture, albeit a gradual one: the study of the soul at sixteenth-
centuryMarburg and Leiden followed in the footsteps ofMelanchthon andhis use of
anatomy inorder todescribe thehumanbodyandcertainparts of the soul. According
toMengal, the tradition of books on the soul inspired byMelanchthon’s inGermany
and theLowCountries coincides in factwith theoriginofpsychology.Thisdiscipline,
Mengal concludes, is the product of the Protestant reform and ismarked by forms of
dualism.
In this thesis I shall confirm Mengal’s idea that a new way of looking at the
soul was developed by a group of Protestant authors and that their psychological
workswere linked towhatMengal interprets as a ‘dualistic anthropology’. However,
my analysis will differ from Mengal’s on the following points. First, I prefer not to
use terms such as ‘dualistic’ and ‘dualism’, because they either do not seem precise
and informative enough, as they have been used to indicate disparate philosophical
theories, or because they are normally linked to thework ofDescartes.114The authors
taken into consideration in this thesis wrote their works prior to Descartes, nor does
it appear legitimate to retrospectively ascribe to their works the type of psychology
that emerged in the wake of Cartesian philosophy. For this reason, I shall rather
use the terms ‘bipartite’ or ‘disjunctivist’ to refer to the type of anthropology that
surfaces in the works of Melanchthon and some of his followers.115 Second, whilst
113 Paul Mengal, La naissance de la psychologie, 355.
114 For instance, James B. Southhas spoken of “Cognitive ProcessDualismPrinciple” in the case of
Fancisco Suárez’s psychology. See: James B. South, “Singular andUniversal in Suárez’s Account
of Cognition”, The Review ofMetaphysics 55.4 (2002), 796.
115 This point will occurmany times in this thesis. However, amore detailed explanation of what
Imeanby ‘disjunctivist’ or ‘bipartite’ anthropologymaybe found further in this introduction,
79, and infra, ‘Chapter 5’, 152.
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Mengal’s effort to link new psychological ideas to the intellectual context of the
Protestant Reformation is valuable, I shall narrow down the tie between such ideas
and their confessional context to a more specific group of authors (in fact, to Philip
Melanchthon and some of his followers). As I hope it will emerge throughout this
thesis, ‘Protestant Reformation’ is so broad a category or to become almost useless
when it comes to analysing the interplay between psychology and confessions in
the sixteenth century. Not all sixteenth-century Protestants did psychology in the
way described by Mengal. The crucial point is that ‘Protestantism’ never implied a
specific way of looking at the soul. This does not mean that Protestant confessions
had no influence on the Renaissance science of the soul. Quite the contrary: because
confessions did play a role in the development of sixteenth-century psychology, it is
desirable that scholars abandon terms such as ‘Reformation’ or ‘Protestant’, which
are too vague from a confessional point of view.
Third, I shall try todemonstrate that although the type of bipartite anthropology
describedbyMengalwas theproduct of a specific part of Protestant culture, it didnot
staywithin such cultural boundaries. The idea that the science ofman (or anthropol-
ogy) should consider the human body (by means of anatomy) and the humanmind
(the task of psychology) became a commonplace beyond the boundaries of psycho-
logical texts produced at Protestant universities.
The picture of sixteenth-century psychology proposed by Mengal was quite in-
novative vis-à-vis the scholarship available until 2005. Mengal’s observations about
Melanchthon’s use of anatomy, however, has received detailed attention in earlier
studies,most; notably in the seminalworks ofVivianNuttonandSachikoKusukawa.
Their analyses are particularly interesting for the present thesis, because they show
thatMelanchthon’s use of anatomy inhisDeanimahada specific Lutheran character.
The case of Melanchthon’s work on the soul nicely illustrates the way in which
psychology could correspond to specific confessional needs.
In his article “Wittenberg Anatomy”, Nutton showed that Vesalian anatomy
occupied a central role in the curriculum at Wittenberg, in medicine as much as
in the arts faculty. Under the auspices of Philip Melanchthon, Nutton explains, the
study of anatomy at the Saxon university became an educational process in which
a message that went beyond purely medical interests was transmitted from mas-
ter to pupil. According to Nutton, the teaching of anatomy at Wittenberg cannot
be understood in terms of the discoveries it made, for those were in fact minimal.
What Wittenberg anatomy was all about was recognising God through his handi-
work: the human body. But forMelanchthon and his students, anatomy also taught
the workings of the soul and most importantly how the soul acted for good or evil.
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Anatomy was supposed to contribute to curing the body, but more importantly it
instructed the Lutheran youth about the health of the soul.116 According to Nut-
ton, Wittenberg anatomy was «part of a broader movement for the understanding
of man’s place in God’s creation». This was an educational ideal that «aimed to pro-
duce Christian intellectuals, both learned and Lutherans».117 Whilst Nutton suffi-
ciently demonstrates that anatomy at Wittenberg was a Christian endeavour, he
is less clear about the more specifically Lutheran nature of the anatomical teach-
ings contained in Melanchthon’sDe anima. This point has been better explained by
Kusukawa’s study of theWittenberg reformer, who earned the title of ‘praeceptor Ger-
maniae’.
Kusukawa’s The Transformation of Natural Philosophy devotes many pages to Me-
lanchthon’s works on the soul, and it is probably the best account available of Me-
lanchthon’s attempt to devise a Lutheran doctrine of the soul.118 According to Kusu-
kawa, although many scholars have pointed to the humanist nature of Melanch-
thon’s educational reform, his De anima cannot be interpreted as a humanist work.
On Kusukawa’s account, what Melanchthon wrote about the soul is nothing like a
philological exegesis of Aristotle’sDe anima. True,Melanchthon collatesmany opin-
ions of otherswithout ever committinghimself to any position; but it is nonetheless
important to observe that he takes a particular stance on very relevant issues. At
the same time, Kusukawa explains, one will be equally disappointed when reading
Melanchthon’s De anima as a philosophical work. For, instead of the kind of coher-
ence that one would expect from philosophy, it presents a mixture of teleological
and dogmatic statements of theological principles. According to Kusukawa, one has
to read the Commentarius de anima asMelanchthon himself conceived of it, namely as
a Lutheranwork on the soul. Whilst Kusukawa’s argument will surfacemore clearly
in several parts of this thesis, it isworth statinghere at least themain reasons that led
Kusukawa to assign a confessional nature to Melanchthon’s work. In a way similar
to Nutton, Kusukawa demonstrated that Melanchthon looked at Aristotle, Galen,
and Vesalius (in fact, the main sources used in the Commentarius) as showing that
the human body presented a teleological nature – the body was made for a pur-
pose. Perhaps the most important purpose that Melanchthon saw in the body and
humannature as awhole (body and soul)was thepossessionof innatenotions of civic
116 Vivian Nutton, “Wittenberg Anatomy”, in Ole P. Grell and Andrew Cunningham, eds.,Medi-
cine and the Reformation (London 1993), 11–32.
117 Vivian Nutton, “Wittenberg Anatomy”, 11, 12.
118 Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy, 75–123.
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moral, hence man’s capability to tell right from wrong. It is with this conception,
Kusukawa argues, that the Lutheran character of Melanchthon’s work lies. When
Melanchthon wrote the Commentarius de anima, he was busy tackling movements
of political unrest within the Evangelical camp: as Luther’s reform neutralised the
papal authority, minor Protestant groups (notably, the Anabaptists) called for civil
disobedience. As a consequence, Luther’s andMelanchthon’s reform came under the
fire of their Catholics opponents, who accused Lutheranism of violence. In order to
steer clear of such accusations as well as of the claims for civil disobedience defended
by the Anabaptists, Melanchthon had recourse to natural philosophy: the observa-
tion of the natural world would show the law of God, which culminated in civic
morality.119 From this perspective, the study of human nature was of paramount
importance: anatomical knowledge about man’s body and the study of the human
soulwould show the orderly structure of nature and the fact that civil obediencewas
amongst the innate ideas that God had bestowed uponman’s soul. It is in this sense
that, according to Kusukawa, Melanchthon’s psychology and his use of anatomy
were Lutheran: they had to provide Lutherans with knowledge of God’s law. But
theywere alsomeant to defend Luther’s reformby enforcing political order amongst
Protestants.120
Sixteenth-century psychology bore witness to a very lively discussion about its
disciplinary aspects. The introduction of anatomical knowledge in treatises on the
soul is probably one of the most significant methodological and disciplinary inno-
vations brought about by Renaissance authors. According toNutton andKusukawa,
the use of anatomy in works on the soul and the religious ideas that accompanied
such use were not completely new, whereas the specific way in which psychology,
anatomy, and religion were linked together in the sixteenth century was certainly a
novel element in the Aristotelian tradition of commentaries on the soul. ForNutton
and Kusukawa, this development was characteristically Lutheran.
As a consequence of Nutton’s and Kusukawa’s works, the confessional aspects of
sixteenth-century psychology and anatomy have received increased attention.
Andrew Cunningham’s The Anatomical Renaissance offered what is probably the
most explicit account of the linkbetween anatomy and religious views in theRenais-
sance. In a chapter tellingly entitled “The Anatomical Reformation? An Enquiry”,
Cunningham argued for some stronger link between anatomy and the Lutheran
119 This point will be extensively treated further in this introduction, 64–74.
120 Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy, 99–101.
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world: «Thus – Cunningham argues – although the evidence is not conclusive, yet
because, it shows, in my view, Vesalius’ work in anatomical reform replicating pre-
cisely Luther’s work in religious reform, and because the Protestant leaders them-
selves took up Vesalian anatomy andmade it central to their philosophical teaching
in the Protestant cause, it points to Vesalius being a Lutheran and as coming to a
new view of the body because hewas playing out his Lutheranism into his practice of
anatomy».121 After Nutton, Kusukawa, and Cunningham, other scholars have grap-
pled with the relation between confessions and the use of anatomy in Renaissance
psychological treatises. Their conclusions, however, are not always concurring with
those sketched above.
The link between anatomy, psychology and Protestantism is the subject of Jür-
gen Helm’s “Protestant and Catholic Medicine in the Sixteenth Century? The Case
of Ingolstadt Anatomy”. Although the title is mainly concerned withmedicine, this
article offers important insights in the use of anatomy made in works on the soul
produced in Wittenberg and Ingolstadt. Helm’s article sets out to compare the con-
clusions reached by Nutton, Kusukawa, and Cunningham with the use of anatomy
at the Catholic university of Ingolstadt in the sixteenth century. Helm looks at the
origin and institutional context of the university of Ingolstadt and importantly to
the fact that the whole arts faculty was formally transferred to the Jesuit order in
1588. The importance of this observation lies in the fact that the Jesuit Constitutiones
had established that teaching of medicine should not be performed by members of
the Society of Jesus. Therefore, Helm argues, it is not surprising that anatomy found
no place in the teaching on the soul given at Ingolstadt.122
Yet, according to Helm, the fact that anatomy did not have at Ingolstadt the
same systematic place it received in the Wittenberg arts curriculum does not mean
that anatomical knowledge was completely lacking at the Jesuit institution, nor
that it had no religious connotations. In fact, Helm shows the case of violent anti-
Protestant attacks coming from Ingolstadt, in which Luther was made responsible
for the diffusion of Paracelsus’ allegedly impiousmedicine. As a consequence of this,
the Ingolstadt physician Adam Landau (died 1573) praised Galen, Hippocrates, and
Vesalius as the authors of the medicine given to us by God. Their legacy had to be
preserved against Paracelsus’ medicine, which was – in Landau’s opinion – being
121 Andrew Cunningham, The Anatomical Renaissance. The Resurrection of the Anatomical Projects of
the Ancients (Aldershot 1997), 234–235.
122 JürgenHelm, “Protestant and CatholicMedicine in the Sixteenth Century? The Case of Ingol-
stadt Anatomy”,Medical History, 45 (2001), 83–96, 92.
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defended by the Lutheran camp. Hence, according to Helm, Vesalian anatomy was
not a Wittenberg monopoly, but could actually be used in an anti-Lutheran way.123
What is more, Helm demonstrates, the very substance of Melanchthon’s reading of
Deanima could be taught at Ingolstadt aswell, as it emerges from the case of a certain
MelchiorFleck’sDepraestantia corporishumani. This orationgivenat Ingolstadt in 1568
was intended to show the strength of the Jesuit university. Ironically, it included
extensive passages about the divinely ordained structure of man’s body that were
almost literal quotations fromMelanchthon’s Liber de anima (1552). As I will show in
this thesis, by the time Fleck’s oration was given, the Ingolstadt teaching about the
soul had followed in the footsteps of Veit Amerbach’s Quatuor libri de anima (1542).
Amerbach, who was formerly at Wittenberg, wrote this book in the wake of some
differences withMelanchthon, which led him to abandon the Lutheran faith and to
join the Jesuits at Ingolstadt. It is all themore amusing – as Helm points out – to see
the core of Melanchthon’s work being used in Fleck’s oration. According to Helm,
the Jesuit teachers at Ingolstadt did not consider Melanchthon’s teaching about the
human soul and anatomy specifically Lutheran.124
In a way similar to Jürgen Helm, Michael Edwards’ “Body, Soul and Anatomy
in Late Aristotelianism” has tried to gauge the use that different sixteenth-century
religious groups made of anatomy in the study of the soul.125 By looking at a sam-
ple of Jesuit authors (such as Francisco Suárez, Emanuel de Goes, and Roderigo de
Arriaga), Edwards observed that the official restrictions issued by the Society of Jesus
forwhat concerned the teachingof anatomywere formative rather thanprescriptive:
Jesuit authors in fact cited anatomical sources in their commentaries onDe anima.126
However, Edwards points out, their psychological works did not provide detailed
anatomical descriptions of the bodily organs as Melanchthon and his Wittenberg
students did.127 Whilst Edwards’ research may be used to confirm Helm’s observa-
tions about thenon-denominational nature of sixteenth-century uses of anatomy in
the study of the soul, it does not seem to compare confessional groups (e.g. Catholics
and Protestants) in the way proposed by Helm. Edwards rather focuses on smaller
intellectual communities, viz., some authors belonging to the Jesuit order and some
123 Helm, “Protestant and Catholic Medicine in the Sixteenth Century?”, 89–92.
124 Helm, “Protestant and Catholic Medicine in the Sixteenth Century?”, 94–96.
125 Michael Edwards, “Body, Soul and Anatomy in Late Aristotelianism”, in GideonManning, ed.,
Form andMatter in Early modern Philosophy (Leiden 2012), 33–75.
126 Edwards, “Body, Soul and Anatomy in Late Aristotelianism”, 55–57.
127 Edwards, “Body, Soul and Anatomy in Late Aristotelianism”, 65.
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others following the teaching on the soul devised at Wittenberg, by the Lutheran
Philip Melanchthon.
The study of the relationship between the use of anatomy in sixteenth-century
works on the soul and the confessional contexts inwhich suchworks were produced
thus appears to have received diverging accounts: scholars like Edwards and Helm
have tried to soften the denominational nature of the use of anatomical knowledge
in Renaissance psychological works. Authors like Cunningham, on the other hand,
have emphasised the specific Lutheran character of Vesalian anatomy and its uses in
the sixteenth century.
In this thesis I shall try to show that these two interpretations may be recon-
ciled. Whilst the idea that anatomy had to be included in the study of the soul was
not necessarily Lutheran, it took on a specific meaning and importance within a
group of Lutheran authors, who followed in the footsteps of Philip Melanchthon.
In the following chapters, I shall show that the particular use of anatomy made by
Melanchthon in his works on the soul became very influential among some Protes-
tant authors who worked between the end of the sixteenth century and the begin-
ning of the seventeenth. Also for this reason, the present thesis will try to provide
an image of Melanchthon’s and some of his followers’ psychologies that differs in
some way from that recently portrayed by Sascha Salatowsky. In his De Anima. Die
Rezeption der aristotelischen Psychologie im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert, Salatowsky sets out
to describe the reception of Aristotelian psychology (especially as it was developed
by the main ancient and medieval schools: Alexandrism, Neoplatonism, Averroism,
and Thomism) in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Interestingly enough,
Salatowsky’s analysis starts with Luther’s rejection of the philosophical demonstra-
bility of the immortality of thehuman soul andwith theway inwhichMelanchthon
dealt with Luther’s ideas. In a way different from Luther – Salatowsky explains –
Melanchthon valued Aristotelian psychology, whilst recognising that philosophi-
cal psychology needed to be completed by a Christian understanding of the soul.
According to Salatowsky, the result of Melanchthon’s endeavour was a theologi-
cal anthropology, a mixture of philosophy and theology, which did not result in a
viable compromise between philosophy and the Christian faith. So much so, Sala-
towsky concludes, that Lutheran universities at the turn of the seventeenth century
replacedMelanchthon’s works with the psychologies produced by Spanish and Ital-
ian authors in the Renaissance.128
128 Sascha Salatowsky, De Anima.Die Rezeption der aristotelischen Psychologie im 16. und 17. Jahrhun-
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In the following chapters, I shall explain that it is true that not all Lutherans
and not all Lutheran universities considered Melanchthon’s their preferred way of
looking at the soul. Moreover, even authors who followed Melanchthon could very
well integrate material stemming from Spanish and Italian commentaries in their
works about the soul. However, in this thesis, I shall show that the mixture of
philosophy, anatomy, and theology found inMelanchthon’s Commentarius and Liber
de anima did not stopmany sixteenth- and seventeenth-century authors from using
these books as their favourite platform for the study of the soul. On the contrary,
they thought that the blend of theology and philosophy produced by Melanchthon
was the only Christian – hence, true – way of studying the soul.
If we now go back to our overview of the available literature that has devoted
some effort to link specific theories about the soul to different confessional contexts,
there is one last scholarly debate I find opportune to mention in this introduction.
This is the case of studies about Renaissance disputes on the origin of the soul,
fromwhich some confessional aspects of sixteenth-centurypsychology emerge quite
clearly.
As I shall show in this thesis, Renaissance authors ascribed great importance to
the questionwhether the intellective soul ofmanwas created directly byGod in each
individual, or rather only in the first created man and then propagated by means of
natural reproduction. The two alternatives were respectively referred to as “creation
dert, 131: «Diese philosophisch-theologische Eklektik gereichte freilich beiden Disziplinen
nicht zumVorteil. Denn anders als Luther gelang esMelanchthonmit diesem Programnicht,
die Differenz von Philosophie und Theologie offenzuhalten. Seine krude Vermischung bei-
der Disziplinen, die jeden philosophischen Locus theologisiert und verchristlicht, beraubt
der Philosophie die Möglichkeit, aus sich selbst heraus die Kraft für ein besonnenes und der
Wahrheit dienliches Argumentieren zu entwickeln, und hindert die Theologie, das Andere
ihres Glaubens in Differenz zur Philosophie deutlich zu machen. Dies ist auch der Grund,
weshalb Melanchthons Psychologie zu Recht von Frank und Stiening eine ‚theologische An-
thropologie‘ bzw. ‚theologische Psychologie‘ genannt worden ist. Das Werk ist nur vorder-
gründig eine philosophische Psychologie, die sich um ein Verständnis der aristotelischen
Lehre bemüht. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist es aus philosophischer (und auch aus theologis-
cher) Sicht verständlich,wennMelanchthonsWerke zuBeginndes 17. Jh.s an den lutherischen
Hochschulenmehrundmehr durch andere Schriften, die demsensus Aristotelis angemessen-
er waren, ersetzt worden sind. Der Anlass hierfür liegt im Bekanntwerden der Lutheranermit
denWerken des spanischen und italienischen Renaissance-Aristotelismus begründet, dermit
den Errungenschaften des Humanismus und einem veränderten philosophischen Interesse
eine Neuinterpretation der aristotelischen Schriften unternahm. Dies ist im folgenden Kapi-
tel aufzuzeigen».
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exnihlo” and “generation ex traduce”. In awaydifferent to theirmedieval predecessors,
sixteenth-century authors assigned a systematic place to this question in theirworks
on the soul. Interestingly enough, scholars who looked at Renaissance discussions
about the origin of the soul have tended to emphasise the confessional character of
the dispute between “creationists” and “traducianists”.
For instance, Michael Stolberg has observed that determining the origin of the
soul became a major issue of interconfessional debate, between the sixteenth and
the seventeenth centuries. More precisely, Stolberg argues, Lutherans differed from
their Calvinists and Catholics contemporaries in that the former confessional group
defended that the human soul was generated ex traduce, whereas the latter group
advocated creationism. According to Stolberg, the God of traducianismwas a Luthe-
ran God and traducianism was the most immediate and radical reflection of one’s
Lutheran allegiance.129 I will give more space to Stolberg argument further in this
thesis.Here, it isworthmentioning that conclusions similar tohishavebeen reached
by other scholars. Amongst others, Joseph S. Freedman has argued that Renaissance
discussions on the soul presented by Lutherans differed from those presented by
their Catholic and Calvinist counterparts on one specific point: Lutherans stated
that the souls were generated through the seed of the parents, whereas Catholic and
Calvinist authors opted for the ex nihilo thesis.130 A somewhatmore careful interpre-
tation of sixteenth-century debates on the origin of the soul has been recently pro-
posed by Leen Spruit. In effect, according to Spruit, the discussion amongst Luther-
ans was very lively and only “as a rule” did Lutherans defend traducianism.131
I shall devote a specific part of this thesis to the sixteenth-century debate on
the origin of the soul. In that context, I will be able to offer a different account
of the confessional character of the dispute, as well as of the very notion of “con-
fession”, when it comes to understanding the relationship between Renaissance
psychology and religious views. The categories of “confession” and “confessional-
isation” may fruitfully be used to interpret specific aspects of psychology during
the sixteenth century, insofar as they are conceived as describing processes whereby
129 Michael Stolberg, “Particles of the Soul. TheMedical and LutheranContext of Daniel Sennert’s
Atomism”,Medicina nei Secoli 15/2 (2003), 189–194.
130 Joseph S. Freedman, The Soul (anima) according to Clemens Timpler (1563/4–1624) and Some of His
Central European Contemporaries, in Scientia et Artes. Die Vermittlung alten und neuen Wissens
in Literatur, Kunst undMusik (Wolfenbüttel 2004), 806–807.
131 Leen Spruit, The Origin of the Soul From Antiquity to the EarlyModern Era (Lugano 2014), 81.
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religious identities are formed by means of controversies rather than fixed intellec-
tual blocks. Confessional identities are better understood as dynamics which were
intertwined with psychological controversies rather than as rigid intellectual for-
mations from which theories about the soul could be deduced. This point will be
grasped better by briefly looking at the historiography of the idea of “confessionali-
sation”.
1.3. Confessionalisation, Confession, and Confessionalism
To what extent were the innovations brought about by Renaissance psychology
motivated by different confessional demands? Was anatomy used only in Lutheran
treatises about the soul?Was ‘traducianism’ a distinctly Lutheran theory?Aswehave
seen, these are some of the questions onwhich research dealingwith the interaction
between psychology and religion in the sixteenth century has hitherto focused. In
fact, these are also some of the main themes addressed by this thesis.
As we have just seen, scholars have ascribed a specifically Lutheran nature to the
adoption of anatomy in the sixteenth-century scientia de anima. By doing this, they
have compared a specific type of intellectual production with the need for enforcing
orthodoxy and social discipline within a determinate confessional context. More-
over, research has more recently compared the use of anatomy in psychology across
different confessional groups in the sixteenth century, and studies are now available
that trace determinate doctrines about the origin of the soul back to the specific doc-
trinal demands of the different Christian denominations. Interestingly enough, all
these questions appear to involve – more or less implicitly – the categories of ‘con-
fession’ and ‘confessionalisation’. But what does it mean when we say that a certain
psychological theory interacted with the strife on the part of some religious men
to discipline a social group? Or what do we imply when we say, for instance, that
‘traducianism’ was the Lutheran way of looking at the origin of the human soul?
In order to assess the current research about the interplay between psychology and
confessions in the sixteenth century, it is opportune to briefly sketch the way in
which historians have conceived of the categories of ‘confessionalisation’ and ‘con-
fession’.
‘Confessionalisation’ is English for Konfessionalisierung, which is in fact a cate-
gory that since the 1970’s has been adopted to interpret German history, in the wake
of the Protestant reform. Three conferences promoted by the Verein für Reforma-
tionsgeschichte made ‘confessionalisation’ gain widespread popularity in the field
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of Reformation history.132However, no univocal idea of ‘confessionalisation’ appears
to be available. What seems to be shared by the various versions of the concept of
confessionalisation is the idea that certain sixteenth-century political and territorial
formations developed as a consequence of particular religious transformations.
As Susan R. Boettcher pointed out, ‘confessionalisation’ has been used, in a re-
stricted sense, by Anton Schindling to interpret the later GermanReformation (1555–
1649). In this sense, ‘confessionalisation’ stands for the doctrinal and political con-
solidation of the three Christian denominations in Germany, as connected with the
development of the territorial state.133 In a broader sense, Heinz Schilling and Wolf-
gangReinhardhaveused the ideaof ‘confessionalisation’ todescribe aprocess involv-
ing post-Reformation Europe in its entirety. This process amounted to an alliance
between church and state that facilitated political centralisation, as opposed to local
privileges.134As far as our discussion is concerned, themost interesting aspect of both
uses of the idea of ‘confessionalisation’ is the following: the historical processes that
have been described by means of the term are all linked to the issuing of confes-
sional statements and churchordinances. In effect, ‘confessional groups’ are, roughly
speaking, aggregates of people who adhere to an explicit statement of doctrine, or
‘confessio’ (confession). Themain statements of doctrine for the three Western Chris-
tian denominations were the following ones: the Confession of Augsburg (1530) and
the Book of Concord (1580), for Lutheranism; the Helvetic Confessions (1536, 1566),
the Zurich Consensus (1549), and the Canons of Dordrecht (1619), for the Reformed
Calvinist confession; the Tridentine Profession of Faith (1564), for Catholicism.
When one compares these definitions of ‘confessionalisation’ and ‘confession’
to the available research on the confessional aspects of sixteenth-century psychol-
132 The results of these conferences are published in: Hans-Christoph Rublack, ed.,Die lutherische
Konfessionalisierung in Deutschland (Gütersloh 1992); Wolfgang Reinhard, ed., Die katholische
Konfessionalisierung (Gütersloh 1995); Heinz Schilling, ed., Die Reformierte Konfessionalisierung in
Deutschland (Gütersloh 1986).
133 See Susan R. Boettcher, “Confessionalization: Reformation, Religion, Absolutism, andModer-
nity”, History Compass 2 (2004), 1. For Schindling’s research on confessionalisation, see: Anton
Schindling, ed., Die Territorien des Reichs im Zeitalter der Reformation und Konfessionalisierung, 7
vols. (Münster 1089–1997).
134 For Schilling andReinhard researchon confessionalisation, see:Heinz Schilling, “Confessional
Europe: Bureaucrats, La Bonne Police, Civilizations”, in Handbook of European History 1400–
1600: Late Middle Ages, Renaissance and Reformation, 2 vols. (Leiden 1995), ii, 641–681; Wolfgang
Reinhard, “Reformation, Counter-Reformation, and the EarlyModern State. AReassessment”,
The Catholic Historical Review 75,3 (1989), 383–404.
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ogy, the following point can bemade. Scholars who have linked particular aspects of
Renaissance psychology to determinate confessional groups only very seldom look
at confessions in the way I just sketched. True, virtually none of the works men-
tioned in the previous section of this introduction explicitly uses the categories of
‘confessionalisation’ and ‘confession’. This can perhaps explain why scholars such
as Eckhard Kessler and Paul Mengal do not seem to be worried about official state-
ments of doctrine. Yet, how are we to understand Kessler’s observation that in the
wake of the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Reformation (the age of the
‘re-birth’ of Christian psychology), the science of the soul gave rise to two Christian
philosophies?Or,what exactly does PaulMengalmeanwhenhe argues that psychol-
ogy as a discipline is the fruit of the Protestant Reformation and that the ‘dualist’
tendencies surfacing in sixteenth-century psychology reflected the dualismbetween
church and state that characterised post-Reformation Germany and the Low Coun-
tries?
What does ‘Lutheran’ stand for when Michael Stolberg states that to hold tra-
ducianism in the Renaissance debates about the origin of the soul was the most
immediate and radical reflection of one’s Lutheran allegiance?
To the best of my knowledge, traducianism was not part of the Lutheran state-
ments of doctrine, or at least Stolberg never seems to show that the thesis ex traduce
was implied by official statements of the Lutheran church. In a way similar to Stol-
berg, Kessler and Mengal also link certain transformations in the Renaissance De
anima tradition to confessional differences, withoutmaking reference to the confes-
sional statements throughwhich Lutheranism, Calvinism, and Catholicism became
internally coherent andmutually exclusive doctrines.
The lack of references to official confessional statements does not diminish the
importance of the scholarly studies that addressed the interplay between psychol-
ogy and religious views in the sixteenth century. Traducianism was indeed quite
widespread amongst Lutherans; Catholics and Protestants did philosophy in ways
that differed in many respects from each other, and a new way of doing psychology
was indeed produced at the hand of authors affiliated to Protestant institutions. But
if all this is true, one must well recognise that the confessional nature ascribed to
certain psychological views in the sixteenth-century cannot be taken in the sense of
a rigid relationship between confessional statements and psychological doctrines.
Especially during the first half of the sixteenth century, when confessional iden-
tities were not yet well defined, there never was something like a Lutheran psychol-
ogy. There was instead, I argue, much interplay between Lutheran, Calvinist, and
Catholic views and debates about the soul. Which kind of interplay exactly?
introduction 69
In his book Social Discipline in the Reformation, Ronnie Po-chia Hsia made a dis-
tinction between ‘confessionalisation’ and ‘confessionalism’ thatmay help us better
define the relationship between sixteenth-century psychology and the transforma-
tion of Western Christianity into a confessionalised landscape. According to Hsia,
‘confessionalisation’ refers to the «process by which the consolidation of the early
modern state, the imposition of social discipline, and the formation of confessional
churches transformed society». Hsia defines ‘confessionalism’ as the interrelated
process that amounted to «the formation of religious ideologies and institutions in
Lutheranism, Calvinism, and Catholicism. The concept denotes the articulation of
belief systems (in “confessional texts”), the recruitment and character of various pro-
fessional clerical bodies, the constitution and operations of church institutions, and
systems of rituals».135
I propose to consider this idea of ‘confessionalism’ as a fruitful category to inter-
pret the relationship between sixteenth-century psychology and the religious views
held by Lutherans, Calvinists, and Catholics in that age. Because it treated the soul,
psychology handled subjects that were immediately relevant to Christian theology.
The science of the soul had to do with the origin and place of man in the created
world, with man’s will and sinful nature, as well as with the possibility for man’s
corrupted nature to be redeemed through the Christian God. Now, since these theo-
logical issues were of paramount importance in the articulation of beliefs and insti-
tutions on the part of Lutherans, Calvinists, and Catholics, psychology was part and
parcel of what Hsia described by the term ‘confessionalism’.
Given these premises, this thesis shall not considered psychology in the age of
confessionalisation as a type of intellectual production that can be derived from
confessional statements. Instead, this thesis shall look at sixteenth-century psychol-
ogy as an important part of the process by which confessional identities formed.
True, some of the views about the soul that the reader will encounter by reading
this thesis did respond to specific theological views, which were held by determi-
nate confessional groups. More often, however, the texts on the soul that I will con-
sider in the present work contributed to the formation of those groups. And they
did so in a number of different ways. I have already mentioned Kusukawa’s anal-
ysis of Melanchthon’s works on the soul as an intellectual endeavour finalised to
enforce discipline within the Lutheran camp. Melanchthon’s psychology of course
135 Ronnie Po-chia Hsia, Social Discipline in the Reformation: Central Europe 1550–1750 (London 1989),
4, 5.
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responded to the most important theological views defended by Luther, but at the
same time, it also contributed to create a Lutheran idea of the nature of man and his
place in society. But psychology did not always contribute to the formation of con-
fessional identities in such a clearly identifiable way. Sometimes, as I hope to show
in this thesis, certain views about the soul became characteristic of a religious group
for the simple reason that authors affiliated to another confession rejected them as
unorthodox or as belonging to their religious rivals.
1.4. Lutheran Theology: A Conceptual Toolkit
The interaction between theological, philosophical, and scientific ideas presented
in this thesis is not necessarily one of dependence of psychological doctrines upon
confessional statements. As I have argued, in many cases, psychological doctrines
were an integral part (rather than a consequence) of the intellectual process by
which confessional statements were produced. Yet, independently of the particular
configurations that the relationship between psychology and theology acquired in
the historical context I have considered, a number of theological tenets appear to
surface in many parts of the present work. This is due to the simple reason that, as I
hope to show, some theological ideaswere tightly interwovenwith theway inwhich
the authors I have taken into exam looked at the soul. The present section of this
introduction is devoted to a short explanation of the main theological notions that
the reader will encounter in the following parts of this work.
This thesis, in fact, will consider a number of texts produced by Protestant
authors in the sixteenth century. More precisely, it will looked at a group of authors
who found in Philip Melanchthon’s Commentarius de anima and Liber de anima their
preferred texts for dealing with topics about the soul. Because they worked in the
footsteps of one of the main leaders of the movement that triggered the Protestant
reform, Philip Melanchthon, their texts can only be adequately understood when
read against the backgroundof the latter’s theological thought. For this reason, Iwill
now lookat some theological tenets thatwere central inMelanchthon’s theology and
that appear to have been intimately connected with the way in which he and some
of his followers looked at the soul. I will take into account the following five ideas:
1) the idea that the subject of divine grace is not simplyman’s soul but the entirety
of the human nature; that is, both the soul and the body;
2) the difference between God’s Law and Gospel;
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3) the impossibility for man’s fallen intellect to fathom the essence of the human
soul in its immaterial and immortal state;
4) the very central Lutheran principle according to which man is justified only by
faith (sola fide) in the Christian God;
5) the personal union of two natures in Christ.136
Before treating these five items, it must be said that of course they do not represent
the entirety of the enormous theological endeavour started by Martin Luther and
developed by his Wittenberg collaborator Philip Melanchthon.137 Yet, they are the
136 Of these five items the first three have been extensively treated by Kusukawa, in her book The
Transformation of Natural Philosophy. Instead, the fourth and the fifth items seem to be absent
from Kusukawa’s work and in general less familiar to scholars dealing with the psychology of
Melanchthon and his followers.
137 Here follows a list of some of themost relevant studies available about early Reformation the-
ology, as well as about Luther’s and Melanchthon’s theologies. General studies about early
Reformation: Michael Beyer and Günter Wartenberg, eds., Humanismus und Wittenberger Ref-
ormation. Festgabe anlässlich des 500. Geburtstages des Praeceptor Germaniae Philipp Melanchthon
am 16. Februar 1997 (Leipzig 1996); Irene Dingel and Günther Wartenberg, eds., Die Theologis-
che Fakultät Wittenberg 1502–1602 (Leipzig 2002); Robert Kolb, Bound Choice, Election, and Wit-
tenberg Theological Method: From Martin Luther to the Formula of Concord (Grand Rapids 2005);
Robert Kolb, Lutheran Ecclesiastical Culture, 1550–1675 (Leiden 2008); Steven E. Ozment, The Age
of Reform 1250–1550. An Intellectual and Religious History of Late Medieval and Reformation Europe
(New Heaven 1980). Studies on Martin Luther: Martin Brecht, Martin Luther. Sein Weg zur Ref-
ormation 1483–1521 (Stuttgart 1981); Robert Kolb, Irene Dingel, and L’ubomir Batka, eds., The
Oxford Handbook of Martin Luther’s Theology (Oxford 2014); Bernhard Lohse,Martin Luther’s The-
ology. Its Historical and Systematic Development (Minneapolis 1999); Alister E. McGrath, Luther’s
Theology of the Cross. Martin Luther’s Theological Breakthrough (Oxford 1985); Heiko Augustinus
Oberman, Luther: Man between God and the Devil (New Heaven 1989); Johannes Schilling and
Bernd Moeller, Luther-Rezeption: Kirchenhistorische Aufsätze zur Reformationsgeschichte (Arbaiten
Zur Religionspaedagogik) (Göttingen 2001); Johann Anselm Steiger, Fünf Zentralthemen der The-
ologie Luthers und seiner Erben: Communicatio, Figura, Imago,Maria, Exempla (Leiden 2002); David
Curtis Steinmetz, Luther and Staupitz: An Essay in the Intellectual Origins of the Protestant Ref-
ormation (Durham 1980); David M. Whitford, Luther. A Guide for the Perplexed (London 2011).
Studies on Philip Melanchthon: Oswald Bayer, “Freedom? The Anthropological Concepts
in Luther and Melanchthon Compared”, Harvard Theological Review 91 (1998), 373–387; Euan
Cameron, “Philipp Melanchthon: Image and Substance.” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 48
(1997), 705–722; Irene Dingel and Armin Kohnle, PhilippMelanchthon: LehrerDeutschlands, Refor-
mator Europas (Leipzig 2011); Günter Frank and Felid Mundt, eds., Der Philosoph Melanchthon
(Berlin 2012); Lowell Green, “Melanchthon’s Relation to Scholasticism”, in Carl R. Trueman
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ideas that seemtomemore evidently connectedwith theway inwhichMelanchthon
and some of his followers treated the soul. In the first part of this section, I shall con-
sider Luther’s and Melanchthon’s conceptions of the subject of divine grace, of the
difference between law and Gospel, and of the limits of man’s natural understand-
ing. After that, I will examine Luther’s andMelanchthon’s less well-known ideas on
justification and Christology. I will show that they are intertwined with each other
and that they are very relevant when it comes to understanding important transfor-
mations in sixteenth-century psychology.
Let us turn, then, to a brief overview of the five mentioned theological notions
whichwill recur in the five case studies composing this thesis. These notions are not
separate stories in their own right, but they imply each other in a way that really
points to Luther’s and Melanchthon’s intention to devise a new theological system.
In the case ofMelanchthon, this system included philosophy, or better still a specific
way of doing philosophy and a specific way of considering the human soul.
1.4.1. Flesh and Spirit: The Subject of Grace
One of Luther’s ideas appears to be particularly important when it comes to under-
standing theway inwhich he andMelanchthon looked atman’s nature and place in
the world. When Melanchthon started working on psychology, Luther had stressed
that being a human creature was about having a soul as much as about having a
body. But this seemingly innocuous statement was intended by Luther (and later by
Melanchthon) in one specific sense that had very important consequences for the
transformation of psychology at the hand ofMelanchthon’s students and followers.
According to Luther and Melanchthon, man’s possession of a body and a soul could
only be understood from a Christian point of view.
By the endof the thirties of the sixteenth century, Lutherhad alreadyput forward
his anthropological views on several occasions, most notably in two texts: the Dis-
and R.S. Clark, eds., Protestant Scholasticism: Essays in Reassessment (Carlisle 1999), 273–288; Gre-
gory B. Graybill, Evangelical Free Will: Philipp Melanchthon’s Doctrinal Journey on the Origins of
Faith (Oxford 2010); Wolfgang Matz, Der befreite Mensch. Die Willenslehre in der Theologie Philipp
Melanchthons (Göttingen 2001); Barbara Pitkin, “The Protestant Zeno: Calvin and the Devel-
opment of Melanchthon’s Anthropology”, The Journal of Religion 84.3 (2004), 345–378; Heinz
Scheible, Melanchthon. Eine Biographie (Munich 1977); Timothy J. Wengert, Human Freedom,
Christian Righteousness: Philip Melanchthon’s Exegetical Dispute with Erasmus of Rotterdam (New
York 1998). Timothy J.Wengert andPatrickGraham,PhilipMelanchthon (1497–1560) and theCom-
mentary (Sheffield 1997).
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putatio de homine (1536) and the Resolutiones lutherianae super propositionibus suis Lipsiae
disputatis (1519), which was part of a theological controversy (known as the “Leipzig
Disputation”) between Luther and one of his main Catholic opponents: the Ingol-
stadt professor Iohannes Eck.
In the Disputatio de homine, Luther states forty propositions, in which he com-
pares the type of knowledge about man that can be reached by the human intellect
with the understanding of anthropology provided by Christian theology. According
to Luther, the best that the first mode of knowledge can reach is an understanding
of man in his mortal life:
1. Philosophy, [which is] humanwisdom, definesman as a rational, sensitive,
and corporeal animal. 2. Andnow it is not necessary to discusswhether or not
man is appropriately named an animal. 3. But this has to be known, that this
definition of his life defines only the mortal man.138
According to Luther, philosophical anthropology boils down to Aristotle’s definition
of man as a corporeal and corruptible being; that is, a definition that recognises
man’s specificity in his possession of a rational soul. Luther, on his part, allows that
man’s reason is something good and divine, which discovers and governs the arts
of medicine, law, ethics, and all that concerns happiness in this life. Yet he believes
thatman cannot adequately know himself as a rational being, insofar as he does not
consider himself in his creaturliness.139 But what does this mean exactly?
According to Luther, only the second of the abovementioned modes of knowl-
edge, theology, is capable of providing a true anthropology; that is, a definition of
man as God’s creature:
138 Martin Luther,Disputatio de homine (1536), in wa, 39, i, 175: «1. Philosophia, sapientia humana,
definit hominem esse animal rationale, sensitivum, corporeum. 2. Neque disputare nunc
necesse est an proprie vel improprie homo vocetur animal. 3. Sed hoc sciendum est, quod haec
definitio tantummortalem et huius vitae hominem definit».
139 «4. Et sane verum est quod ratio omnium rerum res et caput, et praeceteris rebus huius
vitae optimum et divinum quiddam sit. 5. Quae est inventrix and gubernatrix omnium
artium medicinarum, iurium, et quiquid in hac vita sapientiae, potentiae, virtutis et gloriae
ab hominibus possidetur. […] 11. Si comparetur Philosophia seu ratio ipsa ad theologiam,
apparebit nos de homine paene nihil scire. […] 17. Nec spes est, hominem in hac praecipuae
parte ses posse cognoscere quid sit, donec in fonte ipso, qui Deus est sese viderit» (wa 39, i, 175,
176).
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20. Theology, however, due to the fullness of itswisdom, definesman entirely
and perfectly. 21. Namely, [theology asserts] that man is a creature of God,
consisting of flesh and a living soul, created in the beginning in God’s image
without sin, so that it may generate, rule over things, and never die. 22. Yet,
after Adam’s fall it [the creature of God] is subject to the power of the devil, to
sin, to death, and to whatever insuperable and eternal plague of its powers.
23. And it will not be liberated or granted eternal life if not by the son of God,
Jesus Christ (if it believes in him).140
Contrary to (Aristotle’s) philosophy, which only describes man as a mortal being,
theology can explain human nature in its entirety, namely, as God’s creature. To
be a creature of God means for Luther that man is the subject of sin, as well as of
salvation through faith in Christ. More precisely, Luther explains that the subject of
sin and salvation is a being consisting not only of a rational soul but also of flesh.
It is the entirety of man (body and soul) that defines man in his fallen state and as
redeemable.
Almost twenty years before writing his 1536 Disputatio de homine, Luther had
made it clear thatman –when considered as the subject of divine grace – couldnot be
conceived only as a rational being, buthad tobeunderstood as a combinationof flesh
(caro) and spirit (spiritus). In 1519, Luther was involved in a theological controversy
with the Ingolstadt professor Johannes Eck, which concerned church indulgencies
and the authority of the Pope. Eck first attacked Luther’s views on those topics in
his Obelisci (1518). Luther’s colleague Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt (1486–1541)
felt that Eck’s attacks were directed to him as well. Karlstadt therefore reacted by
publishing the Apologeticae Conclusiones (1518), in which Eck was attacked by name,
the Scriptures were defended as the sole theological authority, and human will was
stated to be passive towards grace and to be incapable of doing good. The exchange of
attacks called for a dispute,whichEckwanted to take place in Leipzig. For the Leipzig
Disputation, Eck prepared twelve theses against Luther. The latter’s written reply
was published in June 1519 and was entitled Resolutiones lutherianae super proposition-
140 «20. Theologia vero de plenitudine sapientiae suae hominem totum et perfectum definit. 21.
Scilicet, quod homo est creatura Dei carne et anima spirante constans, ab initio ad imaginem
Dei facta sine peccato, ut generaret et rebus dominaretur, nec unquam moreretur. 22. Post
lapsum vero Adae subiecta potestati Diaboli, peccato et morti, utroque malo suis viribus
insuperabili, et aeterno. 23. Nec nisi per Filium Dei Christum Ihesum liberanda (si credat in
eum) et vitae aeternitate donanda» (wa 39, i 176).
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ibus suis Lipsiae disputatis. Amongst other things, this document contains a statement
that is particularly important for the present discussion.
In the Conclusio ii of the Resolutiones, Luther argues against those who affirm
that man’s good deeds or baptism can revoke man’s sinful nature.141 In connection
with this argumentation, Luther is particularly critical of a view he ascribes to his
opponents (Eck and his Ingolstadt colleagues), according to which the subject of
divine grace is the human soul alone:
The cause of the error is that they make only the soul and its most noble
part the subject of grace; then, that they divide the flesh and the spirit
metaphysically, as though they were two substances, when rather the whole
man is flesh and spirit; [man is] as much spirit as when he loves the law of
God, and as much flesh as when he hates the law of God.142
According to Luther, it is an error to take the body and the soul apart fromeach other,
as if they were ontologically different substances. Man’s sinful nature indeed affects
the body asmuch as the soul; therefore, alsoman’s salvation by faith in Christ has to
affect the entirety ofman.When one looks atman from aChristian point of view – as
we have seen above, the only point of view fromwhich Luther believesman’s nature
canbedescribed – onehas to account for the subject of divinegrace,which in Luther’s
opinion is the soul and the body together.
SachikoKusukawapointedout that Luther’s claimplayedout inavery important
way inMelanchthon’sworks about the soul. According toKusukawa,Melanchthon’s
Commentarius and Liber de animawere books about the Christian (Lutheran) soul. For
this reason they treated both the soul and the body, or the whole human nature, in
the light of Luther’s teaching. As a consequence of this, Melanchthon’s psychology
differed from most of his contemporary Aristotelian accounts of the soul in that it
did not address the soul or the animated body, but rather took the nature of man as
its own subject matter.143
141 «conclusio ii. In bono peccare hominem et peccatum veniale non natura sua sed Dei
misericordia solum esse tale aut in puero post baptismum peccatum remanens negare, hoc
est Paulum et Christum semel conculcare» (wa, 2, 410).
142 «Causa erroris est quod subiectum gratiae dant solam animam eiusque nobiliorem partem;
deinde, quod carnem et spiritum distinguunt metaphysice tanquam duas substantias, cum
totus homo sit spiritus et caro, tantum spiritus quantum diligit legem Dei, tantum caro
quantum odit legemDei» (wa, 2, 415).
143 Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy, 89.
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In this thesis, I shall confirm Kusukawa’s observation concerning the influence
that Luther’s teaching about the subject of divine grace had onMelanchthon’s books
on the soul. However, I shall add something to this observation: the claim that
psychology should be about the entirety of human nature (rather than about the
soul alone) exceeded Luther’s andMelanchthon’s works and it became popular with
many of Melanchthon’s students and followers. Even more importantly, I shall try
to explain that whilst Melanchthon and his followers thought that the science of
the soul should be about the entirety of the Christian man (flesh and spirit), their
anthropologies differed from Luther’s on one specific point: they addressed both the
flesh and the spirit of man and yet tended to treat them as two different substances.
This point will be made several times in this thesis and I will return to it in
my conclusions. For the moment, suffice it to know that, from one point of view,
Melanchthon and many of his followers accepted Luther’s idea that man could not
be understoodmerely as a rational animal, but that hewas (and that psychology had
to studyhimas) an indissolubleunionof fleshand spirit. Fromanotherpoint of view,
they tended to look at this union as indissoluble indeed, and yet as one that obtained
between two different substances.
Inmyopinion, this differencebetweenLuther on theonehandandMelanchthon
and his followers on the other has to be understood in the light of another point on
whichLuther’s andMelanchthon’s theologies differ fromeachother: their respective
views of the difference between God’s law and Gospel, to which we now turn.
1.4.2. Law, Gospel, and the Boundaries of Human Reason
Asweare about to see, according tobothLuther andMelanchthon,Godhadbestowed
two words upon mankind: the Gospel and the law. For both Protestant reformers
the two words of God had to do with what man knew about the world and himself
and they were to be interpreted in the light of the central principle of Luther’s
theology: after Adam’s fall man was not able to reach his salvation without God’s
grace. Salvation indeed couldnot be gainedbymeans of goodworks.On the contrary,
goodworkswere only possible throughGod’s grace,whichhad tobe receivedby faith
in Christ alone (sola fide).
As is well known, Luther’s principle of salvation by faith alone had an enormous
impact on the way in which he, and thenMelanchthon, started to look at scholastic
philosophy. According to Luther, the divine promise of grace and salvationwas given
to man through Jesus Christ and revealed in the Gospel. And only through grace
couldman comply with God’s law (the Ten Commandments). Luther’s emphasis on
introduction 77
God’s Gospel and on salvation by faith alone gave rise to a vigorous criticism of the
existing system of university learning. In fact, at Wittenberg, university education
had traditionally been conceived as preparation for the theology Luther was trying
to debunk: the theology of the Church, which in Luther’s eyes failed to understand
the notion of salvation by faith alone.
Yet, before long, Melanchthon had to find a compromise between Luther’s firm
rejection of scholastic philosophy and pressing political problems, which in Me-
lanchthon’s opinion called for a newuse of philosophy. As Kusukawa has shown, the
difference between Luther and Melanchthon clearly surfaces in the way in which
they interpreted the apostle Paul’s words in Colossians 2.8: “See to it that no one
deceives you by philosophy”.144
According to Luther, Paul had to be understood as saying that philosophy was
to be abandoned, for it was deceiving and not from Christ. Because philosophy
was traditionally taught as instrumental in knowing divinematters, Luther started
to look at it as a hindrance to establishing a theology based solely on the Gospel.
Melanchthon would initially follow suit.
In fact, very soon upon joining Wittenberg as a lecturer in Greek, in 1518, Me-
lanchthon embraced Luther’s theology and his campaign against scholastic philos-
ophy. In 1521, Melanchthon’s endorsement of Luther’s views resulted in the first
systematic explanation of Lutheran theology: the Loci communes rerum theologicarum
seu hypotyposes theologicae. Over the next few years, however,Melanchthonwould put
forward a fresh understanding of Luther’s sola fide doctrine as well as of his notions
of law and Gospel. I will return toMelanchthon’s interpretation of justification sola
fide in the next section of this introduction; for the moment let us focus on the way
in which he looked at the difference between law and Gospel.
Melanchthon’s understanding of the two words of God is interwoven with a
positive reassessment of philosophy in the context of Lutheran education. This point
surfaces most eloquently in a 1527 oration –De discrimine Evangelii et philosophiae – in
whichMelanchthon reinterpreted Colossians 2.8 as follows:
When Paul says: “See to it that no one deceives you by philosophy”, he does
not condemn philosophy but [its] abuse; just as, when one says: “take care
not to be trapped by wine”, he does not disparage wine but [its] abuse.145
144 Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy, 27–74.
145 cr, xii, 689: «Cum Paulus ait, videte ne quis vos decipiat per philosophiam, non improbat
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In a way different from Luther, Melanchthon no longer looked at philosophy as
something intrinsically bad. To Melanchthon’s mind, only the abuse of philosophy
was deleterious. But what causedMelanchthon tomitigate his (and Luther’s) initial
rejection of philosophy? What did he exactly mean by ‘abuse’, or what were the
boundaries he assigned to man’s natural understanding of the world?
Upon the Diet of Worms (1521), Melanchthon took the lead of the Reformation,
which at that time chiefly meant the task of devising a system of education consis-
tent with Luther’s message about the Gospel. Melanchthon’s plans, however, had to
take a new direction, as he was faced with pressing political issues, first of all with
what is known as the ‘WittenbergMovement’, which took place in 1521.
The ‘WittenbergMovement’ originated when Luther’s ideas became interpreted
as the legitimisation for social unrest, armed riots, and iconoclasm. The move-
ment gained momentum especially when Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt and
the Augustinian Gabriel Zwilling (1487–1558) urged the youth to abandon the uni-
versity and called, amongst other things, for the abolishment of the Mass and the
abandonment of begging.146Melanchthon reacted to the ‘WittenbergMovement’ by
implementing new regulations at the university of Wittenberg, including injunc-
tions against riots and the possession of arms on the part of the students. But it was
after a new period of political disorder that Melanchthon started to look at the uni-
versity arts faculty and at the teaching of philosophy in a way that would remould
his understanding of Luther’s teaching about law and Gospel for good. As we shall
see, Melanchthon’s fresh conception of the difference between the twowords of God
would impact in a very decisive manner on his and his followers’ way of looking at
nature andman.
The second wave of social disorder Melanchthon had to tackle took place in
the aftermath of the well-known ‘Peasants’ War’ of 1524–1525. The war began when
groups of peasants and farmers across the German-speaking part of Europe started
philosophiam sed abusum, ut si quis dicat, cave ne vino decipiaris, is non vituperat vinum sed
abusum». English translation in Sachiko Kusukawa, ed., PhilipMelanchthon.Orations, 23–25.
146 About the Wittenberg Movement, see: Nikolaus Müller, Die Wittenberger Bewegung, 1521 und
1522.Die Vorgänge in und umWittenberg während Luthers Wartburgaufenthalt (Leipzig 1911); Kaarlo
Arffman, The Lutheran Reform of Poor Relief : A Historical and Legal Viewpoint, in Virpi Mäkinen,
ed., Lutheran Reform and the Law (Leiden 2006). English translations of some reports – including
Melanchthon’s – of the University of Wittenberg regarding the movement in Wittenberg
are found in: Carter Lindeberg, ed., The European Reformations Sourcebook (Oxford 2000), 59–
61.
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seeking for more freedom and equality through civil disobedience.147 As some of
them interpreted Luther’s theology in the sense of a rhetoric against the established
Catholic religious andpolitical hierarchies, theyused Luther’smessage as ideological
backing for their revolts. The peasantswere indeed joined by some figures belonging
to the Lutheran clergy, most notably by Thomas Müntzer (1489–1525), who had
professed radical views, such as the destruction of the Godless and the abolition
of infant baptism. However, Luther soon condemned the revolts by publishing his
Wider dieMordischen und Reubischen Rotten der Bawren.148
The war did not last too long and in 1525 the aristocracy gained the upper hand.
The peasants lost their cause and hundreds of them were murdered. Yet, the Peas-
ants’ War left its mark on Thuringia, where chaos was still present. It was with the
residual chaos in this territory thatMelanchthonhad towrestle, and this taskwould
become of paramount importance for his theological and philosophical thought.
As the result of a visitation of Thuringia on the parts of representatives of the
university of Wittenberg, Melanchthon was shocked by the poor quality of pas-
tors’ training, as well as by the practice of adult baptism. Melanchthon linked the
situation in Thuringia to the figures of Karlstadt and Müntzer and came to con-
sider civil disobedience and the practice of adult baptism to be one and the same
phenomenon. In 1527, Melanchthon renamed the ‘fanatics’ of Thuringia ‘Anabap-
tists’.149
Melanchthon’s will to react became evenmore intense after 1530, when Johannes
Eck linked both his name and that of Luther to those of Karlstadt and Müntzer.
Eck, in fact, published a document consisting of 404 articles, in which Luther and
147 The peasants and farmers were not the only ones who expressed grievances; also burghers,
guildsmen andminers participated in a movement that rebelled against the oppressive pow-
ers that held the unprivileged in a condition of scarce political freedom and economic rights.
About this and for a detailed explanation of the exact claims put forward by those involved in
the Peasants’ War, see: Steven Ozment, The Age of Reform 1250–1550. An Intellectual and Religious
History of LateMedieval and Reformation Europe (Yale 1980), 272–289.
148 On Thomas Müntzer’s theology and on the theological differences between him and Luther,
see: AbrahmFriesen andHans-JürgenGoeritz,ThomasMüntzer (Darmstadt 1978). OnMüntzer
and the Peasants’ War, see: George Huntston Williams, The Radical Reformation (Philadelphia
1975), 38–84; Janos Bak, The German PeasantWar of 1525 (London 1976).
149 See: Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy, 63. On the Thuringia visitation and
more in general on the role of visitations in the pedagogy of LutheranReformation, see: Gerald
Strauss,Luther’sHouse of Learning. Indoctrinationof theYoung in theGermanReformation (Baltimore
1978), 249–267.
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Melanchthon were blamed for having instigated the seditions that had taken place
inGermany.150 It became then indispensible forMelanchthon to clearly dissociate his
and Luther’s reform from the Anabaptistmovement and to restore civil obedience in
the Evangelical camp.
Now – this is the most interesting point for our discussion – Melanchthon was
quite sure that thepractices of civil disobedience andadult baptism largelydepended
on the arbitrariness with which Luther’s sola fidemessage was being interpreted by
some. More specifically, he ascribed the Anabaptists’ wrong way of doing theology
to the state of neglect in which the teaching of the arts had fallen at their hand.151
As a consequence of this conviction, Melanchthon thought that the teaching of the
arts should play a major role in his efforts to explain the Evangelical faith and its
commitment to political order. It was at this stage that Melanchthon thought that
enforcing social discipline in the Lutheran camp could not be possible without some
use of philosophy. But which type of use of philosophy exactly?
In the abovementioned oration De discrimine Evangelii et philosophiae, Melanch-
thon had already provided a very clear answer to this question:
Paul is speaking of the kind of abuse that is most harmful in the Church,
namely when Scripture is received as though it taught nothing other than
a knowledge of human reason. […] Philosophy contains the art of rhetoric,
physiology and precepts on civic morals. This teaching is a good creation of
God, and the principal amongst all natural gifts. And it is a thing that is
necessary in this corporeal and civic life, such as food, drink, or such as public
laws, etc. Moral philosophy is the very law of God on civic morals. […] The
150 Johannes Eck, Articulos 404 partim ad disputations Lipsicam, Baden et Bernem attinentes, partim vero
ex scriptis pacem ecclesiae parturbantium extractos, coram divo Caesare Carolo v (Ingolstadt 1530).
151 In his 1531 orationDeordine discendi,Melanchthon eloquently linkedMüntzer and the Anabap-
tist to somedisregardof the arts knowledge «Si quispropter admirationemdoctrinae religionis
iubeat e vita tollere omnia iura atque institute civitatum, omnia vincula domesticate vitae,
none hunc omnes sani homines vi atque armis cohercendum esse iudicarent? Et videmus
his annis quosdam ἀνοσίως θεολογοῦντας dementos huiusmodi fanaticis opinionibus, erroris
sui poenas dare. Meministis enimMonetarium [Müntzer] et Abnabaptistas, et hoc genus alia
portenta. Ad hunc modum iudicate insanire eos qui chorum et concertum artium pertur-
bant, neglectis et contemptis inferioribus artibus.Quare sicut de literamelementis cogitantes,
totum ἂλφα καὶ βῆτα necessarium esse ad sermonem ducitis, ita disciplinas omnes quae in
scholis traduntur, extimabitis ad vitam esse necessarias» (cr xi, 212; English translation of
this oration in Kusukawa, ed., PhilipMelanchthon.Orations, 3–8).
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Gospel is not a philosophy or a law, but it is the forgiveness of sins and the
promise of reconciliation and eternal life for the sake of Christ, and human
reasonby itself cannot apprehendanyof these things. […] Just as astronomy is
the knowledge of the heavenlymotions, which are arranged byGod, somoral
philosophy is the knowledge of the works, that is, of the causes and effects
that God has arranged in the mind of man.152
In this very rich passage, Melanchthon emphasises the importance of civic rules
and makes room for philosophy in the context of Lutheran theology. He does so
by interpreting Paul’s words not as a straightforward rejection of philosophy but
rather as drawing the boundary between a legitimate and an illegitimate use of
philosophy.
According to Paul,Melanchthon argues, it was illegitimate to look at philosophy
as thoughphilosophyand the Scriptureswere essentially only twodifferentmanners
of teaching the same thing. The content of the Scriptures, instead, was radically
different from the content of philosophy, and the latter was altogether incapable
of obtaining the type of knowledge found in the Scriptures. Philosophy (or human
reason), according toMelanchthon, was an entirely legitimate endeavour, insofar as
it dealt with a completely different subject from that taught by theology. Whilst
the Gospel indeed was knowledge of man’s salvation and eternal life for the sake
of Christ, philosophy could only teach rhetoric, physics (what Melanchthon calls
‘physiology’), andmorals.153
On the one hand, Melanchthon ascribed to philosophy more or less the same
type of knowledge that Luther had assigned to human reason in his 1536 Disputatio
152 English translation in: Kusukawa, ed., Philip Melanchthon. Orations, 23, 24. Latin in cr xii,
689, 690: «Loquitur autem Paulus de illo abusu qui maxime nocet in Ecclesia, vidilicet cum ita
accipitur scriptura quasi nihil aliud doceat, nisi rationis humanae doctrinam. […] Philosophia
continet artes dicendi, physiologiam et praecepta de civibus moribus. Haec doctrina est bona
creatura Dei, et inter omnia naturalia dona praecipuum. Et est res in hac vita corporali ac
civili necessaria, sicut cibus, potus, sicut publicae leges et caetera. Philosophia de moribus est
ipsa lex Dei de civilibusmoribus. […] Evangeliumnon est philosophia aut lex, sed est remissio
peccatorum et promissio reconciliationis et vitae aeternae propter Christum, de quibus rebus
nihil potest ratio per se suspicari. […] Sicut astronomia est cognitio motuum coelestium, qui
divinitus ordinati sunt, ita philosophia moralis est cognitio operum videlicet causarum et
effectuum, quos Deus ordinavit in mente hominis».
153 On the sixteenth-century usage of the term ‘physiologia’ to indicate physics or the study ‘de
natura’, see: Vidal, The Science of the Soul, 26.
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de homine. Human reason, according to Luther, could obtain knowledge ofmedicine,
law, andmorals (to these three domains of knowledgeMelanchthon adds rhetoric).154
On the other hand,Melanchthon differs from Luther in that he now looks at philos-
ophy asmirroring the divinely arranged order of nature. For Luther, philosophy had
to be banned for itwas not fromChrist. ForMelanchthon, philosophy, and especially
knowledge of civic morals were the very law of God. So much so, that Melanchthon
came to look at moral philosophy as a type of innate knowledge arranged by God in
man’s mind.
This point is of particular importance for the present discussion, for the follow-
ing reasons. First, by looking at philosophy as the law of God,Melanchthon is essen-
tially saying that civil obedience is not only necessary but even a direct command of
God. Second, Melanchthon’s assimilation of philosophy and the law of God implies
a new place for philosophy – including psychology – in the context of Lutheran uni-
versities (first and foremost Wittenberg). Philosophy was neither a preparation for
the study of theology (as Melanchthon’s Catholic contemporaries claimed), nor an
idle human product (as Luther had vigorously affirmed). Philosophy was rather to
be taught as the law of God: the way in which God had arranged the natural and the
civic worlds.
And yet, these two worlds needed God’s grace to be fully understood in their
true meaning (God’s promise to redeem and save his creatures). This grace was
not provided by philosophical knowledge or by man’s will to comply with civic
morals, but by the Gospel alone. According to Melanchthon, philosophy taught a
type of knowledge thatwasmost necessary forman’smortal life and yet incapable of
providing any understanding of Christian salvation.
In sum, philosophy obtained a new position in the context of Lutheran learning,
insofar as it was conceived as awaiting faith in the Christian salvation to be illumi-
nated in its true meaning.
Besides the preceding two reasons, there is a third one why Melanchthon’s new
understanding of philosophy as the law of God is important for the present thesis.
Melanchthon’s ideas about God’s law and Gospel had indeed a huge impact on the
way in which he (and his followers, as I shall show) started to look at the natural
world, includingman’s body and soul.
A fair amount of studies has been devoted to Melanchthon’s attempt to har-
monise the study of natural philosophy with his newly reached understanding
154 See: supra, 62.
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of God’s law and Gospel.155 Notably, Kusukawa explained on different occasions
how Melanchthon devised a system of natural philosophy, in which astrology and
anatomywould show even to the heathen that nature consisted in an orderly struc-
ture.156This recognition of an order in the naturalworldwould indicate the presence
of a divine architect – Melanchthon used to call this knowledge ‘agnitio Dei’.157
Even more importantly, Kusukawa argues, Melanchthon’s conception of moral
philosophy as it surfaces in the above oration De discrimine Evangelii et philosophiae
constitutes the main theme of Melanchthon’s psychology. Because he conceived of
moral philosophy as a set of laws arranged by God in man’s mind, Melanchthon
thought that psychology could and should demonstrate man’s possession of innate
notions of morals – notably, these notions included civil obedience. According to
Kusukawa, especially Melanchthon’s Commentarius de anima of 1540 was principally
about the law of God.Melanchthon, bywriting a book about the soul, was disciplin-
ing the Evangelic camp and demonstrating that civil obedience was essential to the
Lutheran faith.158
In this thesis I will recognise the importance of Melanchthon’s efforts to fight
against civil disobedience for the way he conceived of man’s soul. What is more, I
will have occasion to notice that his belief that man had innate knowledge of moral
principles (the law of God) became accepted by some of his followers as well. Yet, as
I shall show, there is also another way in which Melanchthon’s conception of God’s
155 Besides by Kusukawa, theway inwhichMelanchthon balanced natural philosophy and theol-
ogy in the light of his conceptionofGod’s lawandGospel has been taken into considerationby:
VivianNutton, “TheAnatomyof the Soul inEarlyRenaissanceMedicine”, inDunstan,Gordon
Reginald (ed), The Human Embryo: Aristotle and the Arabic and European Traditions (Exeter 1990),
136–157; Dino Bellucci, Science de la nature et Réformation. La physique au service de la Réforme dans
l’ enseignement de PhilippeMélanchthon (Rome 1998), 129–168, passim.
156 For the case of astrology, see: Sachiko Kusukawa, “Aspectio divinorum operum. Melanchthon
and astrology for Lutheran medics”, in Ole Grell and A.R. Cunningham, eds., Medicine and
the Reformation (London, 1993), 33–56. A recent attempt to criticise Kusukawa’s views on the
relationship between Melanchthon’s use of astrology and his Lutheran faith has been made
by Gábor Almási, “Rethinking Sixteenth-Century ‘Lutheran Astronomy’”, Intellectual History
Review 24:1, 5–20.
157 For the Christian, or even Pauline connotation of Melanchthon’s use of ‘agnitio’, see: Kusuka-
wa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy, 95.
158 Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy, 100: «Melanchthon was deeply worried
about civil disobedience when he began to work on the philosophy of the soul. It is indeed
this issue that his Commentarius de anima ultimately addressed».
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law and Gospel impacted on his psychology as well as on most works on the soul
written by his followers.
There is a sense inwhichMelanchthon’s understanding of law andGospel deter-
mined – I shall argue – his philosophical explanation of the relationship between
man’s body and soul. This aspect has not been emphasised by Kusukawa or by most
studies devoted toMelanchthon’s psychology.
At the end of the previous section of this introduction, I explained that Luther,
Melanchthon, and Melanchthon’s followers all appear to agree on the fact that
human nature is about the body as much as it is about the soul. I also underlined,
however, that a difference between Luther’s and Melanchthon’s theologies exists
as for the way in which the two reformers looked at the unity obtaining between
body and soul. Both Luther and Melanchthon thought that the body and the soul
of man were indissolubly united with each other, and that their unity was the
main character of the Christian history of fall and grace. Nevertheless,Melanchthon
and some of his followers differed from Luther in that they believed that the unity
between body and soul was one obtaining between two different substances. This
difference between Luther and Melanchthon can be better understood in the light
of their respective conceptions of God’s law and Gospel.
In effect, just as law and Gospel differ from each other, so also man’s body and
soul split up in Melanchthon’s psychology. Melanchthon’s conception of the two
words of God appears to reverberate in his works about the soul, in the sense of a
twofold epistemology: because in our fallen state we know theworld either through
the law or through the Gospel, this has to apply to human nature as well. This
point will be illustrated on several occasions in the following chapters. Here, I shall
briefly describe the way in which Melanchthon’s conception of law, Gospel, and of
the postlapsarian limits of man’s reason played out in his and some of his followers’
psychologies.
As we have seen, according to Melanchthon, the fact that God’s law and philos-
ophy coincide implies that philosophy can indeed provide true knowledge of the
natural and moral orders as they are devised by God. But the fact that this knowl-
edge is restricted to the law of God and does not stretch to the Gospel also implies
very precise limits for philosophy. These limits are the very boundaries of human
reason in its fallen state. But if original sin affects man in such a way that he is inca-
pable of knowing his origin and destiny without the Christian faith, what can he
know about his soul?
In the preface to his Commentarius de anima, Melanchthon clearly delineates the
way in which the study of the soul fits in his scheme about law and Gospel:
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If the soul had kept that light andharmonywhich are bestowedupon it in its
creationbydivineprovidence, therewouldbe lessneed forother learnedmen,
and it would examine its nature by its own sharpness of vision. However,
now that – like some outstanding picture by Apelles bespattered withmud –
it lies in the body, buried in hideous darkness, there is the greatest need
for knowledge that should bring it forth and put it in our view. […] But
there remain other schools for us, my Hieronymus, in which we can again
philosophise about the soul together, when we enjoy the eternal fellowship
of Christ and of that venerable assembly of the angels, prophets andApostles,
as well as of the other faithful. There we will not ask Democritus if the soul
is made of atoms, or Aristotle if it is a complete reality (entelecheia), but the
Architect Himself will show us the nature of the soul, at the same time the
Archetype and the copy – that is, He will show us His nature, of which He
willed the human being to be the image.159
Had it retained its pristine state, the soul would intuitively know its own nature.
Because of original sin, however, the soul can only obtain some residual knowledge
of itself and it needs philosophy to do so. What Melanchthon is effectively saying
here is, on the one hand, that the very study of the soul he is going to present in his
Commentarius is made necessary as an effect of the original sin. On the other hand,
he is warning the reader about three points that will determine the meaning of the
study of psychology. First, psychology will not provide any complete knowledge of
the soul’s nature. Second, complete knowledge of the soul’s nature will be possible
only in the afterlife, when the essence of the soul will be showed to us directly by
God. Third, by affirming this second point, Melanchthon is implicitly saying that
159 English translation in: Kusukawa, ed., Philip Melanchthon. Orations, 146, 151. Latin in: Philip
Melanchthon, Commentarius de anima, Officina Petri Seitz (Wittenberg, 1540), 6, 12–13: «Si [ani-
ma] retinuisset eamlucemacharmoniam,quae in conditione ei divinitus attribuita est,minus
esset opus aliis doctoribus, suam ipsa naturam sua acie introspexisset. Nunc vero postquam
velut excellens aliqua Apellis tabula coeno conspersa iacet in corpore, tetra caligine obruta,
maxime opus est doctrina, quae proferat eam, et in conspectum ponat. […] Restant autem
nobis aliae Scholae, mi Hieronyme, in quibus iterum de anima philosophabimur una cum
fruemur aeterna consuetudine Christi et illius augusti coetus Angelorum, Prophetarum ac
Apostolorum et caeterorum piorum. Hic non quaeremus a Democrito an sit ex atomis anima;
nec ab Aristotele an sit ἐντελέχεια; sed architectus ipse monstrabit nobis naturam animae et
simul archetypum et exemplaruam videlicet naturam ostendet, cuius effigem esse humanam
mentem voluit».
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there is an afterlife; this means that he is going to devote a book about the soul by
assuming (and not in order to demonstrate) that the soul is immortal.160But howdoes
Melanchthon know that the human soul is immortal? Is this part of the residual
knowledge about the soul that is still attainable by man’s fallen reason? If man
cannot know the essence of the soul, what canwe expect from a book on psychology?
As we know fromMelanchthon’s 1527 oration on the difference between philos-
ophy and the Gospel, philosophy – besides containing the art of rhetoric and the
study of ethics – is mainly about physics. Therefore philosophical knowledge can
only explain the soul from the point of view of physics. As I shall show in this thesis,
Melanchthon realised this scope by treating the soul – especially the vegetative and
sensitive parts of the soul – by looking at its embodied acts, as they couldbedescribed
through human anatomy. Of course, Melanchthon was well aware of the fact that
human anatomy could not possibly teach anything about the immortal intellective
soul ofman; and neither should it. In fact, again in the abovementioned 1527 oration
we are told that eternal life is the promise of the Gospel, about which human reason
knows nothing. It is through faith that Melanchthon knows about the immortal-
ity of the soul, and only for this reason can he state that the soul is immortal at the
very onset of his 1540 Commentarius de anima. It is for the same reason that never in
the Commentarius (or in its 1552 revised version, the Liber de anima) doesMelanchthon
treat the intellective soul of man from a philosophical point of view. Man’s ‘spiri-
tus intelligens’ (‘intelligent spirit’, asMelanchthon definesman’s intellective soul), in
these books, is always defined and described solely on scriptural basis.
Now, most studies about Melanchthon interpret this twofold epistemology
(physical arguments for the lower souls and scriptural argument for the intellective
soul) as follows.Melanchthon’snatural-philosophical treatment of the soul ought to
be takenmerely in the sense of a list of opinions about the soul, as they are found in
learned and authoritative medical and philosophical treatises. On the other hand,
Melanchthon’s own view is provided only on the basis of the Scriptures. On this
reading, Melanchthon’s use of Aristotle, Galen, Cicero, Vesalius, and other sources
needs to be understood only as the didactic effort of someone whomeant to provide
the Lutheran students with information about the most important views available
about the soul. But because Melanchthon’s psychology was intended indeed as a
160 Melanchthon’s strategy to state (as opposed to demonstrate) the immortality of the soul in
the beginning of his Commentarius de anima has been noticed by Gabor, TheDoctrine of the Soul’s
Immortality in Sixteenth-Century German Lutheran Theology, 95.
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textbook for Lutherans, its genuine conception of man’s soul boils down to what
Melanchthonknew, as itwere, sola fide: the soul is an intelligent and immortal spirit.
In this thesis I shall argue against this interpretation and in favour of the follow-
ing one. Melanchthon’s new understanding of Luther’s teaching on law and Gospel
determines an epistemological tension in Melanchthon’s psychology, whereby the
soul is treated both from a philosophical and from a theological point of view. But
this epistemological distinction – I shall maintain – results in an ontological split-
up betweenman’s intellective soul, on the one hand, andhis vegetative and sensitive
powers, on the other. Melanchthon leans towards looking at them as two different
substances and he relies on the authority of William Ockham for this position..161
Furthermore, because Melanchthon makes the lower powers of the soul coincide
with the activity of the body’s organs, his distinction between two souls in man
amounts to a distinction between body and soul, in terms of two different sub-
stances. To sum up, I contend that Melanchthon’s conception of law and Gospel
played out in his works on the soul in the sense of a bipartite anthropology that
understands the unity between man’s body and soul as one, pace Luther, obtaining
between two different substances.
This aspect surfaces even more clearly in the works about the soul written by
authors who followed in the footsteps of Melanchthon. In this thesis, particular
attention shall be devoted to Caspar Peucer, Gregor Horst, Rudolph Snellius, and
OttoCasmann. All of these authorswrote books about the soul that electedMelanch-
thon’s psychology as their preferred textbook to examine the human soul. Of course,
this does not mean that these authors adhered to the entirety of Melanchthon’s
teaching. As a matter of fact, they rather drew on Melanchthon’s teaching to come
upwith their own views about the human nature. Yet, I think that themost evident
heritage of Melanchthon’s psychology in their work amounts to this: Peucer, Horst,
and evenmore eloquently Snellius and Casmann endorsedMelanchthon’s view that
the intellective soul ofman is an immortal and intelligent spirit,which is completely
different from man’s body. As a result, these authors devised treatises about the
soul that were in fact books divided into an anatomical description of the human
body and a treatment of man’s spirit. This tendency became so predominant that
Otto Casmann divided his treatment of human nature into two different books: one
devoted to the arrangement and workings of the human body, the other devoted
to man’s spiritus. Melanchthon’s division between law and Gospel resulted in the
161 A similar interpretationhas beenput forward byDinoBellucci; see: infra, ‘Chapter 2’, 92, fn. 211.
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production of a new type of anthropology, not any longer one that looked at man
as a rational animal, in the Aristotelian sense but one that conceived of man as a
divinely arranged unity between a body (of which human reason had knowledge)
and an immortal spirit (as it was taught by the Gospel).
But how could Melanchthon and Casmann treat body and soul apart from each
other and still see them as forming an indissoluble unity? Was it not true, after
all, what Luther had said, that man was about the flesh as much as he was about
the spirit? Moreover, was it not true that the term ‘spirit’ according to the medical
tradition meant something bodily (e.g., the humours of the body) and at the same
time something divine according to the Christian faith?
This thesis will address these tensions. However, I think that my answers to the
above questions are more easily understood against the background of two further
theological points. In my opinion, indeed, Melanchthon’s views about justification
andChristology determined to a significant extent his choice to look atman’s soul as
‘intelligent spirit’ and theway inwhich he and his followers (particularly Casmann)
believed that two substances, flesh and spirit, could form one indissoluble unity. Let
us move on then to the last part of this overview of the key theological conceptions
that, tomymind, determined theway inwhichpsychologywas studied at sixteenth-
centuryWittenberg andelsewhere inNorthernEurope,whereMelanchthon’s teach-
ing was heard. Let us turn to some relevant aspects of Luther’s and Melanchthon’s
ideas about justification and Christology.
1.4.3. Justification and the Soul
Justification and Christology are probably some of the most difficult theological
subjects present in Luther’s andMelanchthon’s theological works. Tomakematters
worse, the two reformers spoke about these ideas on several occasions during the
course of their lives and their opinions underwent changes over time. Here, how-
ever, I do not claim to provide a proper account of Luther’s andMelanchthon’s ideas
on justification and Christology. Rather, I shall emphasise some aspects of these the-
ological points that seem to be relevant when it comes to understanding some the-
ories about man’s soul and body. More specifically, in the following chapters I shall
stress a nexus between the following ideas. First, in some of the texts I shall exam-
ine (especially Melanchthon’s and Casmann’s books about the soul), there appears
to be a connection between Christological theories regarding the union between
two natures in Christ and philosophical theories about the soul-body relationship
in human beings. Second, some of Melanchthon’s uses of the term ‘spiritus’ are in
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my opinion better understood against the background of his theory of justifica-
tion as the renewal of man’s affects through the action of the Holy Spirit. I will
address the first point (on the connection between Christology and psychology) in
the next section of this introductory essay. Before that, let us examine some aspects
of Melanchthon’s theory of justification that are helpful in understanding his idea
of ‘spiritus’.
Melanchthon’s definition of man’s intellective soul as ‘spiritus intelligens’ met
with mixed reactions on the part of his contemporaries and has intrigued modern
scholars as well. Notably, scholarship has shed light on Melanchthon’s ambiguous
use of the term ‘spiritus’ to define a set of very different items: the medical bodily
spirits, the intellective soul, and the third person of the divine Trinity. Even more
importantly, scholars have put emphasis on one theory proposed by Melanchthon
in his Liber de anima, according to which the Holy Spirit can literally get mixed
with man’s bodily spirits. Whilst some scholars – particularly Daniel P. Walker –
have understood this point as a sign of Melanchthon’s alleged ‘materialistic inter-
pretation’ of the Christian divinity, here I shall propose an alternative reading.
Melanchthon’s admittedly odd view, according to which the Holy Spirit can inter-
act with man’s spirits has nothing to do with materialism (whatever material-
ism might mean) but is rather part of Melanchthon’s understanding of justifica-
tion by faith alone. Let us turn then to a brief overview of Melanchthon’s con-
ception of justification. This will enable us to adequately understand aspects of
Melanchthon’s usage of ‘spiritus’ that were discussed by his contemporaries as much
as by ours.
Similarly to the cases of grace, law, and Gospel, the relevant aspects of Melanch-
thon’s conception of justification are better understood when seen in comparison
to Luther’s own theology. As recent scholarship – especially Olli-Pekka Vainio – has
pointed out, themain difference between Luther andMelanchthon is the following.
Luther thought that being justified through faith amounted to actual participation
in Christ on the part of the Christian believer. Melanchthon on the other hand
thought that justification consisted in a renewal of the powers of man’s soul.162 On
Vainio account, Luther devised a theory of justification by faith alone that pivoted
on Christology andwhich amounted, roughly speaking, to the following idea. God’s
incarnation results in the personal union of two natures (one human and the other
162 Olli-PekkaVainio, Justification andParticipation inChrist.TheDevelopment of the LutheranDoctrine
of Justification from Luther to the Formula of Concord (1580) (Leiden 2008), 63–64.
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divine) in Christ. This union consists in an exchange of attributes (communicatio
idiomatum), through which the divinity takes on the sins of the human nature and
allmen literally participate in Christ.163The believer, according to Luther, is justified
not by his works or by redirecting his soul to Christ as an object, but by his faith in
Christ, through which Christ becomes the form of the believer.164
Interestingly enough, Melanchthon did not quite believe the same and yet he
had to balance his opinion with Luther’s. The way in which he did it is, in my
opinion, of great importance when it comes to understanding Melanchthon’s ideas
about ‘spiritus’.
According to Melanchthon, the affects (affectus) of the soul – especially the will
(voluntas) – are the central protagonists of human sin and salvation. AsMelanchthon
explained in his 1521 Loci communes, man’s fallen will is not free, but dominated by
mutually contrasting affects.165 Because of this, man is incapable of attaining justi-
163 Olli-Pekka Vainio, Justification and Participation in Christ, 22. Vainio refers to the following pas-
sage in Luther’s 1531 commentaries to Galatians: «Ista est iucundissima omnium doctrinarum
et consolationis plenissima quae docet habere nos hanc ineffabilem et inaestimabilem mis-
ericordiam et charitatem Dei, scilicet: cum videret misericors Pater per legem nos opprimi
et sub maledicto teneri nec ulla re nos posse ab eo liberari, quod miserit in mundum filium
suum in quem omnia omnium peccata coniecit et dixit ad eum: Tu sis Petrus ille negator,
Paulus ille persecutor, blasphemus et violentus, David ille adulter, peccator ille qui comedit
pomum in Paradiso, Latro ille in Cruce; in summa, tu sis omnium hominum persona qui
feceris omnium hominum peccata, tu ergo cogita, ut solvas et pro eis satisfacias. Ibi Lex venit
et dicit: Invenio illum peccatorem suscipientem omnium hominum peccata in se et nullum
praeterea peccatum video nisi in illo, Ergomoriatur in cruce. Atque ita invadit eum et occidit.
Hoc facto totusmundus purgatus et expiatus est ab omniubus peccatis. Ergo etiam liberatus a
morte et omnibusmalis. Sublatis vero peccato etmorte per unum illumhominemDeus nihil
aliud videret amplius in toto mundo, praesertim si crederet, quam meram purgationem et
iustitiam. Et si quae peccati reliquiae remanerent, tamen prae illo Sole, Christo, Deus eas non
cerneret» (wa 40, i, 437–438).
164 Olli-Pekka Vainio, Justification and Participation in Christ, 32–33: «According to Luther, when
the human intellect focuses on Christ in the Gospel, it apprehends and owns Christ. Hence,
Christ is made the form of the human intellect. In faith, the believer not only possesses the
intelligible species of Christ, but Christ himself. The believer is not only transformed into
the natural likeness of Christ, but Christ himself is present in him or her. Based on this,
justification does not consist of redirection of the human faculties of the soul, gone astray
because of sin. Christ himself must become the Life of the sinner; the apprehended Christ has
taken over the human being and he now becomes the new will of the sinner».
165 StA, ii, 1, 27: «Contra interni affectus non sunt in potestate nostra. Experientia enim usuque
comperimus non posse voluntatem sua sponte ponere amorem, odium aut similes affectus,
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fication by means of good deeds. On the contrary, his works can only be righteous
once he is justified by God. Justification – Melanchthon surely agrees with Luther –
is in turn dependant on faith alone. Faith, however, has a further prerequisite: the
renewal of the human soul’s affects on the part of the Holy Spirit.166
Melanchthon’s complex doctrine would deserve a more detailed and technical
explanation. Here it is sufficient to notice the way in which it differs from Luther’s:
whilst Luther based his theory of justification on the exchange of attributes between
the two natures of Christ,Melanchthon looked at justification as the consequence of
a renewal of the powers of man’s soul on the part of the Holy Spirit.
This point is of particular importance, because it came under attack from the
theologian AndreasOsiander (1498–1552). Theway inwhichMelanchthon responded
to the so-called ‘Osiandrian Controversy’ – I argue – is central to the views about
‘spiritus’ expressed in his Liber de anima.
In 1550, Osiander challenged Melanchthon’s views on justification by means of
a disputation (Disputatio de justificatione) held in Königsberg. As he thought to stand
in defence of Luther’s genuine doctrine, Osiander accused Melanchthon of having
removed the idea of presence, or ‘indwelling’, from Luther’s theory of justification.
Osiander, indeed, saw in Christ’s actual presence in the believer the central point
of justification.167 Whilst he was busy drafting the Liber de anima, Melanchthon also
published a response to Osiander’s attack: Antwort auff das BuchHernn Andreae Osian-
dri (1552). In this response, Melanchthon finds a compromise position between his
initial views and Osiander’s emphasis on ‘indwelling’. According to Melanchthon,
justificationby faith is still a renewal of the powers of the soul on the part of theHoly
Spirit. But now he thinks that through this renewal God simultaneously makes the
heart of the believer his dwelling place.168
Whilst Melanchthon’s solution to the ‘Osiandrian Controversy’ would of course
deserve a more detailed account, its emphasis on justification as the renewal of the
sed affectus affectu vincitur, ut, quia laesus es ab eo, quem amabas, amare desinis. Nam te
ardentius quam quemvis alium amas».
166 Olli-Pekka Vainio, Justification and Participation in Christ, 66–67.
167 Olli-Pekka Vainio, Justification and Participation in Christ, 95–97.
168 StA, vi, 458: «Welches allesmuss also verstandenwerden, daswir vergebungder sündenhaben,
und angenem sind vor Gott durch den verdienst Christi, so wir mit warhafftingem glauben
denHernn Christum annemen und gleuben, das uns gnädig sein wölle, und ist zugleich war,
das als denn Gott in uns wohnet, so wir durch diesen trost aus rechter angst erret werden».
About this passage, see: Olli-Pekka Vainio, Justification and Participation in Christ, 81–83.
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soul and the presence of God in man’s heart should be kept in mind. This point
will be particularly helpful in order to understandMelanchthon’s theory about the
interaction between the human and the divine spirits. In this thesis, I shall argue
that the views expressed in Melanchthon’s Liber de anima on this interaction must
not be understood as Melanchthon’s attempt to embody the Christian divinity, but
rather as part of his conception of justification, as I have just explained it.
To understand this point will also enable us to look at Melanchthon as one
important protagonist of the age of confessionalisation who, by means of psychol-
ogy, tried to teach to his Wittenberg students his own Lutheran doctrines. It is no
coincidence, as it will emerge from the third chapter of this thesis, that some of
Melanchthon’s followers – especially Otto Casmann – accepted Melanchthon’s def-
inition of the soul as ‘spiritus intelligens’ because they considered it to be consistent
with the Christian doctrine.
Now, there is yet another occasion on which theories about the soul treated by
this thesis appear to be interwovenwith reformation theology. This appears to be the
case, when one looks at the books on the soulwritten by Casmann andMelanchthon
and the way in which they conceived of Christology as a model for their accounts of
human nature. In order to better understand this discussion let us briefly turn to a
short overview of the Christological aspects that will turn out to be more relevant
for the psychological theories considered in the present work.
1.4.4. Christology andMan’s Soul and Body
Ever since the Council of Chalcedon (451), Christology addressed the figure of Jesus
according to his divine and his human nature.169 In the wake of the reformation,
169 That Jesus Christ consisted of two natures was indeed the conclusion reached by the Council
of Chalcedon,which reads as follows: «Sequentes igitur sanctos Patres, unumeundemque con-
fiteri FiliumDominumnostrum IesumChristum consonanter omnes docemus, eundemper-
fectum indeitate, eundemperfectum inhumanitate, Deumvere et hominemvere, eundemex
anima rationali et corpore, consubstantialem Patri secundum deitatem et consubstantialem
nobis eundem secundum humanitatem, ‘per omnia nobis similem absque peccato’ (cf. Hebr
4, 15); ante saecula quidem de Patre genitum secundumdeitatem, in novissimis autem diebus
eundem propter nos et propter nostram salutem ex Maria virgine Dei genetrice secundum
humanitatem. […] Unum eundemque Christum Filium Dominum unigenitum, in duabus
naturis inconfuse, immutabiliter, indivise, inseparabiliter agnoscendum, nusquam sublata
differentia naturarumpropter unitionemmagisque salva proprietate utriusque naturae, et in
unam personam atque subsistentiam concurrente, non in duas personas partitum sive divi-
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however, Christology took on a particular meaning, as it became instrumental in
the reformers’ endeavour to devise a doctrine of the Eucharist alternative to that
belonging to the Roman Church, the so-called theory of ‘transubstantiation’.170
In effect, especially in his De captivitate babylonica ecclesiae (1520), Luther mar-
shalled several arguments against the theory of transubstantiation,which theCoun-
cil of Trent (1545–1563), as a reaction, would reaffirm some years later.171 According to
the theory of transubstantiation, a change took place in the consecrated bread and
wine, whereby the substance of the bread genuinely became the substance of the
body of Christ, whilst the species of the bread and wine (taste, smell, ect.) stayed the
same. According to Luther, this theory lacked any Scriptural basis and was packed
with the allegedly nonsensical Aristotelian jargon of ‘substance’ and ‘accident’.172
Nevertheless, Luther agreed with the Catholic Church that the body of Christ was
truly present in the Eucharist; a viewwhich, in his anti-transubstantiation scheme,
was in need of a new explanation.
sum, sed unum et eundem Filium unigenitum Deum Verbum Dominum Jesum Christum:
sicut ante Prophetae de eo et ipse nos Jesus Christus erudivit, et Patrum nobis symbolum
tradidit» (Heinrich Denzinger and Adolf Schönmetzer, Enchiridion symbolorum, definitionum et
declarationum de rebus fidei et morum (Freiburg 1991), 301–302). An English translation of this text
is found in: Richard Pierce and Michael Gaddis, eds., The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon (Liver-
pool 2005), 59.
170 As Paul Bakker has explained, Christology had been used in medieval sacramental theology
by John of Paris († 1306). See: Paul J.J.M. Bakker, La raison et le miracle. Les doctrines eucharestiques
(c. 1250–c. 1400). Contribution à l’ étude des rapports entre philosophie et théologie. 2 vols., PhD thesis
(Radboud University Nijmegen 1990), 253–269. For philosophical theories of the Eucharist
in the Middle Ages, also see: Paul J.J.M. Bakker, “Aristotelian Metaphysics and Eucharistic
Theology: John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen on the Ontological Status of Accidental
Being”, in JohannesM.M.H.Thijssenand JackZupko, eds.,TheMetaphysics andNaturalTheology
of John Buridan (Leiden 2001), 247–264.
171 Heinrich Denzinger and Adolf Schönmetzer, Enchiridion symbolorum, definitionum et declara-
tionum de rebus ridei et morum (Freiburg 1991), 530, 534: «Per consacrationem panis et vini con-
versionem fieri totius substantiae panis in substantiam corporis Christi Domini nostri. […]
Quae conversion convenienter et proprie a sancta catholica Ecclesia transsubstantiatio est
appellata. […] Si quis dixerit, in sacrosanto Eucharestiae sacramento remanere substantiam
panis et vini una cumcorpore et sanguineDomini nostri IesuChristi, negaveritquemirabilem
illam et singularem conversionem […] quam quidam conversionem catholica Ecclesia aptis-
sime transsubstantiationem appellat: anathema sit».
172 See: wa 6, 508.
94 chapter 1
Luther did find a new way to account for the real presence of Christ in the
Eucharist, when he based his new doctrine on the same idea of ‘communicatio idioma-
tum’ thatwehave seenasplaying akey role in Luther’s theory of justification. Because
of the exchange of attributes happening between the two natures of Christ, upon
Ascension, the human nature of Christ takes on the attributes of the divine nature.
As a consequence of this, Christ’s body becomes divine and capable of ubiquity. It is
thanks to this ubiquity that the body of Christ can be really present in the Eucharist.
Interestingly enough, some aspects of Luther’s doctrine had an impact on six-
teenth-century natural philosophy. For instance, because Luther’s theory involved
statements about the concepts of ‘substance’ and ‘ubiquity’, it caused the emergence
of new ways of looking at important at traditional concepts, such as ‘place’, ‘space’,
‘body’, and ‘matter’, amongst natural philosophers who worked in the reformed
theological framework.173
What is more, Luther’s doctrine also impacted on sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century metaphysics, after it had to tackle criticisms coming from the very Protes-
tant camp. In fact, Luther’s theory was challenged by the Swiss reformers Ulrich
Zwingli (1484–1531) and Theodore Beza (1519–1605), who held a symbolic interpreta-
tion of the Eucharist. On such interpretation, it was false that the two natures of
Christ could swop properties, hence that the body of Christ could be ubiquitous.
Instead, Beza maintained, Christ’s (human) body was circumscribed in space, and
therefore the presence of Christ in the Eucharist was only a ‘sign’ of his body and
blood.
Luther’s theory of the ‘communicatio idiomatum’ and of the real presence of Christ
in the Eucharist called for a defence. Importantly, this defence resulted in philosoph-
ical disputes. Thisuseofphilosophy inChristological and sacramentaldisputesbears
witness to the recovery of Aristotelian metaphysics, which had hitherto endured
harsh criticisms on the part of most Lutherans.174
Now, whilst scholarship has focused on the interactions between Protestant
Christological/sacramental theology and the transformation of early-modern phys-
173 On this point see: Cees Leijenhorst andChristophLüthy, “TheErosionofAristotelianism.Con-
fessional Physics in Early Modern Germany and the Dutch Republic”, in Cees Leijenhorst,
Christoph Lüthy, Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen, eds., The Dynamics of Aristotelian Natural Philos-
ophy from Antiquity to the Seventeenth Century (Leiden 2002), 375–411.
174 On this point, see: Sachiko Kusukawa, “Lutheran Uses of Aristotle: a Comparison between
Jacob Schegk and PhilipMelanchthon”, in Constance Blackwell and SachikoKusukawa, Philos-
ophy in the SixteenthandSeventeenthCenturies.ConversationswithAristotle (Aldershot 1999), 180–182.
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ics and metaphysics, the influence of Lutheran Christology on sixteenth-century
psychology seems to have been largely neglected. This thesis will point to cases in
which theories about the soul-body relationship were developed in close connec-
tion with doctrines about the union of two natures in Christ. In these cases, the
Aristotelianhylomorphic schemeofmatter and formseems tobe replacedby aChris-
tological framework, inwhichChrist becomes, so to speak, the ontological archetype
for the soul-body relationship in man. In order to better grasp this point, let us
briefly look at some relevant aspects of Christology, which this thesis will show to
be relevant for psychology in the age of confessionalisation.
When one looks at the development of Christology in sixteenth-century Ref-
ormation, one may notice the existence of a third way between Luther’s unionist
doctrine of the ‘communicatio idiomatum’ and Beza’s disjunctivist idea that the prop-
erties of Christ’s two natures were not communicable. Philip Melanchthon pro-
vided the alternative, which implied important doctrinal, methodological, and lexi-
cal consequences in psychology. Notably, Melanchthon’s Christology seems to offer
some answer to one of the questions that emerged from the above discussion about
Lutheran notions of law and Gospel. As I pointed out in conclusion of that discus-
sion, Melanchthon’s understanding of law and Gospel determined an important
change at the heart of Lutheran anthropology. Whilst Luther’s Disputatio de homine
had insisted on the indissoluble unity between flesh and spirit inman (as they were
both the subject of sin and grace), Melanchthon looked at the human nature as a
type of unity holding between two different substances. As a consequence, flesh and
spirit parted company in Melanchthon’s and some of his followers’ anthropologies.
But how could they believe this and at the same time affirm that human nature (the
subject of sin and grace) was an indissoluble unity of body and soul?
I think the answer to this question lies in Melanchthon’s conception of the two
natures of Christ and the way in which he made Christology a viable model for
examining the nature ofman.Melanchthon presented his Christologymainly in his
commentary on Colossians and in his expert opinion during the Eucharistic contro-
versy of Bremen.175 InhisEnarratioEpistolaePauli adColossenses, he puts forward a view
that seems closer to Beza’s than to Luther’s Christology: according to Melanchthon,
Christ’s ascension to heaven has to be interpreted literally as meaning that Christ’s
body ascends to a physical place.176 As Joar Haga pointed out, Melanchthon’s opin-
175 Heinz Scheible, “Melanchthon, Philip (1497–1560)”, in Horst Robert Balz, Gerhard Krause,
SiegfriedM. Schwertner, eds., Theologische Realenzyklopädie, 36 Vols., (Berlin 1977–2007), 22, 384.
176 Philip Melanchthon, Enarratio Epistolae Pauli ad Colossenses praelecta anno mdlvi a Philippo
96 chapter 1
ion filled with joy the reformer Peter Vermigli (1499–1562), who wrote to John Calvin
(1509–1564):
I read fragments of his [Melanchthon’s] new interpretation of the Letter to the
Colossians, in which he writes in an orthodox way about the human nature
of Christ and he affirms that it [the human nature of Christ] is truly and
properly in heaven. Moreover, he claims with Augustine, that, on account
of the body, it [the human nature of Christ] occupies a certain place; and by
the expression ‘in heaven’ he seeks no allegory. On this basis, the error of the
ubiquitarians is clearly shattered.177
Had Vermigli readMelanchthon’s textmore carefully, he would probably have tem-
pered his enthusiasm, for Melanchthon was not trying to refute the ‘ubiquitari-
ans’. He was rather trying to reconcile his understanding of the ascended human
nature of Christ as bound to a physical heaven with the real presence of Christ’s
body in the Eucharist. He did so, albeit somewhat uneasily, as follows. According
to Melanchthon, Christ is indeed in a physical place (heaven), yet he could be every-
where, if he so wished. As observed by Haga, Melanchthon conceives of the ubiquity
of Christ’s body not as a property of the ascended body, but rather as a voluntary
action.178But how is this voluntary action possible at all?DoesMelanchthon’s theory
not involve a split-up between the heaven-boundbody and the divine part of Christ?
Melanthone (Wittenberg 1559), h3r (italics mine): «Si Christus est in vobis, corpus mortuum
est propter peccatum, spiritus autem vita est propter iusticiam. Hic multae insignes mate-
riae continentur, declaration articulorum symboli: ‘ascendit in coelos, sedet ad dextram Dei
patris &c.’ Item quae sint proprietates glorificati corporis. Item quomodo dicatur ‘Christus
est in vobis, Christus est vita vestra’, ac primum de dicto ‘ascendit in coelum’; quomodo haec
congruent? […] Respondeo. In symbolo intelligatur dictum ut sonat litera, et de corpore et de
corporali locatione. Ascendit, scilicet, corporali et physica locatione, in coelum, id est, in locum
coelestem, ubicunque est; quia hic non sunt fingendae allegoriae».
177 cr 44, 586: «Fragmenta quaedam legi novae interpretationis eius Epistolam adColossienses in
quibusdenaturaChristi humanaorthodoxe admodumscribit; eamque in coelo vere acproprie
affirmat esse, atque cumAugustino propter corporismodumcertum locumhabere contendit,
nec allegoriam in coeli vocabulo quaerit. Unde ubiquistarum error aperte convellitur». About
these lines, see: Joar Haga,Was There a Lutheran Metaphysics? The Interpretation of Communicatio
Idiomatum in EarlyModern Lutheranism (Göttingen 2012), 91.
178 Joar Haga, Was There a Lutheran Metaphysics?, 95. On the affinity between Melanchthon’s and
the Swiss reformers’ Christological and sacramental theologies, see: Wim Janse, “Wittenberg
Calvinizans: The Involvement of Melanchthon, Peucer, and Eber in the Bremen Sacramentar-
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According to Haga, the answers to these questions lie in Melanchthon’s fresh
understanding of the ‘communicatio idiomatum’, which is also the most interesting
point for the present study: «here a crucial element inMelanchthon’s interpretation
of ‘communicatio idiomatum’ can be observed: it is not possible to apply all the divine
features to thehumanity ofChrist, thedivine features should ratherbe applied solely
to the whole person».179 It is because Christ’s ascended body is part of the whole
person of Christ that it has a share in divinity. According to Melanchthon, then,
Christ’s flesh and spirit are not united by an exchange of properties but by their
union in one single person, which is both human and divine.
Most interestingly, Melanchthon thinks the pivot around which this union
happens is the same in the case of Christ’s two natures and in the case of man’s
body and soul. In commenting on Colossians 2.9 (“for in him the whole fullness of
deity dwells bodily”), Melanchthon explains that God is present in the world in four
manners. In the first manner, God is present in the sense of the preservation of all
substances (praesentia universalis). In the second manner, God is in the believers by
vivifying them for eternal life (praesentia specialis). In the third manner, God causes
the renewal of the saints in this life (also praesentia specialis). Finally, in the fourth
manner, God is present in Christ. Melanchthon describes this presence as follows:
The fourth manner of presence is the personal union; that is, that through
which the second person of the divinity took on a human nature; not simply
inseparably, but even as though it were one complete ὑφιστάμενονwith that
human nature; and the when the divine λόγος properly takes up a human
nature, as in all the other men the union between soul and body is one
complete ὑφιστάμενον.180
In this very rich passage, Melanchthon’s new take on the ‘communicatio idiomatum’ is
defending a certain disjunction between the divine logos and the flesh, whilst at the
ian Controversy, 1560”, in Wilhelm Neuser and Herman Silderhuis, eds.,Ordentlich und frucht-
bar: Festschrift für Willem van ’t Spijker (Leiden 1997), 53–67.
179 Joar Haga,Was There a LutheranMetaphysics?, 98.
180 «Quartus modus praesentiae est unio personalis, qua scilicet secunda persona divinitatis as-
sumsit humanam naturam, non solum inseparabiliter, sed ita, ut sit unum completum ὑφι-
στάμενον illa natura humana, et λόγος assumens humanam naturam propemodum, ut in
caeteris hominibus copulatione animae et corporis fit unum completum ὑφιστάμενον» (cr
15, 1253).
98 chapter 1
same time keeping them together as one single entity, or ὑφιστάμενον. But, what is
even more interesting for the present discussion, Melanchthon is saying that there
is a structural similarity between the personal union of two natures in Christ and
the soul-body relationship inman.
This part of Melanchthon’s Christology will be of much importance when read-
ing this thesis. In fact, in this study I will try to show the following two things. First,
Melanchthon’s idea of ὑφιστάμενον enables him to look at man as the union of two
substances (thebody and soul, or intelligent spirit),which,whilst being radically dif-
ferent from each other, are indissolubly united to form the subject of sin and divine
grace: the whole human nature. Second, by establishing a structural relationship
between the Christology and anthropology, Melanchthon provided a new method,
as well as a new jargon, to consider the soul-body relationship inman.181
In the present study I shall refer to this new framework as ‘Christologising of
psychology’ and I shall argue that this transformation lies at thebasis of anewtypeof
anthropology. Especially in the case of Melanchthon’s follower, Otto Casmann, this
type of anthropology stops looking at the body and soul of man in the Aristotelian
fashion of matter and form and conceives of them as two difference substances
forming, indeed, a ὑφιστάμενον. This type of anthropology has been shown to be
all the more important, because it became accepted even beyond the disciplinary
borders of reformed psychology, as well as beyond the temporal boundaries of the
age of confessionalisation.182
1.5. Overview of the Chapters of This Thesis
The following chapters of this thesis were written independently of each other, as
articles. ‘Chapters 5’ has already been published and ‘Chapter 4’ has been accepted
181 To thebest ofmyknowledge,Melanchthondoesnotprovide adefinitionof the termὑφιστάμε-
νον. However, the same termwas used by two of the authorswhoseworks I shall discuss in the
following chapters: Bruno Seidel and Otto Casmann. In a way different from Melanchthon,
they did supply a definition of ‘ὑφιστάμενον’, by which they mean – roughly speaking –
‘hypostases’, or ‘substance’. Formore details, see: infra, ‘Chapter 4’, 133–140 and ‘Chapter 6’, 174.
On Casmann’s use of the term see: Salatowsky, De Anima. Die Rezeption der aristotelischen Psy-
chologie im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert, 302, fn. 81, Vidal, The Sciences of the Soul, 55.
182 See: SimoneDeAngelis,Anthropologien.GeneseundKonfiguration einer ‚Wissenschaft vomMenschen‘
in der FrühenNeuzeit (Berlin 2010); Paul Mengal, La naissance de la psychologie, 223–256.
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for publication. ‘Chapter 3’ has been submitted for publication in a collected vol-
ume. ‘Chapter 2’ and ‘Chapter 6’ will be submitted to scientific journals in the near
future.183
Because these chapterswereoriginally conceivedas separate articles, they contain
some overlaps. I have triedmy best to eliminate all repetitions in the final redaction
of this thesis, provided that the internal coherence of each chapter not be altered.
‘Chapter 2’ addresses the diffusion a new question in sixteenth-century works
on the soul, namely, “whether the soul is best defined as perfection (ἐντελέχεια) or
as continuous motion (ἐνδελέχεια)”. In this chapter, I shall show that this ques-
tion originated from a humanist debate during the Italian Quattrocento and that
in its original set-up it regarded mainly the philological accuracy of Cicero’s opin-
ion, according to which Aristotle’s De anima referred to the soul as ἐνδελέχεια (and
not as customarily thought, as ἐντελέχεια). Subsequently, I shall show that Philip
Melanchthon’s works on the soul addressed this question in a way that emphasised
its philosophical aspects, viz., the alternative between defining the soul as a perfec-
tion or rather as a bodilymovement. I shall explain thatCicero’s reading of Aristotle’s
De anima was accepted by Melanchthon, at least as far as man’s vegetative and sen-
sitive souls were concerned. I shall claim that Melanchthon did so in a way to fit, or
even to convey, his Lutheran conception of the entirety of human nature as the sub-
ject of divine grace, as well as his distinction between God’s law and Gospel. I shall
then look at the impact thatMelanchthon’s treatment of the question “whether the
soul is ἐντελέχεια or ἐνδελέχεια” had on some of his contemporaries. By doing this,
I will argue that, in the wake of Melanchthon’s work, this originally humanist dis-
pute on the two alternative definitions of the soul transformed into a choice between
Melanchthon’s Lutheran anthropology and a more traditional way of conceiving of
the soul.
‘Chapter 3’ is meant to give amore complete picture ofMelanchthon’s and some
of his followers’ anthropologies. In fact, Melanchthon and those who subscribed
to his anthropology thought that man’s vegetative and sensitive souls should be
defined as ἐνδελέχεια, or continuous movement of the body. But how did they
conceive of man’s higher powers, viz., intellect and will? In this chapter, on the one
183 ‘Chapter 5’ has been published as Davide Cellamare “Anatomy and the Body in Renaissance
Protestant Psychology”,Early Science andMedicine 19.4 (2014), 341–364. ‘Chapter 4’ is forthcoming
as Davide Cellamare, “Renaissance Psychology. Francisco Vallés (1524–1592) andOtto Casmann
(1562–1607) on Animal and Human Souls”, in R. Lo Presti and S. Buchenau, eds., Animal Minds
in EarlyModern Philosophy andMedicine (Pittsburgh 2015).
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hand, I shall show that Melanchthon and some of his followers thought that man’s
intellect andwill shouldbedefined as ‘spiritus intelligens’ (or intelligent spirit). On the
other hand, I will point to the factMelanchthon’s use of ‘spiritus’ is surrounded with
ambiguity, as he uses the term ‘spiritus’ to refer to an array of different entities, such
as: man’s higher soul, man’s bodily spirits, as well as the Holy Spirit. In this chapter
I shall first presentMelanchthon’s different and tangled-up uses of ‘spiritus’; second,
I shall point to the way in which he conceives of the interaction between these
different spirits that inhabit his world. I shall argue that Melanchthon’s definition
ofman’s higher soul as spirit, as well as the interaction between it, the bodily spirits,
and the Holy Spirit are part Melanchthon’s understanding of justification by faith
alone. Authors who accepted Melanchthon’s view on ‘spiritus’ – I shall also point
out – did so because they considered it more in harmony with their understanding
of the Holy Scriptures.
‘Chapter 4’ looks at the way in which one among those who endorsed Melanch-
thon’s notion of ‘spiritus intelligens’, Otto Casmann, tried further to determine this
notion. In this chapter, I shall argue that according toCasmann, ‘spiritus intelligens’
is the notion that defines man in his specificity. Casmann’s position surface in his
critique of some psychological views by the Spanish physician Franciscus Vallesius.
For this reason, I shall first look at Vallesius’ views on the difference between ani-
mal and human soul. Subsequently, I shall examine Casmann’s counterarguments
against Vallesius. I shall claim that Casmann’s criticism of Vallesius depends on his
endorsement ofMelanchthon’s definition of the soul as ‘spiritus intelligens’, as well
as onMelanchthon’s and Casmann’s own Christological views.
Whilst these first chapters examine their conceptions of the soul as ἐνδελέχεια
and ‘spiritus’, ‘Chapter 5’ takes into exam the way in which Melanchthon, his fol-
lowers, and his foes conceived at the human body. In this chapter, I shall explain
thatMelanchthon and his followers looked at the human body by introducing large
anatomical discussions in their books about the soul. I shall show that they tried
to harmonise an essentially teleological account of the body and its workings with
mechanistmetaphors. On the one hand, they looked at the human body as teleolog-
ically devised for the sake of the soul’s operations; on the other hand, they thought
that the body could be more easily understood when considered as a machine, just
like clocks and automata. In this chapter, moreover, I shall first demonstrate that
Melanchthon’s introduction of anatomy in his books about the soul was motivated
by his specific understanding of the Lutheran faith; second, that Melanchthon’s
Catholic contemporaries were generally less keen on using anatomy in the science
of the soul. Lastly, I shall claim that these confessional reasons notwithstanding,
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Melanchthon’s set-up of psychology as a discipline encompassing human anatomy
was later accepted across different confessional contexts or even independently of
denominational issues.
‘Chapter 6’ addresses one last case in which the influence of Melanchthon’s psy-
chology on his students and followers is visible: the case of disputes on the ori-
gin of the human soul. In this chapter, I shall take into exam the way in which
Melanchthon, some of his students, as well as other Lutherans conceived of the ori-
gin of the human soul. By doing this, I shall also question a popular scholarly view,
according to which most Lutherans thought that God did not create the intellec-
tive souls anew and ex nihilo in each human being, but rather only in the first man,
Adam, and left to natural procreation the task of transmitting the intellective soul
from parents to offspring. In this chapter I shall demonstrate that the discussions of
sixteenth-century Lutherans about the origin of the soul enjoyedmuch less consen-
sus than has so far been thought. However, one group of sixteenth-century Luther-
ans, who followedMelanchthon’s teachingmore closely, shared the view that ques-
tions concerning the origin ofman’s soul go beyond human natural understanding.
By addressing Lutheran discussions on the origin of the human soul, this chapter
will also put forward some ideas about the formation of Lutheran confessional iden-
tity in connection with sixteenth-century discussions about the soul.

chapter 2
‘Whether the Soul is ἐντελέχεια or ἐνδελέχεια’.
Humanist Psychology at Renaissance
Universities in Germany and the Low Countries
2.0. Introduction
Psychology during theMiddle Ages and the Renaissance amounted, inmost cases, to
commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima, or to other types of written production (e.g.
treatises, questions, and handbooks) that drew on this great book as their preferred
platform to consider the principal subject of any psychological investigation: the
soul. At the very onset of the De anima, Aristotle raises two very essential problems
with which the medieval and Renaissance tradition of books on the soul had to
deal. When introducing the soul as the main subject of the De anima, Aristotle
writes:
Our aim is to grasp and understand, first its essential nature, and secondly
its properties. […] To attain any knowledge about the soul is one of the most
difficult things in the world. As the form of question which here presents
itself, viz., the question ‘What is it?’, recurs in other fields, it might be sup-
posed that there was some single method of inquiry applicable to all objects
whose essential nature we are endeavouring to ascertain. […] But if there is
no such single and general method for solving the question of essence, our
task becomes stillmore difficult; in the case of each different subject we shall
have to determine the appropriate process of investigation. If to this there
be a clear answer, e.g., that the process is demonstration or division, or some
other knownmethod,many difficulties hand hesitations still beset us –with
what fact shall we begin the enquiry?1
According to Aristotle, the very first points that psychology had to take into account
were the definition of the soul and the method one had to follow in order to suc-
1 Aristotle,De anima, i. 1, 402a7–22.
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cessfully determine what the soul was. Whilst virtually all medieval commentators
sought to answer these questions, the problems of determining the essence of the
soul and the method for attaining such knowledge took on an interesting meaning
in the Renaissance. New theological and philosophical concerns that a definition of
the soul was altogether impossible to obtain were combined with the eclectic use
of a variety of methods and types of knowledge – medicine, theology, and philos-
ophy – that Renaissance authors employed to study the soul. This is particularly
true in the case of psychological works produced at northern European universi-
ties, where a renewed interest inmedicine, togetherwithhumanist learning and the
process of confessionalisation, arguably played an important role.2 This interplay of
methods and disciplines involved in the task of defining the soul is nicely illustrated
by the diffusion of one psychological question at northern European universities in
the Renaissance, namely the question “whether the soul is best defined as perfection
(ἐντελέχεια) or as continuous motion (ἐνδελέχεια)”.
In fact, the question at issuewas in its initial character a distinctly humanist con-
troversy between John Argyropulos (1415–1487) and Angelo Politian (1454–1494), and
it concerned the philological accuracy of Cicero’s view, according to which Aristotle
had defined the soul as ἐνδελέχεια (and not, as customarily accepted, as ἐντελέχεια).
Philosophical implications were already visible in these early stages of the debate.
However, the dispute on Cicero’s use of ἐνδελέχεια acquired a fully-grown doctrinal
significance when it obtained a systematic place in commentaries on Aristotle’s De
anima produced in Renaissance Germany and the Low Countries.
Between the beginning of the sixteenth century and the first half of the seven-
teenth century, the questionwhether the soul is ἐντελέχεια or ἐνδελέχειαwas treated
in a remarkable number of works on the soul, written by intellectuals working in
northern Europe. For instance, the theme is extensively developed by Jan Ludovicus
Vives (Bruges), JuliusCaesar Scaliger (Agen), ConradGesner (Zürich), PhilipMelanch-
thon (Wittenberg), Veit Amerbach (Ingolstadt), Otto Casmann (Steinfurt), Rudolph
Snellius (Leiden), and Libertus Fromondus (Leuven). Although the discussion ap-
pears to have been very popular with Renaissance commentators on Aristotle’s De
2 By “confessionalisation” Imean theprocess throughwhichChristianitydeveloped into three inter-
nally coherent and externally exclusive groups (Lutherans, Catholics, and Calvinists), and which
led these groups to issue official statements of doctrine. This process involved social disciplining
and the constitution of clerical and political institutions, as intertwined with the formation of
religious ideologies and of belief systems. For amore extended discussion of this theme, see: supra,
‘Chapter 1’, 55–59.
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anima, scholars have hitherto devoted nearly no work to this aspect of Renaissance
psychology.3
As a case study in this development, this chapter will focus on Melanchthon’s
Commentarius de anima. It will show that the dispute, which stems from the context
of the ItalianQuattrocento, was treated byMelanchthon in away that served the pur-
poses of his own Lutheran conception of the soul. Melanchthon’s endorsement of
Cicero’s definition of the soul as ἐνδελέχεια, or “continuous motion”, nicely fits his
Lutheran idea that the entirety of the human nature (soul and body) is the subject of
grace, aswell as his understanding of the relationship betweenGod’s lawandGospel.
Moreover, by means of a few examples in the reception of Melanchthon’s work in
northern Europe, this chapterwill show that the humanist dispute became fashion-
able whenMelanchthon’s viewwas accepted by a number of Protestant authors and
rejected by Catholic professors, who defended a more traditional conception of the
soul. By doing this, the present chapter will show that although the authors I will
take into consideration all show a keen interest in a humanistic approach to Aristo-
tle’s De anima, their concerns are ultimately linked to theological and – certainly in
the case of Melanchthon – confessional scopes.
2.1. The Humanist Dispute and Philip
Melanchthon’s Commentarius De anima
Before becoming a disputed question in the Renaissance scientia de anima, the discus-
sion onwhether the soul is ἐντελέχεια or ἐνδελέχεια had intrigued several fifteenth-
century humanist authors. Eugenio Garin provides us with the only account of the
dispute of which I am aware. He correctly reports that the dispute started as a con-
troversy between Argyropulos and Politian over the following passage from Cicero’s
Tusculan Disputations i, x:
3 Vives’ and Gesner’s discussions may be found in: Ioannis Ludovici Vivis Valentini De anima et vita
libri tres. Eiusdem argumenti Viti Amerbachii de Anima Libri iiii. Philippi Melanthonis Liber unus. His
accedit nunc primum Conradi Gesneri De anima liber, sententiosa brevitate, velutique per tabulas et apho-
rismos magna ex parte conscriptus, philosophiae, rei medicae ac philologiae sudiosis accommodatus; in quo
de qualitatibus, saporibus, odoribus, sonis, et coloribus copiose accurateque tractatur (Zurich 1563), 48, 730.
Reference to the discussions of the other authors I mentioned will be provided further on in this
chapter.
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Aristotle, [a man] superior to all others in genius and industry – Plato ex-
cepted –, having embraced these four known kinds of principles, fromwhich
all things originate, believes that there is a certain fifth nature, from which
the mind [mens] is; […] he adds a fifth kind, which lacks a name, and thus he
calls the soul [animus] by the new name ἐνδελέχεια, as it were a continued
and perennial motion.4
According to Cicero, Aristotle defines the soul as “endelechy”, which has to be ren-
dered as “continuous and perennial motion”. Argyropulos questioned the truth-
fulness of Cicero’s reading of Aristotle. In fact, the Greek humanist contended that
Cicero had mistakenly ascribed to Aristotle a term and a view that rather belonged
to Plato’s Timaeus.5 Argyropulos’ criticismwas rejected by the Italian humanist Poli-
tian, according to whomCicero’s interpretation was based on a lost Aristotelian text
and was accordingly a legitimate one.6
In the wake of the polemic between Argyropulos and Politian, several other
authors began to take a stand in the debate. For instance, Hermolaus Barbarus
argued that, whilst Cicero’s interpretation of Aristotle was essentially correct, the
spelling ἐντελέχεια had to be favoured; this, because the letter δ changes into τ in
Attic Greek.
Interestingly enough, what appears to be an exclusively philological dispute
quickly became a genuine philosophical problem, in the sixteenth century. This
emerges, for example, fromGuillameBudé’sDeasse et partibus (1551), inwhichCicero’s
view is rejected on the following grounds. Independently of whether it was philo-
logically accurate, Cicero’s rendering of ἐνδελέχεια as “continuous motion” fails to
do justice to Aristotle’s conception of the soul as something static, or perfectio.7 This
4 A.E. Douglas, ed., Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations, i (Warminster 1985), 32: «Aristoteles longe omni-
bus – Platonem semper excipio – praestans et ingenio et diligentia, cum quatuor nota illa genera
principiorum est complexus, e quibus omnia orerentur, quintam quandam naturam censet esse,
e quia sit mens; […] quantum genus adhibet vacans nomine et sic ipsum animum ἐνδελέχειαν
appellat novo nomine quasi quandam continuatammotionem et perennem».
5 Angeli Politiani Opera, ApudNicolaum Episcopium Iuniorem (Basel 1564), 224.
6 Angeli Politiani Opera, 227: «Quid autem prohibet, quo minus Cicero ipse videre matricem quoque
librorum Aristotelis, qui fuerint ipsius aetate publicati, si non incorruptam, certe (sicut diximus)
conscribellatam potuerit?».
7 Gulielmi Budaei Parisiensis, De asse et partibus eius, Apud Sebastianum Gryphium (Paris 1551), 38:
«Quare liquido (ut arbitror) constat verba illa Ciceronis de anima humano non esse consentanea
cum entelechia Aristotelis».
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opinion will be espoused by Francisco Suárez, in his De anima, published posthu-
mously in 1621. According to Suárez, Budé correctly sees that Cicero’s TusculanDispu-
tations fails to understand the essence of Aristotle’s definition of the soul.8
It is this philosophical aspect of the humanist discussion that drew the attention
of sixteenth-century northern European commentators on Aristotle’s De anima. In
that intellectual milieu, however, what was at stake is not only a philosophical
interpretation of Aristotle’s definition of the soul, but rather the choice between two
divergent conceptions of the human being and of its study, more precisely between
the type of anthropology resulting from the Scholastic synthesis and the Lutheran
type of anthropology proposed by Melanchthon’s Commentarius de anima, to which
we now turn.
In the case of Melanchthon, Cicero’s interpretation of Aristotle does not appear
to be the cause of certain philosophical implications. Rather, it seems to play the role
of an erudite corroboration of the philosophical account of the soul developed by
Melanchthon. In fact, his treatment of Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations has to be read
against the background of the main views about the soul proposed in the Commen-
tarius. The opening section of the book – “quid continet haec pars philosophiae cui
titulus est de anima” – provides us with a first appraisal of the ideas that mould
Melanchthon’s psychology, as well as his endorsement of Cicero’s use of ἐνδελέχεια.
The text reads as follows:
There is nomore eminent,more erudite ormore pleasant part of Physics than
these disputations on the soul. For although the essence of the soul cannot be
sufficiently grasped, nevertheless its actions show the way to the knowledge
of it. Thus, we will have to discuss the actions, the powers are distinguished
andwhile the organswill be described, bywhich, at the same time, thewhole
nature of the body is to be explained. Therefore, this part [of Physics] has to
encompass not only the soul, but also the whole nature of man.9
8 Francisco Suárez, Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis De anima, edited by Salvador
Castellote, Vol. 1 (Madrid 1978), 70: «Ex quibus patet recte interpretari nomen “entélecheia” per
actum et formam, quod in Physicis annotavimus. Unde interpretatio Ciceronis non est ad rem,
contra quem optime disserit Budaeus, lib. 1 De Asse».
9 Philip Melanchthon, Commentarius de anima, 1v: «Nec vero locupletior, nec eruditior, nec dulcior
ulla pars est Physices quam hae disputationes de anima. Etsi enim substantia animae non satis
perspici potest, tamen viam ad eius agnitionem monstrant actiones. Itaque quum de actionibus
dicendum erit, potentiae seu vires discernentur, describentur organa qua in re simul tota corporis
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Contrary tomostmedieval commentaries onAristotle’sDeanima,Melanchthon’s
Commentarius has the human nature as its subject matter. Virtually all ancient and
medieval commentators had looked at the soul as the principle of life and vital oper-
ations,which evenplants andbeasts partook in. According to themthehuman ratio-
nal soulwas only themost complexmanifestationof lifewithin the realmof animate
beings.Melanchthon, on the other hand, looks at the soul as one of the twoparts (the
body being the other) composing the human being. Furthermore, he states that we
are unable to fathom the essence of the soul in our fallen state, and that for this rea-
son we can only know the way in which man’s soul acts. The knowledge of these
actions, in its turn, requires the description of the whole human body, which is sup-
plied by Galenic and Vesalian anatomies.10
By looking at these initial statements it should already be clear that Melanch-
thon’s work is quite different from Aristotle’s De anima, in both its structure and
contents. In effect, although Melanchthon entitles his book Commentarius de anima,
he explicitly states his intention to diverge from Aristotle in all cases in which the
latter’s views are inconsistent with Christian theology.11 In so doing, he aims to put
forward a fresh account of the soul, consisting in a Christian anthropology based, to
some extent, on Aristotle and on anatomical knowledge.
The result of this endeavour is a work that Melanchthon himself is not satis-
fied with. In the preface to the Commentarius, he refers to it as an hodgepodge and a
disorderly lucubration, which he decided to publish nonetheless, simply to pass on
rightful anduseful ideas and to encourage the youth to examine such a crucial aspect
of natural philosophy as the science of the soul.12 As I will have occasion to high-
ac praecipue humani natura explicanda est. Itaque, haec pars non solum de anima, sed etiam
de tota natura hominis inscribi debebat».
10 Melanchthon relied on Galen’s On the Opinions of Hippocrates and Plato for the anatomical
account of man’s body presented in the Commentarius (1540). About Melanchthon’s use of
Galen, see: Jürgen Helm, “Die Galenrezeption in PhilippMelanchthonsDe anima (1540/1552)”,
Medizinhistorisches Journal, 31, h. 4/4 (1966), 298–321. Instead, the revised edition of the book (the
Liber de anima of 1553) uses Vesalian anatomy. About this, see: Vivian Nutton, “The Anatomy
of the Soul in Early Renaissance Medicine”, 146 and Sachiko Kusukawa, The Transformation of
Natural Philosophy, 75–123.
11 Melanchthon, Commentarius de anima, α5v.
12 Melanchthon, Commentarius de anima, α5v, α8r «Cum igitur invitanda sit adolescentia ad doc-
trinamde Anima, fui hortator D. IacoboMilichio, ut hic praelegeret cum alias partes physices,
tumhanc quoque; et communicates operis sylvulam collegimus, quamnunc edidimus, nequ-
quam expolitam ut vellem, scis enim haec tempora turbulent mihi non concedere ocium ad
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light, Melanchthon’s treatment of the soul is indeed not always straightforward. It
presentsmany views of other authors, thoughwithout being clear in all cases about
which of those are to be accepted andwhich are not.Moreover, because the Commen-
tarius is a natural-philosophical work in view of a Christian type of anthropology, it
looks at the soul from both a philosophical and a theological perspective. However
the relation between those two angles, as well as theirmutual coherence do not sur-
faceunequivocally in the text. According toVivianNutton, theunsatisfactory results
achievedbyMelanchthon’sworkmustbe ascribed to thedifficulty involved in trying
to definewhat the soul is and inharmonising Scriptures, philosophy, and anatomy.13
Nevertheless, I propose, it is precisely by looking at these scopes, which animate the
Commentarius, that onemight be able to identify the coherence of its views, including
its positive judgement of Cicero’s use of ἐνδελέχεια.
In fact, Melanchthon’s theories on the soul are better understood against the
background of his broader ideas on the relation between philosophy and the Chris-
tian faith. Aswehave already seen, a pronounced refusal of scholastic philosophyhad
accompanied Luther’s reform, which Melanchthon wholeheartedly embraced. Yet,
during the twenties and thirties of the sixteenth century, Melanchthon was faced
with problems within the Evangelical camp that lead him to reconsider Luther’s
views. Hence, to look at the teaching of part of the Aristotelian corpus as instru-
mental in conducting church disputes in an orderly manner, as well as in pursuing
the confessionalisation of Saxony. More specifically, Melanchthon fiercely opposed
claims for civil disobedience defended by the Anabaptists and the Zwinglians. He
traced their views back to a lack of erudition inmatters of theology. As a result of this,
Melanchthon sought to restore civil obedience within the Protestant lands by devis-
ing a system of education in which rhetoric, physiology and ethics would show the
Law of God, i.e., the fact that God has bestowed innate knowledge of civic morals on
human beings. According to Melanchthon, the teaching of philosophy would pro-
vide the basis to show that civil obedience was divinely ordained and that its notion
was found amongst the innate ideas of civic morals, with which the human mind
was endowed.14
haec studia colenda. Extant autemmulti libelli, hoc argumento,mediocriter scripti; quare for-
tassis reprehendetnt nostrum consilium nonnulli, quod hanc inconditam farraginem edidi-
mus; sed opinor etiam novis scriptis accedenda esse studia iuventutis. […] Etsi autem nemihi
quidem haec tumultuaria lucubratio ubique, satisfacit, tamen, recata et utilia tradere conati
sumus».
13 Vivian Nutton, “The Anatomy of the Soul in Early Renaissance Medicine”, 147.
14 The term ‘Anabaptist’ is in fact Melanchthon’s own coinage to refer to a group of radical
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Surely, Melanchthon’s political agenda was a Lutheran one, in that he did not
judge that rhetoric, physiology and ethics could supply exhaustive knowledge of
reality. The study of these matters is most helpful during our mortal and civic
life, for it ensures that human reason apprehends the law of God. However, the
will of the Creator to forgive his creatures, the immortal nature of their souls, and
the promise of the eternal life, fall by no means within the scope of philosophical
knowledge. Instead, these matters are the business of the Gospel and can be known
solely by means of the Scriptures and the faith in Christ.15 As Sachiko Kusukawa
has demonstrated, this clear-cut distinction between philosophy and the Gospel is
reflected inMelanchthon’s use of natural philosophy in theCommentarius. Thiswork
uses Aristotle’s De anima, as well as other philosophical sources, such as works by
Galen and Cicero, only insofar as a rational grasp of the human nature is concerned.
Instead, all points concerning the soul that are relevant to theological matters (e.g.,
the spiritual nature of the soul, its free will, and its immortality) are treated by
Melanchthon on a strictly scriptural basis. By combining natural philosophy and
Christian ideas, Melanchthon puts forward a psychological work, in which the soul
is shown to possess innate knowledge of good and evil actions. This knowledge, in
its turn, forms the philosophical justification of his claim for civil obedience.16
reformers whom – he alleged – supported the unorthodox idea of adult baptism. For more
details about this point, see: supra, ‘Chapter 1’. 67.
15 Melanchthon eloquently expressed these views in his 1527 oration ‘De discrimine Evangelii et
philosophiae’. About this oration, as well as the relationship between Melanchthon’s strive
for social disciplining in Saxony and his ideas on God’s law and Gospel, see: supra, ‘Chapter 1’,
64–74.
16 In the final pages of the Commentarius, Melanchthon departs from the common Aristotelian
doctrine that nothing that is in the intellect was not formerly in the senses and argues for
innate ideas of mathematical and moral entities: «ut speculative principia, ita practica certa
et firma sunt; sed practica facilius labefieri sinimus, propter voluntatis nostrae infirmitatem
ac mobilitatem. Certa est et firma sententia. Adulterium est turpe. Sed non tam firmiter eam
amplectimur, ut hanc, bis 4 sunt 8. Re ipsa tamen certitudo similis est; non quia foris eviden-
tia movet oculos, sed quia et haec sententia divinitus insita est menti. Itaque nos sequemur
Pauli sententiam de hac controversia, qui testatur divinitus insitas esse mentibus has noti-
tias, quod sit Deus, quod Deo sit obediendum. Item discrimen honestorum et turpium, seu
leges naturae» (Melanchthon, Commentarius de anima, 210r). Sachiko Kusukawa has extensively
treated Melanchthon’s conception of natural philosophy, as well as the relation between this
theme, his claim for civil obedience, and his works on the soul; see Kusukawa, The Transfor-
mation of Natural Philosophy, 75–123. Kusukawa also studied the use of Melanchthon’s belief
in innate ideas made by Rudolph Snellius and other Philippo-Ramist authors, in order to
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Interestingly enough, Sachiko Kusukawa has also shown that Melanchthon’s
political agenda required a theory of the Lutheran man and that this task, in its
turn, is reflected by the structure and contents of the Commentarius de anima. In fact,
according to Kusukawa, Melanchthon’s choice to treat the whole human nature
(rather than on the soul considered to be the Aristotelian principle of life), as well
as his downplaying of the capability of the fallen man to fathom the essence of the
soul, depend on his Lutheran conception of man, which characterises the Praecep-
tor’s philosophical project. The subject of the Commentarius, man’s body and soul,
corresponds to what Luther had considered to be the subject of grace: the entirety
of man’s fallen nature.17 Furthermore, Melanchthon believes that the inclusion of
the anatomical study of the body in the science of the soul plays a double role
with regard to our knowledge of the natural world. On the one hand, it enables
us to gain knowledge of the operations of human beings, in default of an essential
account of their souls. On the other hand, the anatomical study of the mechanisms
of the body reveals the orderly structure of nature and the divine law governing
it.
In what follows I shall use this reading of Melanchthon to explain his view
that, from a philosophical point of view, the soul is ἐνδελέχεια. I shall argue, on
the one hand, that Melanchthon’s approval of Cicero’s notion of ἐνδελέχεια reflects
the goal of devising a type of psychology that, by considering the entirety of the
human nature, would also provide an intellectual backing for the enforcement of
social discipline. On the other hand, I will emphasise that, despite the fact that
Melanchthon’s conception of the soul as ἐνδελέχεια was part and parcel of his aim
to study the entirety of human nature, the result of this project involved a split-
up between man’s body and soul. In fact, Melanchthon’s intention to work in the
abovementioned framework of the Lutheran concept of gracewas carried out accord-
ing to his understanding of the difference between philosophy and theology, which
Melanchthon, as we shall see, treated in terms of the difference between God’s law
and Gospel. But such difference determined a disjunction between body and soul
in Melanchthon’s anthropology. Melanchthon’s idea of ἐνδελέχεια plays an impor-
anchor themethodof dialectics to certain knowledge. See: SachikoKusukawa, “Between theDe
anima and Dialectics: a Prolegomenon to Philippo-Ramism”. On the theme of moral psychol-
ogy at sixteenth-centuryWittenberg and in the work ofMelanchthon, see: Pekka Kärkkäinen,
“Synderesis in Late Medieval Philosophy and the Wittenberg Reformers”, British Journal for the
History of Philosophy, 20:5 (2012), 881–901.
17 I have extensively discussed this point; see: supra, ‘Chapter 1’, 61–64.
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tant role in this transformation.18 Let us proceed in order, then, and let us turn to
Melanchthon’s interpretation of Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations.
Melanchthon’s endorsement of Cicero’s take on ἐνδελέχεια seems to reflect pri-
marily the Commentarius’ dissatisfaction with Aristotle’s definition of the soul. In
fact, the term ἐνδελέχεια first occurs in Melanchthon’s commentary in connection
with the following criticism of the Aristotelian definition of the soul:
The soul is the first actuality of the physical organic body having life poten-
tially. Andhe adds another [definition]: the soul is the first principle through
which we live, sense, move and understand. The latter definition describes
the soul only from its effects, but it does not determine which thing that
principle of life andmovement is. The formerdefinition,whilst it isnot taken
a posteriori, is nonetheless obscure, for it seems to be a nominal definition
rather than a real definition. In fact, when he said ‘it is the first actuality’,
with what confusion and darkness does he obfuscate the eyes?19
According toMelanchthon’s analysis, Aristotle’s two definitions of the soul are both
insufficient, for the two following reasons. Aristotle’s conception of the soul as the
principle of life, sensation, motion, and intellection only supplies an account of the
soulaposteriori.Moreover,Aristotle’saprioridefinitionof the soul as the first actuality
of an organic body possessing life potentially is unclear In fact, it uses the term “first
actuality” (actus primus), which Melanchthon deems unclear and capable to provide
us, at most, with a nominal definition. According to Melanchthon, Aristotle fails to
determine what thing the soul is.
Melanchthon’s ensuing effort to put forward a clearer account of the soul con-
sists of an explanation of the expression “first actuality”. It is in the context of his
discussion of this expression that Melanchthon resorts to the Greek word ἐνδελέ-
χεια, which he defines in the following passage:
18 OnMelanchthon’s understanding of the difference between law and Gospel, as well as on the
impact this distinction had on his psychology, see: supra, ‘Chapter 1’, 64–74.
19 Melanchthon, Commentarius de anima, 7v: «Anima est actus primus corporis physici organici,
potentia vitam habentis. Addit et alteram, anima est principium quo vivimus, sentimus,
movemur et intelligimus primo. Posterior definitio tantum ab effectibus describit animam,
sed qua res sit illud vitae et motus principium non dicit. Et prior definitio etsi non est a
posteriori sumpta, tamen admodum obscura est, ut videri possit quaedam definitio nominis
potius quam rei. Nam cum ait ‘est actus primus’, quas tenebras, quam caliginem offundit
oculis?».
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This I say so that it can be understoodmore easily what he calls ‘actuality’ or
(touse theGreek term) ‘endelechy’.Now,whenyouhear someone speakingof
the soul of an ox or a tree, surely you do not think of a nature that originates
from somewhere else and that is separable from the body or anything other
than the very form or life of the ox or the tree. […] The soul is endelechy, i.e.,
the agitation or the life itself of the physical body. […] That endelechy or agi-
tation is the δύναμις that supplies the vital operations. In fact, ‘life’ here (i.e.
in the definition of the soul dc) means those very operations concomitant
with the soul. And if you ask ‘what is the soul of the ox?’ he (i.e. Aristotle dc)
replies: it is precisely that agitation throughwhich the ox lives, or life itself.20
TheGreekword ‘ἐνδελέχεια’ means agitation and, according toMelanchthon, better
expresses the sense of the Aristotelian definition of the soul than the traditional ren-
dering ‘entelechy’. In fact, because Aristotle looked at the soul as a principle encom-
passing not only the human soul, but also the soul of animals and plants he could
not conceive of the soul as something disembodied or essentially different from the
life or agitation of the body.Now, that the soul is ἐνδελέχειαmeans just this: the soul
is not a perfect being, but the movement towards it. This movement coincides with
the life or the operations themselves of the animate being. This point is presented
only as a way to make it clearer what the soul is according to Aristotle. However,
the identification of the Aristotelian soul with the life and operations of the body
itself appears to reflect Melanchthon’s own view. It nicely fits his attempt to deter-
mine what thing the soul is, as well as the intentions stated in the opening chapter
of the Commentarius, namely to put forward an operational – as opposed to an essen-
tial – account of the soul. What is more, bothMelanchthon’s friends and his foes did
not look at his identification of soul and life as merely an interpretation of Aristotle.
In fact, this identification between soul and life was the main point of divergence
between those amongst Melanchthon’s contemporaries who criticised his endorse-
ment of Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations and the ones who defended Melanchthon’s
20 Melanchthon, Commentarius de anima, 7r–8v: «Id eo dico, ut facilius quid actum seu ut Graeca
voce potius utamur, Endelechiam vocet intelligi possit. Nam cum bovis aut fruticis animam
nominari audis, certe non intelligis naturam aliunde ortam, separabilem a corpore, aut aliud
quam ipsambovis aut fruticis formam aut vitam. […] Anima est endelechia, id est, agitatio seu
vita ipsa corporis physici. […] Illa endelechia, seu agitatio est δύναμις quae parit operationes
vitales. Nam, vita significat hic ipsas operationes comitantes animam. Si quaeras quid est
anima bovis? Respondet, est illa ipsa agitatio, qua bos vivit, seu ipsa vita».
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anthropology. Melanchthon’s allies tended to lean towards looking at the soul as
identical with the operations of the bodily organs, whereas his adversaries based
their criticism on their reading of Aristotle’s definition of the soul in terms of the
principle of life, rather than life itself. I will return to this point later, when I will
illustrate a sample of criticisms againstMelanchthon, produced at the Catholic uni-
versity of Ingolstadt.21
Afterhavingdefined the soul in termsof its operations or as agitationof thebody,
Melanchthon strives to determine what thing this “agitation” is. For this reason
he uses Galen’s conception of the soul as either the temperament of the body or
the bodily spirit. In an effort to ground the soul in the human body, Melanchthon
puts forward a definition of the soul based on Cicero’s interpretation of Aristotle,
as well as on Galenic anatomy: the soul is ἐνδελέχεια, i.e., a continuous movement
concomitant with certain parts of the body or with its spirits and temperaments.
The following section of the Commentarius confirms this definition of the soul
by addressing the philological aspects related to the humanist dispute triggered
by Argyropulos and Politian; and this, according to Melanchthon, for the didactic
purpose of enabling the youth to grasp Aristotle’s definition of the soul better.22
However, Melanchthon does not dwell too long on this discussion and states that
a terminological analysis is not his main intention: ego quidem non rixor de vocabulo.23
What really counts for him is not the word ‘ἐνδελέχεια’ and its etymology, but its
usage. According toMelanchthon, Cicero recognises two points. First, he sees that at
21 It is worth pointing out that Melanchthon recognises that his identification of soul and life
might be taken as implying that soul is an accidental property of the body; a thesis thatwould
be patently against the opinion of Aristotle. According to Melanchthon, however, this is not
quite the case: «Aristoteles ipse diluit hanc obiectionem; inquit enim, duplicem esse ἐνδελέ-
χειαμ, alteram substantialem, alteram accidentalem. Substantialis est ipsa animati talis exis-
tentia seu vita, quae actione ciet. Nam in viventibus formas voluit ἐνδελέχειας vocare, ut sig-
nificaret eas dissimiles esse formis inanimatorum.Vita enimest continuata quaedamagitatio;
talis non est forma lapidis. Est igitur anima, substantialis quaedam ἐνδελέχεια, non acciden-
talis» (Melanchthon, Commentarius de anima, 14v–15r). Although Melanchthon maintains that
the ἐνδελέχεια is a substantial form, his view appears to differ from the Aristotelian one on
another important aspect:whilst beinga substantial form,Melanchthon’s soul isnot theprin-
ciple of the vital operations of the body, but its agitation or its very life.
22 «Sed quoniam et de vocabulo endelechia litigatur, et Cicero a multis reprehenditur, qui vertit
continuatam et perennem motionem, adiiciam quaedam de interpretatione vocabuli […] ut
Aristotelis sententia iuvenibus fiat illustrior» Melanchthon, Commentarius de anima, 11.
23 Melanchthon, Commentarius de anima, 13r.
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the time Aristotle wrote his De anima, the term ‘ἐνδελέχεια’ was taken as meaning
“continuous motion”. Second, Cicero rightly observes that Aristotle used an already
existing termto express the idea of the soul asmotionor life of thebody. As it emerges
from the following passage, Melanchthon concludes that Cicero’s interpretation of
Aristotle must be accepted on philosophical grounds:
As amatter of fact, thosewho rebukeCicero and contend thathehasnot quite
understood the opinion of Aristotle, are, in my judgment, rather mistaken
and turn by far aside from the opinion of Aristotle. For this reason then they
erroneously translate the term as ‘inner perfection’, for they think that here
the rational soul is being defined, as though it occupied a certain place inside
the body, as the captain sits in a certain place on the ship, viz., at the helm.
Therefore, they imagine that ‘endelechy’means an equipping and perfecting
nature inside the body. But, as mentioned, Aristotle believes something very
different, and he does not discuss merely the soul of man, but also those of
plants and beasts. And what else is the soul in these (plants and beasts) but
their very life and agitation?24
Cicero correctly understands that Aristotle does not look at the soul as a perfection
or a being of its own, and that he does not conceive of the soul-body relation as that
obtaining between a sailor and his ship. Far from it, Aristotle’s soul is the agitation
concomitant with the bodies of all animate beings, or their very life.
It might already be clear at this stage that Melanchthon finds in Cicero an
authoritative ally in his attempt to interpret Aristotle in such a way as to deter-
mine what thing the soul is. Cicero’s ἐνδελέχεια and Galen’s psychology corroborate
Melanchthon’s view: the soul is a continuous agitation concomitant with the tem-
peraments of the body. In order to better understand this point and to show the
reasonsmotivatingMelanchthon’s embodied conception of the soul,weneed to look
24 Melanchthon, Commentarius de anima, 11v–11r: «Ego vero eos qui flagellant Ciceronem ac putant
Aristotelis sententiam non satis assecutum esse, falli ipsos potius iudico, ac procul ab Aris-
totelis sententia deerrare. Ideo enimmalunt verti interiorem perfectionem, quia cogitant hic
rationalem animam definiri, quae intus in corpore locum aliquem teneat, veluti gubernator
in navi sedet certo loco, videlicet ad gubernaculum. Ideo imaginantur endelechiam significare
naturam intus perficientemet ornantemcorpus. At Aristoteles, ut dictumest, longe aliud sen-
tit, nec tantumdehomine quaerit, sed etiamde plantis et pecudibus, in quibus quid est anima
nisi ipsa vita seu agitatio?»
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at the section of the Commentarius entitled “what can be said about man’s soul from
a religious point of view (pie)”.25
In this sectionMelanchthon changes his viewpoint: he stops looking at the soul
from the perspective of natural philosophy and he limits his observation of the soul
to its rational part, which he defines solely on scriptural bases, as follows:
The rational soul is an intelligent spirit, which is the other part of the sub-
stance ofman; and it does not perishwhen it leaves the body, but it is immor-
tal. This definition isnotbasedonphysical argument; instead it is taken from
the Scriptures.26
In contrast to his natural philosophical definition of the lower parts of the soul as
an embodied ἐνδελέχεια, Melanchthon denies that a definition of the rational soul
can be obtained by man’s natural understanding. As a consequence, he uses the
Scriptures to ground his conception of the higher powers of the soul (intellect and
will) as an immortal intelligent spirit.27 This is consistent with the methodological
premises of Melanchthon’s natural philosophy. As mentioned earlier, Melanchthon
denies that philosophy can deal with anything exceeding the limits of rhetoric,
physiology, and civic morals. The task of defining the soul as an incorporeal and
immortal nature does indeed fall outside the scope of our natural consideration of
theworld and is rather to be accomplished bymeans of theological knowledge based
on the Gospel.
25 Melanchthon, Commentarius de anima, 15r.
26 Melanchthon, Commentarius de anima, 15v: «Anima rationalis est spiritus intelligens, qui est
altera pars substantiae hominis nec extinguitur cum a corpore discessit, sed immortalis est.
Haec definitio non habet physicas rationes, sed sumpta est ex sacris literis».
27 Interestingly enough,Melanchthonutilises the same term“spiritus” to indicate the intelligent
spirit of man (which is immaterial and immortal), as well as the Galenic animal and vital
spirits (i.e., the vegetative and sensitive soul l or ἐνδελέχεια). In the Liber de anima of 1553,
Melanchthon employs the term to refer also to the Holy Ghost and proposes that the latter
may interact with the bodily spirits (see cr xiii, 88 f.) This aspect of Melanchthon’s work
has already been pointed out by Daniel P. Walker, “Medical Spirits and God and the Soul”, in
Marta Fattori andMassimo Bianchi, eds., Spiritus. iv Colloquio Internazionale Roma, 7–9 gennaio
1983 (Rome, 1984), 223–244, 228; Daniel P. Walker, “The Astral Body in Renaissance Medicine”,
Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 21 (1958), 119–133; Kusukawa, The Transformation of
Natural Philosophy, 120. On Melanchthon’s varied usage of the notion of “spirit” and his ideas
about the interaction between bodily spirits, the Holy Ghost, and the stars, see ‘Chapter 3’ of
this thesis.
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Unfortunately, the Commentarius fails to explain how the natural philosophical
and the scriptural points of view can be reconciled. Onemay verywell argue that the
shift presented in the Commentarius, from a philosophical to a scriptural account of
the soul, corresponds toMelanchthon’s intention of replacing Aristotle’s ἐνδελέχεια
with the Christian conception of the soul, or spiritus. This argument may even be
back by recalling Melanchthon’s intention to diverge from the views of Aristotle
that are at odds with the Christian doctrine. However, I do not think this reading
ofMelanchthon’s text is correct. Instead, I suggest, the consistency ofMelanchthon’s
views appear to lie elsewhere. According to him, ‘ἐνδελέχεια’ and ‘spiritus’ are not two
mutually exclusive ways of looking at the soul. The following part ofMelanchthon’s
discussion in the Commentarius sheds some light on this point. Immediately after
defining the rational soul as intelligent spirit, Melanchthon discusses whether such
spirit forms an entity of a single naturewith the sensitive and vegetative parts of the
soul, or rather if these are different souls coexisting in each man.28 Melanchthon’s
solution reads as follows:
The opinion is generally accepted that there is only one soul in man. But if
we say that only the vegetative and the sensitive souls are ἐνδελέχεια – i.e.,
agitations of certain parts of the body or the temperaments – whereas the
rational soul is the spirit, it will not be absurd to say that there are three soul
in man. […] Ockham, one of the sharpest amongst recent authors, defends
that the rational and the sensitive souls in man are really distinct from each
other and puts forthmany arguments in favour of his opinion. […] But we do
not wish to dwell much longer on such discussions; suffice it to suggest that
this can be said probably and without absurdity.29
28 Melanchthon ascribes the second view to Plato, Aristotle andGalen: «Anuna sit tantumhomi-
nis anima, videlicet rationalis, continens simul vires aliarum animarum, videlicet sentientis
et vegetativae. An vero sint distinctae animae in homine, vegetativa, sentiens, et rationalis,
sicut Plato, Aristoteles, et Galenus loquuntur» (Melanchthon, Commentarius de anima, 15v).
29 Melanchthon, Commentarius de anima, 16r: «Vulgo recepta est sententia, unam tantum in
homine Animam esse; sed si dicimus Vegetativam et Sentientem tantum ένδελεχείας esse,
hoc est, agitationes certarumpartiumCorporis, seu temperamenta, Rationalemvero Animam
spiritumesse; nonerit absurdumdicere tres esseAnimas inhomine. […]Unus ex recentioribus,
homo acutissimus, Occam defendit re ipsa distinctas in homine Anima esse, Rationalem et
Sentientem et colligit multa argumenta huius suae sententiae […]. Sed nos has disputationes
prolixius agitare nolumus; satis est admonere quid probabiliter et non absurde dici possit».
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To the best of my knowledge, this passage is largely neglected in the schol-
arly studies on Melanchthon’s psychology.30 Nevertheless, it provides us with some
important information regarding the notion of the soul presented in the Commen-
tarius. As it emerges from the last quotation, Melanchthon does not conceive of the
difference between ἐνδελέχεια and spiritus only in epistemological terms. Not only
do the two definitions of the soul correspond to two types of knowledge (whereby
the soul is defined as ἐνδελέχεια by the natural philosopher and as spiritus by the
theologian) but they also appear to refer to two different natures. According to
Melanchthon, the term ‘ἐνδελέχεια’ applies strictly to the vegetative and sensi-
tive parts of the soul, which are agitations of the organs or the temperaments of
the body. Instead the rational soul is an incorporeal and immortal spirit. The two
souls are ontologically distinct from each other, in the way described by William of
Ockham.31
Melanchthon proposes this conclusion probabiliter. In fact, his commitment to
treat these matters from a scriptural point of view keeps him from resolving the
issue philosophically. However, the idea that man possesses two different types of
soul is reiterated by Melanchthon on scriptural grounds. He does so in the context
of the question whether the rational soul is generated ex traduce (by means of the
ratio seminalis, present in the parents’ seed) or rather created ex nihilo by God in each
individual.
As I will show in more detail, in the last chapter of this thesis, Melanchthon’s
Commentarius favours the second answer on a scriptural basis.32 In fact, the Christian
doctrine teaches that God infuses the rational soul in each individual, once the body
is sufficiently developed according to its shape and limbs. Such an individual is
one that is already capable of the corporeal actions supplied by the vegetative and
sensitive souls. The latter, in turn, are defined by Melanchthon as ἐνδελέχεια, or
as agitations, life, and motion of the body. Therefore, also from this point of view,
30 An exception to this scholarly trend may be found in: Dino Bellucci, Science de la nature et
Réformation, 335–344.
31 Melanchthon probably refers to Ockham’s Quodlibet ii, q. 10 (= Opera Theologica 9), 156–161. In
the Liber de anima of 1552, Melanchthon leaves out the reference to Ockham; nonetheless, he
maintains the same position as in the Commentarius of 1540: the spiritus and the ἐνδελέχεία are
probably different from each other (cr xiii, 17). For an account of Ockham’s discussion of
the soul, see: Dominik Perler, “Ockham über die Seele und ihre Teile”, Recherches de théologie et
philosophie médiévales 77. 2 (2010), 313–350.
32 See, infra, ‘Chapter 6’, 164–165.
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Melanchthon appears to point to a real difference between the parts of the soul he
calls ἐνδελέχεια and the rational soul, which he defines as spiritus.
Melanchthon’s choice to treat the rational soul from a scriptural point of view
is consistent with his premises regarding the relationship between the law and
the Gospel of God: the nature and destiny of the rational soul is not the business
of natural philosophy but is taught by the Gospel. The downside of this type of
discourse, however, is that the Commentarius appears to leave us without precise
answers to somerelevantphilosophical questions.Notably,what typeof relationship
is there between the lower and the higher souls? Is the link between the spiritus and
the human body of a hylomorphic type, or is the Aristotelian framework of actuality
and potentiality to be abandoned altogether?
As I will show in the fourth chapter of this thesis, a tentative answer to these
questions can be found in Melanchthon’s Christology. For in the context of his
discussion of Christ’s human and divine natures, Melanchthon suggests that there
is a parallel between the ontological constitution of the two natures of Christ and
the relationship between man’s body and soul. As I shall show, Melanchthon seems
to suggest thatAristotle’s hylomorphic account of the soul-body relationshipmaybe
replaced by the Christological notion of hypostasis, intended as the personal union
obtaining between two natures.33
For the moment, suffice it to notice the following point. The remarks on Me-
lanchthon’s theological and political agenda made in the beginning of this section
might help make sense of Melanchthon’s choices in the Commentarius, most specifi-
cally of his adopting Cicero’s interpretation of Aristotle’sDe anima.
As a Lutheran text on human nature,Melanchthon’s Commentarius is committed
to two important ideas. First, our fallen state hinders us from acquiring true knowl-
edge of the soul. Second, not just the rational soul, but the entirety of human nature
is the subject of grace. Accordingly, Melanchthon’s endeavour to develop a Lutheran
conception of man leads him to consider both man’s soul and its body and to do so
on the basis of the Christian doctrine. At the same time, as a man engaged in devis-
ing a system of education in view of certain specific political objectives (particularly
that of reinforcing civil obedience amongst the Evangelicals), Melanchthon has to
make his ideas intelligible to a broad audience. For this reason, he needs to provide
his anthropology with a sound philosophical backing.
33 About this point, see: infra, ‘Chapter 4’, 138–139. For a more detailed account of Melanchthon’s
Christology, see: supra, ‘Chapter 1’, 77–82.
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I think that these needs form the background against which Melanchthon’s
bipartite account of the soul may be adequately understood. On the one hand,
Melanchthon’s definition of the lower powers of man’s soul as motions of the body
enables him to make room for a philosophical treatment of the soul in the scheme
of his Lutheran anthropology. By looking at the Aristotelian soul in the terms pro-
posed by Cicero, Melanchthon tries to firmly ground the soul in the human body;
this, in away to put forward an operational account of the soul based on the (Galenic)
anatomical description of the mechanisms of the body.34 On the other hand, Me-
lanchthon relies on what the Christian faith teaches about the rational soul and
defines it as an intelligent and immortal spirit, provided with innate knowledge of
civic morals. This spirit is a nature that radically differs from the operations of the
body.
In sum, Melanchthon’s endorsement of Cicero’s use of ἐνδελέχεια is part of an
attempt to embody the lower powers of the soul. This also enables Melanchthon
to ascribe a two-fold task to the science of the soul: the anatomical description of
the operations of the body, and a Christian account of the human spirit, as the
latter is described by the Gospel. On the one hand, Melanchthon’s conception of
philosophy as the law of Godmakes it possible to harmonise an anatomical descrip-
tion of the vegetative and sensitive operations of the soul with a Christian study
of man’s intellective soul, or spirit. In this scheme, the human bodily acts and the
human spirit together form the entirety of the human nature: the Lutheran subject
of grace. On the other hand, however, because from a philosophical point of view,
Melanchthon’s conflates the lower powers of the soulwith themovement of body (or
ἐνδελέχεια), and because his Christian account ofman’s higher soul as spiritus intel-
ligensmakes this spiritus differ substantially fromman’s body; for all these reasons,
Melanchthon’s anthropology is characterised by a disjunction between man’s body
and his spirit.
2.2. The Reception of Melanchthon’s View in Renaissance Northern Europe
In Melanchthon’s Commentarius de anima, the philosophical aspects of the debate
concerning the term ἐνδελέχεια becamemore emphasised, vis-à-vis the predilection
34 Melanchthon appears to combine Galen’s teleological anatomy with a seemingly mechanist
conception of the human body. About this, see: infra, ‘Chapter 5’, 143–150, 157–159.
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for the philological side of the dispute that had characterised the polemic between
Argyropulos, Politian andother outstandinghumanists. The approval of Cicero’s use
of ἐνδελέχεια on the part of Melanchthon seems to be an important ingredient of
his broader project to provide Lutheran anthropology with a sound philosophical
backing.
At the same time, the specific way in which Melanchthon discusses the term
ἐνδελέχεια seems to play an important role in the diffusion and systematisation
of the polemic on Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations within the De anima tradition in
northern Europe. In that context, the alternative between ἐντελέχεια and ἐνδελέχεια
does not only amount to a choice between two philosophical conceptions of the soul.
Even more importantly, it seems to coincide with a choice between Melanchthon’s
type of Lutheran anthropology and a more traditional conception of the human
being. This surfaces, for instance, in Veit Amerbach’s Quatuor libri de anima, printed
in Strasbourg, in 1542.
Amerbach’s text was produced at Wittenberg, though it was deliberately com-
posed as a criticism of Melanchthon’s Commentarius. As a matter of fact, Amerbach
published it in the wake of a row with Melanchthon and in concomitance with
his leaving Wittenberg for Ingolstadt (where he succeeded Johannes Eck), hence
the Lutheran for the Catholic faith.35 In fact, the discussion between Amerbach
and Melanchthon appears to have centred on the Lutheran doctrine of justifica-
tion by faith, the authority of the Pope, and to some extent on the science of the
soul. Whilst no document signed by Amerbach appears to be extant, his differ-
ence withMelanchthon can be gathered indirectly from the latter’s correspondence.
On 19 November 1543, Melanchthon writes in reply to Amerbach’s doubts concern-
ing the doctrine of justification by faith alone and reiterates that the remission
of sins is made possible only by faith, whereas it has nothing to do with either
our merit or the free will.36 The following day, Melanchthon writes a letter to the
35 On 10 November 1543, Melanchthon writes to Camerarius: «Vitum Amerbachium scito ab
Academia Bavarica conductum esse» (cr v, 231). Amerbach’s moving to Ingolstadt angered
Luther, who on 9 February 1544 writes to the theologian Anton Lauterbach: «Nosti ex nobis
exisse, qui non fuit ex nobis, M. Vitum Amerbachium Ingolstadiam, ut succedat Eccio, blas-
phematurusnostrumverbumfortemagis quamille fecit» (cr v, 231). The rowthat culminated
in Amerbach’s decision to leave Wittenberg may be dated back to 1537, when during his lec-
ture on the Physica, Amerbach slandered Melanchthon. About this, see: Walter Friedensburg,
Geschichte der UniversitätWittenberg (Halle a. S. 1917), 226; Sachiko Kusukawa, The Transformation
of Natural Philosophy, 109.
36 InMelanchthon’s ownwords: «Dicimus: fide, quae est assensus et in voluntatemotus, clamans
Abba Pater, accipi remissionem peccatorum; nec divelli ab ea dilectio ac spes possunt. Sed sola
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Saxon chancellor Gregorius Pontanus, in which Amerbach’s argument is summa-
rised as follows:
Mr Veit Amerbach wrote to me, only about the two parts regarding justi-
fication and the leadership of the Pope. He is dissatisfied with the particle
‘alone’ [in ‘by faith alone’, or sola fide] and argues that ‘by faith’ means only
the knowledge and not the trust in the mercy. Moreover, Veit is moved by
this argument concerning all things that are discussed between us and the
Catholics: “it is impossible that the Church is wrong about justification, the
Mass, the vows, and so many things. Everybody always thought differently
from the Lutherans. Therefore, the Lutheran opinion is new, alien to the
Church, and to be rejected”.37
Amerbach reportedly thinks the Catholic Church cannot possibly be wrong on so
many issues, such as the vows, the Mass, and the doctrine of justification; whereas,
the Lutheran views – especially the theory of salvation by faith alone – are novel,
unusual, and thus to be rejected. But these were not the only issues that made the
continuation of Amerbach’s appointment at Wittenberg problematic. In fact, his
teaching on the soul also seems to have exacerbated his linkswithMelanchthon and
the university. This emerges from the Annales of the life of Melanchthon, in which
Amerbach is reported as having started a quarrel withMelanchthon inOctober 1543,
which concerned the science of the soul.38 Amerbach’sDe animawasmet withmuch
scludit nostrummeritum, et significatur, propter Christum accipi remissionem peccatorum.
[…] fide, id est, fiducia misericordiae propter filium Dei promissa donatur reconciliatio. De
hac non dicit Thomas aut similes. Nec pertinent haec ad quaestionem de libero arbitrio;
ut vides, ad vera consolationem pertinent» (cr v, 231–232). To the best of my knowledge,
the original letter by Amerbach to Melanchthon is not extant or not printed; in fact, the
editor ofMelanchthon’s correspondence writes: «intelligitur Amerbachium adMelanthonem
scripsisse» (cr v, 231, fn.).
37 cr v, 233: «Ad me scripsit Magister Vitus Amerbachius, tantum de duobus articulis, de ius-
tificatione, et de primate Pontificis. De iustificatione displacet ei particula sola, et disputat
fide significare tantum notitiam, non fiduciam misericordiae […] Movetur autem Vitus hoc
argumento de omnibusmateriis, quae inter nos et Pontificos agitantur. Impossibile est totam
Ecclesiam de tantis rebus, de iustificatione, de missa, de votis, errare. Semper omnes aliter
senserunt, quam Lutherani. Ergo Lutherana sententia est nova, ignota Ecclesia, et reicienda».
38 «Oct. 22. 1543. VitusAmerbachiusWitebergae litesmovet adversusMelanchthonemindoctrina
de anima» (cr v, ix).
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disapproval inWittenberg, to the extent that its viewswerepublically condemnedon
a flyleaf affixed in the Saxon town.39 Unluckily, the document does not spell out the
reasonsmotivating this disapprobation of Amerbach’s psychology.Nor is the precise
nature of the disagreement between Melanchthon and Amerbach clear. However,
Amerbach’s Quatuor libri de anima is certainly very different from Melanchthon’s
Commentarius, particularlywith regard to the definition of the soul,whichAmerbach
treats in the first of the four books composing hisDe anima.
Interestingly enough, Amerbach devotes fifty-five pages of Book i to the discus-
sion of the term ἐντελέχεια. His extensive analysis of the philological aspects related
to the problem is intertwined with a refutation of Melanchthon, or as Amerbach
more indirectly has it, a refutation of those who endorse Cicero’s use of ἐνδελέχεια
and state that Aristotle’s account of the soul ismerely the definition of a term.40From
a philological point of view – Amerbach judges – Cicero’s reading of ἐντελέχεια as
ἐνδελέχεια (or continuous motion) is just inconsistent with Aristotle’s thought as
we know it. In fact, Amerbach leans towards tracing Cicero’s reading back to the fact
that the Latin author was probably in possession of a lost version of Aristotle’s De
anima.41 From a philosophical point of view, Amerbach concludes:
The term ἐντελέχεια means for the Greeks the same thing that the Latins
call ‘perfection’. For this reason, this word has to be spelled by τ and not
by δ. In fact, I understand Aristotle as seeing a difference between the soul
and life, and [as holding] that the soul is the first actuality and life the
second. Moreover, this is what Aristotle says against Plato, that the soul
does not move, but it is the principle and the cause of movement; namely, a
39 The flyleaf reads as follows: «constat aliquos veterum philosophorum ad insaniam versos,
quos imitatus Amerbachius pro philosophari debacchari incoepit, inque convitia prolapsus
pro scientia de anima docet inania, quae confixerat somnia. Rogetis dominum, ut redeat vir ad
animum, et rixis bonorum non ita remoretur studium, cuius loco si alium instituerit, facerit
studiosis quamgratissimum» (Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, o. iii. 4., f. 120v; this note can also
be found in: cr v, 231).
40 Veit Amerbach,Quatuor libri de anima, 42.
41 «Ciceronem aut lapsum esse memoria, quod hominibus facile accidit (non enim Deus fuit)
et Aristoteli tribuisse, quod fuerit tribuendum Platoni, et Platoni, quod fuerit tribuendum
Aristoteli, aut aliud habuisse opus Aristotelis, quam nostrum est, ex quo illa sumpserit, ut
quidam suspicantur. Quanquam in re tanta non puto hunc virum fuisse tam varium et
incostantem, ut sibi esset plane contrarius» (Veit Amerbach,Quatuor libri de anima, 63–63).
124 chapter 2
certain power and force of life, not life itself, orwhat producesmovement and
sensation in the organic body, not themovement and sensation themselves.42
Contrary toMelanchthon, Amerbach contends that the soul is a perfectio, namely the
principle of man’s life and operations, and not the life or the operations themselves.
Amerbach’s rejection of Melanchthon’s position revolves around this point: look-
ing at the soul as ἐνδελέχεια amounts to a confusion between the source of life and
life itself, viz., between the soul and its operations. But precisely because the soul is
the principle of life and movement and not life and movement themselves, Amer-
bach concludes, the soul is not ἐνδελέχεια, nor does this term reflect Aristotle’s own
definition of the soul. Therefore, and in a way different from Wittenberg teaching,
Amerbach develops his commentary along the lines of the questions traditionally
debated within the science of the soul. What is more, he shows no interest in the
anatomical description of the human body.43 This is all themore important, consid-
ering that Amerbach’s Quatuor libri de anima seems to have influenced the teaching
on the soul at Ingolstadt until well into the second half of the sixteenth century.
This is nicely illustrated by twobooks produced at Ingolstadt: ChristophViepekhius’
Assertiones de anima (1568) and Albert Hunger’s Adversus veteres et novos errores de anima
conclusionum centuria (1575). The first book rejects Galen’s view of the soul as the har-
mony of the temperaments and states that the soul is not the life of the body, but the
substance thanks towhich the body lives.44Asmentioned in the preceding section of
this chapter, this point involved the most important difference between northern
European critics of Melanchthon’s anthropology and its advocates. Albert Hunger
reiterates the same idea, in open opposition toMelanchthon:
42 ad 1542, 36, 37, 41: «Vox ἐντελέχεια significat Grecis idemquod Latinis habens perfectionem. […]
Propterea haec dictio scribenda est per τ non per δ. […] Ita enim ego Aristotelem intelligo ut
faciam differentiam inter animam et vitam, sitque anima primus actus, secundus vita. Atque
hoc est quod contra Platonemdicit Aristoteles, animamnonmoveri, sedprincipiumet causam
esse motus, hoc est, potentiam et vim quandam vitae, non ipsam vitam, aut id quod efficit in
corpore organico motum et sensum, non ipsummotum et sensum».
43 The remaining three books of Amerbach’sDe anima respectively address the different powers
of the soul (book ii), the intellect and the will (book iii), some topics from the ParvaNaturalia
(book iv).
44 Assertiones de Anima, Nobilis, et Ingenui Iuvenis ac Eruditi Philosophiae Studiosi, D. Christo-
phori Viepekhii (Ingolstadt 1568), xxxv–xxvii.
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When this little grammarian, Melanchthon, who is hardly versed in the
writings of Cicero, as well as in the weightier and more solid philosophy
of Aristotle and the other ancients, follows him [Cicero], he [Melanchton]
too falls into error. He translates ‘entelechy’ by ‘continuous agitation, life
and substantial movement’. As though for Aristotle there was no cause of
the continuous agitation and no soul of the life, and in fact no cause; [or as
though] cause and effect, the principle and what derives from the principle
were the same thing.45
Hunger’s book was signed by both the dean of the faculty of philosophy, Wolfgang
Zettel, and the dean of the faculty of theology, Rudolph Clencke. By backing the
contents of the book, Clencke also stated that the theses held by Hunger expressed
Catholic orthodoxy.46 The case of Albert Hunger’s book is thus particularly relevant.
By endorsing what had formerly been Amerbach’s criticism of Melanchthon’s defi-
nition of the soul, it also states the official position on the topic held at the Catholic
university of Ingolstadt.
At the time when the Ingolstadt science of the soul developed in opposition to
Melanchthon, the latter’s views were being systematised at Wittenberg and sub-
sequently spread across Germany and the Low Countries.47 For instance, Melanch-
thon’s analysis of the term ἐνδελέχεια was accepted in two important texts, pro-
duced respectively at Stainfurt and Leiden:Otto Casmann’s Psychologia anthropologica
(1594) and Rudolph Snellius’s In Melanchthonis de anima, vel potius de hominis physiolo-
gia, libellum, commentationes utilissima (1596).More precisely, Casmann’s endorsement
ofMelanchthon’s views stems froman argument against JuliusCaesar Scaliger’s def-
inition of the soul, in the latter’s well-known Exotericae Exercitationes. In that work,
45 Albert Hunger, Adversus veteres et novos errores de anima conclusionum centuria (Ingolstadt 1575),
xxxiii: «Quem cum sequatur Grammaticulus illeMelanthon, in Ciceronis scriptis utcunque,
in graviori et solidiori Aristotelis veterumque aliorumPhilosophia perparumversatus, pariter
et ipse labitur. Vertit is entelechiam assiduam agitationem, vitam et motum substantialem.
Quasi apud Aristotele, aut non sit caussa agitationis assiduae, vitaeque anima, aut siquidem
caussa, idem sint caussa et effectus, principium, et quod a principio manat». Albert Hunger’s
1575 polemicalwork also targeted other aspects of Luther’s andMelanchthon’s views about the
soul, as it will emerge in further in this thesis. See: infra, ‘Chapter 6’, 162.
46 Albert Hunger, Adversus veteres et novos errores de anima conclusionum centuria, back page.
47 On the systematisation of anatomy in Wittenberg treatises on the soul see Jürgen Helm,
“Protestant and Catholic Medicine in Sixteenth Century? The Case of Ingolstadt Anatomy”,
83–96.
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Scaliger ridicules Melanchthon’s psychology and defines the soul as ἐντελέχεια.48
Otto Casmann, in turn, accuses Scaliger of being inconsistent with the Scriptures
and for the same reason favours Melanchthon’s conception of the soul as spiritus.49
Rudolph Snellius also agrees withMelanchthon’s definition of the soul and looks at
ἐνδελέχεια as a genus capable of encompassing two terms: substantial motion (the
soul) and accidental motion (the operations of the soul).50
Both Casmann and Snellius espouse Melanchthon’s conception of the science of
the soul as the study of the entire human nature (man’s spirit and body). Snellius
looks at his own De anima as a treatise on what he calls ‘human physiology’. Cas-
mann even redefines the study of the soul as part of a new discipline, anthropology,
consisting of psychology andhumananatomy. In the cases of Amerbach, Viepekhius,
and Hunger, on the one hand, and of Casmann and Snellius, on the other, the neg-
ative or positive assessment of Cicero’s use of ἐνδελέχεια coincides with the refusal
or acceptance of Melanchthon’s use of anatomy in the science of the soul, as well as
with his Lutheran conception of man.
2.3. Conclusions
The humanist dispute over “whether the soul is ἐντελέχεια or ἐνδελέχεια” was
mainly of a philological nature. However, some philosophical consequences were
already made visible as the dispute developed in fifteenth-century Italy. Already in
that context, the two alternative spellings corresponded to two diverging interpre-
tations of Aristotle’s conception of the soul. In fact, the spelling ἐντελέχειαwas ren-
48 In Exotericae Exercitationes 307, 49, Scaliger speaks of Melanchthon’s definition of the soul
in the following way: «Omnino vero causia digna, aut vomere definitio animae rationalis,
quam talem affert. Spiritus intelligens. Videtur haec e culina quapiammonachali simul cum
fumo, aut nidore erupisse in oculos nostrorum deambulatorum» (Iulii Caesaris Scaligeri.
Exotericarum Exercitationum Liber xv. De subtilitate ad Hiarronymum Cardanum (Paris 1557), 421r).
Scaliger’s Exercitationes and his conception of the soul have been carefully studied by Kuni
Sakamoto, Julius Caesar Scaliger, Renaissance Reformer of Aristotelianism: A Study of Exotericae
Exercitationes (Leiden, forthcoming).
49 Otto Casmann, Psychologia anthropologica, 60. Formore information about Casmann’s intellec-
tual biography and his relationship with Ramism, see: supra, ‘Chapter 1’, 17–20. On Casmann’s
conception of the soul, see: infra, ‘Chapter 4’, 137–140. On the debate between Scaliger and Cas-
mann regardingMelanchthon’s definition of the soul, see: infra, ‘Chapter 3’, 108, passim.
50 Rudolph Snellius, In Phil. Melanchthonis de anima, 35.
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dered by the Latin perfectio, which conveyed the idea of a static form. The alternative
term, ἐνδελέχεια, was taken as meaning “continuous agitation or motion”, as sug-
gested by Cicero. These philosophical consequences becamemore emphasised when
Melanchthonmade themthe central point of thediscussion. Indeed, heusedCicero’s
interpretation in the context of his redefinition of psychology as the study of the
(Lutheran) human nature in its fallen state. The discussion of the soul as a perfectio
or motion appears to have become increasingly popular in the course of the six-
teenth century.Thishappenedwhenanumberof reformedauthors acceptedCicero’s
use of ἐνδελέχεια in the way proposed by Melanchthon, and when (predominantly)
Catholic professors sought to reject this view. In this manner, the debate was sys-
tematisedwithin treatises on the soul produced in Germany and the LowCountries.
It mushroomed into many texts, at least until the first half of the seventeenth cen-
tury, when we find it treated again, for instance, at Leuven, in Libertus Fromondus’
Philosophia Christiana De anima (1649).51
Interestingly enough, after the humanist dispute over Cicero’s Tusculan Dispu-
tationswas appropriated byMelanchthon, it stopped coinciding with an exclusively
philological disagreement. Instead, it grew into a doctrinal problem, which was sys-
tematically treated in the Renaissance science of the soul. The Renaissance debate on
Cicero’s use of ἐνδελέχεια is an example of the continuity between humanist, philo-
sophical, and theological discussions, in sixteenth-century northern Europe. On the
one hand, it shows that humanist polemics could be full of doctrinal implications.
On the other hand, it helps us better appreciate the impact of sixteenth-century
confessionalisation on the diffusion of humanist culture in Renaissance northern
Europe.52More specifically, all the authors that I have discussed in this chapter were
humanist, in both their approach and their philological skills in reading Aristotle
andCicero’sworks about the soul.Melanchthonandhis followers,Amerbachand the
Ingolstadt Jesuits,were all interested in recovering the truemeaningofAristotle’sDe
anima, and they sought to do it by engaging in subtle philological discussions. Yet,
the differences between Melanchthon and Amerbach do not seem to have focused
on reading Cicero for the sake of philological accuracy.What was at stake all along in
their humanist debate was their notion ofman.53 Amerbach defended amore clearly
51 Fromondus criticises Cicero’s reading of Aristotle in: Libertus Fromondus, Philosophiae chris-
tianae de anima libri quatuor (Leuven 1649), 28–31.
52 About the confessionalisation of humanism inReformationGermany, see: Erika Rummel,The
Confessionalization of Humanism in Reformation Germany (Oxford 2000).
53 CharlotteMethuen offers a different perspective onMelanchthon’s general attitude, whereby
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Aristotelian conception of man, as one living substance informed by the intellective
soul. Melanchthon, on his part, thought that man was a compound of two sub-
stances, the body and the spirit, which together formed the subject of divine grace.
By showing this, Melanchthon also sought to show that God had provided man’s
spirit with an innate ability to tell the right fromwrong.Melanchthon’s anthropol-
ogywas for this reason part and parcel of his confessionalising efforts to disciplining
the reformers in the direction of civil obedience.
Whilst authors who defendedMelanchthon’s reading of Cicero’s TusculanDispu-
tations embraced this type of anthropology, those who opposed it – as the Ingolstadt
Jesuits – were primarily interested in rejecting not just Melanchthon’s definition of
the soul, but with it also his Lutheran conception of man.
the impact ofMelanchthon’s humanist interest inHellenism on his way of looking at physics
and psychology ismore emphasised than in the present study. See: CharlotteMethuen, Science
and Theology in the Reformation. Studies in Theological Interpretation and Astronomical Observation
in Sixteenth-Century Germany (London 2008), 95–99.
chapter 3
TooManyMeanings for OneWord. The Notion of
‘Spiritus’ in the Work of Philip Melanchthon
3.0. Introduction
In the preceding chapterwe have seen thatMelanchthon’sway of looking at the soul
was at the basis of a new type of anthropology, whereby man was considered to be
composed of two parts: a body and an intelligent spirit. According to Melanchthon
and some of his followers, the human body also encompassed the vegetative and
sensitive operations of man, or ἐνδελέχεια. But how did they conceive of the other
part of man, namely the intelligent spirit?
This chapter is devoted toMelanchthon’s conceptionof ‘spiritus’ and to thedebate
it triggered amongst some of his contemporaries. More specifically, I shall address
the varied usage of the notion of ‘spirit’ in the work of Melanchthon, as well as
the theological and medical aspects that his idea of ‘spirit’ involves. My aim is to
show that Melanchthon conceived of ‘spirit’ as both the bodily spirits (responsible
for important biological and psychological activities of living beings) and the intel-
lective soul, created by God in his image and likeness and provided by him with
innate notions of civic morals (what Melanchthon calls the ‘law of God’). Moreover,
I shall point out that in the revised edition of his book on the soul, the Liber de
anima, Melanchthon also used ‘spirit’ in a way that was not present in his Commen-
tarius de anima, namely, to refer to the third person of the Divine Trinity: the Holy
Spirit.
First, I shall provide a schematic account of the different significations that the
notion of ‘spirit’ acquires in the work of Melanchthon, as well as of their mutual
interaction. Second, I shall show that the interplay between the different kinds of
spirits that fill Melanchthon’s natural philosophy involves an important practical
dimension.More in particular, it is at the core ofMelanchthon’s ideas on themedical
cure of the body and the virtuous direction of human nature and society. Third, I
will demonstrate that the interaction between man’s and God’s spirit presented by
Melanchthon is an important part of Melanchthon’s views about of justification by
faith alone as they developed in the period during which he worked on his Liber de
anima.
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On the one hand, this chapter will focus on an important aspect of Melanch-
thon’s psychology and natural philosophy, which drew the attention of some of his
contemporaries and followers. On the other hand, it will shed light on Melanch-
thon’s use of philosophical and medical ideas in his understanding of one central
point of the Lutheran faith: the doctrine of justification sola fide.
3.1. A World Full of Spirits
Towards the end of the sixteenth century, Melanchthon’s natural philosophy – and
in particular his psychology – had become popular with many philosophers and
physicians working in northern Europe. Especially Melanchthon’s definition of the
soul as ‘intelligent spirit’ (spiritus intelligens) was vastly debated within the field of
psychology.1 For instance, Otto Casmann (1562–1607) defends it in his popular Psy-
chologia anthropologica (1595) against criticisms put forward by Julius Caesar Scaliger.
The latter’s doubts amount to the idea that spirit – as opposed to the more custom-
ary ‘entelechy’ or ‘first actuality’ – is too murky a term, when it comes to defining
the soul. In fact, as Scaliger explains in his widely read Exotericae Exercitationes, ‘spir-
itus’ has acquired too many meanings in the course of the history and prevalently
that of a corporeal item, corresponding to either air or blood. As such, it is at odds
with the immortal nature that surelyhas tobegranted to thehumansoul.2Casmann
1 On the reception of Melanchthon’s psychology in renaissance northern Europe see: Simone De
Angelis, Anthropologien, 54–63; ‘Chapter 5’ of this thesis.
2 In Exotericae Exercitationes 307, 49, Scaliger criticises Melanchthon’s idea that spiritus intelligens is a
term more suitable than ἐντελέχεια, for defining the human soul: «Dolebas te nescire quid esset
entelechia, etsi mox aiebas esse vocabulum sumptum ex usu populari. Multo difficilior cognitu
spiritus est. ExM. Tullio, animae vocabulo aerem designari, etiam declamatores sciunt. Item spir-
itum. Inde spirare, agitare aerem pulmonibus. Quare apud Latinos erit anima istius definitionis:
ventus intelligens aut aer intelligens. Apudmedicos pars sangiunis tenuissima, spiritus est. Liber
Aristotelis De Spiritu deiecit nos amplius septies de spe interpretationis, propter perplexissimas
difficultates. Omnino πνευμα nihil aliud quam flatum significant. Et Hippocratesφύσαmultis in
locis idemquodπνευμαnostrum est. Quod tamen et aliud significat undemale sit aequivocae def-
initioni. Putabat se in popularibus versari libris ut obtrudere posse speraret spiritum pro forma
substantiali animantium. Nugatoriam vero subtexuit explicationem. Voco, inquit, spiritum sub-
stantiam spiritualem. Perinde ac si quis dicat: substantia est ens substantiale. Spiritus vero Latinis
et Graecis omnibus, philosophis, medicis, oratoribus, corpus est; id est materia et forma» (Julius
Caesar Scaliger,ExotericarumExercitationum, 421r). Scaliger’s objections toMelanchthon’s conception
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rebuts Scaliger’s criticism, by arguing that it is irrelevant vis-à-vis thedefinitionpro-
posed by Melanchthon: it is true that ‘spiritus’ has been used in various manners,
butMelanchthon clearly looks at it in Christian terms, as a spiritual and intelligent
substance.3
Casmann makes a fair point: in the Liber de anima (1552), Melanchthon explains
that the human soul, or intelligent spirit, is an incorporeal and immortal substance.
However, Scaliger’s criticism points to a confusion that in fact surfaces in the work
of Melanchthon and of which the latter himself appears to be well aware. In the
section of his Loci Praecipui Theologici devoted to theHoly Spirit,Melanchthon indeed
recognises some fear that different understandings of the notion of spirit might get
mixed up:
The word ‘spirit’ generally means agitation or an agitating nature or force,
and the variety [of its meanings] must be observed in the writings of the
prophets and apostles; and all their sayings inwhich the term ‘spirit’ is found
arenot tobehastilymixed.Many times theymeanwind, frequently the life of
man, or the createdmovements and impetuses – the good asmuch as the bad
ones – of men. Here, they denote a spiritual essence, i.e., a living, intelligent,
incorporeal, and active essence.4
of the soul also regarded the latter’s use of ἐνδελέχεια, as I explained above. See: supra, ‘Chapter 2’,
103–104.
3 Casmann reacts to Scaliger in the section of his book entitled “An hominis animam recte et per-
spicue dicatur spiritus, proMelanchthone contra Scaligerum”. There, he argues as follows: «vocab-
ulum polysemon reddit aequivocam definitionem. At spiritus est vocabulummultae significatio-
nis. Ideoque, inquit Scaliger, multo difficilior spiritus cognitu. Si igitur anima est spiritus, apud
Latinos erit anima istius definitionis ventus intelligens, aut aer intelligens. Apud Medicos, pars
sanguinis tenuissima. Resp. Propositio vera est, nisi vocabuli polysemi significatio certa deter-
minatione designetur, ita ut vel antecedat vocis usurpandae explicatio, vel usu omnibus in ea
usurpatione innotuerit. […] Neque sequitur: anima est spiritus intelligens, ergo est aer vel ven-
tus intelligens. At, inquit, sequitur quia spiritus ventum et aerem etiam notat. Sophisticum est.
Non enim nomine spiritus, cum dicatur de anima, omnia intelligendi veniunt quae quavis sig-
nificatione designat, sed certa significationis specie limitatur» (Psychologia anthropologica, 61–62,
63).
4 Philip Melanchthon, Loci Praecipui Theologici, in cr xxi, 629–630: «Nomen spiritus in genere sig-
nificant agitationem aut naturam, seu vim agitantem et observanda est varietas in ipsis scriptis
Propheticis et Apostolicis nec temere omnia dicta miscenda sunt, in quibus reperitur vocabulum
spritus. Saepe significant ventos saepe vitamhominis, saepemotus seu impetus hominumcreatos,
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Spirit might mean ‘agitation’ or ‘movement’, or a ‘nature in motion’; it can also
refer to a wind or breathe-like item, the very life of man, as well as to his good and
evil impulses. Luckily enough, the reader of the Loci Praecipui Theologici is warned
that, in that particular context, ‘spiritus’ exclusively indicates the Holy Spirit. Less
fortunate is the reader of the Liber de anima. In effect, Melanchthon uses all of the
listed meanings of spirit in his work on the soul and even looks in wonder at the
way they interact, as yet another sign of the orderly structure of nature, the work of
God. This is epitomised by the concluding lines of the section that the Liber de anima
devotes to the discussionDe spiritibus:
Galen says about man’s soul that these spirits are either the soul or the
immediate instrument of the soul.Which is certainly true; andby their light,
[the spirits] excel the light of the Sun and all the stars. Andwhat is evenmore
marvellous, in pious men the divine spirit itself is mixed with these very
spirits and makes them brighter with divine light, so that their knowledge
of God be clearer, their ascent [to him] more resolute, and their strivings
towards God more ardent. Conversely, when the devils occupy the hearts,
by their blowing they trouble the spirits in the heart and brain, impede
judgments, and cause manifest madness and propel the heart and the other
limbs to the cruellest movements; as when Medea killed her children and
Judas killed himself.5
In this remarkable passage, Melanchthon sketches a notion of ‘spiritus’ that stands
right at the heart of the interplay between body and soul, as well as between the
animate creatures and the superior forces influencing the flow of human affairs.
Here, Melanchthon draws on the well known passage found in Galen’s De Placitis
Hippocratis et Platonis, in which the bodily spirits are associated with the astral body
tum bonos, tummalos. Hic significant essentiam spiritualem; id est, vivam, intelligentem, incor-
poream, efficacem».
5 cr xiii, 88–89: «Galenus inquit de anima hominis hos spiritus aut animam esse, aut immediatum
instrumentum animae. Quod certe verum est, et sua luce superant solis at omnium stellarum
lucem. Et quodmirabilius est, iis ipsis spiritibus in hominibus piis miscetur ipse divinus spiritus,
et efficit magis fulgentes divina luce, ut agnitio Dei sit illustrior et adsensio firmior, et motus sint
ardentiores erga Deum. Encontra ubi diaboli occupant corda, suo adflatu turbant spiritus in corde
et in cerebro, impediunt iudicia, et manifestos furores efficient et impellunt corda et alia membra
ad crudelissimos motus; ut Medea interficit natos, Iudas sibi ipsi consciscit mortem».
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and said to be either the soul or its first instrument in the interaction with the
bodies.6 What is more, Melanchthon seems to see some affinity between the bodily
spirits, the spirit of God, and that of the devil in such away that all these can interact
and get mixed with each other. The communication between these spirits prompts
humans to good and bad actions and the presence of the Holy Spirit and the devil’s
spirit in our heart and brainmightmake us either recognise the ChristianGodmore
easily or lead us to madness and dysfunctions of our thinking.7
But how is this interactionmade possible? In what does it consist exactly, and to
what extent can human beings control so as to influence their lives for the good? In
order to answer these questions, let us first look at the different notions of ‘spiritus’
considered by Melanchthon, more specifically at the way he conceives of the partic-
ular workings of the human and divine spirits.
3.2. The Human Soul: The Intelligent Spirit and the Bodily Spirits
The twomost important ways inwhichMelanchthon uses the notion of ‘spiritus’ are
found in his Liber de anima and are both related to his definition of the human soul.
In order to better grasp what Melanchthon means by ‘spiritus’ in that context, it is
helpful to reiterate some fundamental ideas we examined in the preceding chapter
of this study and expand those.
6 Galenwrites: «At si de animae substantia pronunciare oportet, alterumnecessario dicetur, authanc
esse veluti lucidum et aethereum corpus affirmandum, in quam sententiam vel inviti ex consecu-
tione Stoici et Aristoteles perveniunt; aut ipsam incorporeamesse substantiam, primumque ipsius
vehiculumhoc corpus, quo ceumedio cum reliquis corporibus communionem suscipit» (Karl Got-
tlob Kühn, ed., Galeni Opera Omnia (Leipzig 1823), v, 643).
7 Daniel P.Walker is to the best ofmyknowledge the firstwho ever looked at the affinity between the
human spirits and those ofGod and thedevil inMelanchthon’s Liber de anima. See:Daniel P.Walker,
“Medical Spirits and God and the Soul”, 223–244. The idea of ‘spiritus’ plays a central role in the
works of two authors who worked approximately in the same age as Melanchthon’s: Jean Fernel
and Daniel Sennert. On this, see: Hiro Hirai,Medical Humanism and Natural Philosophy. Renaissance
Debates onMatter, Life and the Soul (Leiden 2011), 46–79, 151–172. On early-modern theories of ‘spiritus’
and its relation to notions of the divinity also see: Guido Giglioni, “Spiritus Plasticus Between
Pneumatology and Embryology (A Note about Comenius’ Concept of Spirit)”, Studia Comeniana et
Historica, 24 (1994), 83–89. An extensive analyses of the varied and overlapping notions of ‘spiritus’
in the medieval tradition and their transmission to the Renaissance is found in James J. Bono,
“Medical Spirits and theMedieval Language of Life”, Traditio, 40 (1984), 91–130.
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The Liber de anima is in fact the revised edition ofMelanchthon’s Commentarius de
anima, first published in 1540. Aswe know fromour discussion aboutMelanchthon’s
definition of the soul, both of these books lie at the heart of his plan to give the
Lutheran faith some robust philosophical support; for the same reason, the Liber de
anima is beyond any doubt a Christian, or better still a Lutheran,work on the human
soul.
As such, Melanchthon’s Liber de anima is committed to one important Lutheran
idea: our fallen state hinders us from obtaining any precise knowledge of the sub-
stance of the human soul. All we can say with certainty about the rational soul of
man corresponds to what the Holy Scriptures teach about it. It is at this point of
Melanchthon’s discourse that the notion of ‘spiritus’ comes into play. In effect, given
said premises about the intellectual limits of man in his fallen state, Melanchthon
defines the soul from a Christian point of view as ‘spiritus intelligens’, or intelligent
spirit.8
‘Spiritus’, according toMelanchthon, is first and foremost a term drawn from the
Scriptures and not from natural philosophy. It stands for one of the two parts of the
human being (the intellective soul), the body being the other one. ‘Spiritus’ is the
intelligentpart ofman, it is different fromthebody, anddoesnotperishwith it. Later
in the Liber de anima, the ‘spiritus intelligens’ is shown to have two faculties: intellect
and will. It thus governs specific human activities, such as knowing (particulars
and universals) and judging. Even more importantly, Melanchthon thinks that the
Christian teaching – instead of Aristotle’s philosophy – has to be followed, for it
correctly shows that the intelligent spirit of man possesses innate knowledge of
the presence of a God, as well as of his law: the distinction between good and bad.9
‘Spiritus’ – as Casmann points out in his discussion with Scaliger – is indeed the
term used by Melanchthon to characterise the soul from a Christian point of view.
However, things aremore complicated than this anda closer lookat theLiberdeanima
8 See: supra, ‘Chapter 2’, 96.
9 cr xiii, 137–138, 142: «Etsi penetrari acie humanae mentis rerum natura non potest, tamen vult
Deus eam ab hominibus aspici, ut in ea consideremus testimonia de ipso, quae ostendunt et esse
Deum, et quails sit. […] Sicut autem homo conditus est, ut in eo luceat notitia Dei, et ut ei Deus
communicet suam sapientiam et bonitatem, ita mentem humanam voluit evidentissimum de
ipso testimonium esse. Cui et insita est lux, qua esse Deum agnoscimus, et insitae sunt noticiae
discernentes honesta et turpia. […] [Intellectus] est potentia cognoscens, recordans, iudicans, et
ratiocinans singularia et universalia, habens insitas quasdam notitias nobiscum nascentes, seu
principiamagnarumartium,habens et actumreflexum, quo suas actions cernit et iudicat, et errata
emendare potest».
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shows that Melanchthon considers ‘spiritus’ also in another sense that is strikingly
different from the Christian one.
As I pointed out earlier, Melanchthon was pursuing an essentially Lutheran
study of the soul; at the same time, this was but a part of his bigger plan to pro-
vide his theology with some rational backing. Accordingly, he sought to accompany
his Christian definition of the soul with some, albeit tentative, philosophical under-
standing of it. InMelanchthon’s opinion there is virtually nothing that natural phi-
losophy can say about the essence of the soul. Nevertheless, he explains, one could
study itsmost evident features, i.e., its operations. The operations of the soul, in their
turn, can only be known by means of anatomical knowledge; namely, by looking
at the arrangement and workings of the ‘machines’ of the bodily organs, through
which the functions of the soul are carried out.10
In an effort to achieve aphilosophical explanationof the soul,Melanchthon seeks
to ground it in the human body. It is within this discussion that he uses the term
‘spiritus’ again. In fact, as we have seen in the second chapter of this thesis, ever
since his Commentarius of 1540, Melanchthon was not happy with the traditional
Aristotelian definition of the soul as the first actuality of a living body possessing
life potentially, for it did not make it clear what that ‘first actuality’ might be. To
this interpretation of Aristotle’s De anima, Melanchthon preferred Cicero’s view of
the soul as ἐνδελέχεία. At the same time he tries to be even more specific as to what
this agitation exactly is. For this reasonhehas recourse toGalen’s account of the soul:
Most prudently among all speaks Galen, who does not hesitate to affirm
about the nutritive and sensitive soul that it is either the natural and the
vital spirits or the temperament [of the body]. But about the rational soul,
he says that he does not pronounce himself on whether the intellect is some
other incorporeal and separablenature, or rather a corporeal one.Whereas [he
says] that the animal spirit is either that very rational soul or its immediate
instrument.11
10 A more detailed explanation of Melanchthon’s use of anatomy can be found in ‘Chapter 5’ of
this thesis. More specifically, about Melanchthon’s use of the idea of ‘machine’ to describe
man’s body and its workings as they are described through anatomical knowledge, see: infra,
‘Chapter 5’, 147, passim.
11 cr xiii, 10: «Verecundissime omnium Galenus loquitur, qui de anima nutritiva et sensitiva
nondubitat adfirmare, esse eas aut spiritusnaturales et vitales, aut crasin. Sedde rationali dicit
se non adfirmare an λογιστικóν sit alia natura incorporea et separabilis, an vero sit natura
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According to Melanchthon, Galen thought that the vegetative and sensitive
operations of the soul conflated into the natural and the vital spirits in the animate
bodies whereas the rational soul was either the animal spirit or used it as its first
instrument.12 Bymeans of this interpretation of Galen’s notion of the soul, as well as
by using Cicero’s reading of Aristotle, Melanchthon reaches a philosophical account
of the human soul grounded in the body: the soul is the very life ormovement of the
body, which either coincides with the bodily spirits or is something concomitant to
them.
‘Spiritus’, therefore, is not only the immaterial and rational soul of man, as it
is suggested by the Scriptures; it is also the item that comes closest to our nat-
ural understanding of the soul. On this account, the soul is nothing but what
Melanchthon calls ἐνδελέχεία.
On the one hand, Melanchthon’s diverse use of ‘spiritus’ might look confusing.
After all, he uses the same term to describe both an immaterial and intelligent sub-
stance and an embodiedmovement of certain parts of the humanbody. On the other
hand, one has to keep in mind the two following points. First, the two meanings of
‘spiritus’ also correspond to an epistemological distinction: the intelligent spirit is
what we know about the soul solely on scriptural grounds whereas the bodily spir-
its are the corporeal item that accounts for the soul from a natural-philosophical
standpoint. Second, as I have shown in the preceding chapter,Melanchthon’s under-
standingof thedifferencebetweenGod’s lawandGospel impactedonhispsychology,
in the sense of a disjunction between the bodily and the spiritual parts of man. In
effect, already in his 1540 Commentarius de anima, Melanchthon had suggested that
man’s lower soul, or ἐνδελέχεία, was substantially different fromman’s intellective
soul, for the latter was incorporeal whilst the former was part of man’s body. In the
Liber de anima, Melanchthon reiterates this point and we are told that the two types
of spirit he mentions, the spiritus intelligens and the ἐνδελέχεία, might correspond to
corporea. Sed spiritum animalem aut esse, illam ipsam animam rationalem, aut proximum
eius organon».
12 Interestingly enough, a modern scholar, Abraham P. Bos, has held an interpretation of Aris-
totle’s definition of the soul that comes very close to Melanchthon’s. According to Bos, the
‘organic body’ mentioned by Aristotle inDe anima ii. 1 needs not be understood in terms of ‘a
body equipped with organs’. Rather, Bos argues, the body Aristotle thinks of is an instrumental
body, or the instrument of the soul. According to Bos, this instrumental body coincides with
‘pneuma’ or ‘spirit’. Bos’ long and detailed argument can be found in Abraham P. Bos, The Soul
and its Instrumental Body. A Reinterpretation of Aristotle’s Philosophy of LivingNature (Leiden 2003).
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two distinct souls in the human being.13 At this stage, one may very well wonder
whether this double use of ‘spirit’might not indicateMelanchthon’s wish to find an
item (‘spirit’ indeed) capable of bridging the gap between man’s higher and lower
powers. However, it should be clear by now, Melanchthon’s psychology goes more
in the direction of a disjunction between the human body (and bodily soul) and the
‘spiritus intelligens’. Melanchthon’s ‘spirit’ is not a bridge between man’s two parts,
but a term that Melanchthon uses equivocally to refer both to man’s spiritus intelli-
gens and to the lower soul conceived as ένδελεχεία or the bodily spirits.
But if the embodied soul of man, or ένδελεχεία, corresponds to the bodily spirits
(or their movement), what exactly are these spirits?
3.3. Bodily Spirits Between God, the Evil Spirits, and the Stars
The Liber de anima devotes a specific section to the description of the bodily spirits.
From there we gather a picture of them that is very different from that of the
immaterial ‘spiritus intelligens’, provided with innate knowledge of the law of God.
The bodily spirits are corporeal and volatile entities. They appear to be subject to
many and various influences, which determine the inclinations and behaviour of
human beings. This aspect is particularly interesting, because it will enable us to
observe a practical dimension involved in Melanchthon’s notion of ‘spiritus’: the
bodily spirits will turn out to play a central role in the health of the body and in
the virtuous direction of the soul and the human affairs. Melanchthon defines the
bodily spirits as follows:
The spirit is a subtle vapour concocted from the blood, by virtue of the heart,
and kindled, just as if it were a flame, which performs different actions in
different limbs. Although the source of the spirits is only one, they change
13 cr xiii, 17: «Sed haec sententia recepta est. In homine esse animam unam, videlicet spiracu-
lum illud, simul vehens lucem divinam, et adferens vitam partibus omnibus congruentem.
Non pugno de hac sententia, nec tamen absurdam esse iudico opinionem supra recitatam,
eorum qui dicunt, animam sentientem et vegetatricem esse vel χρᾶσιν vel ἐνδελέχεία, vel ani-
masdistinctas ab illo spiraculo, in quo est intelligentia et electio». In theCommentarius de anima
of 1540, Melanchthon had inclined even more strongly towards the idea of multiple souls in
eachman and he had praisedWilliamOckham for this idea. About this, see: supra, ‘Chapter 2’,
97.
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according to the place [they occupy]; and when they change [places], they
carry out different actions.14
‘Spiritus’ is a subtle vapour concocted from the blood by the power of the heart. It is
a corporeal item, though not quite, for it stems out of the most refined blood and
is a flame-like thing, capable of performing different actions in different parts of
the body. More exactly, Melanchthon distinguishes between two types of actions,
corresponding to an equal number of spirits:
There are two typesof spirit. Thevital spirit is a flame thatoriginates fromthe
finest blood in the heart, conveys vital heat to the other limbs, and imparts
to them the force to exercise the actions that are carried out in virtue of the
vitalheat.With respect to thismeaningof the term, itwas said earlier that the
arteries are arranged for this purpose, so that they transmit this spirit to the
other limbs. The animal spirit is the part, belonging to the samekindof spirit
as those originating in the heart, that is transmitted to the brain, where it is
made brighter in virtue of the brain andwell-suited to its temperament, and
[it is] infused into thenerves, as if [itwere] light, inorder topropel themto the
actions of sensation and locomotion. Although others discuss whence this
spirit is brought forth, it is reasonable that it originates from the vital spirit,
as Galen says in the seventh book of On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato:
Οὒτω τὸ ψυχικὸ πνεῦμα ἐκ τοῦ ζωτικοῦ κατειργασθέντος ἐπὶ πλέον ἔχει τὴν
γένεσιν. And it is manifest that the spirit becomes better in the brain when
the temperament of the heart is good and when the heart is not troubled by
rage or sadness.15
14 cr xiii, 88: «Spiritus est subtilis vapor ex sanguine coctus virtute cordis, ac incensus, ut sit
velut flammula, quae in diversis membris dissimiles habet actiones. Quanquam enim unus
est fons spirituum, tamen locis mutantur, et mutati dissimiles habent actiones».
15 cr xiii, 88: «Sunt autem species duae. Spiritus vitalis est flammula ex purissimo sanguine
in corde nata, calorem vitalem devehens ad coetera membra, et impertiens eis vim exercendi
actiones, quas calore vitali efficiunt. Ad hunc usum supra dictum est arterias esse conditas,
ut hunc spiritum in omnia membra transvehant. Spiritus animalis est ex eodem genere spir-
ituum, qui nati sunt in corde, pars, transmissa ad cerebrum, ubi virtute cerebri fit lucidior, et
conveniens temperamento cerebri, et in nervos infusa velut lumen, ut eos impellat, et actiones
sensuum etmotum localem cieat. Etsi enim alii disputant unde generetur hic spiritus, tamen
consentaneum est, oriri eum a vitali spiritu, ut Galenus inquit libro septimo de dogmatum
Hippocratis et Platonis consensu:Οὒτω τὸ ψυχικὸν πνεῦμα ἐκ τοῦ ζωτικοῦ κατειργασθέντος ἐπὶ
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The first spirit present in animate bodies is the ‘vital spirit’ (spiritus vitalis), which
is a flameoriginating fromthe finest blood in theheart. It plays a very important role
in living creatures, because by travelling through the arteries, it transmits vital heat
from the heart to all the other limbs, so as to provide these with the force necessary
to carry out their actions. The second type of spirit is called ‘animal spirit’ (spiritus
animalis). The animal spirit also originates from the heart, though it is specifically
assigned to the brain and made well suited to its temperament. If there were no
animal spirit, animals and men would not be able to perform some of their most
fundamental operations at all. In effect, the animal spirit shinesmore brightly in the
brain and flows through the nerves of the body, as though itwere some kind of light.
As such, it propels the nerves to the actions of locomotion and sensation. Moreover,
Melanchthon ascribes this view to Galen, the spirit in the brain is better when the
temperament of theheart is good, for instancewhen theheart is not troubled by rage
or sadness. Therefore, the animal spirit originates fromthe vital one, andboth spirits
bear a special relation to the temperaments of the bodily organs and themood of the
heart.16
Interestingly enough, according to Melanchthon, the lower soul of man – or
ἐνδελέχεία – corresponds to these bodily spirits:
Now, let the erudite ones consider thiswondrouswork ofGod inman. Partic-
ular actions are carried out through the vital and animal spirits, the preser-
vation of life, nutrition, and generation; and besides these, sensation, move-
ment, reasoning, and themoods in our heart. For this reason, some said that
the soul was these spirits or vital and animals flames.17
πλέον ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν. Etmanifestum est, spiritum fierimeliorem in cerebro, quando bonum
est cordis temperamentum, et quando cor non turbatum est ira et moestitia».
16 A few lines further in the text, Melanchthon also points out that traditionally another type
of spirit is believed to exist; that is, the natural spirit, present in the liver, where it has to
warm up the blood. However, Melanchthon thinks that this functionmay well be performed
by the vital spirit and that therefore there is no need for a separate natural spirit: «Quidam
addiderunt tertiam speciem, videlicet spiritum naturalem in epate, qui ibi fovet sanguine, et
in sanguine halitus excitat. Sed commodious est dicere vitalem spiritum a corde etiam ad epar
transvehi, qui calorem vivificum epatis adiuvat in generatione sanguinis. Est enim cor fons
vitae».
17 cr xiii, 88: «Iam cogitent studiosi hoc mirandum Dei opus in homine. Spiritu vitali et ani-
mali actiones praecipuae efficiuntur, vitae conservatio, nutritio, generatio, deinde sensus,
motus, cogitatio, adfectus in corde. Ideo aliqui dixerunt, animam esse hos spiritus seu flam-
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The bodily spirits are so remarkable that their functioning shows that man is
the orderly work of God. They preserve life and are linked to nourishment, genera-
tion, sensation, motion, reasoning and moods in our hearts. Yet, their divine origin
notwithstanding, the bodily spirits appear to be much less stable than the ‘spiritus
intelligens’: the latter has innate and clear notions of what is good and what is not,
whereas the former spirits are subject to heart moods, such as rage and sadness, as
well as to all sorts of other influences, as we are about to see.
As Imentioned in the beginning of this chapter,Melanchthon concludes the sec-
tion of the Liber de anima devoted to the bodily spirits by hinting at their capability of
mixing with the spirit of God and with the devils’ spirits. The devils, Melanchthon
explains, can occupy our hearts and interfere with the spirits in our body. By doing
so they can impede judgment, producemadness, and drive us to the cruellest move-
ments, as when Judas killed himself upon betraying Christ. In contrast, the vital and
animal spirits in piousmen (i.e.,menwhohave accepted the Christian faith) are ren-
dered brighter by the action of the Holy Spirit in their bodies. But how are these
external influences on the bodily spirits even possible?Moreover, if the spirits of the
devils can drive us tomadness, is there anywaywe can cure it? Dowe have any influ-
ence at all on these interactions?
In what follows, I shall show that Melanchthon’s theological conception of jus-
tification by faith alone (or sola fide) is the key to understanding his ideas about
the interaction between the natural and the supernatural spirits. Moreover, I shall
explain that Melanchthon looked at the Christian faith and at prayer as the way to
influence said interaction for the good.
Unfortunately, the Liber de anima does not elaborate on the details of the inter-
play between themovements of the soul and the divine and evil forces. Nonetheless,
we can obtain some more information about the relationship between the various
kinds of spirits that fill Melanchthon’s world, by looking at some of his other writ-
ings.
In the second book of his 1549 Initia doctrinae physicae, he writes a section entitled
De reductione eventuum adDeum et ad bonos aut malos spiritus. There, Melanchthon sets
mulas vitales et animales». The ‘aliqui dixerunt’ in this quote might make one think that
Melanchthon is distancing himself from those who conflate the soul with the bodily spir-
its. However, I hopemy analysis ofMelanchthon’s work, in this and in the previous chapter of
this thesis, sufficiently shows the following point: both in the Commentarius and in the Liber
de anima, Melanchthon agrees that – at least the vegetative and sensitive souls – are either the
movement of the bodily spirits, or the bodily spirits themselves.
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out to determinewhich events in the sublunaryworld can be attributed to the direct
work of God and which instead have to be traced back to other causes.
There are indeed events that cannot be ascribed to the natural order, in such a
way that their causes may be exhibited:
But there are many other events that are to be assigned to the divine provi-
dence; for they do not proceed from that order, in a way that the secondary
causes that primarily govern the event may be exhibited. As for instance,
when Moses was preserved when cast away at sea. […] And the greatest part
of the saddest events in thewhole human kind originates primarily from the
devil, who strengthensmadness among the impious. […] And that suchmad-
ness originates from the devil is certain, for whichever nature, insofar as it is
guided by its natural light and disposition, seeks its preservation and loves
its fellows. But the devil destroys that light and those dispositions, as it is
written: “he holds the minds of the impious captive”. And about Judas it is
said: “Satan entered into him”.18
Melanchthon considers thebiblical episode ofMoses’ crossing theRed Sea tobeGod’s
immediate doing. At the same time, he also thinks that the devil too can act directly
on us and penetrate into our heart, as in the case of Judas’ suicide. And yet, there are
events in human life that do not depend on the direct intervention of God and the
evil spirits.
We have already noticed that Melanchthon links important aspects of human
life to the bodily spirits. These can determine ourmood, aswell as the (pious or cruel)
movements of our soul. But the good or bad disposition of the bodily spirits, in its
turn, has been shown to depend on the temperaments of the heart and the brain:
the more serene our heart, the better the spirit in our brain. Interestingly enough,
according to Melanchthon, this is not the end of the story. His discussion of the
18 Philip Melanchthon, Initia doctrinae physicae, in cr xiii, 322–323: «Sed alii multi eventus sunt,
quos ad providentiamdivinam referri necesse est, qui non eo ordine fiunt, ut causae secundae,
quae principaliter gubernent eventum, monstrari possint. Ut cumMoises servatur in aquam
abiectus […] Et magna pars tristissimorum eventuum, in toto genere humano, principaliter
oritur a Diabolo, qui furores in Impiis confirmat […] Hos furores a Diabolo oriri certum est,
quia quaelibet natura, donec naturali luce et adfectu regitur, sui conservationem adpetit, et
amat cognatos. Sed hanc lucem, et hos adfectus extinguit Diabolus, ut scriptum est: tenere
eum captivas mentes impiorum. Et de Iuda dicitur: intravit in eum Satanas».
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good and bad spirits in the Initia doctrinae physicae continues with a section on De
temperamentis et stellis. Here, Melanchthon links the action of the temperaments to
that of the stars, by means of some illustrative example:
It is true then that the temperaments are governed and changed by the posi-
tion of the stars. For this reason I connected both causes here. […] Marquees
Iohannes Albertus, Archbishop of Magdeburg, has the Moon in Aries, in the
sixth house, which refers to health. And theMoon is besieged byMars, which
is itself in Aries, as well as by Saturn, which is in Taurus. And the Sun and
Mercury are in opposition. These are manifest signs of constant ferocity of
sickness. Nor are only the signs of health evident in the stars, but also [those]
of the successful and unsuccessful inclinations in the arts or in other actions
that are common to the nature of man, as in pursuing the peaks of the hon-
ours, doing battle, and in the dangers of life.19
This passage gives us a clearer idea of how the temperaments are affected by the
position of the stars and the extent to which their joint action is relevant inmatters
of the health of our bodies and souls. Melanchthon refers to a horoscope regarding
the Archbishop of Magdeburg, who has the Moon in Aries, in the sixth house; this
has to do with health. But theMoon is besieged byMars, which is itself in Aries, and
bySaturn,which is inTaurus.Given this constellation, and that the SunandMercury
are in opposition, it is manifest that the archbishop is subject to fierce sickness. But
the stars not only determine our health, they also play a role in human actions, such
as in our successes and failures, as well as in political conditions and dangers.
These observations are the basis ofMelanchthon’s defence of the utility of astrol-
ogy. If it is true that the action of the stars on sublunary bodies – including ours – is
a determining factor in matters of the health of the body and in the inclinations of
the soul, then astrology is of the utmost importance when it comes to the care of
19 cr xiii, 324–325: «Verumest autem, stellarumpositu gubernari et variari temperamenta. Ideo
coniunxi hoc loco utranque causam. […] Marchio Iohannes Albertus Archepiscopus Magde-
burgensis Lunam habet in Ariete in domo sexta, quae valetudini significat. Et circumsessa
est Luna a Marte, qui et ipse in Ariete est, et a Saturno, qui est in Tauro. Et oppositi sunt Sol
et Mercurius. Hae sunt manifestae significationes assiduae sevitiae morborum. Nec tantum
valetudinis signa sunt illustria in stellis, sed etiam inclinationum foelicium aut infoelicium
in artibus, aut aliis actionibus quae naturae hominum familiares sunt, ut in adsequendis
fastigiis honorum, in praeliando, in periculis vitae».
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both. This is nicely illustrated by some lines inMelanchthon’s oration TheDignity of
Astrology (1535):
But let us look at the individual morals. If one understands the inclinations
of one’s nature, he can nourish and strengthen the good ones and avoid the
vices by diligence and reason. In fact, what Ptolemy says is true; namely, that
the wise soul assists the activity of the heaven, just as the good farmer in
ploughing and cleansing assists nature. This is evident in the care for health,
in choosing a type of life or study, and in undertaking business that is either
fit or unfit for one’s talent.20
To recapitulate, Melanchthon believes that there are mainly two types of spirit in
human beings. Man has an immaterial intelligent spirit, which is responsible for
higher forms of theoretical and practical thinking (i.e. intellect and will), and is
endowed with knowledge of what is good and what is bad. But each human being
is also provided with a lower form of spirit, which is made out of the finest blood
and linked to fundamental life functions, such as nourishment and generation.
Given their affinity with the temperaments of the heart and the brain, the bodily
spirits are linked to our moods and inclinations and therefore influence our will
and behaviour. What is more, the bodily spirits and the temperaments are subject
to the influence of divine and evil forces, as well as to the action of the stars. In fact,
these considerations causedMelanchthon tobelieve that astrologywas an important
art vis-à-vis the care of man’s bodily health and vicissitudes. In this respect, other
scholars – prominently Sachiko Kusukawa – have stressed the importance ofmedical
astrology inMelanchthon’s thought.21Here, in addition to this, I would like to draw
20 Philip Melanchthon, Dignitas astrologiae, in cr xi, 266: «Sed videamus privates mores. Si
quis naturae suae inclinationem intelligit, alere bona et confirmare, et vitare vitia diligentia
ac ratione potest. Verum est enim quod ait Ptolomaeus. Sapiens anima adiuvat coelestem
operationem, quaemadmodum optimus agricola arando expurgandoque adiuvat naturam.
Hoc late patet in cura valetudinis, in diligendo genere vitae, studii, in suspiciendis negotiis
vel aptis vel abhorrentibus ab ingenio».
21 Kusukawa has shown that Melanchthon looked at astrology as inseparable from astronomy
and as one important way in which man could recognise the presence of a divine mind
governing the universe according to a providential plan. For reference to Kusukawa’s work
on Melanchthon’s astrological thought, see: supra, ‘Chapter 1’, 70, fn. 154. On the impact of
astrology on renaissance medical theories, see: Hiro Hirai, “The New Astral Medicine”, in
Brendan Dooley, ed., A Companion to Astrology in the Renaissance (Leiden 2014), 267–286.
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attention to another aspect of Melanchthon’s ideas on the relationship between
the natural order, the bodily spirits, and their right disposition. More specifically,
I would like to return to the initial questions mentioned in this chapter, regarding
the interplay between the bodily spirits, the devil, and the Holy Spirit, as well as our
power to influence their interaction.
In effect, on the one hand, the medical and astrological consideration of the
affinity between the stars and our bodies can help us determine the best cures for
our health and the optimal ways of going along our business in society and politics.
On the other hand, the question arises how, in Melanchthon’s opinion, we are to
deal with the presence of the spirits of God and the devil in our brain and heart.
By providing an answer to this question we will also be able to better understand
Melanchthon’s ideas about the presence of the Holy Spirit in human beings, as they
seem to form an important part of his theology of justification by faith alone.
In the section of Melanchthon’s Initia doctrinae physicae devoted to the bodily
temperaments and the stars, we are presented with a clearer, somewhat hierarchical
scheme of the relationship between God, the stars, and the inclinations of our soul:
And God must not be removed from the direction of the stars; but truly
it must be stated that God regulates many of the inclinations proceeding
from the stars; and He must be invoked in order that He assist the good
[inclinations] and curb the bad ones. In fact, we do not believe this saying
was in vain: “howmuchmorewill theheavenly Father bestow theHoly Spirit
upon those who ask for it?” (cf. Mt 7, 11).22
According toMelanchthon, the stars can determine the inclinations of our tempera-
ments and spirits. Therefore, the acute medic (sagaxmedicus), one possessing knowl-
edge of both medicine and astrology, can show the natural causes of certain human
events and accordingly devise cures and methods to avoid those that might cause
harm.23 Yet, one should not look at these natural causes as an order independent of
22 cr xiii, 325: «Nec Deus removendus est a gubernatione propter astra, sed vere statuendum
multas inclinationes ab astris ortas Deum moderari et orandum ut bonas iuvet et reprimat
malas. Non enim frustra dictum putemus: quanto magis Pater coelestis dabit Spiritum Sanc-
tum petentibus».
23 In conclusion of his discussion on the temperaments and the stars, Melanchthon elaborates
on the usefulness of astrology for the cure of our bodies and the handling of our good and
bad inclinations. In that context, he writes: «Fatum nec ignis nec ferreusmurus arcere potest,
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God. Quite the contrary: God regulates the inclinations of the soul by means of the
stars. It is for this reason that we need to invoke him to bestow the Holy Spirit upon
us and in thisway facilitate thegood inclinations of our spirits and curb thebadones.
Therefore, prayer – I would like to suggest – plays a crucial role in Melanchthon’s
conception of the interaction between the human temperaments and spirits, on the
one hand, and the divine and celestial influences to which they are subject, on the
other.
In fact, Melanchthon’s mention of prayer is not limited to the passage just
quoted. Nor does it appear to be merely a rhetorical interlude on the part of one
who, after all, was pursuing a Christian type of natural philosophy. Similar remarks
are found at least twice in the Liber de anima. For instance, in conclusion of the
anatomical section on the temperaments, Melanchthon writes:
But there exists a great difference between species, such that the tempera-
ments in the individual bodies differ [from each other] in consideration of
the different natures of the parents and the differentmixtures (i.e. positions)
of the stars. And the consideration of these differences appears to benecessary
for themedics. The same consideration also helps to uphold the sanity in the
public life, to rulemorals, and tobe cautious inprivatematters. Thediligence
is most necessary to avoid the monstrous, arrogant, malevolent, and treach-
erous natures. Moreover, given that we notice in ourselves howmuchwe are
prone to vices, let us work in order to curb and destroy those inclinations by
vigilance and training. Let us behold that helpmust be asked from the Son of
God, so thatHe curb and shutter our vicious impulses; for it is written: “how
muchmorewill yourheavenly Father bestow theHoly Spirit upon thosewho
ask for it?” (cf. Mt 7, 11).24
ut Carthaginenses non possunt impedire quo minus Imperio potiatur urbs Roma. Tamen,
particulares eventus multi et prospici et bonae inclinationes iuvari et malae reprimi possunt,
ut sagaxmedicus corpora praemunire potest contra certosmorbos, qui ea invasuri essent, nisi
arcerentur. Ita cum videmus ad quae vitia proni sumus, propter stellas aut temperamenta
maiore vigilantia regendi sunt mores ne malae inclinationes vincant. Et cum ex hac ipsa
doctrina discamus, Deum causam esse praecipuam liberrime caeteras moderantem; ab ipso
etiam regi nos petamus» (cr xiii, 328).
24 cr xiii, 87: «Sed omnium specierum magna varietas est, ut in singulis corporibus tempera-
menta propter diversas parentum naturas, et diversas stellarum commixtiones different. Ac
medicis necessariam esse considerationem harum dissimilitudinum constat. Prodest autem
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Here, Melanchthon stresses that different temperaments of our body depend on
the diverse nature of our parents as well as on the influence of the stars. On this
basis, he explains, medics should consider such differences so as to promote good
health and morals. At the same time, however, Melanchthon draws the attention
of the reader to the fallen nature of human beings and to their ensuing drift to
vices and evil inclinations. As a consequence of this, he deems it necessary for the
medical handling of the bodily temperaments to be complemented with the help of
the Christian Trinity: the Son of God has to be invoked to plead with the Father, so
that the Holy Spirit may control the vicious urges of our temperaments.
Interestingly enough, the theme of prayer surfaces again at the end of Melanch-
thon’s discussion De spiritibus that I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter.
There, Melanchthon describes the bodily spirits as a subtle vapour originating from
themost refined blood in our heart. These spirits coincide with the corporeal soul of
man and his fundamental vital operations. Melanchthon looks at these operations
against the background of a wondrous world full of spirits, in which the vital and
animal spirits in our body can getmixed with the spirit of God and the spirits of the
devils. In this way, they either shinemore brightly or are led to cruelty andmadness.
Melanchthon ends this discussion by an exhortation to the virtuous direction of the
human nature bymeans of prayer:
Let us observe and rule our nature and behold that our spirits ought to be the
dwelling of the Holy Spirit; and let us pray the Son of God, so that He expel
the devils from us and infuse the divine spirit into our spirits.25
Prayer appears necessary in guiding our nature, for however subject to the evil
influences and keen on vices, our bodily spirits can be ruled by the action of theHoly
et in communi vita ad tuendam valetudinem, ad regendos mores, ad circumspectionem in
familiaritatibus. Omnino necessaria diligentia est vitare monstrosas, superbas, malevolas et
perfidiosas naturas. Praeterea cum animadvertimus in nobis ipsis, ad quae vitia proniores
simus, vigilantia et adsuefactione eas inclinations frenare, et extinguere annitamur. Sciamus
etiam a filio Dei petendum esse auxilium, ut viciosos impetus in nobis reprimat et fran-
gat, sicut scriptum est: quanto magis Pater vester coelestis dabit Spiritum Sanctum petenti-
bus?».
25 cr xiii, 89: «Aspiciamus igitur naturam nostram, et diligenter eam regamus, et scimus,
oportere spiritusnostros essedomiciliumSpiritus sancti, et oremus filiumDei, ut ipsedepellat
a nobis diabolos, et spiritum divinum in nostros spiritus transfundat».
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Spirit on them. It is no coincidence, then, that later in the text of the Liber de anima,
we are told that the trust in God’s presence and help is themost effectivemedication
and that our cure lies with him:
Certainly, then, it happens that very many men decline in health and die
from sadness, for man’s heart, which is the seat of the affects, hardens and
the spirits are brought forth weaker and they enfeeble all the other powers.
For this reason Hippocrates says: “hypochondria, painful disease”. Indeed,
to rest with trust in the divine presence and help is the most effective of
medicaments, just as it is said: “your cure lies with God and he himself
nurtures you”.26
This point is of particular importance, because it may help us understandMelanch-
thon’s rather unique idea, according to which the Holy Spirit can get mixed with
man’s bodily spirits. On the one hand, I have shown thatMelanchthon thought that
invoking the presence of God inman was essential to ruling one’s soul for the good.
On the other hand, onemight wonder whyMelanchthon emphasised somuch that
taking care of the soul amounted to the actual presence of something as immaterial
as the Holy Spirit in the very body of man.
Daniel P.Walker has attempted to answer this question in his 1983 article “Medi-
cal Spirits and God and the Soul”. According toWalker,Melanchthon’s theory is part
of a broaderhistory of overlaps betweendifferent significations of the term ‘spirit’ – a
history, inWalker’s opinion, that brought about «theologically unorthodox concep-
tions of God». OnWalker’s account,Melanchthonwasmeaning to say that therewas
a congruity between the Holy Spirit and the bodily spirits, such that man’s spirits
became as spiritual as the soul and theHoly Spirit became «quasi-corporeal». Accord-
ing to Walker, Melanchthon brings the two types of spirit so close together that the
result is a «sensualist conception» of the Christian divinity.27
26 cr xiii, 95: «Certo est autem,valdemultoshomines tantummoestitia contabescere et interire,
quia cor, quod sedes est adfectuum, torrefit, et spiritus gignuntur debiliores et languefiunt
omnes aliae vires. Ideo Hippocrates inquit: φροντὶς, χαλεπὴ νόσος. Medicatio autem omnium
efficacissima est, fiducia praesentiae et auxilii divini acquiescere, et a Deo petere et expectare
vel liberationem vel mitigationem, iuxta dictum: iacta in Deum curam tuam et ipse te enu-
triet».
27 Daniel P. Walker, “Medical Spirits and God and the Soul”, 223–231.
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Also Kusukawa has written that «Melanchthon began to see the Holy Spirit as a
physical reality» and that his theory about the mingling of man’s spirits with the
spirit of God «seems to signify what Melanchthon wanted to see all along in the
human body, namely the presence of the power of God».28
In my opinion, the idea of God’s presence in man was indeed essential to Me-
lanchthon’s thought.However, it had very little to dowith looking at theHoly Spirit
as a physical reality or with any sensualist or unorthodox conception of God. On the
contrary,Melanchthon’s theorywas a very important part of his attempt to establish
a new orthodoxy and one, in fact, in which God’s presence in the world could be
safeguarded without making the divinity too worldly.
I think it is no coincidence that Melanchthon refers to the presence of the Holy
Spirit in “pious” men and that he exhorts his readers to pray, so that man’s spirits
became the “dwelling” of theHoly Spirit. A closer look at whatMelanchthon exactly
understands by the terms “pious” and “dwelling”will enable us to adequately inter-
pret the overlap of spirits in the Liber de anima.
Interestingly enough, around the same time when he wrote the Liber de anima,
Melanchthon was also busy with the so-called ‘Osiandrian controversy’: a dispute
with the theologian Andreas Osiander, which led Melanchthon to make some
changes tohis conception of justificationby faith alone. At theheart of these changes
was the idea of “dwelling”.
In his Loci communes of 1521, Melanchthon had embraced Luther’s idea that man
was incapable of attaining salvation by means of good works. Since the original sin
had effectively weakened the affects of the soul, especially man’s will was no longer
free. Butwhilst Luther thought that participation inChrist by faithwas the onlyway
inwhichman could be justified,Melanchthonwas of a different opinion. According
to Melanchthon, justification sola fide meant the renewal of the powers of the soul
(especially the will) that had been damaged by the original sin. The pious man was
for Melanchthon aman whose soul was renewed by Christ.
Now, Osiander considered Melanchthon’s doctrine to be unorthodox, for it al-
legedly removed Luther’s idea of the presence of Christ in the believer from the
notion of justification. In 1552, as he was publishing his Liber de anima, Melanchthon
also produced a written reply to Osiander, which sought to balance the latter’s crit-
icism with the views expressed in the 1521 Loci communes. In his Antwort to Osiander,
Melanchthon reiterated that pious men were not men in which Christ was present
28 Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy, 120.
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but rathermenwhose soulshadbeen renewedby theHoly Spirit. Yetbymeansof this
renewal, Melanchthon now thinks, God made the pious men’s hearts his ‘dwelling
place’.29
Melanchthon’s fresh understanding of justification sola fide involvedmuch psy-
chology: it was based on an understanding of original sin pivoting on the weak-
ening of man’s will, as well as on God’s renewal of and dwelling in man’s soul. It
is no surprise, then, that Melanchthon’s Liber de anima looked at the Holy Spirit as
effectively interacting with man’s spirits and as present in man’s heart: these spir-
its were central to man’s will and behaviour and the part of the justified men in
which God was present. As I hope should be clear by now, Melanchthon did not
look at these ideas in terms of a ‘sensualist interpretation’ of the Christian divinity,
nor did he want to conceive of the Holy Spirit as a physical reality. On the contrary,
the Liber de anima’s unusual theories were only the philosophical underpinning of
Melanchthon’s efforts to balance his notion of justification as a renewal of the soul
with Luther’s emphasis on the real presence of God in the Christian believer.
It is for these reasons that Melanchthon thought that the best cure for man’s
sinful soul (viz., a soul dominated by the affects of the bodily spirits) was to invoke
God, so that he may make the human soul the dwelling place of the Holy Spirit. In
the years of the Liber de anima, Melanchthon had come to understand the presence of
the Holy Spirit in men as the way in which God renewed, hence justified, the souls
of those who had faith. In this sense, the interaction between the Holy Spirit and
man’s soul as described in the Liber de anima was part of Melanchthon’s theology of
justification.
3.4. Conclusions
Melanchthon used the notion of ‘spirit’ in many and sometimes overlapping ways.
This varied usage was discussed by some of his contemporaries who studied topics
concerning the soul. Some of them, like Otto Casmann, tried to downplay the prob-
lems connected with its multi-faceted nature and instead preferred to emphasise
the Christian connotation ofMelanchthon’s notion of ‘spiritus’. As such, ‘spiritus’ was
taken to be an intelligent, immaterial, and immortal nature, provided with innate
29 Formore details regardingMelanchthon’s and Luther’s theories of justification, as well as the
‘Osiandrian controversy’, see: supra, ‘Chapter 1’, 74–77.
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ideas of civic morals.30 Others, like Julius Caesar Scaliger, pointed to the ambiguity
involved in the idea of ‘spiritus’, its sensualist implications, hence its unsuitability as
a definition of the human soul.
In effect, Melanchthon appears to use ‘spiritus’ to define both the immaterial and
the corporeal souls of man. That ‘spiritus’ was applied by Melanchthon to both of
these souls does not mean that he came to see them as one single entity. On the
contrary, it means that Melanchthon used ‘spiritus’ in an equivocal way, to indicate
two completely different souls. What ismore, he employed the same term to refer to
the Christian divinity, as well as to the evil spirits, or devils. Melanchthon’s natural
philosophy was not only a world full of spirits, but in fact the stage on which these
characters interacted. The present chapter further develops the idea that has been
presented by other scholars, according to which Melanchthon’s conception of the
human soul involved an essentially practical dimension.Historians – chiefly Sachiko
Kusukawa – have demonstrated that Melanchthon’s main scope in writing his De
anima was to show that human beings were endowed with an intelligent spirit,
which had innate knowledge of God’s Law.
By looking at Melanchthon’s varied understanding of ‘spirit’ however, one may
better grasp the way in whichMelanchthon looks at the dynamics underlingman’s
interaction with the world and with himself. On the one hand, the soul knows the
law of God; on the other hand, human nature bears the effects of the fall. According
to Melanchthon, man is provided with bodily spirits that govern fundamental life
functions (such as, generation, growth, and sensation) and are linked to practical
dimensions of human nature and society. Because the spirits and the temperaments
of the human body – together with the influence of the stars – determine the good
or bad state of the human body, as well as the moods and inclinations of the soul,
they are relevant toman’s health, behaviour, andmorals. Especially in consideration
of his fallen nature, man is likely to go along the negative inclinations of the bodily
spirits and to undergo the influence of those belonging to the devil.
Nevertheless, human beings are also provided with an intelligent spirit, capable
of devising methods for healing the body and to tell the difference between good
and evildoings. The human soul – or at least the soul of those who have accepted the
Christian faith – is also able to interact with the spirit of God and to invoke him in
30 Casmann endorses Melanchthon’s conception of innate ideas in the human soul, in his dis-
cussion “An pervulgatum hoc Aristotelis ‘nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu’
sit vero de omni”. See Casmann, Psychologia anthropologica, 122–125.
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such a way that the action of the Holy Spirit may promote man’s pious inclinations
and curb the bad ones.
When one looks at Melanchthon’s Liber de anima, one may very well agree with
Scaliger that the notion of ‘spiritus’ emerging from that book is quite tangled-up. But
true as this may be, a broader look at Melanchthon’s understanding of ‘spiritus’ may
prove Scaliger’s critic Casmann right:Melanchthon looked at ‘spiritus’ essentially as a
Christianway to look atman’s soul.Melanchthon’s notionof ‘spiritus’ was an integral
part ofMelanchthon’s effort to define the soul fromaChristian point of view. But his
notion of ‘spiritus’ was also central toMelanchthon’s understanding of a very central
point for the Lutheran faith: the doctrine of justification sola fide.
In the following chapter of this thesis, I shall show how Otto Casmann relied
on Melanchthon’s understanding of ‘spiritus’ in discussing another psychological
question: the difference between the human and the animal souls. By doing this,
I shall also show that the theological dimension of Melanchthon’s and Casmann’s
conflicting ideas about ‘spiritus’ also involved the way in which these men thought
there was a parallel between man’s body and ‘spiritus’, on the one hand, and Christ’s
human and divine nature, on the other hand.

chapter 4
Franciscus Vallesius and Otto
Casmann on Animal and Human Souls
4.0. Introduction
PhilipMelanchthon’s psychology dealt with the entirety of human nature, i.e., with
man’s body and soul. In doing this,Melanchthonwas followingMartin Luther, who
had stated that a truly Christian understanding ofmanwas asmuch about the body
as it was about the soul. Man as a whole, Luther had said in his 1536 Disputatio de
homine, was not just an ‘animal rationale’ (a rational animal), butwasmore adequately
understood as the subject of sin andgrace. As a consequence of this, Luther explained,
body and soul should not be considered apart from each other, but they had to
be taken together as forming the subject of Christian anthropology.1 Melanchthon
accepted this idea and developed it in his Commentarius de anima and Liber de anima.
Yet, he did it in his own way.
According to Melanchthon, the Christian subject of sin and grace was indeed
the whole man. But the whole man was composed of two radically different parts:
a body and an intelligent spirit. As we have seen, it was this version of Luther’s ideas
thatMelanchthon taught to hisWittenberg students. But thanks to the diffusion of
Melanchthon’s psychology at other reformeduniversities, the type of anthropology I
have described so far became popular with some of his contemporaries, such as Otto
Casmann, to whom this chapter will devote special attention.
Here, I shall examine the way in which Casmann looked at what was specifically
human, or in other words, what made man differ from all other animals. Far from
arbitrary, this issue appears to involve a question that one might quite logically ask
when looking at the notion of ‘spiritus’, which bothMelanchthon and Casmann put
at the centre of their psychologies. In effect, this notion involved somemajor points
of divergence from the Aristotelian hylomorphic way of looking at the soul. Most
medieval andRenaissance authorswhoworked in theAristotelian framework looked
1 On Luther’s anthropology and on Melanchthon’s reliance on it, see: supra, ‘Chapter 1’, 61–64 and
‘Chapter 2’, 89, passim.
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at the soul as “the form of an organic body possessing life potentially”. Part of this
conceptionwas the idea thatman differed specifically from all other animate beings
due to his unique possession of one higher power of the soul: the intellect. Now,
Luther’s andMelanchthon’s dissatisfactionwith the idea of ‘animal rationale’, as well
as with Aristotle’s definition of the soul resulted in confining the role of being the
form of the body to a movement of the bodily spirits, or ἐνδελέχεια. At the same
time, Melanchthon thought that the notion of ‘spiritus intelligens’ was a better (that
is, Christian) way of definingman’s soul.
Otto Casmann accepted Melanchthon’s views because he considered them to be
more in consonance with the teaching of Christian theology. But in which terms
did he look at the specificity of human beings now that he favoured the idea of
‘spiritus intelligens’ over that of ‘anima rationalis’? As I shall explain in this present
chapter, Casmann proposed a new way to consider human life. But because he
did so most elaborately in his comparative analysis of the souls of men and ‘brute
animals’, this chapter shall examine the question “whether bruta possess reason”.
More in particular, Casmann developed his ideas in the course of his criticism of
the Spanish physician Franciscus Vallesius, who in his Sacra Philosophia (1582) had
defended the view that animals were provided with some form of reason. In his
Psychologia anthropologica (1594), Casmann defended the rival position on the basis
of a direct attack on Vallesius’s argumentation.2
The discussion between Vallesius and Casmannwill enable us to understand the
way in which Melanchthon’s and Casmann’s shared idea of ‘spiritus’ also involved a
new way of considering human beings and their place in the created world. More
precisely, I shall show that, on the one hand, the differences between Vallesius and
Casmannwere to a significant extent occasioned by the increasinguse of ancient and
contemporary medical sources in their psychological studies. On the other hand, I
shall point out that the way in which Casmann handled issues concerning animal
and human souls brought man into a particular relationship with the Christian
divinity, whereby Christology – instead of Aristotelian biology – became the model
for definingwhatwas specifically human. Let us turn then to thediscussionbetween
2 In the texts I examine, Vallesius and Casmann use a variety of different terms to refer, broadly
speaking, to a power of the soul higher than sensation. Those are, for instance: ‘intelligence’
(intelligentia), ‘understanding’ (intellectus), ‘reason’ (ratio), and ‘mind’ (mens). However, Vallesius and
Casmann appear to mostly call this power ‘reason’. Therefore, and for the sake of simplicity, I will
use the term reason (and the related expressions: rational/rationality) throughout my study, in
order to indicate the power of the soul debated by Vallesius and Casmann.
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Vallesius and Casmann on animal and human souls. Because much of Casmann’s
argument is a direct criticismof Vallesius’ ideas, let us start by presenting the latter’s
argument in favour of brute animals’ reason.
4.1. Franciscus Vallesius: Animal Reason and ‘Reason’ as an Analogical Term
Vallesius’ discussion of human and animal reason is found in his Sacra Philosophia,
which was first published in 1582. It is not surprising that Vallesius wanted to
dedicate the book to the then King of Spain, Philip ii. In fact, at the time Vallesius
drafted that work, he had already been working as physician to the Royal Court of
Spain for ten years.
Before accepting this prestigious position, Vallesius had been professor of med-
icine at Alcalá, where he published widely in the fields of natural philosophy, med-
icine and anatomy. His academic production mainly consists of commentaries on
medical texts byHippocrates andGalen. For this reason, scholars have consideredhis
work to be an example of “Galenist Hippocratism”.3 Although it is not my purpose
to assess the historical accuracy of this label for the case of Vallesius, it is quite
evident that ancient medical knowledge represents his main intellectual source. As
I will show, part of Vallesius’ reliance on the work of Hippocrates also surfaces in
Vallesius’ argumentation in favour of the reason of lower animals, to which we now
turn.
Vallesius’ comparative study of animal and human souls is part of the bigger
objective that lies at the heart of the Sacra Philosophia, namely to conduct a ratio-
nal study of those teachings in the Holy Scriptures that are relevant to physics. The
ninety one chapters composing the text consist of the author’s commentary on an
equal number of passages taken from the Bible. Instead of proceeding thematically,
Vallesius’ Sacra Philosophia follows the order of the books in the Old and New Tes-
taments. Vallesius’ discussion hence goes from the Book of Genesis to Maccabees, and
then fromMathew to the Book of Revelation. Vallesius’ discussion of the souls of ani-
mals and men stems from several passages in the Sacra Philosophia that take their
start from Job, 38.36 (according to the Latin text of the Vulgate): «who placedwisdom
3 About this, see José M.L. Piñero and Francisco Calero, Las “Controversias” (1556), 3–10. An extensive
list ofmedical and philosophical publications by Vallesius is found inMarcial Solana,Historia de la
filosofía española, 299–307. Formore information about Vallesius’ intellectual biographies, see: supra,
‘Chapter 1’, 21–23.
156 chapter 4
into the inward parts of man, and who gave intelligence to rooster?» (Quis posuit in
visceribus hominis sapientiam, vel quis dedit gallo intelligentiam?).
Vallesius takes this passage quite literally, as stating the two following ideas. On
the one hand – Vallesius explains – the scriptural verse hints at the metaphysical
dependence of all creatures on God. On the other hand, it seems to suggest that
roosters, and hence all animals, are provided with some form of reason. On the basis
of this interpretation, Vallesius produces a philosophical argumentation in favour
of reason in lower animals, aiming to show exactly what animal reason is. This
discussion proposed in the Sacra Philosophia can be divided into two parts. The first
appears to be mostly based on the authority of an alleged Hippocratic conception of
the relation between animal sensation and reason. The second part is grounded in
the observation of animal behaviour.
The strategy adopted by Vallesius to develop his first argument consists in han-
dling the question of the reason of animals as one concerning the relation between
reason and sensation in general. Seemingly drawing on Plutarch’s De sollertia ani-
malium, Vallesius writes that ancient philosophers who recognised that all animals
partook in reason relied on a theory proposed by Strato of Lampsacus, ‘in some book’
(libellum quendam). According to Strato’s view, all sensations involve reason.4 By look-
4 A passage at the beginning of the discussion in the Sacra Philosophia suggests that Plutarch’s text
is Vallesius’ source of information about the different positions taken by ancient authors in the
debate over animal reason: «De qua quaestione Plutarchus libello de animalium industria optime
mihi videtur disputasse» (Vallesius, De Sacra Philosophia, 273). Vallesius seems to refer to a passage
in Plutarch’s De sollertia animalium, the English translation of which goes as follows: «There is, in
fact, a work of Strato, the natural philosopher, which proves that it is impossible to have sensation
at all without some action of the intelligence. Often, it is true, whilst we are busy reading, the
letters may fall on our eyes, or words may fall on our ears, which escape our attention since our
minds are intent onother things; but later themind recovers, shifts its course, and followsup every
detail that had been neglected; and this is the meaning of the saying ‘mind has sight and mind
has hearing; everything else is deaf and blind’, indication that the impact on eyes and ears brings
no perception if the understanding is not present» (Harold Cherniss and William C. Helmbold,
eds., Plutarch, De sollertia animalium, Harvard, 1957, 131–132). The passage in Greek can be found in
GregoriusN.Bernardakis, ed., Plutarch,Moralia (Leipzig 1895). Plutarchappears to refer to fragment
112 by Strato of Lampsacus (335c.–269c. bc), in Fritz Wehrli, Die Schule des Aristoteles (Basel 1978), v,
34. As Robert Sharples pointed out, Strato explains the activities of the soul by the idea of pneuma
or spirit. The spirit extends throughout the body from the head. Because Strato was influenced
by contemporary anatomical and medical views, he observed that the functions of the nerves
always involvepsychic spirit extending fromthebrain. Fromthis, Stratogathered that all sensation
involves reasoning (Robert W. Sharples, “The Peripatetic School”, in David Furley, From Aristotle to
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ing at this ancient debate, Vallesius argues that the relationship between sensation
and reason seems to be what really is at stake in the question concerning the soul of
brute animals. Consequently, in order to establish whether animals have a share in
reason, one has to ascertain whether or not the absence of reasonmight impede sen-
sation to come about at all.5 According to Vallesius, sensation cannot exist without
the joint action of reason, on the following grounds:
Now, it seems that the mind cannot be separated from sense; for, as Hip-
pocrates states, those who do not feel painwhen some part of the body aches,
in them themind becomes ill. Therefore, given thatwhen themind becomes
ill and insane, so that it is not attentive to the organs of sensation, and
although the cause of pain approaches, it is not sensed, then even less any
other thing can be sensed of thosewhich stimulate the senses less vigorously,
unlessmind is present. We also experience this in ourselves. In fact, whenwe
aremore intent on thinking of something,many things occur to the eyes and
ears that we do not see or hear. Therefore, if those animated beings that are
provided with the mind do not sense when the mind does not attend, much
less can those that lack themind altogether. For this reason, if those that lack
the mind cannot sense, they cannot have sensation either. Therefore, sensa-
tion cannot be without the mind.6
The first claim expressed in the quote – that themens, or reason, is inseparable from
the sensitiveoperationsof the soul – resembles theview found inAristotle’sDeanima,
Augustine:RoutledgeHistory of Philosophy, Volume 2 (London 2003), 162–163). For the debate on animal
minds in Antiquity, see: Richard Sorabji, AnimalMinds andHumanMorals. The Origins of theWestern
Debate (Worcester 1993).
5 Vallesius, De Sacra Philosophia, 274: «Itaque, huc controversia vertitur an possit esse sensus sine
mente».
6 Vallesius, De Sacra Philosophia, 274: «Videtur autem non posse mens separari a sensu, quandoqui-
dem, utHippocrates dicit, qui parte aliqua corporis dolentes doloremnon sentiunt, iismens aegro-
tat. Si igitur cum mens aegrotat alienataque est, ita ut sensuum organis intenta non sit, etiamsi
dolendi accedat causa, non sentitur,multominus sentiri possit res ulla alia earumquaeminus vio-
lenter sensum pulsant, nisi adsit mens, quod etiam in nobis ipsis experimur. Nam, cum re aliqua
attentius cogitamus, plurima obversantur ob oculos et aures quae neque videmus neque audimus.
Si igitur animantia mente praedita, cum mens non attendit, non sentiunt, multo minus sentire
possent quae penitus essent amentia. Quod si amentia sentire non possunt, neque sensum pos-
sunt habere. Non potest igitur sensus esse sine mente».
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according to which higher vital functions necessarily involve the lower ones.7 But
what Vallesius proposes is in fact a reversal of the order of vital functions described
by Aristotle. In Aristotle’s opinion, the mind cannot operate without sensation,
whereas in Vallesius’ view the vector of the relation between those two powers of
the soul goes also in the inverse direction: sensation occurs only in the presence of
reason. Vallesius argues in this manner by endorsing a conception that he ascribes
to Hippocrates. Unfortunately, he does not provide any reference to Hippocrates’s
work; yet, I was able to trace the passage mentioned by the Spanish physician back
to Hippocrates’s Aphorisms.8 Following this view, some form of ‘rational’ attention is
needed for sensation in general to come about.9 According to Vallesius, Hippocrates
makes this point by looking at the dysfunctional behaviour presented by animals
that do not feel pain, even though a part of their body does ache. The ancient
physician, Vallesius explains, ascribes this anomaly to a disease of the mens (mens
aegrotat), more exactly to the fact that an ill mens is not capable of attending to the
operations of the sense organs. Therefore, some animals may fail to feel pain, even
though something painful affects their body, because their mens (due to some form
of illness) fails to be attentive to the information conveyed by the sense organs.
Now, Vallesius draws on thisHippocratic view for proposing his own solution to
the sense-reason problem. In fact, if Hippocrates is right in saying that even animals
provided with mens, or reason, fail to have sensation in the absence of ‘rational’
attention, how would it be possible for animals lacking reason altogether to have
sensation at all? This analysis leaves us with only two possible scenarios: either we
deny that animals have sensation orwe grant their soul some form of highermental
activity. Vallesius rules out the first possibility on observational grounds. As amatter
of fact, we observe animals reacting to images and sounds (e.g., a flock of sheep
running away upon being scared by a noise). Therefore, theymust be provided with
sensation. On this basis, Vallesius concludes that animals are provided with some,
if minimal, level of reason, consisting in the attention required for the sensitive
operations to go through.
7 Aristotle,De anima ii. 1, 413a21–b10.
8 TheGreek text byHippocrates can be found inEmile Littré, ed.,Œuvres Complètes d’Hippocrate (Paris
1884), iv, 471; Galenus, “Hippocratis Aphorismi, et Galeni in eos Commentarii”, in C.G. Kühn, ed.,
Claudii Galenii Opera Omnia (Hildesheim 1965), 460.
9 On early-modern psychological theories of attention, see: Cees Leijenhorst, “Attention Please! The-
ories of Selective Attention in Late Aristotelian andEarlyModern Philosophy”, in Paul J.J.M. Bakker
and Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen, eds.,Mind, Cognition and Representation, 205–230.
vallesius and casmann on animal and human souls 159
Interestingly, attending to sense operations is not the only ‘rational’ feature
that Vallesius attributes to animals, as he makes clear in the second part of his
argumentation in favour of the rationality of the bruta:
Moreover, to do somethingwell or badly pertains to one and the same faculty.
In fact, it is not the case that one sees badly through his ears, or hears badly
through his eyes. Instead, seeing is either way of the eyes, and hearing of
the ears. Therefore, becoming crazy or going insane belongs to the same
[faculty] thatknowsand that reasonsproperly.Now, it seems that animals are
sometimes deceived, which in fact makes the art of hunting very enjoyable,
for although it is inflicted on them in several different ways, they use many
stratagems to avoid the traps. Sometimes they also seem to become insane,
for instance monkeys that are swept away by intoxication, and many other
diseases, such as rabies or hydrophobia, which especially dogs – but also
horses, oxen, donkeys and camels – usually suffer from, andwhichphysicians
attribute to some types ofmadness. Thus, if animals canbedelirious, they can
also reason. In fact, delirium is a damage of reason.10
The observation of their behaviour does not only show that animals can feel pain,
see colours, and hear sounds, but it also presents us with cases of animals suffer-
ing from diseases that physicians trace back to some form of madness. This is the
case, for instance, of intoxicated monkeys, and of dogs, horses and camels suffer-
ing from hydrophobia. According to Vallesius, such dysfunctional behaviour (and
more in general any improper way of operating) needs to be explained in terms of
themalfunctioning of an underlying faculty. In effect, the operation of seeingmight
or might not be performed properly, but either way of functioning pertains to one
and the same faculty (sight, in this case, embodied in the eyes). Therefore, madness,
10 Vallesius, De Sacra Philosophia, 275: «Praeterea, ad eandem facultatem pertinent bene et male
aliquid facere. Non enim evenit male videre auribus, aut male audire oculis, sed utcumque
videre oculorum est, et audire aurium. Igitur desipere, aut insanire, eiusdem est cuius sapere
et bene ratiocinari. […] Videntur autem bruta nonnunquam decipi, quod quidem facit artem
venandi iucundissimam, quia multis modis illis imponitur, etiamsi non paucis illa utantur
stratagematis ad vitandum insidias. Videntur etiam aliquando insanire, nam simiae ebrietate
corripiuntur, et ut alios morbos quam plurimos, ita hydrophobiam, seu rabiem pati solent
canes maxime, sed et equus, bos, et asinus, et camelus, quem morbum medici ponunt in
maniae generibus. Si igitur bruta possunt delirare, possint et ratiocinari. Namdelirium laesio
rationis est».
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which corresponds to an improper way of reasoning, can only occur in animals pro-
vided with the ability of reasoning. On this basis, the capability of reasoning, either
sanely or insanely, must be grounded in the same underlying faculty: reason. Inci-
dentally, it should be pointed out that the Sacra Philosophia is not entirely consistent
in its explanation of madness and sanity. As I will show later, when discussing Otto
Casmann’s counterarguments to Vallesius, the former cites passages from the lat-
ter’s text, in which phenomena of insanity are traced back to the internal senses and
not to the higher power of reason. For themoment, suffice it to know that Vallesius,
who is convinced that insanity in general occurs only in animals provided with a
mens, concludes that animals must have some form of reason.11
Although Vallesius openly assigns the power of reason to animals, he never
pushes his argument so far as to assimilate it to the human mens. This seems to
surface in the following passage from the Sacra Philosophia:
Yet, it results frommany arguments that this reason of the animals is largely
different from the human mind; and it does not merely differ in terms of
more and less, but in terms of the very being of reason. This is why the terms
‘reason’ and ‘rational’ are to be predicated of both [animals and men] not
univocally but analogically.12
Vallesius appears to soften his initial claim that all animals have reason. In fact, he
points out that reason in humans and animals differs essentially. Thus he contends
that “reason” and “rationality” are analogical terms and can only be predicated
analogically of men and animals. Vallesius does not elaborate further on the nature
of the analogy he proposes nor does he provide uswith a definition of animal reason.
Instead, he offers a comparative sketch of the operations that men and animals can
perform. First of all, animals and men differ with respect to the objects and modes
of their reasoning:
First, in fact, because thehumanmind is bynature and per semade to think in
11 «Certe rationem aliquam esse brutis, negare non possumus citra proterviam» (Vallesius, De
Sacra Philosophia, 275).
12 Vallesius, De Sacra Philosophia, 276: «multis tamen constat argumentis, hanc brutorum ratio-
nem longe diversam esse ab humanamente, nequemaioris velminoris solum ratione differre,
sed ipso rationis esse, atque ita ut rationis et rationalis nomende utrisque nonunivoce dicatur
sed analogice».
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an absolute sense and of anything. […]On the contrary, none of the brutes has
been made to reason unless with respect to certain specific things, namely,
by virtue of some natural instinct. Therefore, man is rational in an absolute
sense, animals always with respect to something, hence not in an absolute
sense, but in some way and by virtue of some analogy.13
Strictly speaking, only men possess the faculty of reasoning. In other words, human
beings alone are capable of thinking of everything and freely (e.g., this or that given
man is fully equipped to become, to his liking, a mathematician as much as a
theologian). Animals appear to be able to form concepts as well, but only a very
limited set of concepts, mostly related to essential life functions (e.g., foreseeing
dangerous situations, or supplying the means necessary to realise their happiness).
The performance of these functions, on the part of the animals, does not issue from
acts of deliberate thought but is the fruit of natural instinct. In this respect, Vallesius
argues, animals are like men deprived of free will.14
Another relevant feature of the reason of bruta is its corruptibility. Eternal and
incorporeal items do not fall within the scope of what animals are capable of dealing
with. Accordingly, their reason cannot reach the level of separation needed to gain
immortality.15Because they cannot form concepts of incorporeal things, and because
they do not have free will (on which moral virtue in general depends), they are not
capable of wisdom (sapientia) either.
In consonancewith the scriptural verse ( Job, 38.36) that triggers Vallesius’ discus-
13 Vallesius, De Sacra Philosophia, 276: «Primum quidem, quia mens humana, natura sua et ex
sese nata est ratiocinari simpliciter et circa quidvis. […] Brutorum […] vero nullum ratiocinari
natum est, nisi circa quiddam, quo scilicet naturali quodam instinctu. […] Igitur homo sim-
pliciter rationalis est, brutorum quocunque circa quidpiam, quapropter non simpliciter sed
quodammodo et analogia quadam».
14 Vallesius,De Sacra Philosophia, 277: «qui ab homine tollit liberum arbitrium, nihil aliud quam
beluam ipsum facit».
15 Vallesius, De Sacra Philosophia, 277: «Praeterea, nihil eorum de quibus ratiocinatur aliorum
animalium ullum est incorporeum aut aeternum, sed omnia sensibilia et caduca: nam de
quaerendo victu, de innuendo coitu, de nutrienda, et conservanda prole, de fugiendo dolore,
de vita valetudineque tuenda, de corporis, vero. Et divinis, aut immortalitate, nulla illis subest
cogitatio. […] Quapropter ignorantissimi sunt qui timent, si sensum cum quadam ratione
brutis tribuant, ne illa donent immortalitatem, et qui, quia bruta ratione quadam pollent,
vocent in discrimen humanaementis immortalitatem. Non enim quia ratiocinantur utcum-
que immortales esse homines cognoseuntur, sed quia incorporeis, aeternis et divinis».
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sion in the SacraPhilosophia, roostersmaypossess reason, but onlymenhavewisdom.
In fact, it is the possession of sapientia, not that of reason, which distinguishes men
from animals:
Man’s specific difference is to be capable of wisdom [sapientia]; and since it
is necessary that wisdom be combined with real virtue, and this (real virtue)
with the fear ofGod,Ecclesiastes, in the conclusivewords of its discourse,most
rightlydefinesmanby saying: “fearGodandobserveHis commandments, for
thewholeman is this”;which is to say the sameas: this isman.Thereforeman
is the animal capable of true wisdom, which consists in the fear of God and
His commandments and in the meditation of Him. How much closer does
this distinctive difference ‘being capable of wisdom’ come to the essence of
man than the distinctive difference ‘rational’, and likewise ‘understanding’,
aboutwhichwe indicated elsewhere that all animals are rational in someway
and about certain things, and that they have some kind of understanding,
whereas they are in no way capable of wisdom. Therefore, man is called the
‘animal capable of wisdom’ with much less ambiguity than the ‘rational
animal’.16
To sumup, Vallesius draws onHippocrates to claim that a well-functioningmens, or
reason, is needed in order for sensation to occur in animate beings. On this basis,
the Spanish physician claims that animals experiencing sensation must also pos-
sess some form of reason. More exactly, they must be provided with the attention
needed for sensation to come about. Animals other thanmenmight suffer from dis-
eases pertaining to the faculty of reason (e.g. hydrophobia), thoughnormally they are
able to use that faculty so as to provide the means necessary for their own survival
as well as for the protection of their progeny. The reason of animals differs from that
16 Vallesius, De Sacra Philosophia, 215 (italics mine): «Differentia propria hominis est sapientiae
esse capacem; atque quoniam sapientia cum vera virtute coniuncta necessario est et haec cum
Dei timore, omnium optime definivit hominem Ecclesiastes in verbis ultimis suae concionis,
dicens: Deum time et mandata eius serva, hoc est enim omnis homo; quod nihil aliud est
dictu quam homo. Homo enim est animal capax sapientiae verae, quae in timore Dei et legis
eius meditatione consistit. Quanto autem proprius accedat ad hominis essentiam differentia
haec quam rationale, inde intelligens, quod ut alibi indicavimus, bruta omnia rationabilia
etiam quodammodo et circa quaedam sunt, et intelligentiam quandam habent; sapientiae
vero nullatenus sunt capacia. Itaque, hominem esse animal sapientiae capax multo cum minori
ambiguitate dicitur quam animal rationale».
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of men in that it is not capable of free choice and of considering immaterial con-
cepts. As a result, animals are not immortal or capable of sapientia – the latter falling
within the capability of human beings alone. These features seem to mark a signif-
icant difference between human beings and other animals. Nonetheless, Vallesius
prefers to emphasise their similarities and to endorse an analogical conception of
reason.
The SacraPhilosophiawent throughmanyeditions, andprovoked criticismswith-
in the Catholic Church. In fact, the book was prohibited in Rome in 1603.17 Although
the book does not seem to have received much attention within recent scholarship,
itmust have been rather popular among Vallesius’ contemporaries. Certainly, it was
read by Otto Casmann, whose discussion “an ratio sit brutis communis ac propterea non
propriahominis forma” – adirect attackonVallesius’ views –wearenowable to address.
Whilst Vallesius draws on (his particular interpretation of) ancient medical knowl-
edge to develop his arguments, the discussion on the soul of bruta undergoes an
interesting theological,more specifically Christological twist in Casmann’s Psycholo-
gia, to which we now turn.
4.2. Otto Casmann and the Christologising of Psychology
As we have seen in the previous chapters, Casmann draws on Melanchthon’s books
on the soul for the view that the subject matter of psychology is the whole nature
of man. He suggests the name ‘anthropologia’ for the study of what he describes as
the essential union of the two natures of man: the spiritual nature, which is the
subject of the part of anthropology called psychologia, and the corporeal one, which
17 The Sacra Philosophia appeared in Turin in 1587; it was then published three times in Lyon
(1588, 1592, 1595) and reprinted in 1602 in Frankfurt amMain. The Sacra Philosophia came under
scrutiny of the Congregation for the Index in 1597. In 1599 a censura was commissioned to
Luis Ystella and Vincenzo Bonincontro. The book was prohibited by the Master of the Sacred
Palace in 1603 with the clause “donec corrigatur”. The Congregation criticised Vallesius for
interpreting the divine spirit in terms of fire animating the primordial waters, for proposing
naturalistic explanations ofmiraculous events, aswell as for defending the rationality of brute
animals. On this case of censorship, together with the edition of the documents produced by
the Congregation, see Ugo Baldini and Leen Spruit, eds., Catholic Church and Modern Science.
Documents from the Archives of the Roman Congregation of theHolyOffice and the Index (Rome 2009),
Vol. i, 2435–2446.
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is the subject of anatomy, and which Casmann addresses in a separate book: the
Secundapars anthropologiae, hoc est fabrica humani corporis (published in 1596).18As I have
already argued, Casmann prefers Melanchthon’s definition of the human soul (as
‘intelligent spirit’) over Aristotle’s, because he deems the former more in keeping
with Christian theology.19 Casmann also refers to the ‘spiritus intelligens’ as ‘anima
logica’, or logical soul. According to Casmann, the logical soul is not the form of the
body, which rather has its own corporeal form:
Just as the form is, so is the informed thing. In fact, the thing acquires both
its essence and its name by virtue of the form. Now, the soul is an immortal
spirit. Therefore, if the soul were the form of the body, the body would be
spiritual and immortal. Therefore, we conclude that the soul [animus] is not
the form of the body, nor may it be rightly said to be so.20
Instead, the human soul is a substance of its own, which is immortal and accounts
forman’s intellect, will and language.21 Further in his text, Casmann also denies that
the logical soul be the form of man taken as a hylomorphic composite. I will return
to this point later, when I will also show that Casmann’s comparative analysis of
humans and animals is to a significant extent determined by his rejection of the
Aristotelian-hylomorphic account of man, as well as by his particular conception
of the relationship between man’s essence and the double nature of Christ. Before
getting to this point, let us first look at Casmann’s reaction to Vallesius’ arguments
in favour of reason in brute animals.
18 Otto Casmann, Psychologia anthropologica, 1. On Casmann reorganisation of psychology, see:
supra, ‘Chapter 5’, 155–157. On Casmann’s anthropology, see Uwe Kordes, “Otho Casmanns
Anthropologie (1549/96)”, 195–210; Simone de Angelis, Anthropologien, 198–203.
19 PhilipMelanchthon’sDe anima had defined the soul as follows: «Anima rationalis est spiritus
intelligens, nec extinguitur cum a corpore discessit, sed immortalis est. Haec definitio non
habet physicae rationes, sed sumpta est ex Sacris literis» (Melanchthon,Commentarius de anima,
15v).
20 Otto Casmann, Psychologia anthropologica, 5: «qualis forma, talis res formata. Res enim per
formam et essentiam et nomen acquirit. At animus est spiritus immortalis. Si igitur animus
corporis forma, corpus fuerit spirituale et immortale. Concludimus itaque animum corporis
formam non esse, nec recte dici».
21 Otto Casmann, Psychologia anthropologica, 89: «logica itaque animae facultas est rationis vel
orationis. Ratio hoc loc est vis animae qua intelligimus et volumus».
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Casmann’s discussion “an ratio sit brutis communis” is structured in a fairly
scholastic manner. It is divided into two parts: the first part presents the arguments
in favour of animals’ reason, the second the arguments contra, which express Cas-
mann’s own view. Like Vallesius, Casmann traces the debate on the soul of animals
back to Plutarch’s De sollertia animalium and suggests that among ancient authors
only Cicero had held that animals were gifted with reason. As for the discussion
among his contemporaries, Casmann states:
In our own time, Franciscus Vallesius, in his Sacra Philosophia, denies that
the difference between animals and man consists in the difference between
rational and irrational. All animals, he states, are rational beings and are
provided with intelligence.22
Therefore, in order to refute the claim that bruta are rational beings, Casmann
develops counterarguments against the view proposed by Vallesius.
To start with, Casmann argues, Vallesius’ interpretation of Job, 38.36 is erro-
neous. For, contrary to what Vallesius claims, the Hebrew version of that scriptural
verse has no mention of roosters (or of any other animal), and it speaks of reason
and wisdom only insofar as men are concerned.23 What is more, not only does Valle-
sius fail to read the Bible correctly, but he alsomakes similarmistakes in reading his
ancientmedical sources. According to Casmann, Vallesius’ reading of Hippocrates is
both incorrect and philosophically unsound. As I have pointed out before, according
to Vallesius, Hippocrates thinks that sensation in general needs a fully functioning
mind (mens) to come about. In order for an animal to have sensation, some form of
attention on the part of reason is needed. Now, in Casmann’s opinion, this is not the
genuine view of Hippocrates:
I consider thatHippocrates in the quoted passage spoke ofmen, so that it [the
mens] is not of all animals, but of men alone. […] Goclenius says that, in the
relevant passage, the Greek does not read νοῦς but γνώμη, with which term
22 Casmann, Psychologia, 9: «Nostra aetate, Franciscus Vallesius, in Sacra sua Philosophia, negare
videtur rationale et irrationale esse differentiambruti et hominis. Omnia bruta affirmans esse
rationalia et intelligentia praedita».
23 Casmann, Psychologia, 14: «Fallitur cum Vallesio prava versione quisquis ita legendum existi-
maverit. Veritas enim Hebraea sic habet: quis indidit praecordiis sapientiam, aut quis dedit
menti intelligentiam. Nulla hic mentio galli. Hominis et mentis tota est».
166 chapter 4
Hippocrates does notmean reason but common sense, or the judgment con-
cerning sensation,whichbelongs to the interior sense that is called ‘common
sense’. Which opinion is very plausible.24
According toCasmann, the viewof the relationbetweenattention and sensation that
Vallesius ascribes toHippocrateshasnothing todowith animals.Moreover, there are
good reasons for doubting that Vallesius’ interpretation ofHippocrates’ view applies
to human beings either. In fact, Casmann prefers the interpretation of the Hippo-
cratic text proposed by his mentor Rudolph Goclenius. According to this reading,
Hippocrates indeed claims that sensation in general requires some formof attention
to come about. But Goclenius – followed by Casmann – argues that the Greek text
mentions the common sense and not the mens, or reason, as the soul’s faculty sup-
posed to attend the operations of the sense organ in the process of sensing.25 In sum,
Casmann claims thatVallesius’ interpretation ofHippocrates ismistaken. According
to Casmann, a correct reading of Hippocrates’ Greek text suggests the two following
conclusions. First, the ancient physicianmakesnomention of the souls of animals in
the passage considered by Vallesius. Second, Hippocrates claims that only the inter-
nal senses (more precisely, the common sense), and not any operation of mens, are
needed for sensation to occur inman’s soul.26
24 Casmann, Psychologia, 15: «Hippocratem citato in loco de hominibus loqui arbitror, ita ut
generalis illa non sit animalium, sed hominum duntaxat. […] Goclenius in contextu, inquit,
Greco est non νοῦς sed γνώμη; qua voce Hippocrates hic intelligit non rationem, sed sensum
communem, vel judicium de sensatione, quod sensus interioris est, qui communis dicitur.
Quae sententia valde probabilis est».
25 Casmann refers to Goclenius’ commentary on Scaliger’s Exotericae Exercitationes 307, 5. In his
Adversaria ad Exotericas aliquot Iulius Caesaris Scaligeri, Goclenius writes: «Hippocrates quidem
in Aphorism., ait: qui aliqua parte corporis dolent, et dolorem tamen non sentient, iis γνώμη
laborat; sed γνώμη non recte redditum est ab interprete Mens. Γνώμη enim ibi non signifi-
cant animam ipsam seu mentem, sed iudicium de sensatione, quod est sensus intimi, quem
communem dicimus, qui sentit et discernit, quid exteriores sensus patiantur et percipiant»
(Rudolph Goclenius, Adversaria Ad Exotericas exercitationes, 52).
26 A long history of discussions about the internal senses had traditionally considered them as
faculties or operations of the soul that human beings had in common with lower animals.
For some background onmedieval theories of the internal senses, see: Harry AustrynWolfson,
“The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophic Texts”, The Harvard Theological
Review 28.2 (1935), 69–133; Dag Nikolaus Hasse, “The Soul’s Faculties” in Robert Pasnau and
Christina vanDyke, eds.,TheCambridgeHistory ofMedieval Philosophy, 2 Vols. (Cambridge 2009),
i, 305–319.
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Furthermore, Casmann objects to the logical validity of Vallesius’ argument
based on attention. In fact, Casmann argues, Vallesius implies that animals have
reason on the assumption that some rational attention is needed for sensation to
occur. But this is a petitio principii, because the very idea that the attention at issue
has to be ascribed to rational operations (instead of sensitive ones) is precisely what
needs to be proved.27Therefore, Casmanndoes not seem to attack Vallesius’ idea that,
both inmen and in animals, sensation is accompanied by some level of attention.He
only points out that the power of the soul carrying out this task is not reason, but
the common sense.
Casmann’s criticism of Vallesius’ argument based on madness is close to this
point. As we have seen, according to Vallesius, the observation of animal life suffices
to show that animals, as much as men, suffer from various forms of dysfunctional
behaviour, such as hydrophobia – both being phenomena, Vallesius claims, that
physicians explained in terms of insanity. Now, Vallesius believes that the fact that
animals sometimes go insane suggests that they can reason, because insanity is
the contrary of reason and occurs only in rational beings. In this case, it is not too
difficult for Casmann to counter Vallesius. He does so by literally quoting a passage
from the Sacra Philosophia in whichmadness is explained on the level of the internal
senses:
To this argument of Vallesius’ I reply with Vallesius’ own words, from the
Sacra Philosophia, p. 433: “it is far from being the case that, since these beasts
can become insane, they must have a mind similar to the human one. In
fact, not evenmen become insane according to thatmind that distinguishes
them from the animals; rather, according to the internal senses, which they
[men] have in common with them [animals], the imagination and the sen-
sitive capacity, which many call ‘cogitative’ or ‘estimative’. Now, given that
diseases of delirium andmelancholy are corporeal affections, they cannot per
27 Casmann,Psychologia, 16: «Argumenti vis est in contrariorumpari oppositione. Animantia tum
non sentiunt cum mens non attendit; ergo animantia tum sentiunt quando mens attendit
et vi consequentis, omnis sensio est cum attentione mentis coniuncta. Hic autem quemad-
modum oppositio de homine intellecta designat animam et mentem humanam; ita accepta
de bestiis significat brutorum animam, quae est definitore Vallesio actus corporum senguine
viventium. Atque ut differ attentio bruti et hominis, ita et anima utriusque. Neque hinc sta-
tim paritas et identitas animae utriusque efficitur. Quod si vero per ventemhic denotat intel-
lectum bestialem, petit principium».
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seharmanythingbut the corporeal faculties. The lesion only affects themind
accidentally [per accidens], because the ἐνεργείας are hindered, and because in
so far as [the mind] is in the body, it uses the senses”.28
According to Casmann, Vallesiusmakes contradictory statements. In fact, on the one
hand he claims that animals suffering frommadness must also have reason. On the
other hand, he admits that phenomena of insanity (such asmadness and depression)
are corporeal dysfunctions; hence, they cannot affect reason, which is immaterial.
Vallesius himself affirms that those pathologies need to be explained on the level of
the internal senses (more specifically, cogitation and estimation). Casmann is happy
to agree on this point, which also proves Vallesius to be inconsistent.
Also in this case, Casmann recognises that animals act in the way observed
by Vallesius, but disagrees on the explanation of their behaviour proposed by the
Spanish physician. According to Casmann, animals can indeed become insane, but
dysfunctions on the level of the internal senses suffice as an explanatory cause of
those biological phenomena.
To sumup, Casmann disagrees with Vallesius on two points. First, he rejects the
interpretation of the scriptural and medical sources used by the Spanish physician
to argue for the rationality of animals. Second, he doubts the philosophical legit-
imacy of Vallesius’ choice to ascribe forms of rationality to animals: to Casmann’s
mind, even the most complex forms of animal life (men excepted) can be explained
in terms of external and internal senses, and without the need for rational opera-
tions.
But if one looksmore closely at Casmann’s text, one can observe that his rejection
of animal reason does not depend only on his being at variance with Vallesius’
argumentation. In fact, the very fundamentals of Casmann’s psychology seem to
mark in principle an irreconcilable gap between human beings and other animals.
28 Casmann, Psychologia, 17: «Respondeo verbis Vallesii ad hoc Vallesianum argumentum, ex pag.
433. Sacrae philos. Longe abest ut, quia delirare possunt, istae belvae habentmentemhumanae
similem. Nam ne homines quidem delirant secundum eam mentem, quae illos separat a
brutis, sed secundum internos sensus, quos cum illis habent communes, imaginationem
et sensitivam, quam nonnulli vocant cogitativam et aestimativam. Nam cum phrenitis et
melancholia morbi sint corporales affectiones, non possunt per se laedere nisi facultates cor-
porales.Mentemvero laesio non attingit, nisi ex accidenti, et ratione energeias impeditae, quia
dum in corpore est sensibus utitur». The passage to which Casmann refers is found in Valle-
sius,De Sacra Philosophia, 278.
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Casmann’s Psychologia puts forward a conception of the soul according to which
reason is part and parcel of what Casmann calls the ‘logical soul’ (anima logica). This
anima logica is as different as it can get from the soul of brute animals. The latter is a
corporeal form that supplies animals with life and basic vital operations; the former
is neither a corporeal form nor the form of the human body.
In fact, as we have already observed, because the ‘logical soul’ is immaterial, it
cannot be the formal principle of the body, which has a (corporeal) form of its own.
Accordingly, human beings are composed of two different natures: a corporeal and a
spiritual one, the latter being the logical soul.
Interestingly enough, not only does Casmann deny that the logical soul is the
form of the human body; he also thinks that from one perspective the logical soul
is not the form of man altogether. On the one hand, Casmann recognises that the
logical soul may be considered as the item marking the difference between human
beings and brute animals. One the other hand, he thinks that the possession of
the logical soul does not sufficiently define what a human being is. But in which
sense exactly? Is there anything else that makes man differ from all other crea-
tures?
The key to understanding this point is what I would like to call Casmann’s
‘Christologising’ of anthropology. In Casmann’s opinion, the two forms composing
humannaturedonot bear ahylomorphic relationship to eachother, but ahypostatic
one. This point clearly emerges from the following passage:
If the rational soul is the form that givesmanhis being, then the omnipotent
divine nature in Christ will also be the complete form that gives Christ his
being. The same relation obtains between peers. But both Christ and man
equally consist in two natures and in the union of those in one hypostasis.
However, one cannot safely dare to state that God’s omnipotent nature be
the complete formof Christ Immanuel. For both the nature of humanity and
that of divinity, in a personal union, combine to bring about the theandric
(so to say) form of Christ. Establish therefore that according to my opinion
man’s form is placed in that union of the soul with man’s body in one
hypostasis.29
29 Casmann,Psychologia, 7–8: «Si anima rationalis est formahominis dans suumesse, omnipotens
etiam divina natura in Christo erit forma completa Christo […] suum dans esse. Parium
enim par ratio est. In duabus autem diversis naturis et earum in unam hypostasin unione
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The compound substance that we call “man” mirrors the nature of Christ, who
is composed of a human and a divine nature. Therefore, human nature cannot be
looked at simply in terms of rationality. In fact, the possession of rationality on
the part of men does not mirror the complexity of human beings, just as Christ’s
divine nature does not account for the entire nature of Christ. The very notion of
God’s incarnation implies that Christ possesses two natures: a divine and a human
one, which are joined together in a hypostatic union. Casmann appears to inter-
pret God’s incarnation in the sense that Christ’s nature must somehow reflect the
nature of man (and man is made in the image of God). Accordingly, man’s nature
(which is the subject of anthropology)must be explained in the sameway as Christ’s.
Just as Christ is composed of a human and a divine nature, human beings in gen-
eral are composed of a bodily and a spiritual nature. And just as Christ’s nature lies
precisely in the unity of both natures in one subject (or hypostasis) so the human
nature lies in the unity of the bodily and the spiritual nature in one subject, i.e.,
in terms of a hypostatic union of two natures: a corporeal one (which is the subject
matter of anatomy) and a spiritual one (which is the anima logica, studied by psychol-
ogy).
Casmann’s view is quite uncommon, as far as the sixteenth century is concerned.
However, it had one very important precedent inMelanchthon’s Christology. In his
commentary on Colossians 2.9, Melanchthon had explained that the way in which
God was present in Christ was the union of two natures in one person, in the way
of a hypostasis. Moreover, Melanchthon claimed that the same type of union holds
between the soul and the body of each human being.30
Melanchthon’s view attracted as much enthusiasm on the part of his Calvin-
ist contemporaries as it provoked criticisms from some Lutherans. In effect, as I
explainedmore extensively in the first chapter,Melanchthon’s viewswere expressed
in the context of his own interpretation of a Christological doctrine that was cen-
tral to the Lutheran conception of the Eucharist: the doctrine of the ‘communicatio
idiomatum’, or the exchange of properties between Christ’s two natures. For Luther,
the fact that divine properties were transferred to the human nature of Christ was
pariter Christus […] et homo […] conveniunt. At vero omnipotentemDei naturam esse Christi
Immanuelis […] formam plenam, confidenter asseverare non ausim, cum ad formam hanc
Christi Theandricam (ut ita dicam) tam ratio humanitatis, quam divinitatis in unione per-
sonali concurrat. Satuis itaque foret mea sic ferente opinione, formam hominis in unione illa
animae et corporis humani in unam hypostasin statuere».
30 About this, see: supra, ‘Chapter 1’, 81–82.
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the prerequisite for Christ’s body to be ubiquitous, hence present in the Eucharist.
Melanchthon, however, held that the ‘communicatio idiomatum’ happened on the
level of the whole person of Christ, rather than between his two natures. Some of
Melanchthon’s Calvinist colleagues denied that Christ’s body took on divine proper-
ties and that it was really present in the Eucharist. For this reason they thought that
Melanchthon’s theory was friendly to theirs, which earned to Melanchthon allega-
tions of crypto-Calvinism from some Lutherans.31
Now,whilst Casmannwas himself a figure in between Lutheranism and Calvin-
ism, I have not been able to determinewhether he too saw inMelanchthon an ally in
matters of sacramental theology.32 What I can say with certainty is that he followed
Melanchthon in psychology (he accepted Melanchthon’s conception of the soul as
‘spiritus intelligens’) and that, like Melanchthon, Casmann thought that Christology
could provide anthropology with a helpful model to describe the nature of man.
Both for Melanchthon and for Casmann, the hypostatic relationship between the
two natures of Christ served as a parallel to describe the spirit-body relationship in
men.
Casmann, onemay think, went even further thanMelanchthon, for not only did
he devise a psychology consistent with his Christology (as Melanchthon also did),
but he brought the two disciplines together into his anthropology. Moreover, Cas-
mann thought that the concept of ‘hypostasis’ could replace those of ‘matter’ and
‘form’ in interpreting the link between man’s spirit and body. Casmann’s Chris-
tologising of anthropology ensures that the soul-body relation be interpreted in a
hypostatic – and not in a hylomorphic – fashion. In Casmann’s opinion, the hypo-
static union of a spiritual and a corporeal nature constitutes the distinctive feature
of man.
But, I argue, for precisely the same reason, the problem of animal rationality is
to be dismissed a priori in the case of Casmann’s anthropology. In fact, to Casmann’s
mind there is little difference between asking whether animals have reason and the
other absurd question whether animals reflect the nature of Christ. This point can
bemade on the basis of the two following passages from Casmann’s text:
31 Luther and Melanchthon were not the first to draw on Christology for issues concerning the
Eucharist. Formedieval uses of Christological arguments inmatters of sacramental theology,
see: supra, ‘Chapter 1’, 78, fn. 168.
32 About Casmann’s fuzzy confessional affiliation, see: supra, ‘Chapter 1’, 17–18.
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We accord that animals have a soul, but not a spirit, that is, the logical and
eternal spiritual essence, that subsists per se. Neither is there a proper hypo-
static union between the body and the soul of animals, for it [the hypostatic
union] obtainsbetween thedifferentnatures, corporeal and spiritual. But the
soul of animals, springing from the body, is immersed in the body. It is not a
spirit properly speaking, but something corporeal, springing from the body
and not per se subsisting, but perishing in and with the body.33
The mind or intelligence is of those who are created in God’s image and
likeness. But intellect and reason are in the soul by virtue of the divine image.
From which it is also understood why only those [things] that consist in a
spiritual essence, per se subsisting and immortal, are provided with it [the
mind]. Now, as theHoly Scripture affirms,men aremade in God’s image and
likeness, not any animals.34
In conclusion, Casmann’s comparative analysis of human and animal souls denies
animals to be endowed with reason. On the one hand, this conclusion follows from
Casmann’s criticism of Vallesius’ interpretation of the observable animal behaviour.
On the other hand, the view espoused by Casmann depends on his Christologising
of anthropology: reason cannot considered apart from the logical soul, which is
characterised by its likeness to Christ’s divine nature, as explained above. Therefore,
if animalswere to be granted rationality, two absurd conclusionswould follow: first,
the nature of brutawould be similar to the nature of Christ, in that it would consist
of a hypostatic union of two natures, a bodily and a spiritual one. Second, if animals
were provided with reason, they would be created in God’s image and likeness just
as man is.
33 Casmann, Psychologia, 8: «Animam habere bruta concedimus, sed non spiritum seu essentiam
spiritualem, logicam, aeternam et per se subsistentem; neque unio hypostatica proprie est
in brutorum corpore et anima; siquidem est diversarum naturarum, corporeae et spiritualis.
At anima brutorum e corpore orta in corpus immersa est; non quidem proprie spiritus,
sed corporeum quid e corpore ortum, non per se subsistens. Sed in corpore et cum corpore
evanescens».
34 Casmann, Psychologia, 11: «Eorum mens et intelligentia est, qui sunt ad imaginem et simil-
itudinem Dei creati. Intellectus enim et ratio vi imaginis divinae inest animae. […] Unde
etiam videre est ratione illa tantum praedita esse quae spirituali essentia, per se subsistenti et
immortali constat. Atqui attestantibus sacris literis, homines ad similitudinem et imaginem
Dei sunt conditi, non vero bruta ulla».
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4.3. Conclusions
The debate between Casmann and Vallesius concerning human and animal reason
appears to be triggered, at least in part, by their rediscovery of ancient philosophical
and medical knowledge. In fact, both Vallesius and Casmann seem to base their
discussion on an already existing debate, found in Plutarch’s De sollertia animalium,
as well as on an aphorism by Hippocrates.
Besides the interest in ancient sources, the analyses proposed by Vallesius and
Casmann show that both the observation (and interpretation) of animal behaviour
and concerns connected to a Christian interpretation of what is characteristically
human played a role in the formulation of sixteenth-century conceptions of animal
and human reason. The observation of the behaviour of animals and men testifies
to the fact that the external senses alone are not a sufficient explanatory tool when
it comes to understanding animal and human sensation. Casmann and Vallesius
agreed on this. But Vallesius claimed that sensation and insanity of animals needed
to be accompanied by some form of rational attention, and by at least a minimal
level of rationality. Casmann, instead, concluded that it was enough to look at the
operationsof the internal senses (especially, cogitationandestimation) to account for
animal sensation and insanity. Vallesius’ strategy is to ascribe ‘ratio’ to bothmen and
animals and then towork out a differentiated notion of ‘ratio’ in order to distinguish
between men and animals. Casmann follows another strategy. He uses a univocal
notion of ‘ratio’ proper to human beings and he attributes the (quasi) intelligent
behaviour of animals to higher forms of sensation (hence to another part of the soul).
Casmann and Vallesius appear to agree on another point: while reason was one
important feature of man, it was not really what made man differ from all other
animals. In fact, bothCasmannandVallesius addressed theproblemsof animals’ rea-
son in Christian texts (albeit of different denomination) and they quite consistently
believed that man should be defined by his relationship to the Christian divinity.
TheCatholicVallesius established this relationshipby arguing thatmanwasdefined
by ‘wisdom’. He eloquently summed up this ‘wisdom’ by referring to a passage in
Ecclesiastes: “fear God and observe His commandments, for the whole man is this”.
Interestingly enough, for the very reason that man was defined by his relation to
God, Vallesius thought that itwas not too problematic ifmanhad some of his higher
faculties in common with the lower animals. Therefore, Vallesius wanted to grant
brute animals some level of rationality.
The Protestant Casmann also thought that man was defined by his link with
God. He defended his views on the basis of the Lutheran conception of the soul
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derived from Melanchthon. According to Melanchthon, Holy Scriptures (and not
rational arguments) showed that the human soul was a spiritual and immortal
substance. Whilst Melanchthon called this substance ‘spiritus intelligens’, Casmann
referred to it as ‘anima logica’. But Casmann agreed with Melanchthon on one very
crucial point: the same relationship holding between the two natures of Christ
should also hold between man’s ‘anima logica’ and man’s body. Both Melanchthon
and Casmann called this relationship ‘hypostasis’. Casmann considered this hypo-
stasis betweenbody and spirit to be thedistinguishing feature ofman. Itwasbecause
of this that Casmann disagreed with Vallesius on ascribing reason to brute ani-
mals. According to Casmann, reason was part and parcel of the hypostasis that
holds together man’s body and spirit and made man be in God’s, or better still, in
Christ’s image. Certainly, Casmann also thought that brute animals differed from
men because they lacked rational thinking. But this was important insofar as it
showed that thenature of brute animals didnot enjoy the typeof special relationship
with Christ that defined human beings in their uniqueness.
chapter 5
Anatomy and the Body in
Renaissance Protestant Psychology
5.0. Introduction
In the previous chapters, we have seen that Melanchthon and some of his followers
considered human nature to consist in two parts, a spirit as well as a body that
encompassed certain parts of the soul. Until now, I have focused my discussion
on the way in which these authors understood the spiritual part of man and the
embodied operations of the soul. But what about the body itself? Which place did
it occupy in the treatises about the soul that have been hitherto examined? Even
more importantly, what was the body like in Melanchthon’s and his followers’
psychologies? As I have already mentioned, works on the soul written by, among
others, Melanchthon, Casmann, and Snellius assigned to the discipline of anatomy
the task of describing the human body. It is therefore by looking more closely at
the way in which these authors utilised anatomical knowledge that we will be
able to observe the place and nature of the human body in their works about the
soul.
In this chapter I shall first show that the inclusion of anatomy in some Renais-
sance treatises on psychology produced in Germany and the Low Countries was
largely due to a new disciplinary organisation of the scientia de anima that was trig-
gered by Philip Melanchthon. I shall then discuss a few examples of the diffusion
of Melanchthon’s views. Among these, I shall focus more extensively on Snellius In
Melanchthonis de anima (1596). In my analysis of these works, I shall show that the
inclusionof anatomy in the scienceof the soul is in somecases connected to the emer-
gence of new notions of the human body whereby man’s organs are conceived of as
a machine.
In this chapter, I will also have the opportunity to address one scholarly debate
that has attracted the attention of historians who have tried to look at the confes-
sional aspects of sixteenth-centurynatural philosophy. In fact, in thewake of Sachiko
Kusukawa’s claim that the use of anatomy made by Melanchthon was essentially
Lutheran, scholars have objected that Melanchthon’s conception of anatomy – par-
ticularly his use of anatomy in the science of the soul – could be found in other
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confessional contexts as well, and was therefore not specifically Lutheran.1 Here, I
shall argue that these two seemingly opposite interpretations of the use of anatomy
in the sixteenth centurymight be harmonised. Inmy view, the use of anatomymade
byMelanchthonwas indeedLutheranand itwaspart of a disciplinary reorganisation
of psychology thatwas part of an effort of re-establishing social disciplinewithin the
Lutheran camp. SomeofMelanchthon’s followers receivedhis conceptionof psychol-
ogy andhis use of anatomy in its Lutheran sense.However,Melanchthon’s inclusion
of anatomy in the science of the soul, aswell as its ensuingnotionof thehumanbody,
could be easily accepted by authors belonging to other confessions or beyond all con-
fessional concernes altogether. Let us then proceed in the right order and go back to
Melanchthon’s psychology and its use of anatomical knowledge.
5.1. Melanchthon’s Use of Anatomy and His Conception of the Body
At the time when Philip Melanchthon drafted his Commentarius de anima (1540),
others – including Magnus Hundt (1449–1519) – had already noticed the importance
of the knowledge of the body for the consideration of the soul.2 But Melanchthon
seems to differ from these former attempts in the philosophical and theological
reasons that motivated his attention to anatomy and in the precise manner in
which he considered anatomy to be relevant to the description ofman’s soul. Indeed,
Melanchthon’s conception of both the soul and the subject matter of psychology
represents a shift-away from the main views on these issues that originated from
the medieval tradition of commentaries on Aristotle’sDe anima. It is in this context
of the redefinition of psychology as a discipline that the study of the bodily organs,
together with a new way of conceiving of the body itself, comes into play.
Let us start, then, by examiningMelanchthon’s own view on the subject matter
of psychology. The definition of the subject matter of the scientia de anima had been
disputed throughout the Middle Ages and, especially, during the Renaissance. The
debate was occasioned by the well-known distinction made in Aristotle’s De anima
between affections of the soul qua soul and affections of the ensouled body.3 Indeed,
if there exist affections common to soul and body together (rather than to the soul
itself), one might well argue that the science of the soul is the study of the whole
1 For the relevant bibliography regarding these claims, see further in this chapter.
2 On this point, see Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy, 88.
3 Aristotle,De anima, i. 1, 402a5–9.
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living being rather than that of the soul as such. Medieval authors distinguished
between three ways of solving this issue: (a) the subject matter of psychology is the
soul; (b) psychology addresses the ensouled body qua ensouled (sub ratione animae);
(c) both answers are defensible. Importantly, one finds none of those positions in
Melanchthon’s work on the soul.4
Independently of which of the stances just listed they took, medieval authors
looked at the soul not as something belonging toman alone, but as a principle of life
common to all living beings. Moreover, even authors who stated that the scientia de
animahad the ensouledbody as its subjectmatter (e.g. RadulphusBrito) didnot seem
to pay much attention to physiological and anatomical aspects of the body. Bearing
this Aristotelian discussion in mind, we can now better appreciate Melanchthon’s
rearrangement of the science of the soul.
As I have already argued, Melanchthon’s psychology did not address the soul as
a principle of life in all living beings. According to Melanchthon, the part of natu-
ral philosophy entitled ‘scientia de anima’ had to address the human soul alone. Even
more specifically, Melanchthon explained, «this part [of physics] has to encompass
not only the soul, but also the whole nature ofman».5 In effect, Melanchthon looked
at the soul insofar as psychology could inform the Lutheran youth about two things:
first, about the fact that the whole human nature (both soul and body) had been
affected by the original sin and was the receiver of divine grace; second, the consid-
eration of the entirety of human nature had to demonstrate that God had endowed
it with innate knowledge of right and wrong. The latter point was of the utmost
importance for Melanchthon, because psychology provided the theoretical under-
pinning of the fact that civil obedience was innately known to man. Now, because
the science of the soul had to consider man in his entirety, it should also provide
knowledge of the human body. This is the first reason motivating Melanchthon’s
decision to include anatomy in his psychology.
4 For the distinction between three positions about the subject matter of psychology in the Middle
Ages I rely on Sander W. de Boer, The Science of the Soul, 71–92. De Boer shows that medieval authors
who considered the soul as the subject matter of the scientia de anima included Thomas Aquinas,
John of Jandun, and John Buridan. Rudolp Brito can be counted among authors who rather
thought that the ensouled body was the subject of the science of the soul. Whilst, de Boer argues,
Nicole Oresme left thematter undecided. Onmedieval discussion regarding the subject matter of
psychology, also see: Jack Zupko, “What Is the Science of the Soul? A Case Study in the Evolution of
Late Medieval Natural Philosophy”, Synthese 110 (1997), 303.
5 See: supra, ‘Chapter 2’, 107–108.
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But such decision was fostered by yet another essential conviction connected to
Melanchthon’s Lutheran faith, with which we are by now familiar. Melanchthon
indeed thought that only the actions andnot the essence of the soul could be known.
In a general sense this conceptionwas not new or peculiar toMelanchthon’s Luther-
an affiliation. In effect, alreadyAristotle had affirmed inhisDeanima that knowledge
of the soul’s properties was instrumental in knowing the soul’s essence; and many
commentators followed suit.6
In the case of Melanchthon, however, the idea that the essence of the soul could
notbe fathomed tookonamore specificmeaning.As an irreparable effect of theorigi-
nal sin, manwas not capable of knowing the soul in its true immortal essence, if not
by means of the Christian Gospel. It was indeed thanks to his Christian faith that
Melanchthon knew that the human soul was an immortal ‘spiritus intelligens’. Nev-
ertheless, he had to give some philosophical explanation of what the soul might be.
As we know from the preceding chapters, Melanchthon found this explanation in
the idea of ἐνδελέχεια indicating that the lower parts of the soul (vegetative and sen-
sitive) corresponded to themovement of the bodily spirits. Precisely from this philo-
sophicalperspective,Melanchthon thought that the lower andembodiedparts of the
soul could be known through their bodily operations. As Melanchthon explained:
«although the essence of the soul cannot be sufficiently grasped, nevertheless the
actions show the way to the knowledge of it».7 It was the task of knowing these
actions that made the use of anatomy evenmore needed.
Now, becauseMelanchthondefined the rational soul as ‘intelligent spirit’ andhe
reduced the Aristotelian form of the human body to the movements of the human
bodily parts, he could look at the former on the basis of what the Gospel taught
6 Aristotle, De anima, i. 1, 402b17–25: «It seems not only useful for the discovery of the causes of the
incidental properties of substances to be acquainted with the essential nature of those substances
(as inmathematics it is useful for the understanding of the property of the equality of the interior
angles of a triangle to two right angles to know the essential nature of the straight and the curved
or of the line and the plane) but also conversely, for the knowledge of the essential nature of a
substance is largely promoted by an acquaintance with its properties: for, whenwe are able to give
an account conformable to experience of all or most of the properties of a substance, we shall be
in the most favourable position to say something worth saying about the essential nature of that
subject». The idea that the knowledge of the soul’s properties was instrumental in knowing the
essence of the soul was also common in the Middle Ages. Onmedieval discussions about this idea
and some connected methodological issues in medieval texts about the soul, see: Sander de Boer,
The Science of the Soul, 45–71.
7 See: supra, ‘Chapter 2’, 89.
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about it (its essence and destiny as a spiritual nature created by God). By doing so,
Melanchthon remained loyal to his Lutheran idea that the essence ofman’s soul was
not knowable bymeans of the human natural understanding. At the same time, his
identifying the lower powers of the soul with the movements of the body made the
sensitive and vegetative functions of man available for a study based on anatomical
knowledge.
A long and comprehensive anatomical account of the human body in fact forms
a remarkable part of the two editions of Melanchthon’s book on the soul. In the
Commentarius deanima of 1540,MelanchthonadoptedGalen’s anatomy todescribe the
body from head to toe, and further by looking at its interior organs, humours, and
spirits. When he became dissatisfied with the anatomical parts of his Commentarius,
Melanchthon replaced Galenic anatomy by Vesalius’ Fabrica in the Liber de anima of
1552. Vesalius’ anatomy provided first-hand knowledge of the human body, because
itwas based ondirect dissection of corpses. AsMelanchthon kept abreast of the latest
anatomical discoveries, his change in anatomical sources also entailed important
new elements. For instance, as Vivian Nutton pointed out, it was thanks to his
reading of the Fabrica that Melanchthon could now account for the correct shape
of the liver and Vesalius teaching also lied behind Melanchthon’s rejection of the
presence in human beings of the so-called ‘rete mirabile’ (viz., a network of blood
vessels that Galen had described in pigs and oxen and then included into his system
of brain function).8 But even more than the details of Melanchthon’s anatomical
descriptionof thebody, it is importanthere tohighlight the reasonswhyhe followed
Galen’s and Vesalius’ accounts of the body instead of the available Aristotelian ones
and the way in which, as a consequence, he conceived of the soul’s body. Let us start
with the first point: why didMelanchthon choose Galen’s and Vesalius’ descriptions
of the human body?
When Aristotle defines the soul as the form of an organic body, he does not
think of the body as a corpse, because a dead body does not have life potentially.
Only matter predisposed for receiving its actualising form is a potentially living
8 Vivian Nutton, “The Anatomy of the Soul in Early RenaissanceMedicine”, 149–150. Melanchthon’s
rejection of the rete mirabile in humans is found in cr xiii, 72: «Nominat Galenus contextum
quendam arteriarum intra os basilare, substratum toti cerebro, πλέγμα διχτυοειδὲς, quod nun-
cuparunt Arabes rete mirabile. Sed in capite hominis hunc insignem contextum negant esse».
Melanchthon refers to Galen’s De usu partium corporis humani, 1. ix, 4, in Galeni Opera omnia, iii,
696. About this, also see: Filippo Melantone, Libro dell’anima, edited by Dino Bellucci (Turin 2009),
868–869.
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body. In this sense, the soul is the form that efficiently provides a body with life.
But in Aristotle’s perspective, the soul as form is also the final cause of the body.
This means that the soul is that for the sake of which the body is. Therefore, the
organs of the body must be accounted for as instruments of the soul. They are to
be described in a teleological manner, i.e., bodily organs are in such and such a way
in view of specific operations of the soul.9 As Robert Hankinson and Nancy Siraisi
have shown, teleological conceptions are found in Galen’s and Vesalius’ anatomies
too.10 Nonetheless, those views differ from the Aristotelian ones in the following
way. Aristotle’s ‘intrinsic’ teleology looks at the body as driven by an inner natural
principle to develop for the sake of the soul’s operations. In contrast, Galenic and
Vesalian anatomies tend to place that principle in an external, intelligent designer.
Accordingly, every single part of the body is designed by a divine craftsman as the
best instrument for carrying out the functions of the soul.
Now, by usingGalen’s andVesalius’ anatomies,Melanchthon also endorses their
‘extrinsic teleology’. More accurately, it is because of the type of teleology that he
found in Galen and Vesalius that Melanchthon loved their works so much, as we
shall see. In 1540, Melanchthon drafted an oration about the life of Galen, in which
the ancient physician is eloquently praised for the way in which he looked at the
utility of anatomical knowledge:
Since it [anatomy] puts before us this admirable structure of human parts,
it teaches that this nature does not exist by chance, but that it is created by
an eternal mind, which did not engage in the shaping of man for nothing,
but to demonstrate that it cares for humankind. Therefore Galen said most
wisely that the knowledge of anatomy is the beginning of theology, and the
path to the knowledge of God.11
9 “It ismanifest that the soul is also the final cause. For nature, like thought, always does what-
ever it does for the sake of something, which something is its end.” (Aristotle, De anima, ii.4,
415b15–21). On Aristotle’s teleological account of the soul, see Mariska Leunissen, Explanation
and Teleology in Aristotle’s Science of Nature (Cambridge, 2010), 49–75.
10 Robert J. Hankinson, “Galen and the Best of All Possible Worlds”, The Classical Quarterly. New
Series, 39, 1 (1989), 206–227. And Nancy Siraisi, “Vesalius and the Reading of Galen’s Teleology”,
Renaissance Quarterly, 50, No. 1 (1997), 1–37.
11 As translated by Kusukawa, Melanchthon: Orations, 218. Latin in cr xi, 501: «Denique cum
hanc admirandam texturam humanorum membrorum proponit, docet hanc naturam non
casu extitisse, sed ab aeterna quadam mente conditam esse, quae non frustra voluit esse
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Galen’s great intuition,Melanchthonexplained inhis oration,was that anatomy,
by showing the admirable structure of the bodywould also invite one to observe that
such a body could not exist by chance.12Melanchthon reiterated the same idea in his
Commentarius, where human anatomy is presented as follows:
Thus far, we described the parts, the humours, and the spirits of the human
body. Such things need to be considered first and foremost in our bodies, for
they are designed for necessary scopes and actions and are wonderfullymade
and arranged.13
The consideration of the parts and spirits of the human body shows the uses and
actions for which they are shaped and artfully organised. ThusMelanchthon, while
sharing with Aristotle a teleological reading of the human body, does not seem to
assign its development to an inner force in the sense of Aristotelian hylomorphism.
Instead, he considers the divinemind to be the source of the functional organisation
of man’s body.
And sinceGod alone applied somuch skill in fashioning the humanbody,He
certainlywished that his wondrouswork be observed, so thatwemay under-
stand that those machines so skillfully devised and arranged by no means
came about by chance, but that there is an eternal architectonic mind.14
adeo occupata in formando homine, sed significare, sibi genus humanum curae esse. Itaque
sapientissime Galenus inquit, doctrinam anatomicam initium esse Theologiae, et aditum ad
agnitionemDei».
12 This point has beenmade by Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy, 102–104.
13 Melanchthon, Commentarius de anima, 135v: «Hactenus etmembra humani corporis et humores
et spiritus descripsimus. Haec enim praecipue consideranda sunt in nostris corporibus, quia
ad necessarios usus atque actiones destinata sunt, et mira arte facta ac distributas».
14 Commentarius de anima, α3v: «Et cumDeus tantum adhibuerit artis in fabricando humano cor-
pore, voluit profecto tam mirum opus conspici, ut cogitaremus, tam artificiose fabricatas
et distributas machinas nequaquam casu ortas esse sed esse mentem aeternam architecta-
tricem». Melanchthon devoted his 1550 oration “On Anatomy” to this type of use involved
in anatomical knowledge. In this oration, he wrote: «The very sight of the structure of many
parts in us is the nurse ofmany virtues. And since the foremost virtue is the recognition of the
Maker God, the assent to providence is much strengthened when we contemplate the won-
derful skill in the entire construction of man. […] Moreover, the individual parts of the body
are so fittingly distributed by locations, and distinguished by material, shape and properties,
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This passage is particularly significant, for the following two reasons. First, it
confirms that Melanchthon saw in Galen’s and Vesalius’ anatomy a type of tele-
ology that corroborated his faith in a divine architect. Second, the above lines are
particularly telling for what concerns the specific way in which Melanchthon (and
some of his followers) conceived of the body. In the above lines of the Commentarius,
Melanchthon seems to harmonise the kind of teleology just described with the idea
of amachine-likebody. According tohim, thehumanbody is an extraordinary aggre-
gate of machines, craftily arranged by God, so as to carry out the actions of human
beings. The consideration of this beautiful anatomical make-up paves the way for
the agnitio Dei. It is Galenic and Vesalian anatomies, and not Aristotle’s natural phi-
losophy, that help us reach the awareness that nature does not move according to
fate or chance, but is governed by a divine design. Inmy opinion, it is exactly because
Melanchthonmoved the teleological principle of nature outside nature itself that he
could look at the workings of the body as a machine and yet as one that was orches-
trated by God according to certain final causes.
To be sure, I am not suggesting that Melanchthon endorsed a proper mechanis-
tic account of the body and of the embodied parts of the soul. What I argue is that
he could look at the body as though it were a machine, because its finalistic arrange-
ment was governed by a supernatural and not by a natural principle. Moreover,
Melanchthonused the idea ofmachine as aheuristic device, as it surfaces in a passage
of his Liber de anima:
In this doctrine, before we discuss the powers [of the soul], it is useful to look
atman’s body and to consider the different limbs and organs as though they
weremachines. In fact, just as oncewehave observed amillstone, or a cannon
andaball, aswell as somegunpowder,wemaymore easily infer [their causes],
so too, in our body, once themachines are demonstrated, wemaymore easily
understand and judge about the powers.15
that we are shown clearly by their order and skill that this nature of things has by no means
emerged by chance, but that there is a creating mind that wants evidence of itself to exist in
human nature, and wants us to recognise and understand it. It is true that this entire beauti-
fulmachine of theworld is a temple of God, and that the traces of the Architect are engraved in
many parts of it, but even more so man is the temple of God, because the other bodies, being
without amind, donot recognise the skill and theMaker». (As translated in SachikoKusukawa,
Melanchthon:Orations, 160; Latin text in cr xi, 941).
15 cr xiii, 20: «in hac doctrina, priusquam de potentiis dicemus, prodest aspicere corpus homi-
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It is helpful to look at the body as if it were a machine for by looking at it in this
fashion we may infer conclusions about the powers of its soul. As I have already
explained, theknowledgeof the soul obtained through the anatomical consideration
of a machine-like body regarded only the lower soul of man, or ἐνδελέχεια; not the
man’s higher soul, or spiritus intelligens, whichMelanchthon considered to be a spir-
itual substance altogether different from the body. In the following section of this
chapter, I shall show that Melanchthon’s use of the machine metaphor was pushed
abit further by someof the authorswhoused theCommentarius and the Liber de anima
as theirmain sources for the study of the soul. For instance, according to the Dutch-
man Rudolph Snellius, the idea of ‘machine’ used by Melanchthon was not simply
a metaphor but became the way in which the body should adequately be under-
stood. Beforemoving on to the consideration of the reception ofMelanchthon’s ideas
about anatomy, let us briefly summerise the main points made so far in this chap-
ter.
Melanchthon’s relative freedom from the scholastic tradition – along with his
effort to reshape the Aristotelian scientia de anima in his own Lutheran fashion –
contributed tobringingaboutnewconcepts, suchas spiritus intelligens, and to encom-
passing anatomical knowledge within the scientia de anima. His new approach was
motivated by theological reasons and moved the focus of psychology from the soul
(or the ensouled body) to human nature. The latter was composed of two parts: a
spiritual and a corporeal one. Hence the task of psychology was twofold: it studied
the rational soul on a scriptural basis and it provided the anatomical description of
the teleologically organisedmachinae of man’s body.
As is well known, Melanchthon’s works on the soul heavily influenced Renais-
sance Protestant teaching. Its claims became popular among Lutherans and Calvin-
ists, and were read by Catholic authors too.16 This does not mean, however, that
the work of Melanchthon marks an irreparable breaking point in the De anima tra-
dition. This is certainly not the case when one looks, for instance, at the Catholic
University of Ingolstadt. JürgenHelm has shown that the use of anatomy devised at
Wittenbergwas heard at Ingolstadt too, although “in its theological and philosophi-
cal background, Ingolstadt anatomywas far less uniform than anatomical education
nis, et diversa membra et organa quasi machinas considerare. Ut enim conspecta mola seu
bombarda et globo, ac pulvere tormentario, facilius raciocinari causas possumus, ita in cor-
pore nostro monstratis machinis, potentias facilius intelligere et indicare».
16 On the establishment of anatomical education at sixteenth-century Wittenberg, see Vivian
Nutton, “Wittenberg Anatomy”, 11–32.
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at Wittenberg”.17 Helm also observes that the use of anatomy at Ingolstadt became
more marginal after 1588, when the faculty of arts was formally transferred to the
Society of Jesus. In effect, an important statement was contained in the Jesuit Con-
stitutiones (1558), which forbade the study of medicine by the members of the order,
because medical education was considered to be of little relevance to the main goal
of all Jesuit learning: the knowledge and glory of God.18 As Michael Edwards has
recently shown, restrictions were placed more specifically on the extent to which
anatomical material could inform lectures on the soul by members of the Society
of Jesus. The Jesuit Ratio Studiorum (1591) stated that the teaching of the scientia de
anima should not digress into anatomy and other issues that are the business of the
doctors.19As I havepointed out in the first chapter of this thesis, Edwardsnotices that
these official injunctions issued by the Jesuit order were seen as formative, rather
than prescriptive, and that digressions and departures from them were possible,
as it emerges from the works on the soul by important Jesuits, such as Francisco
Suárez (1548–1617), Emanuel deGoes (1571–1593), andRoderigo de Arriaga (1592–1667).20
At the same time, Edwards points out that although Jesuit authors cited anatomi-
cal authorities, they did not provide detailed anatomical descriptions of the bodily
organs as Melanchthon and some of his followers did.21 But a somewhat cautious
use of anatomical knowledge was not peculiar to Jesuit authors alone. In effect, even
commentaries produced by eminent figures in the Protestantworld remained faith-
17 JürgenHelm, “Protestant and CatholicMedicine in the Sixteenth Century? The Case of Ingol-
stadt Anatomy”, 96. About this, see: supra, ‘Chapter 1’, 51–53.
18 JürgenHelm, “Protestant and CatholicMedicine in the Sixteenth Century? The Case of Ingol-
stadt Anatomy”, 92. The Jesuit Constitutiones state: “Sic etiam quoniam artes, vel scientiae nat-
urales ingenia disponunt ad theologiam, et ad perfectam cognitionem et usus illius inservi-
unt et per seipsas ad eundum finem juvant; qua diligentia par est, et per eruditos prae-
ceptores, in omnibus sincere honorem et gloriam Dei quaerendo, tractentur. Medicinae, et
Legum studium ut a nostro Instituto magis remotum in Universitatibus Societatis vel non
tractabitur, vel saltem ipsa Societas per se oneris non suscipiet” (Constitutiones Societatis Jesu
Anno 1558 (Rome 1558), xii.3).
19 Michael Edwards, “Body, Soul and Anatomy in Late Aristotelian Psychology”, 56. Edwards
refers to the following passage of the Ratio Studiorum: “In libro primo de anima veterum
placita philosophorum summatim percenseantur. In secundo libro, expositis sensoriis, non
digrediatur philosophus in anatomiam et caetera, quae medicorum sunt. Addat potius, si
vacat, parva naturalia” (Ladislaus Lukacs, ed., Monumenta Pedagogica Societatis Jesu v (Rome,
1992), 280).
20 See: supra, ‘Chapter 1’, 53.
21 Michael Edwards, “Body, Soul and Anatomy in Late Aristotelian Psychology”, 65–66.
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ful to the traditional Aristotelian teaching on the soul and did not discuss human
anatomy in the manner and to the extent proposed by Melanchthon. Very influen-
tial Lutherans such as Johann Ludwig Hawenreuter and Jacob Schegk – the latter in
an anti-Ramist fashion – sought to encompass Lutheran teachings within distinctly
Aristotelian commentaries on the soul.22
This heterogeneous landscape notwithstanding, many other Protestant profes-
sors followedMelanchthonmore closely andcontributed to thediffusionofhis views
on psychology and anatomy. Scholars have singled out JohannesMagus’ Anthropolo-
gia (1603) as an example of the legacy of Melanchthon’s work.23 Here, I shall consider
an earlier representative of that tradition, who has hitherto received relatively less
attention: the Leiden professor of mathematics and natural philosophy Rudolph
Snellius.
5.2. Rudolph Snell van Royen
Snellius’ InMelanchthonis de anima (1596) constitutes an important case in the trans-
mission ofMelanchthon’s treatises on the soul. It is indeed a book that further devel-
ops the major ideas on the soul launched byMelanchthon. Snellius reorganises and
promotes Melanchthon’s conception of the scientia de anima as the discipline that
studies human nature and discusses the faculties of man’s spirit, as well as the tele-
ological account of man’s body, by means of anatomical knowledge.
Snellius’ work is a commentary on Melanchthon’s Liber de anima that makes,
however, aquite eclecticuseof sources. In fact, Snellius seems tomakeMelanchthon’s
views on the subject matter of the science of the soul consistent with a more Aris-
totelian understanding of the place of psychology within the broader context of
natural philosophy. What is more, Snellius looks at the articulation of psychology
and the other disciplines as part of a bigger project which included some elements of
22 See Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy, 108–114. On the medical aspects of
Schegk’s work, see: Hirai, Medical Humanism and Natural Philosophy, 80–103. For more details
about Schegk’s andHawenreuter’s comparatively conservative approach to psychology, aswell
as about their conceptions of the soul and its origin, see, infra, ‘Chapter 6’, 175–179. On Schegk’s
controversies with Petrus Ramus, see: supra, ‘Chapter 1’, 26.
23 SeeMichael Edwards, “Suàrez in Late Scholastic Context”, in BenjaminHill andHenrik Lager-
lund, eds.,ThePhilosophy of Francisco Suàrez (NewYork, 2012), 30; SimoneDeAngelis, Anthropolo-
gien, 54–63.
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Ramus’ philosophy. In fact Snellius considered his psychology to be only one part of
a project entitled Snellio-Ramaeum philosophiae Syntagma (1596).24 Although Snellius’
use of Ramus’ doctrines could certainly be a topic of historical interest, determining
the precise nature of Snellius’ Ramism exceeds the scope of the present research. As
I have explained in the first chapter of this thesis, I prefer not to box Snellius in the
elusive categories of ‘Ramist’ and ‘Ramism’. True, Snellius relied on Ramus’ work on
many occasions, he based the teaching of natural philosophy he gave in Leiden on
the physics of the Ramist sympathiser Cornelius Valerius, and he included ‘psycholo-
gia’ in his Snellio-Ramist project.25 However, considering Snellius as a Ramist does
not seem too helpful when it comes to understanding his InMelanchthonis de anima.
If one really wants to see a Ramist element in this book, one may find it in Snel-
lius’ use of dichotomies for the articulation of natural philosophy he presents in the
Prolegomenon to In Melanchthonis de anima. But by using these dichotomies, Snellius
delineates a philosophical project based on Aristotle’s andMelanchthon’s psycholo-
gies. For these reasons and without denying the presence of Ramus’ philosophy in
Snellius’, I shall consider the latter’s work on the soul mainly as an example of the
diffusion of Melanchthon’s ideas.
In the Prolegomenon, Snellius calls ‘psychologia’ the last part of the physical study
of compound bodies. From this point of view, Snellius’ psychology echoes the Aris-
totelian consideration of the ensouled body (corpus animatum), which is common to
men and animals.26 But in Snellius’ opinion, the study of the soul does not coincide
with psychology, for the latter studies all ensouled bodies whereas the former has
only man as its subject matter. From this point of view Snellius’ work subscribes
to Melanchthon’s conception of the scientia de anima as the discipline that considers
human nature as a whole – the Lutheran subject of grace. In fact, according to Snel-
lius, Melanchthon’s book is somewhat misleadingly entitled On the soul. This title,
Snellius explains, is representative of the contents of the book only insofar as one
considers the soul to be themost eminent part ofman’s nature.27 But since the study
of man’s body is an integral part of it, Snellius suggests that the study of human
nature should rather be called De hominis physiologia (‘on man’s physiology’ or ‘on
24 See: supra, ‘chapter 1’, 25n
25 On Snellius’ relationshipwithRamism, onhisworks andhis intellectual biography, see: supra,
‘Chapter 1’, 17–20.
26 Snellius, In Melanchthonis de anima, 4, appears to exclude plants from the realm of ensouled
bodies: “animate deinde in bestias et hominem partiri solemus.”
27 Snellius, InMelanchthonis de anima, 5.
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man’s nature’). Melanchthon’s views on psychology and anatomy are thus pushed
further by Snellius, to the extent that the De anima almost becomes a treatise on
human physiology. Moreover, Snellius differs slightly fromMelanchthon as for the
reasons he gives for motivating the need of anatomical knowledge for the consider-
ation of man. This emerges from the following passage:
This book is about the soul, or better still, about man. For man, in fact,
consists of two essential parts: the body and the soul. […] Thus, this bookwas
divided by us into two parts, according to the two parts of man, that is, into
the body – with its parts, which are the instruments of the soul – and the
soul itself, which is the pilot [gubernatrix] of the body and the parts of the
body.28
As we have seen, there were several reasons why Melanchthon sought to include
anatomy in the scientia de anima. For instance, he focused on man in his entirety; he
considered the knowledge of the body as a means to understanding the actions of
the soul; and importantly, he looked at the teleological organisation of themachines
of the human body as the sign of the divine order in nature. Snellius accepted those
reasons, buthe emphasised evenmore strongly thanMelanchthonhaddone that the
bipartition of theDeanimawasmotivated by the twofold nature of its subject. In the
first chapter of this thesis I argued that a type of disjunctivist anthropology emerges
from the work of Melanchthon, whereby an epistemological difference between
knowledge of the Gospel and knowledge of the law of God results in a disjunction
between body and soul, when applied to psychology.29 Whilst this view only begins
to surface inMelanchthon’s work (he never seems to have spelled it out explicitly), it
is presented in a clear-cut fashion by Rudolph Snellius.
Snellius too recognised the importance of knowing the body as the clearest sign
of God’s order. In fact, he believed that the body was corrupted less strongly than
the soul after Adam’s fall. However, Snellius’ choice to include anatomy in his book
on the soul seems to be motivated primarily by his looking at the book on the soul
28 Snellius, In Melanchthonis de anima, 4: “Hic libellus est de Anima vel potius de Homine; homo
autemcorpore et animaduabuspartibus essentialibus constat. […] Sit itaquehic liber bipartito
a nobis distributus pro hominis duabus partibus, in corporis scilicet cum suis membris quae
animae sunt organa, et animam ipsam, quae corporis eiusquemembrorum est gubernatrix.”
29 About this, as well as about the use of the term ‘disjunctivist’ in this thesis, see: supra, ‘Chap-
ter 1’, 48, 79.
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as a study of the entirety of human nature. Man is composed of two essential parts.
Therefore, theDe anima has two tasks: it has to account for the faculties of the soul,
which rules over the body, and to describe, in an anatomical fashion, the bodily
organs, which are functionally arranged for the benefit of the soul.
As in the case ofMelanchthon’sCommentarius, anatomy and physiology cover the
largest part of Snellius’ work on the soul, which is in fact presented as the theoretical
part of medicine:
Medicine as awholeproceeds fromhere [frompsychology], to thepoint that it
may be considered almost as some sort of colony of this part [of philosophy,
viz., psychology]. […] Therefore the doctrine about man is necessary to the
physician, because it is almost the foundation, or the basis and pivot of
medicine.30
Despite the fact that they both praise anatomy, Snellius and Melanchthon differ
fromeachother in the anatomical sources theyuse and evenmore importantly in the
different roles they ascribe to anatomy. Whilst Melanchthon bases the anatomical
part of the Liber de anima on Vesalius’ Fabrica, Snellius introduces other anatomical
sources in his book. Especially in his discussion ‘demotibus cordis’, Snellius follows the
De re anatomica (1559) by Realdo Colombo, whom Snellius praises for the discovery of
thepulmonary circulation.31But thedifferencebetweenSnellius’ andMelanchthon’s
explanations of the human body also lies in the fact that Snellius puts less emphasis
than Melanchthon had done on the vestigial role of the knowledge of the body’s
teleological arrangement as a path to the divine truth. Melanchthon stresses that
if we look at the body as amachine, and if we grasp the functional organisation of its
parts, wemay recognise in it the divine order of nature. For instance, the anatomical
description of the human heart that he presents in his Liber de anima ends as follows:
30 Snellius, InMelanchthonis de anima, 7: “Medicina tota hinc dependet, adeo ut quasi huius partis
colonia quaedam videri possit […] Itaque de homine doctrina medico est necessaria, ut quasi
Medicinae fundamentum, basis ac fulcrum sit.”
31 Realdo Colombo, Realdi Colombi Cremonensis de re anatomica (Venice 1559). See Snellius, In Me-
lanchthonis de anima, 168. This difference in anatomical sources used by Snellius andMelanch-
thon has already been noticed by Sachiko Kusukawa, “The Natural Philosophy of Melanch-
thon and His Followers”, in Luce Giard, ed., Science et religion de Copernic à Gallilée (1540–1610)
(Rome, 1999), 451. Colombo (1515–1559) studied at Padua. He became a close friend of Vesalius’,
although the two eventually fell out. On these aspects and for a detailed account of Colombo’s
anatomical work, see: Cunningham, The Anatomical Renaissance, 143–166.
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We are stupefied, considering suchwonderful variety in the works and plans
of God, looking from without and through dense darkness; and we grieve
that we cannot inspect nature deeply and see the causes. And yet, when we
will at last discern the idea of nature in the divine mind, we will look at this
whole machine as if fromwithin and understand the plans of the Workman
and the causes of all divine works. Now, by this incomplete consideration,
we recognise God the architect and we should be inflamed with the desire
for that perfect knowledge.32
This emphasis on the arrangement of the body as a vestige of the divine order of
nature appears less evident in the case of Snellius. On the one hand, the latter praises
the knowledge of the body asmost valuable, because the body is a clear testimony of
God and because the knowledge of the body’s actions is the only means available to
fallenmen to obtain knowledge of the soul.33On the other hand, the Dutch philoso-
pher suggests that the teleological design governing nature must be discovered in
one important feature ofman’s soul. In fact, by followingMelanchthon’s discussion
of the soul, Snellius accepts thePraeceptor’s viewthatman’s rational soul is an immor-
tal spiritus intelligens present in the humanbody. The humanbody, for Snellius, is not
just any kind of body, but one provided with organs through which the soul may
perform its actions. It is a tangible and observable body, comparable to the objects of
mechanics (like clocks and automata).34 In the case of Snellius, this comparison does
not seem to involve only the heuristic value it had inMelanchthon’s psychology, but
is pushed a bit further. According to Snellius, it seems, the body actually works like a
clock. Its functioningdiffers however fromother physical bodies, like stones, because
32 cr xiii, 57: “Hanc mirificam operis varietatem, et haec Dei consilia, foris et per densam
caliginem aspicientes, obstupescimus, ac dolemus, nos non penitus introspicere naturam,
et causas videre posse. Sed tunc demum, cum idaeam naturae in mente divina cernemus,
totam hanc machinam velut intus aspiciemus, et opificis consilia et causas omnium operum
divinorum intelligemus. Nunc inchoata hac consideratione Deum architectum agnoscamus,
et illius perfectae sapientiae desiderio accendamur.”
33 Snellius appears as much attentive as Melanchthon to man’s incapacity to gain thorough
understanding of the soul in his fallen state. In default of that knowledge, the study of
anatomy represents amediumto the description of the soul’s actions. See, Snellius, InMelanch-
thonis de anima, 8.
34 On the changing use of the clock metaphor in early-modern psychology and physiology, see
Hans-Peter Neumann, “Machina Machinarum. Die Uhr als Begriff und Metapher zwischen
1450–1750”, Early Science andMedicine, 15 (2010), 122–191.
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it is organic, amachine-like bodyprovidedwith self-motion and instruments for the
workings of the soul.35
Yet, there is something that the soul possesses and that is not dependent on the
set-up of the body: the innate ideas of mathematics and ethics. Melanchthon had
already accepted the existence of such innate ideas in the Commentarius de anima and
in the Liber de anima, and through natural philosophy this view became a pivoting
point of his confessional endeavor. Snellius draws onMelanchthon’s conception and
uses it as his own way towards the agnitio Dei, as follows:
Melanchthon teaches – against the Epicureans, who contend that everything
exists completely thanks to the fortuitous collision of atoms – that it is
impossible, given natural arithmetic and the innate notions in the soul, that
the soul isnot createdbyGod thedesigner, becausenotions of this sort arenot
from assembling atoms but are inserted into man by the designing God.36
The fact of us having innate ideas of mathematics proves what the Epicureans teach
wrongly, namely that everything occurring in nature is the consequence of the
fortuitous collision of atoms. Our spirit does not take on the notitiae ofmathematics
from the outside world, therefore certainly not via the action of atoms. Fate, in this
way, is removed fromnature, which is, on the contrary, arranged by a craftsman-like
God. On the one hand, Snellius looks at man as a machine-like body. On the other
hand, he makes it very clear that this machine-like organism cannot be reduced to
matter alone, for it possesses a spirit created by God.
To sum up, Snellius endorses Melanchthon’s idea that natural philosophy may
let us recognise the teleological design governing nature. However, the two authors
appear to differ on the following point.Melanchthon looks at anatomy as amedium
to infer the divine order of nature from the teleological make-up of the human
35 Snellius compares the human body to a machine, and in fact to a clock, as follows: “intellige
autem particulam physici corporis adiectam esse propter opera mechanica et fabrilia, cuius-
modi fuit horologium illud a Langravio Saxoni donatum, ubi etiam motus inerrant plane-
tarum quod movebatur quidem sed appensis ponderibus aliisque libramentis” (Snellius, In
Melanchthonis de anima, 46–47).
36 Snellius, In Melanchthonis de anima, 9: “docet ex insitis animo notitiis et naturali Arithmetica
contra Epicureos qui omnia ex fortuito atomorum concursu casu omnia extitisse contendunt
fieri nonposse, quin animusaDeoarchitecto factus sit, namhuiusmodinotitiaenonex atomis
confluentibus, sed a Deo architectante in hominem sunt transfusae.”
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body, whereas Snellius ascribes this role to the consideration of the human soul’s
possession of innate ideas. In Snellius’ work, the use of anatomy in the science of
the soul is retained, but its role of describing one part of human nature (viz., the
body) ismore emphasised than its function as a path to the awareness of the divinely
designed order of nature, as it was repeatedly stressed byMelanchthon.
Moreover, what seems to characterise the work of Snellius is a more radical
interpretation of Melanchthon’s idea that the De anima was a study of the whole
human nature. In Snellius’ case, this idea amounts to an even clearer distinction
between the two parts ofman. Psychology is a physiology ofman that addresses two
different things: a spirit provided with innate notions of God, numbers andmorals,
as well as a clock-like machine.
A use of anatomy similar to that present in Snellius’ work is apparent in other
Renaissance and early modern texts, for instance in Otto Casmann’s Psychologia
anthropologica (1594), which whilst drawing on Melanchthon’s psychology, at-
tempted to give a new disciplinary position to Melanchthon’s ideas. Indeed, Cas-
mann, like Snellius, relies on Melanchthon’s view that the subject matter of the De
anima is man’s complete nature. But contrary to Snellius, who argued that this dis-
cipline should be referred to asOnMan’s Physiology, instead ofOn the Soul, Casmann
suggests the name Anthropologia for the inquiry into what he now characterises as
the ‘hypostatic union’ of the two natures of man: the spiritual nature, which is the
subject of the part of anthropology called Psychologia, and the corporeal one, which is
in fact the subject of anatomy.To this secondpart of anthropology, Casmanndevoted
a separate treatise: Secunda pars anthropologiae hoc est fabrica humani corporis (published
in 1596).37The newdisciplinary set-up proposed by Casmann seems to fit his decision
to replace a hylomorphic-Aristotelian notion of the union between man’s body and
soul with a model that combines Melanchthon’s psychology with ideas drawing on
Christology, most notably the idea ‘hypostatic union’.
As I explained in the previous chapter, Casmann is critical of the Aristotelian
definition of the soul as the form of the body, and prefersMelanchthon’s conception
of the soul as spiritus intelligens, for its being consistent with Christian theology.
According to Casmann, man’s spirit is the anima logica. Contrary to what Aristotle
and the Catholic Church teach, Luther’s opinion must be followed, that the anima
logica is neither the form of the body nor that of man.
37 “Anthropologia est doctrina humana naturae. Humana natura est geminae naturae mun-
danae, spiritualis et corporea in unum hyphistamenon unitae particeps essentia” (Otto Cas-
mann, Psychologia anthropologica, 1).
192 chapter 5
Indeed, by modelling his psychology on Christology, Casmann reasons as fol-
lows: the Christian idea of God’s incarnation must be taken literally as meaning
that there is a parallel between the divine and human natures of Christ on the one
hand, and the soul and the body ofman, on the other. Therefore, if the soul were the
form of the whole composite, Christ’s divine nature would define his entire being
(which is not the case). Melanchthon’s spiritus intelligens, redefined in this fashion, is
an immortal substance that providesmanwith understanding,will, and language.38
The anima logica is inseparably united to man’s body in the same way as Christ’s
divine nature is united to his human part, i.e., by means of a hypostatic union.
The study of the spiritual substance partaking in man’s hypostatic nature covers
the first seven chapters of Casmann’s Psychologia. The remaining twenty-three chap-
ters of the book address themes stemming fromAristotle’s Parva naturalia, andmore
in general consider the faculties that man shares with animals (aloga) and that are
dependent on the body.39 The latter, Casmannmaintains, must not be considered to
be mere flesh, but to be the corporeal part of the hypostatic union of which man
consists. It is the seat of the soul and the instrument through which the actions
of the soul are carried out. According to Casmann, however, the description of the
teleological structure of thehumanbodily organs is accounted for by anatomy (soma-
totomia), to which he devotes the 1596 independent treatise the Secunda pars anthro-
pologiae. In the case of Casmann, psychology and anatomy must be taken jointly
as they together form the study of human nature, which, in its turn, provides the
38 According to Casmann, the faculty of language ( facultas sermocinatrix) is in fact part and parcel
of the anima logica, together with the intellect and the will. The faculty of language forms
the words or symbols through which we signify things and distinguishes precisely between
the different words it forms. Language, Casmann explains, might mean the utterances that
we use and improve by means of grammar, rhetoric, and dialectics. As such, it is the result
of human conventions and an operation belonging to both the soul and the body of man,
because it is made possible by the soul’s use of the body as an instrument. However, when
taken as the faculty that forms symbols to interpret the souls’ thoughts, language belongs to
the anima logica as an innate power, and it marks the difference between human beings and
brute animals (see Casmann, Psychologia anthropologica, 140–151).
39 The chapters 15–23 analyse topics related to De sensu, sensili et sensione, hence the external
and internal senses. Chapters 8–14 focus on the formation and development of the foetus,
on generation, growth, nutrition, and digestion. Chapters 24–30 deal with respiration, de
affectibus, the locomotive faculty, and sleep (see Casmann, Psychologia anthropologica, 151–423).
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physician with important bases for his discipline.40 The pair psychology-anatomy,
proposed by Melanchthon and Snellius, is maintained by Casmann, but formalised
as a new discipline: anthropology. As this new discipline is divided into two dif-
ferent parts (psychology and anatomy), the disconnection between body and soul
involved inMelanchthon’s work andmade clearer by Snellius becomesmore radical:
anthropology is a broad field of enquiry which encompasses the study of the body
and that of the soul, whereas these two subjects are completely different from each
other.41
5.3. Conclusion
The study of the human soul and of man’s body have always been regarded as bear-
ing a structural relation to each other. But sixteenth-century Protestant professors
seem to have considered this nexus in a more specific way, as they included ancient
and modern anatomical accounts of man’s body in their treatises on the soul. This
transformationwithin theRenaissance traditionofnatural philosophywas to a large
extent triggeredbyMelanchthon’s treatises on the soul and then followedby, among
others, Rudolph Snellius. Melanchthon sought to include anatomy within the sci-
ence of the soul for the following main reasons. First, he ascribed a new subject
matter to the scientia de anima: the human nature, which is composed of soul and
body. Therefore, the need for a description of the corporeal part of man’s nature
droveMelanchthon to assign this task to (first) Galenic and (then) Vesalian anatomy.
40 In the preface to Casmann’s Psychologia anthropologica, written by Rudolph Goclenius, the
knowledge of man’s body and soul is discussed with respect to its utility for the disciplines
of law, ethics, theology, andmedicine. According to Goclenius, the knowledge of the faculties
of the soul is most helpful for the physician. Goclenius does not develop this point, but
ascribes this view to the physician Jean Fernel. Goclenius might be referring to Fernel’s
UniversaMedicina (1567), inwhich Fernel says that his enquiry as a physician does not dealwith
man’s body alone, but with the entirety of the human nature, including the faculties of the
soul. In the context of some preliminary explanations of the importance of the study of the
faculties – rather than the essence – of the soul, Fernel states: “Facultates autem proximae et
continentes operum sunt causae, quarum observationem atque cognitionem satis superque
medico sufficere plerique censuerunt: in earum igitur investigationem nobis est diligentius
incumbendum.” (Jean Fernel, Universa medicina [Paris, 1567], in John M. Forester, ed., The
Physiologia of Jean Fernel (Philadelphia, 2003), 312).
41 On Casmann’s anthropology see De Angelis, Anthropologien, 198–203.
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Second, he considered the anatomical knowledge of the body to be ameans to under-
stand the actions of the soul. Third, he believed that the study of the teleological
make-up of man’s body would work as a way to the agnitio Dei. In fact, he proposed
that anatomy could look at man’s body as an aggregate of machines, craftily organ-
ised to carry out specific operations. According toMelanchthon, the beauty and per-
fection emerging from this teleological account of man’s body would show us the
finalistic pattern and the divine order governing nature. Melanchthon’s ideas are
takenupalmost literally in Snellius’workon the soul. Evenmore thanMelanchthon,
who had usedmechanisticmetaphors to describeman’s body, Snellius thought that
the body was a machine, just as clocks and automata. At the same time, however,
he stressed the body’s teleological functioning. Snellius’ attention to anatomy goes
as far as to suggest that the science of the soul can be better understood if taken as
a treatise on human physiology. However, while Snellius accepts the fundamental
role of anatomy in the consideration of the soul, he puts less emphasis on the vesti-
gial value of the study of man’s body than Melanchthon had done. In this way, the
teleological account of human anatomy and the study of faculty-psychology came to
be seen as parts of a single science of humannature. One of Snellius’ contemporaries,
Otto Casmann, renamed that science ‘anthropology’.
Melanchthon, Snellius, and Casmann produced a change in the disciplinary
organisation of the scientia de anima, which was connected to a new use of anatomy
aswell as to proto-mechanist accounts ofman’s body. They did this, as I hope to have
made clear, also for reasons connected to their Christian Protestant faith, or at least
to some important views regarding the nature of man that were first expressed by
Luther. These views were then reformulated by Melanchthon in an effort of confes-
sionalisation and later appropriatedby Snellius andCasmann. Interestingly enough,
the fact that the psychologies ofMelanchthon, Snellius, and Casmann reflected cen-
tral points of Luther’s anthropology does notmean that the newway inwhich these
authors looked at psychologyhad to stay aProtestant, or evenmoregenerally aChris-
tian affair.
The disciplinary setting they devised and the belief it conveys that anatomy
is essential for the study of the soul became widely accepted later on during the
early modern period, and even beyond the De anima tradition as such. For instance,
the Anthropographia (1618) of the anatomist Jean Riolan (the Younger) addresses the
question An animae consideratio ad Anatomen referri debeat. Riolan’s response echoes
Melanchthon’s idea that someonewho is entirely oblivious to the nature of the body
will not understand the nature of the soul. This view ismirrored in the organisation
of psychology and anatomy (somatologia) in Riolan’s own view:
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Some divide anthropology into psychology and somatology, because man is
providedwith two natures: one ismaterial, the body, of course, and the other
formal, namely the soul.42
Similar conceptions are found in Jacob de Back’s Dissertatio de corde, published as an
appendix to the 1660 Latin edition of William Harvey’s Exercitatio anatomica de cordis
et sanguinis motu.43 The opening lines of the text discuss the subject of theDissertatio
against the background of a broader disciplinary organisation as follows:
I call the general doctrine about man anthropology, the parts of which I set
according to the following division: psychology, somatology, and hematolo-
gy.44
PhilipMelanchthon’s teleological account of thehumanbody and soulwas reshaped
in different ways by Snellius and Casmann and it was then retained by anatomists
such as Riolan and De Back. Northern European professors of arts and medicine,
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, sought to assign a clear role to
42 Jean Riolan the Younger,Opera anatomica (Paris, 1650), 37: “Quidam Anthropologiam dividunt
in Psychologiam et Somatologiam; quia homo duabus naturis præditus est: una materiali,
nempe Corpore, altera formali, scilicet Anima.” The ‘quidam’ mentioned in the beginning of
the quote might be Otto Casmann. In effect, Riolan’s division of anthropology as a discipline
that is split up across psychology and anatomy appears to mirror Casmann’s views, both
in its contents and terminology. However, one has to observe that Riolan uses the term
‘somatologia’ for the study of man’s body, whereas Casmann calls this discipline ‘somatotomia’.
Casmann devoted a special book to the discipline he calls ‘somatologia’. In the initial pages of
his Somatologia physica generalis (1598), Casmann presents the reader with a diagram, which
explains that ‘somatologia’ is the part of physics that treats the natural bodies in general,
according to their essences (consisting of matter and form) and qualities (which are either
manifest and tangible or occult). See: Otto Casmann, Somatologia physica generalis (Frankfurt,
1598), 1. Contrary to the broader scope of his Somatologia, Casmann’s Somatotomia addresses the
fabrica of the human body alone: it is the part of anthropology that studies only man’s body
and its parts.
43 De Back’s and Riolan’s statements on anthropology have already been noticed byMengal, “La
Constitution de la psychologie”, 12. On De Back, see De Angelis, Anthropologien, 268–279.
44 Jacob de Back,Dissertationes de corde, in WilliamHarvey, Exercitationes anatomicae de motus cordis
et sanguinis circulatione (London, 1661), 296: “Generalem de homine doctrinamAnthropologiam
voco, partes cujus statuo, secundum hanc divisionem, Psychologiam, Somatologiam et Hoe-
matologiam.”
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anatomy as instrumental in considering the soul as part of the study of human
beings. But the way in which they looked at the anatomical-psychological study of
man could vary considerably. It could be depicted as a teleological account of man’s
nature that would exhibit the Christian (Protestant) order of nature. But it could
also be described as the general doctrine of human being, which is in fact what
happens in the Appendix to Harvey’s work, one of the first mechanist accounts of
blood circulation.
The way in which the use of anatomy in the context of anthropology shifted
from Melanchthon’s Christian psychology to later works on man’s body and soul
signals one very interesting aspect of psychology in the age of confessionalisation.
Philosophical ideas were often an integral part of confessional efforts. For instance,
Melanchthon’s psychology was intended tomake it clear whatmanwas and how he
should behave in society, from a Lutheran perspective. But the effects that confes-
sional endevours, such asMelanchthon’s, had on later science and philosophy could
very well be trans- or non-denominational andmore andmore dissociated from the
confessional debates. Whatever the confessional motivations of certain theories, at a
certain point the scientific discourse seems to have become amotivating factor of its
own.
Let us now turn to a discussion at which I have hinted several times in the
preceding chapters, the discussion about the origin of the human soul. In what
follows, I shall present some sixteenth-century controversies on human animation
as another chapter in the history of psychology in the age of confessionalisation. As
we shall see, determining the origin of the soul could become for some authors a
matter of confessional orthodoxy and identity.
chapter 6
The Origin of the Soul in
Sixteenth-Century Lutheran Psychology
6.0. Introduction
In the present thesis, I have been trying to show thatMelanchthon’s psychologywas
part – and not a consequence – of his Lutheran faith: he did not attempt to write a
psychologicalwork consistentwith given theological tenets, but rather looked at the
two editions of his book on the soul as an integral part of his efforts of confessional-
isation in Saxony.Moreover, I have emphasised severalways inwhichMelanchthon’s
psychology influenced many at Wittenberg and elsewhere in sixteenth-century
northern Europe.
In the present chapter, I shall consider one last psychological discussion inwhich
the influence of Melanchthon is quite visible: the discussion regarding the origin of
the human soul. This topic appears all the more important, because it has attracted
scholarly attention precisely for its alleged religious, more specifically confessional,
implications.More precisely, according to some studies, sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century discussions on the origin of man’s soul present a very marked confessional
dividebetweenLutheranson theonehand, andCatholics andCalvinists on theother.
In this chapter I shall look at discussions on the origin of the human soul in
some sixteenth-century texts producedbyLutheranauthors.On theonehand, I shall
argue that many sixteenth-century Lutheran philosophers and physicians shared
the view that the individual souls of men were not God’s immediate doing. On
the other hand, I will point to a more nuanced picture of the relationship between
Lutheran theology and views concerning the origin of the soul. In fact, the theory
according to which the intellective soul of man was generated ex traduce – i.e., trans-
mitted from the parents to their offspring – became accepted by many Lutherans
working at the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century.
However, this consensus seems to be less stable when one looks at some illustrative
cases of early Lutheran books on the soul. In what follows, I shall first introduce the
theme of the origin of the soul in sixteenth-century psychology. Second, I shall look
at a number of texts that bearwitness to the variety of ideas on this topic heldwithin
the Lutheran camp. Third, I shall demonstrate that some unity in such a variety of
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opinions may well be found, which amounts to an echo of Melanchthon’s message
about the unknowability of the soul. At the end of this discussion, I will be able to
give some indications concerning both the relationship between Lutheran theology
and views on the origin of the soul, and the formation of a Lutheran confessional
identity in relation to psychology.
6.1. The Problem of the Origin of the Human
Soul in Sixteenth-Century Psychology
Discussions concerning animation appear to havemushroomed in sixteenth-centu-
ry books on the soul. Medieval commentators of Aristotle’s De anima had devoted
much attention to themoment rather than themode of animation of human beings.
They disagreed about the question at what stage in the development of a human
fetus God would infuse the intellective soul. On the other hand, they seem to have
accepted quite unanimously that each individual intellective soul was the immedi-
ate work of God.1 Renaissance discussions on animation – especially those produced
at Protestant institutions – differed from the medieval ones in that they wondered
whether God created the intellective soul ex nihilo only in the first created man,
Adam, leaving to the natural process of procreation the task of transmitting both
the body and the intellective soul from the parents to their offspring.
This problem gained relevance in the sixteenth century and was discussed by
most northern European professors of arts and medicine who worked on the soul.
The popularity of this debate is nicely illustrated by the 1590 publication of a book
entitled Psychologia. As Imentioned earlier in this thesis, the Psychologiawas a collec-
tion of contributions regarding human animation, by authors of diverse religious
affiliation, andwas edited by the influentialMarburg professor RudolphGoclenius.2
As Michael Stolberg pointed out, determining the origin of the human soul
became “a major issue of interconfessional debate” at the turn of the seventeenth
century. Stolberg links views of the origin of the soul as being either created ex
nihilo (‘creationism’) or transmitted ex traduce (‘traducianism’) to different confes-
sional backgrounds. More specifically, he argues that traducianism was the the-
ory defended by most Lutherans and tries to account for the reasons that might
1 Aboutmedieval discussion concerning the origin of the soul, see: Leen Spruit, TheOrigin of the Soul
From Antiquity to the EarlyModern Era, 39–54.
2 See: supra, ‘Chapter 1’, 17.
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havemotivated such a pattern. Most sixteenth-century Lutheran, Stolberg explains,
accepted the doctrine of traducianism chiefly for the following reason: they strug-
gled to square the doctrine of creationism with a reasonable account of the direct
transmission of the original sin from Adam to the entire human kind. In effect, as I
will point out in this chapter, sixteenth-century advocates of traducianism argued
that the defenders of the creationist doctrine could not account for the transmis-
sion of original sin without admitting one of two unwanted consequences: either
that an incorporeal form such as the intellective soul was acted upon by the body,
or that God himself was responsible for the presence of original sin in all human
beings.3
The fact that traducianism was the most commonly accepted view among Lu-
therans and that it was endorsed even by Martin Luther himself (albeit not pub-
licly) also appears to surface in some Renaissance texts. One case in point is Albert
Hunger’s Adversus veteres et novos errores de anima conclusionum centuria. I have already
mentioned this 1575 publication, because it contained an open attack on Melanch-
thon’s ἐνδελέχειαdoctrine.4The JesuitHunger devotedmuch of his career towriting
polemical treatises against Lutherans and Lutheran theology; an endeavour thatwas
epitomised in his 1582 book entitledOn the harmony and agreement between the theology
of Luther and the philosophy of Epicurus.5 In his 1575 book on the soul, he rejected tradu-
cianism as being an opinion contrary to the Catholic faith and criticised Luther for
having defended it.6Hiswritingwas published at the Jesuit university of Ingolstadt,
3 Michael Stolberg, “Particles of the Soul”, 190–191. Similar statements about the confessional divide
between Renaissance Lutherans, Catholics, and Calvinists who dealt with the origin of the soul
are made by Joseph S. Freedman, The Soul (anima) according to Clemens Timpler (1563/4–1624) and Some
of his Central European Contemporaries, 806–807. About Stolberg’s and Freedman’s claims, see: supra,
‘Chapter 1’, 54–55.
4 See: supra, ‘Chapter 2’, 103.
5 Albert Hunger, De homologia sive consensus concentuque theologiae Lutheri cum philosophia Epicuri (In-
golstadt 1582).
6 Albert Hunger, Adversus veteres et novos errores de anima, d1v: «Intermortua fuerat iam olim peni-
tus ista carnalis propagatio animae intellectivae et ecce nostris temporibus a carnali illo resus-
citatur Luthero, qui tamen paucos adhuc reperit huiusmodi erroris sectatores. In assertionibus
quibusdamcirca annumDomini 1545Wittebergae propositis inhaec ille verba prorumpit: “quaeD.
Hieronymus adversus traducis propagationem affert nihil faciunt ad rem. Determinationes vero
Papae et Synagogae suae pro exterminatione et execratione habendae sunt. Quia bestia indoctis-
sima et venter surdus ad scripturam sacram est sicut asinus ad lyram”. Peculiari aliquo Canone
num expresse reprobata sit ista carnalis propagatio, non attinet cum Luthero disputare. Quam
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where the Society of Jesus had succeeded in establishing the whole Cursus philosophi-
cus in 1570.Hunger’s text is particularly interesting, because, aswe have already seen,
it was signed by both the dean of the faculty of philosophy,Wolfgang Zettel, and the
dean of the faculty of theology, Rudolph Clencke. The contents of the text were thus
officially endorsed by Clencke, who stated that the theses held by Hunger reflected
the teaching of the Catholic faith.
Not only Catholics, but also important exponents of the Lutheran reform appear
to ascribe the doctrine of traducianism to Martin Luther and some of his followers.
This emerges, for instance, from two texts, published atWittenberg, to which I shall
devote some attention in the present chapter: Bruno Seidel’s Commentarius de corpore
animato (1594) and Gregor Horst’s De natura humana (1626). In the case of Bruno Sei-
del, Luther is reported as stating that the human soul may well originate ex traduce,
although he did not wish to defend this opinion in public.7 Horst’s book also sheds
some light on the confessional nature of Renaissance discussions on animation, as it
supplies a list of contemporaries who held the twomain views (creationism and tra-
ducianism) regarding the origin of the soul. Horst lists mainly authors of Catholic
and Calvinist affiliation among the creationists: Peter Lombard (1096–1164) Thomas
Aquinas (1225–1274), Girolamo Fracastoro (1476–1553), Julius Caesar Scaliger (1484–
1558), John Calvin (1509–1564), Levinus Lemnius (1505–1568), and Franciscus Toletus
(1532–1596). Later in his discussion, Horst ascribes the theory of traducianism essen-
tially to Lutheran authors, such asMartin Luther, PhilipMelanchthon, Caspar Peuc-
er, and Joahnn Ludwig Hawenreuter.
In what follows, I shall return to the discussions on the origin of the soul by
focusing on some of the authors mentioned by Horst. For the moment, suffice it to
say that the link, to which historians have pointed, between Catholic and Calvinist
theology and creationism, on the one hand, and between Lutheran theology and
traducianism, on the other, seems to have been known to early-modern academics
as well. But if this observation is true, the question arises whether traducianism
was directly implied by Lutheran theology. Did all Lutherans believe that the view
enim is factam existimat determinationem eam homo levissimus irridet, proprio iudicio con-
demnatus. Illud nobis satis esse potest, quod Leo x caeterique Concilii Lateranensis ultimi Patres,
sive docentes, sive definientes, animam intellectivam non cum corpore transfundi, sed in corpus
infundi, clare in Sessione octava professi sunt».
7 Seidel, Commentarius de corpore animato, 383: «Lutherus etiam dixisse fertur aliquando: ‘quamvis
fieri potest ut anima sit ex traduce, tamen publice hoc non affirmabo, sed privatim apud me
retinebo’».
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according to which the human soul is transmitted by means of the semen of the
parents was the only opinion consistent with their conception of the transmission
of original sin?
The examples of Horst and Seidel already hint at a less straightforward picture
of the relationship between sixteenth-century discussions on animation and dif-
ferent theological affiliations. True, most of the traducianists listed by Horst were
indeed Lutherans, whereas essentially all of those he counted among the creation-
ists were either Catholic or Calvinist. However, one needs to balance this with the
fact that Horst also mentions the Reformed clergyman and Cambridge physician
Timothy Bright (1551–1615) among the traducianists or Bruno Seidel himself – a dis-
tinctly Lutheran author – as a defender of creationism. The case of Seidel is all the
more interesting when one considers the nature of his reference to Martin Luther’s
defence of traducianism. Luther’s alleged opinion had indeed been used at the Jesuit
University of Ingolstadt to single out and reject traducianism as the philosophical
opinion belonging to a rival confession, hence to confirm the Catholic adherence to
creationism. But in the case of the Lutheran Seidel, Luther’s tactful approach to the
discussion on animation served the creationist cause: according to Seidel, if tradu-
cianism was to be accepted, Luther would have seen no problem with defending it
outspokenly. On the one hand, Horst’s and Seidel’s books testify to a link between
Lutheran theology and traducianism. On the other hand, they make it plausible to
think that the diffusion of traducianism among sixteenth-century Lutherans was a
more complex development than one might expect on the basis of the scholarship
and the primary sources examined until this point. This idea will become clear by
looking at a sample of Lutheran discussions on the origin of the soul, to which I will
devote the rest of this chapter.
6.2. Philip Melanchthon and the WittenbergMessage on the Soul
The number of sixteenth-century books and authors that Imentioned bears witness
to the vast popularity of the theme of human animation among sixteenth-century
Lutherans. In effect, the texts I shall examine in the rest of my analysis constitute
a case study of the disputes on the origin of the soul, which are found in many
commentaries on Aristotle’sDe anima, as well as in university textbooks and reports
of a huge number of disputations produced in Northern Europe, between the six-
teenthand the seventeenth centuries.Here, I shall look at the cases of very influential
Lutheran professors of arts and medicine who appear to mirror two main trends in
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Renaissance Lutheran psychology. In effect, the way in which Lutherans developed
their study of nature and the soul responded inmost instances to the need of found-
ing an educational, philosophical, and political system serving the Protestant cause.
In some cases, these intentions were pursued by a wide use of the Aristotelian nat-
ural philosophy. For Lutheran academics such as Jacob Schegk of Tübingen and the
Strasbourg natural philosopher Johan Ludwig Hawenreuter, this amounted to the
production of books on the soul that followed quite closely the structure and the
questions addressed bymedieval commentaries on Aristotle’sDe anima. This aspect,
aswell as Schegk’s andHawenreuter’s discussionsof the soulwill be taken into exam-
ination in the last part of this chapter. In other cases, Lutheran academics strove to
balance philosophy and theology in such a way that Aristotle’s natural philosophy
would be one amongmany other rational tools used to strengthen – by nomeans to
prove – the truth and practice of the Christian faith. These different ways of using
philosophy in a Lutheran context were very relevant to the way in which Lutherans
working at Wittenberg – the heart of Luther’s reform – looked at the human soul
and its origin. Their discussions followed in the footsteps of Philip Melanchthon’s
De anima, which is the first text I will examine.
It is worth considering both editions of Melanchthon’s De anima, because they
mark a shift in opinion on the part of their author. Melanchthon first addresses the
problem of animation in his Commentarius de anima of 1540. As we have already seen,
he does so right after having established that the intellective soul of man can only
be defined on scriptural basis as a ‘spiritus intelligens’.8 According to Melanchthon,
not only do the Scriptures teach that the soul is an intelligent and immortal spirit;
they also showwhere this spirit comes from. A few lines further in the Commentarius,
Melanchthon states his opinion about the origin of man’s rational soul:
There is another major question regarding whence the souls originate. And
this disputation is not new; but the oldwriters in theChurchwonderwheth-
er the rational soul is ex traduce, as they would put it, i.e., whether it is
propagated from the parents and it originates from the very nature of the
seed. Some fanatics imagined that the soulswere created all at the same time,
in the beginning of the world and then sent into the bodies. This absurd
opinion is to be dismissed. The other opinion is accepted and approved by
all those who are godly, that the rational souls are divinely created, everyday
8 See: supra, ‘Chapter 2’, 96.
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anew, and infused into the bodies, when the limbs are already formed and
arranged; that is, around the fortieth day, as we will say later with regard
to the formation of the foetus. And it is undisputed that a spiritual nature
cannot derive from a corporeal one. But the sensitive and vegetative souls
are ex traduce; that is, they are propagated and derived from the nature of the
seed, for their action is only organic, nor are they [the sensitive and vegetative
souls] anything but the temperaments or ένδελεχείας – i.e., the agitations,
life, or movement – of the organs.9
In the Commentarius, Melanchthon denies that we can know anything about the
nature of the soul by means of our natural understanding. However, he affirms
without hesitation that the Scriptures teach that every human soul is created anew
by God, ex nihilo. But not all parts of man’s soul come into being by an act of divine
creation. For Melanchthon, the action of the lower souls of man is corporeal: the
vegetative and sensitive souls are ἐνδελέχείας, movements concomitant with the
spirits and temperaments of the body. Therefore, they may be propagated ex traduce
from the seed of the parents. The human intelligent spirit, however, cannot derive
from a corporeal nature and has to be infused directly by God in the human body,
when the foetus is well formed (i.e., on the fortieth day after conception).
Interestingly enough, Melanchthon appears to have tempered his ideas during
the years between the first and the second edition of his De anima. In effect, in the
Liber de anima of 1552 he seems less reluctant to grant traducianism some degree of
truth. At the same time, Melanchthon appears unwilling to express any decisive
opinion on the matter and draws the attention of the reader to man’s inability to
know the nature of the soul in his post-lapsarian state. In the discussion on the
origin of the soul presented in the Liber de anima, Melanchthon only mentions the
9 Philip Melanchthon, Commentarius de anima, 16v–17v: «Est et alia maior quaestio unde oriantur
animae. Nec recens est haec disputatio, sed veteres ecclesiastici scriptores quaerunt an anima
rationalis sit ex traduce, sic enim loquuntur, hoc est, an propagetur a parentibus et oriatur ex
ipsa seminum natura. Quidam fanatici finxerunt ab initio mundi, simul creates esse animas, et
postea mitti eas in corpora. Haec absurda opinio repudianda est. Caeterum sententia recepta est,
et probata piis omnibus animas rationales divinitus tunc novas creari et inseri corporibus, cum
membra iam formata seu figurata sunt, videlicet circiter diem quadragesimum, ut paulo post de
formatione foetus dicemus. Et consentaneum est spiritualem naturam non oriri a corporali. Sed
anima sentiens et vegetativa sunt ex traduce, hoc est propagantur et oriuntur ex natura seminum,
harum enim actio nulla est nisi organica, nec ipsae aliud sunt nisi organorum aut temperamenta
aut ἐνδελέχείας, id est agitationes seu vita seumotus».
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main arguments put forward by the creationists and traducianists of his days, while
he does not express himself in favour of either. However, Melanchthon values the
fact that even those who believe that the soul is transmitted ex traduce and through
the vis seminalis of the parents acknowledge that this process happens thanks to the
concurring action of God, who sustains and fosters the forces operating in nature.10
Melanchthon concludeshis discussionby an advice to the youth:what reallymatters
for a Christian understanding of the soul is to recognise that its ultimate cause is
God. However, Melanchthon warns, whether God creates each soul anew or uses
natural causes as an instrument remains beyondman’s grasp.11
Melanchthon’s account of the origin of the human soul appears to change, if
slightly, during the years between 1540 and 1552. Both in the Commentarius de anima
and in the Liber de anima, the Lutheran idea of the limits of man’s intellect after the
fall determines to a large extentMelanchthon’s views on animation. In the Commen-
tarius, this corresponds to the idea that the Holy Scriptures are man’s only source
of knowledge about the direct creation of his intellective soul by God. In the Liber,
a comparatively stronger emphasis on the limits of man’s ken leads Melanchthon
to suspend the dispute: the Lutheran youth need to see that God is the source of our
intellective souls; at the same time, they have to consider that the exactway inwhich
God brings the intellective soul into being cannot be fully understood.
Melanchthonwas a convincing teacher andhis studentswere verygood listeners.
In fact, his Lutheran message regarding the limited knowledge possible for the
human soul shaped the discussions on animation by some of the most important
figures working at Wittenberg, in the years following Melanchthon’s educational
10 Melanchthon does not seem to elaborate on the notion of ‘seminal virtue’, which as Me-
lanchthon himself recognises is found in Augustine. See: Aurelius Augustinus, Saint Augustin.
La Genèse au littéral en douze livres (De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim), edited by Paul Agaësse
and Amato Solignac (Bruges 1972), ii, 15, 30. About Augustine’s theory of ‘seminal virtue’, see:
Jules M. Brady, “St. Augustine’s Theory of Seminal Reasons”, The New Scholasticism 38.2 (1964),
141–158. The idea of ‘seminal virtue’ has been carefully described by Hiro Hirai, Le concept de
semence dans les théories de la matière à la Renaissance, de Marsile Ficin à Pierre Gassendi (Turnhout
2005).
11 cr, xiii, 18: «Sed hanc disputationem abrumpo, et iuniores moneo, ut discernant ea quae
utqunque mentis humanae acie penetrari possunt, ab aliis, quae pervestigari non possunt.
Simus hac sapientia contenti, quod vita, sensus, ratiocinatio et electio ostendunt, esse in nobis
animas, et esse eis insitas notitias et alias ab ipso conditas esse». On the differences between
Melanchthon’s accounts of the origin of the human soul in the Commentarius and in the Liber,
also see: Dino Bellucci, Science de la nature et Réformation, 338–344.
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activity. These aspects emerge, for instance, from the work of Melanchthon’s son in
law andWittenberg physician, Caspar Peucer.
6.3. Caspar Peucer and Gregor Horst: A Mysterious Form of Traducianism
Peucer’s discussion about the origin of the human soul is found in his contribution
to Goclenius’ Psychologia and is entitled De essentia, natura et ortu animi hominis com-
mentatio. Peucer introduces his argument bymeans of an exhortation to caution:
It is a an obscure question, hard to disentangle and full of danger; for, in
favour of whichever part something is argued, there follow absurdities,
which either strike against the testimonies divinely revealed in the Holy
Scriptures, or crush against the eternal order of nature.12
As I mentioned in the beginning of my discussion, some sixteenth-century authors
looked unfavourably at the idea that God created each individual human soul ex
nihilo, because they deemed this doctrine incapable of explaining the transmission
of original sin in the human kind. Caspar Peucer belongs indeed to this group of
authors. He explains that, if creationism were true, one should admit either that
the immaterial intellective soul of man inherits the original sin by being acted
upon by the body (which is a philosophical absurdity), or that God creates sinful
souls (which is an impious conclusion).13 This argument led some authors to believe
12 RudolphGoclenius, Psychologia, 259: «Est quaestio obscura, explicatu difficilis et periculi plena,
quod in quamcunque partem statuatur aliquid, sequuntur absurda, qua vel in Sacrae Scrip-
turae divinitus patefacta testimonia impingunt, vel refrangunt ordini naturae perpetuo».
13 Goclenius, Psychologia, 260–261: «Si creat immediate Deus animas cum imponenda sunt in cor-
pora, aut integras puras et impollutas creat, aut tales quales nunc sunt, id est sauciatas et
contaminatas horribili labe vicii originalis. Si tales creat quales nunc sunt, est et illius pec-
cati auctor et iudex iniustus, quod abiicit et condemnat animas immeritas propter labem a
sese effectam atque inditam operi suo. Sed reclamat auctoritas testimoniorum divinorum et
perpetuus religionis divinitus patefactae consensus, quae et testantur Deum nec velle, nec
efficere, nec adiuvare, nec approbare, sed horribiliter et immutabiliter odisse et abominari
peccata, etsi permittendo tolerat quousque et quamdiu vult. […] A corporum sordibus nullum
animabus nocumentum inferri nec labem imprimi posse manifestum est, quod nullo con-
tectu coniunctae sunt corporibus physico vel mathematico, sed virtuali tantum (ut vocant)
quo ut nobilius ac praestantius agens corpora complexa vegetant, agitant, motuque ac sensu
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that traducianism was the only doctrine about animation capable of avoiding such
unwanted implications. Peucer was concerned about this problem, but he sought to
solve it without endorsing traducianism.
According to Peucer, creationism is to be rejected but the doctrine according to
which human souls are propagated ex traduce by the seed of the parents is also prob-
lematic. In fact, Peucer explains, traducianism implies that something corporeal (the
parents’ seed) generates something incorporeal (the rational soul). What is more,
even if one assumed that the semen responsible for the generation of the intellective
soul were incorporeal, another philosophical absurdity would follow: the very fact
that an incorporeal seed generates something else entails change, or better still, pri-
vation (privatio) in the seed. But privation, according to Peucer, is a change that is only
possible in corporeal substances and on a material level. Therefore, an incorporeal
seed is not capable of producing an incorporeal substance like the human intellec-
tive soul.14
As both creationism and the abovementioned forms of traducianism imply
absurdities, Peucer opts for a third and somewhat uneasy solution:
Man then consists of two parts – one spiritual and the other corporeal –
propagated from the parents by means of a mode of generation which is
divinely ordained and yet unknown to us; and they [the two parts of man]
are connected and tied up with each other by wondrous laws.15
afficiunt et regunt. Ipsae tota natura diversae nihil repatiuntur, quod non ex cognata vel com-
muni cumcorporibus constantmateria, sine quanon estmutua inter se actioullarumrerum».
14 Goclenius, Psychologia, 262–263: «Quod igitur ex ea decidetur et derivabitur semen spirituale et
quomodo cum solis illis quae corporeamole ac substantia constant, etmateria elementari, cui
privatio annexa est, hic modus competat?». Peucer bases his discussion on a conception that
stems from Aristotelian natural philosophy, This is nicely illustrated by Jacqueline Hamesse,
ed., Les Auctoritates Aristotelis.Un florilège médiéval étude historique et édition critique (Leuven 1972–
1974), 168: «hyle, id estmateria prima,maxime et proprie est subiectumgenerationis et corrup-
tionis susceptibile, unde subiectum generationis et corruptionis est materia prima».
15 Goclenius, Psychologia, 265: «Constat homo itaque duabus partibus diversis spirituali et cor-
porea propagatis ex parentibus divinitus instituto sed ignoto nobis generationis modo et
mirandis legibus inter se copulatis ac devinctis». Before stating his position, Peucer admits
thathis positionmightbe at oddswithphysical argument.However, heprefers to accept a the-
ory that is more consistent with the Holy Scriptures: «Etsi autem plurima sequuntur absurda
ex omnibus quae recitata sunt opinionibus, tamen praeferri caeteris illam quae minori cum
periculo coniuncta est et quanquam offendit nostras ex natura depromptas et argumentis
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According to Peucer, the human soul is propagated from the parents together
with the body. But Peucer’s view differs from the forms of traducianism dismissed
by him, in that it recognises that theway inwhich the propagation of the souls from
the parents comes about is for God to know and for us to wonder.
In a way similar to Melanchthon, and as a good Wittenberg professor, Peucer
stresses that the human soul is a spiritual nature and thatman’s fallen understand-
ing is limited in its knowledge of the soul. But this idea plays out in his work in one
particular way: Peucer deems traducianism to be more probable than creationism,
because it accounts better for the transmission of original sin. However, he thinks
that knowledge of the exact nature of thiswondrous transmissionof thehuman soul
is not obtainable.
Interestingly enough, this line of thought was not limited to the work of Cas-
par Peucer. Instead, it was followed by another product of Wittenberg education:
Gregor Horst. In 1608, Horst was appointed chief physician at the University of
Giessen. However, he had received his education at Wittenberg, and his 1626 book
De natura humana clearly reflects the type of study of the human nature fashioned
by Melanchthon’s De anima. Like Melanchthon, Horst believed that the study of
the human nature should include both man’s soul and body. For this reason, De
natura humana is divided into two parts: one treats the human soul and the other
man’s body, bymeans of the latest anatomical findings and – in away different from
Melanchthon – twenty-nine anatomical plates.16Not only the structure, but also the
contents ofDenaturahumana seemtobe imbuedwithMelanchthon’smessage on the
soul and its origin, as it appears fromHorst’s account of human animation, towhich
we now turn.
In the part ofDenatura humana devoted to the soul,Horst includes a section enti-
tledDeanimae rationalis origine et immortalitate. Horst’s discussion openswith a list of
authors who held one of the two rivalling positions (creation ex nihilo or transmis-
sion ex traduce), which I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter. According to
physicis nitentes cogitationes, tamen et a sacrarum testimoniis non dissentit et Deo laudem
omnipotentiae tribuit convenientius est».
16 Gregor Horst describes his use of anatomy – which he divides into ‘anatomia vitalis’ and
‘anatomiamortua’ – in the preface to hisDenatura humana. There, he also attempt to reconcile
Galenic and Paracelsian medicine, as well as their respective conceptions of disease (Gregor
Horst, De natura humana, 1–31). The use of anatomical plates in Horst works has already been
noticed byMichael Edwards, “Body, Soul and Anatomy in Late Aristotelian Psychology”,40–41.
For more details about Horst’s book and intellectual biography, see: supra, ‘Chapter 1’, 14–15.
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Horst, leading figures, such as Thomas Aquinas and John Calvin, had held that the
individual souls of human beings were created directly by God ex nihilo. Luther and
Melanchthon, on the other hand, had taught that the intellective soul was infused
by God only in Adam and that it was then transmitted, in its fallen state, by means
of natural procreation. Although Horst counts Melanchthon among the traducian-
ists, he does not overlook the Praeceptor’s warning regarding the limits of man’s ken.
On the contrary, after havingweighed themain arguments put forward by both the
traducianists and the creationists, Horst uses the advice to the youth that is found
inMelanchthon’s Liber de anima as the point of departure for his argumentation:
Therefore, here we have to discuss soberly, for which reason Mr Philip con-
cludes regarding this question: “but I stop with this disputation and exhort
the youth to tell all the things that can be penetrated by the sharpness of the
mind from those that cannot be fully explored”.17
The production of the souls is most mysterious and all opinions about it are full of
difficulties and danger. In a way similar to Caspar Peucer, Horst thinks that neither
the direct creation of the soul nor its corporeal generation are viable solutions. A
third position is to be espoused, which Horst bases on the views proposed by his
uncle JacobHorst of Helmstedt and an unspecified “man of great intelligence” with
whomGregor Horst tells to have studiedmedicine at Helmstedt (sic).18 According to
Jacob Horst – Gregor reports – the soul is transmitted ex traduce, albeit by means of
a miraculous action performed by God. This happens chiefly thanks to the mother.
In fact, when the embryo is sufficiently developed, according to its parts, the soul is
transmitted, through the umbilical cord and together with the vital heat, from the
soul of themother to the offspring.19Now,GregorHorst combines this positionwith
17 Gregor Horst, De natura humana, 480: «Hic ergo sobrie disserendum, unde Dn. Philippus ita
hancquaestionemconcludit: “sedhancdisputationemabrumpo, et iunioresmoneo, ut discer-
nant ea quae utcunque mentis acie penetrari possunt ab iis quae pervestigari non possunt”».
Horst refers to cr xiii, 18.
18 On Jakob Horst, see: Kathleen M. Crowther, Adam and Eve in the Protestant Reformation (Cam-
bridge 2010), 143–146, passim. Tricia M. Ross (Duke University) has also devoted some atten-
tion to Jakob Horst, in an unpublished paper: “Jakob Horst and ‘Von den wunderbarlichen
Geheimnissen der Natur in des Menschen Leibe und Seel’ ”. I would like to thank the author
for allowingme to read a draft of this paper.
19 Gregor Horst, De natura humana 480–481: “Haec sententia, quam Vir Clariss. Dn. Iacobus
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the view proposed during private disputations by one of his fellowmedical students
at Helmstedt. According to this anonymous fellow student, the only way to explain
the propagation of original sin in mankind is to assume that the human soul is
propagated aswell. But since the incorporealnature of the souldoesnot allowchange
and natural generation, the transmission of the soul has to take place contrary to the
ordinary course of nature (contra naturam) and thanks to the cooperating action of
God.20
Gregor Horst values both this opinion and that of his uncle Jacob Horst. When
taken jointly, GregorHorst explains, these opinions form themost plausible account
of the origin of man’s intellective soul:
Between these two statements,we remain in themiddle; forwe donot ignore
with howmuch difficulty the present question is surrounded. Yet, if we had
to say fromtheheartwhat seemsprobable tous,wewouldnot deny that both
Horstius Med. Doctor, Acad. Iuliae professor primarius, pia memoria, praeceptor ac patruus
noster honorandus, iam senex 64 annorum fovebat et publicis lectionibus atque scriptis de-
fendebat, ut patet lib. 3 operis germanici de occultis naturae ca. ii, cuius verba ex german-
ico ita vertuntur: ‘quamvis olim cum publicis lectionibus ac disputationibus doctrina in
Academiis proponerem, ferenihil certi dehac difficultate concludere potuerimmagis etiamad
creationem animae inclinarim; nihilominus tamen post considerationem naturalium opera-
tionum in homine, et quorundam textuum S. Scripturae, postpositis duabus communibus
sententiis, aliam forte novam et ut mihi videtur in veritate magis fundatam opinionem stat-
uere coactus sum: nimirum, quod anima rationalis ordinatione et miraculosa operatione
divina a parentibus et potissimum a matre, ex traduce, instar surculi ex trunco, non ex
ipsius corpore, nec etiam ex corporeo semine, sed ex anima modo invisibili, tunc temporis,
quando partes embryonis perfecte sunt conformatae et elaboratae, una cum spiritus vitali,
qui partibus conformatis a cordematris peculiarem transitum in embryonemaccipit, infantes
propagetur’ ”.
20 Gregor Horst,De natura humana, 480: «Vir quidam ingeniosissimus amicus noster fratris loco
colendis, olim Iulia Academia mecum in palestra philosophica et medica laborans, modum
propagationis hoc modo privatis lectionibus ac disputationibus declarare conabatur, cuis
verba haec sunt: “cum naturaliter, hoc est, per generationem anima rationalis propagari
nequeat, et nihilominus corrupta substantia (scilicet peccatum originale) potissimum in ipsa
anima insideat, ideo dicamusDeumOpt.Max. Secundo creationismodo (quo aliquid ex praex-
istenti quodam, sed contra naturam producitur) ex praeexistente anima parentum foetui
novam increare, quae quia materiam ex Adamo habet, reatus est particeps, quia non sim-
pliciter generatur, sed concurrente peculiari divina actione producitur, absurdas contradic-
tionum implicationes effugit quae ex simplici generatione sequuntur” ».
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Gregor Horst,De natura humana, Tabula x, 295. The plate illustrates the foetus on the fortieth
day after conception and joined to the mother by the umbilical cord.21
21 This picture is owned by the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek.
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opinions may be retained, if joined with each other; in a way that the soul
be produced from the soul of the mother, as our lord and uncle thinks, and
by means of a cooperating action, as the other sentence states. In fact, given
that [the soul] cannot be produced by generation from the soul, it has to be
added to the former sentence that a creation cooperates; and given that the
rational soul is not present in actuality from the firstmoment of conception,
it remains that the soul is created rather from the soul of themother than by
the father’s; which by no means takes away the dignity from the father, for
either soul – the father’s as much as the mother’s – is similar in essence and
perfection.22
According to Gregor Horst, the human soul is transmitted, together with original
sin, from the parents (and chiefly from the mother) to the offspring. But since
incorporeal substances, such as the souls of the parents, cannot generate another
incorporeal substance (because incorporeal substances do not undergo change), the
propagation of the human soul has to happen by virtue of a divine action, the
workings and nature of which remain invisible to us.
6.4. Bruno Seidel: A Lutheran in Defence of Creationism
Melanchthon’s message concerning the intellectual limits of the fallen man was
heard by another Lutheran, Bruno Seidel, although it led him to conclusions radi-
cally different from those reached by Caspar Peucer and GregorHorst. Seidel studied
arts at Wittenberg, under Philip Melanchthon, and medicine at Padua, under the
anatomist Gabriele Falloppio. The teaching he received at Wittenberg and his inter-
est in anatomy merged to form his work on the soul. In his 1594 Commentarius de
22 Gregor Horst, De natura humana, 482–483: «Has duas assertiones iam in medio relinquimus,
siquidemnon ignoramusquantadifficultate quaestio praesens involuta sit. Si tamenex animo
dicendum quid nobis probabile videatur, non negarem quod utraque opinio coniuncta reti-
neri queat, ita ut anima ex animamatris, quod vult Dn. Patruus, concurrente creatione, quod
vult altera sententia, producatur. Cum enimex anima per generationem non possit produci,
ergo addendum in sententia priori quod creatio concurrat. Cumque in primo conceptionis
momento non actu adsit anima rationalis, ergo superest quod potius exmatris quam ex patris
anima creetur, ubi nihil decedit patris dignitati, quia utriusque anima tam materna quam
paterna conveniunt essentia et perfectione».
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corpore animato, he sets out to explainAristotle’s teaching on the animate body, on the
basis of Melanchthon’s De anima, as well as by using the most up-to-date anatomy
of his time, namely that of Vesalius. The section of the book devoted to man’s intel-
ligent soul contains an extensive discussion of human animation.
According to Bruno Seidel, we cannot fathom the wonderful work of the intelli-
gence and power of God in nature:
We have to look in wonder and we cannot see deep within the work of the
wisdom and power of God in creation.23
For this reason, the problem of the origin of the soul is most difficult and can only
be solved by proposing the theorymost consistent with the Scriptures. Interestingly
enough, Seidel thinks that this theory is creationism.
In fact, Seidel sees a difference between the animation of plants and animals, on
the one hand, and of human beings, on the other. There is no doubt, Seidel explains,
that in both cases the souls are the work of God. However, God uses intermediary
causes in the creation of the souls of plants and animals. Plants and animals possess a
seminal virtue (virtus seminalis) or plastic faculty ( facultas plastica). Seidel is very likely
to have borrowed this latter notion from a text that I will analyse in the following
section of this article: Jacob Schegk’s embryological work De plastica seminis facultate
(1580). In fact, as Hiro Hirai has shown, Schegk was the first to have applied the term
‘plastic’ to thenotion of ‘moulding faculty’ (dunamis diaplastike), whichwas coinedby
Galen, in his On the Formation of the Foetus.24 According to Seidel, this plastic faculty
is an instrument of God, which is endowed with the power of generating the bodies
of plants and animals, together with their parts and organs. The plastic faculty also
draws their souls into actuality from the potentiality of the seed and blood of the
parents.25This process is very different from theway inwhich the souls ofmen come
into being. Seidel explains this in the following passage:
23 BrunoSeidel,Commentarius de corpore animato, 375: «Nosmirandumopus sapientiae et potentiae
Dei in creatione non penitus perspicimus».
24 The notion of ‘moulding faculty’ was used first by Galen and in the Middle Ages as an
explanation for the formationof the foetus andofnatural things in general. About this notion,
its redefinition as ‘plastic faculty’ by Schegk, and its popularity thereafter, see:HiroHirai, “The
Invisible Hand of God in Seeds: Jacob Schegk’s Theory of Plastic Faculty”, in Early Science and
Medicine 12 (2007), 377–404.
25 More precisely, Seidel thinks that God uses two types of intermediary natural causes in the
production of the all entities belonging to the physical world. According to Seidel, the plastic
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Others believe that the souls of individual men exist by means of God’s
creation, together with the organic body; so that God, by creating, infuses
those [the souls] into the bodies and by infusing, He creates. This opinion
is more true, as well as already accepted by many, and has to be approved.
For, without doubt, the rational souls of men are neither the effect of the
generative power nor the work of the secondary causes; and because they do
not originate by propagation of the seed, i.e., ex traduce, nor are they brought
into actuality by the power of matter; instead, they are introduced into it
[matter] fromoutsidebyGod, anexisting craftsman,whocreates those [souls]
ex nihilo – without any natural agent – and in an hypostatic, corporeal, and
essential manner [united] with the body. For, indeed he [God] infuses all the
powers of the soul together at the same time of animation and conjunction
of the soul with the body; in fact, he does not first insert the vegetative, then
the sensitive and lastly the intelligent [power]; for, the essence of the soul is
not divided according to any time or subject.26
faculty acts as the instrumental efficient cause in the generation of plants and brute animals;
but there also exists a principal efficient cause in nature, which coincides with the celestial
body (in the case of all natural things), or the body of the parents, in the case of animate bod-
ies: «Quamquam autem dubium nullum est quod nequaquam excludenda sit Dei praesentia
in formatione et vivificatione corporis cuiuscumque animatae et firmissime statuendum for-
mationem ac vitamDei opus etiam esse, tamen plantarum et brutorum animas Deus dat non
immediate, sed adhibitis mediis ac naturalibus causis, nempe materia phyisica et efficient
principali (qua generaliter est corpus caeleste concurrens ad omnium rerum generationes,
specialiter vero corpus animatum parentum, vel plantarum a quibus semina, surculi, radices
germinante diunamis praeditae sumuntur) et efficient instrumentali, quae est facultas sper-
matica et formatrix in seminibus» (Bruno Seidel, Commentarius de corpore animato, 371).
26 Bruno Seidel, Commentarius de corpore animato, 374: «Alii per creationem Dei existere animas
hominum singulorum credunt, simul cum corporibus organicis, ita ut Deus creando infun-
dat eas corporibus et infundendo creet; que est verior et iam a plerisque recepta et probanda
sententia. Nempe quod animae rationales hominum non sint generativae potentiae effectus
neque causarum naturalium opus, quodque propagatione seminis sive ex traduce non ori-
antur, neque ex potentiamateriae educantur in actum; sed introducantur in eam extrinsecus,
opifice existente et absque ullo agente naturali creante ex nihilo, atque hypostatice, corpo-
raliter et essentialiter cum corporibus vivente illas Deo. Ita quidem, ut omnes animae poten-
tias simul infundat eodem momento animationis atque unitionis animae cum coprore, non
autem primum immittat vegetantem, post sentientem et ultimo intelligentem, cum animae
essentia nullo tempore nulloque subiecto sit dividua».
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Contrary to Melanchthon, who believed that each human being possesses two
different souls (i.e., a lower soul, or ἐνδελέχεία, which was responsible for life and
sensation and a higher soul, or intelligent spirit), Seidel thought that the powers of
the human soul constituted one single essence; for this reason, they could not come
into being at different stages. Neither is this single essence, or soul, brought into
existence by secondary causes. Instead, the soul is created directly by God, together
with the body, so that soul and body could form a ‘hypostatic union’. We are already
familiar with this notion, which we found in Melanchthon’s Christology, as well
as in Casmann’s psychology. Both authors believed that idea of ‘hypostasis’ could
show a parallel between the two natures of Christ, on the one hand, andman’s body
and soul, on the other.27 Although it is perfectly reasonable to think that Seidel was
aware of these parallels between Christology and anthropology, he does not refer
directly to Melanchthon or Casmann. Moreover, the Commentarius de corpore animato
does not seem to elaborate on the notion of ‘hypostatic union’; nor does Seidel make
any explicit statement as to why he thinks such union comes about in a ‘corporeal
manner’ (corporaliter). However, Seidel appears to treat the notions of ‘hypostasis’ and
‘ens’, or substance (the result of the union between form andmatter), as synonyms.28
Such hypostasis is produced when God infuses all the powers of the soul together in
the human body.
Interestingly enough, a few lines further in Seidel’s text, we are told that the
opinion above is merely the most probable one. For as Martin Luther privately
recognised, it would not be impossible for God to arrange nature in such a way
that the soul could come into being ex traduce. However, Seidel explains, this is not
what the Holy Scriptures teach, and it is for this reason that Luther never taught
traducianism in public and that creationism is to be accepted.
To sum up, mainly two points were at the centre of sixteenth-century Lutheran
authors’ discussions about the origin of the human soul. One amounted to concerns
about the transmission of original sin. The other regarded an account of genera-
27 See: supra, ‘Chapter 1’, 77–82. and ‘Chapter 4’, 133–140.
28 For instance, when explaining why there is only one soul in each man, Seidel considers the
‘hypostasis’ to be the same as ‘individual’, or ‘substance’: «ex materia et forma consituitur ens
et unum, sicut etiam ex corpore et anima, quemadmodum paulo ante fuit dictum. Unius igi-
tur una tantum esse potest forma et anima. Nam si plures inessent animae in corpore, non
unus, sed plures homines in uno corpore existerent, et nemo hominum esset unum indi-
viduum vel una hypostasis, sed triplex secundum triplicem animam» (Bruno Seidel, Commen-
tarius de corpore animato, 335).
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tion consistent with two philosophical ideas: first, an immaterial substance (the
intellective soul in this specific case) cannot undergo change; second, an incorpo-
real substance cannot generate from a corporeal one, In the case of works on the soul
produced atWittenberg, this enquiry developed along the lines ofMelanchthon’sDe
anima and its warning that natural philosophy could look at the human soul and its
origin only as fromwithout. According toMelanchthon, only theChristian faith and
the Gospel are able to inform the fallen man about the source and the destiny of his
soul. Melanchthon’s cautionary approach to the problem of animation was heard
by his followers, but the way in which it played out in their works varied. In the
cases of Caspar Peucer andGregorHorst, the recognition of the fact that the origin of
the soul was surrounded with mystery amounted to a theory of animation halfway
betweencreationismand traducianism.According to them, the soulwas transmitted
from the parents to the offspring in a way that surpassed the laws of nature and the
human grasp. Bruno Seidel’s account of human animation was supported by a com-
parativelymore robustnatural-philosophical argumentation.Because the secondary
causes and the physical virtues dispersed in nature cannot explain the production of
the incorporeal soul of man, creationism is deemedmore plausible. However, Seidel
eventually accepted this opinion on the basis of what he considered to be the teach-
ing of the Scriptures and of Luther himself.
Sixteenth-century discussions regarding human animation developed of course
beyond the University of Wittenberg and drew the attention of commentators of
Aristotle’s De anima who worked at other Lutheran institutions. In what follows, I
shall look at two such commentators – Jacob Schegk and Johann Ludwig Hawen-
reuter – and their respective views on the origin of the human soul.
6.5. Jacob Schegk and Johann Ludwig Hawenreuter:
The Origin of the Soul in Lutheran Aristotelianism
The commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima by Jacob Schegk and Johan Ludwig Ha-
wenreuter seem to differ from books on the soul produced at Wittenberg both in
their structure and in the extent to which they considered human natural under-
standing to be capable of grasping the essence of the soul. As I have illustrated,
Melanchthon and his followers believed that knowledge of the essence of the soul
was hidden from man in his fallen state. For this reason, they used Aristotle and
the most up-to-date anatomical findings to provide an operational (as opposed to
an essential) account of the soul. Their psychologies indeed included a discussion of
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the human body and the lower (vegetative and sensitive) faculties of the soul, as well
as an account of the intellective soul of man and its origin based on the teaching of
the Christian Gospel. Their books on the soul consisted in fact of a description of the
entirety of the human nature (rather than the soul alone), in its fallen state. As two
committed Lutherans, Schegk and Hawenreuter also wrote philosophical accounts
of the soul in view of the Christian truth. However, their books on the soul are not
treatises on the fallen human nature and do not include a part on human anatomy.
Instead, they relied on Aristotle’s De anima, which defined the soul as the form of a
body possessing life potentially. The comparatively larger use of Aristotle on the part
of Schegk and Hawenreuter influences the way in which Schegk and Hawenreuter
conceived of humananimation. Their views about the origin of the soul arenonethe-
less to be understood against the background of their Christian (or Lutheran) faith,
as we are about to see.
Jacob Schegk was a very influential philosopher and physician, who worked at
Tübingen. He was a committed Lutheran, who contributed to the reintroduction of
the Aristotelian corpus in Protestant schools, as well as to the debate about the per-
sonal union of the two natures of Christ, at the behest of Duke Christoph (in favour
of the real presence of the body andblood of Christ in the Eucharist).29 In 1546, Schegk
published a commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, which also contained a commentary
onDe anima. In effect, Schegk thought that the science of the soul belonged, at least
in part, to physics. Insofar as the soul is conceived as a kind of corporeal substance,
its study belongs to physics; on the other hand, as the incorporeal soul of man, it
is considered by a higher science, i.e., theology (theologia), which studies the divine
substances.30 Schegk treats the origin of the soul in the last book of his De anima,
29 About this, see: Sachiko Kusukawa, “Lutheran Uses of Aristotle”, 180–182.
30 Jacob Schegk, In octo Physicorum, 252: «Physicus certe unde et quemadmodum affectae et consi-
tutae resmoveantur investigat. Ita enimuniversa pro eo utmotus non sunt expertia cognoscit
quare et formam, gratia cuius cietur quicquid in motu est, quo gignitur aliquid et causam
unde excitat motus, et materiam quae subiecta est, et quam habilem esse atque idoneam
propter certamspeciemnecesse est, utparticepsmotionis esse queat.Quaeomnia cumanimali
causa animae motionum insint et tribuantur, quis non videt hanc scientiam peculiarem esse
ac propriam eius quem indagatorem naturae nominamus, aut physicum? Veruntamen non
quaelibet animahocmodo solet explicari. Quare non omnis de anima cognition ei concedenda
nisi omnem philosophiam nominare physicen velimus, et non tantum eam quae rationes
rerum et causas motionibus demonstrate. Mens certe ipsa nec idoneum corpus efficit ut
moveatur, quam Aristotelis inquit, ne fingere quidam aut comminisci licet, quo pacto corpus
informet. Sed enim necmovet ipsum quin plane omni causa motionis vacans, cui dubium sit
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but his most complete account of animation is found in a separate treatise entitled
De plastica seminis facultate (1580). As we have seen, this book was probably the source
of Seidel’s idea of ‘plastic faculty’. In his embryological treatise, Schegk looks at the
plastic faculty as the main responsible for the generation of plants and animals, as
well as for their souls. As Hiro Hirai has pointed out, Schegk thought that the plas-
tic faculty was the ‘hand’ of God, through which the Creator skilfully preserved the
species.31 But when it comes to the animation of human beings, Schegk explains,
the plastic faculty is not all there is. At the end of the first book of the De plastica
seminis facultate, Schegk addresses the creation of the human soul and states what
follows:
I believe that if the philosophers had recognised God the Creator, theywould
have agreed with us and would have said that the souls are not contained
in the seed and in the seminal liquid of the male before they [the souls]
informthehumanbodies. For, bydenyingGod theCreator, or ratherbybeing
ignorant of Him, they were clearly forced to admit that the human soul and
the body were produced at the same time, by means of the spermatic logos;
and that the human soul was not introduced from outside but drawn from
the potentiality of matter.32
quin inter res etiam divinas ipsa numeretur? Reliques partes omnesmotione definiuntur ali-
qua et perpessione, ut quae nutricatur corpus anima, item quae sentit, nec non quae in loco
movet, quae quidem non dici mens debet, ut quidam arbitrantur, cum in loco progrediantur
etiam quae rationis expertia sunt appetitu quodam, non ratione etmente excitata. Ex quo par
est intelligi ad philosophiam superiorem, quam theologiam nominant, magis pertinere». It
seems legitimate to think that here ‘theologia’ is the same as ‘metaphysics’. In fact, earlier, on
the same page, Schegk calls ‘theologia’ the knowledge of things divine or substances that are
not mixed with the body. For more details and bibliography regarding Renaissance discus-
sions on the disciplinary status of the science of the soul, see: supra, ‘Chapter 1’, 38–41.
31 HiroHirai, “The InvisibleHand of God in Seeds: Jacob Schegk’s Theory of Plastic Faculty”, 386–
388.
32 Jacob Schegk,Deplastica seminis facultate libri tres, b7r: «Credo philosophos, si agnovissentDeum
creatorem, nobiscum consensuros, et non prius animas, quam informent corpora humana,
in semine ac genitali humore masculini sexus contineri dixissent. Nam creatorem Deum
negantes, aut potius nescientes, cogerentur certe fateri: τῷ σμερματικῷ λόγῳ simul animam
humanam, et corpus ipsi nasci, et non θύραθεν introduci, sed educi animam humanam de
potentia materiae».
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Like Bruno Seidel, Schegk thought that the human soul was created directly
by God anew, in each individual. In contrast with the cautionary remarks we have
observed in the works of other Lutherans, Schegk had no doubt that it was only by
being ignorant of the existence of a Creator that one could deny the direct creation
of the human souls by God. On the one hand, Schegk’s theory of human anima-
tion resulted from his analysis of the nature and powers of the plastic faculty. On
the other hand, his conclusions reflect the importance he ascribed to the Christian
revelation. Schegk stressed this point inhisDeanima too,where he praised bothAris-
totle and Plato for having understood that the intellect of man was not drawn from
the potentiality of matter, but was inserted in man’s body from outside. However,
Schegk stressed that Aristotle’s and Plato’s theories were still insufficient to explain
the origin of the soul: according to them, if somethingwas produced, it also changed
and eventually ceased to exist. Therefore, in order to avoid this consequence, Plato
and Aristotle mistakenly thought that the human soul was eternal (both a parte post
and a parte ante). According to Schegk, it was only through the Christian faith that
one could conceive of the soul as something that was both eternal a parte post, or
immortal, and had a beginning, because its source was God, who created all things
ex nihilo.33
The attempt to reconcile a rational understanding of the soul with Christian
views regarding God’s creation and the transmission of original sin also marks the
case of the Lutheran Ludwig Hawenreuter, who taught medicine, metaphysics, and
natural philosophy at Strasburg, from 1585 until his death in 1618. He certainly knew
the work of Schegk through Andreas Planer, under whom Hawenreuter earned his
doctorate from Tübingen.34 Like Schegk, Hawenreuter wrote a commentary on Aris-
totle’sDe anima (1605), in which he argued that the science of the soul stood halfway
between natural philosophy and a higher science. Insofar as the soul was taken to
be the form of a living body, it was the business of the natural philosopher; but the
consideration of themind (mens) of humanbeings pertained tometaphysics.35To the
intellective soul of manHawenreuter devoted the third book of hisDe anima, where
33 Jacob Schegk, In octo Physicorum, 352.
34 See: supra, ‘Chapter 1’, 28.
35 Johann Ludwig Hawenreuter, In Aristotelis De Animo et Parva Naturalia, 3–4: «Deinde a subjecto
horum librorum [of De anima] quod partim sub Physici, partim sub Metaphysici & primi
Philosophi contemplationem cadit: quatenus mens corpus informat, & suas corpore oper-
ationes exercet, a Physico consideratur, quatenus autem separata, & a corpore seiuncta est,
essentiam eamMetaphysicus perpendit».
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he defended the doctrine of traducianism.36 His view was known at least since 1590,
when it was published in Rudolph Goclenius’ Psychologia. In his analysis of human
animation, Hawenreuter was mainly concerned with explaining the transmission
of original sin. Like Peucer and Horst, Hawenreuter believed that creationism could
not account for such transmission, without admitting either that the intellective
soul could be acted upon by the body or that God was responsible for the presence
of sin in eachman.37 This observation led Peucer and Horst to believe that the sinful
human soul was transmitted from parents to offspring in a supernatural or mirac-
ulous way, which would remain unknown to the human understanding. In a way
different from these authors,Hawenreuter opted for a rational understanding of the
transmission of the soul, in terms of the natural dynamic of potentiality and actu-
ality: the intellective soul of man is potentially in the seed of the parents and then
brought into actualitywhen the foetus is sufficiently developed.38Of course,Hawen-
reuter did not think that the transmission of the soul lied entirely with a natural
agent (the seed). Such natural process, he explains, would not be possible without
God’s command ‘be fruitful andmultiply’.39According toHawenreuter, thewords of
Genesis 1,28 were constantly effective in the production of all natural things, includ-
ing the human soul. This is not the only way, however, in which Hawenreuter saw
the interaction betweenGod’s action andman’s soul. In fact, he proposed a new solu-
tion to one of the central problems in the discussions among the authors I have so
36 According to Leen Spruit, The Origin of the Soul From Antiquity to the Early Modern Era, 86,
Hawenreuter’s traducianism drew the attention of the Roman Congregation for the Index.
37 Goclenius, Psychologia, 373: «Praeterea, cum peccatum propagator in hominibus, vel perfectus
erit animus, qui cum corpore non generator, vel imperfectus et peccatis abnoxius. Si perfectus
esse dicatur, et cum corpore coniunctus imperfectus fiery, a corpore patiatur necesse est,
quod est absurdum. Si imperfectus et peccatis conteminatus, Deus auctor fit peccati, quod est
blasphemum».
38 Goclenius, Psychologia, 371: «Principio ergo quaerimus de origine animi non omnis, sed intel-
ligentis; nutrientem anim animum et sentientem una cum re animate nasci nemo dubitat,
sed intelligente omnis est disputatio. Censemus autem di homo generetur quod simul ipsius
animus generetur, et quod in semine hominis potestate insit animus et postea in actum trad-
ucatur. Quod secundo loco confirmamus auctoritate Aristotelis, qui, lib. 2. De gener. Animal.
Cap. 3.Ubi ex professo de origine animidisserit, totamdoctrinamconcludit, quoddixerit, quo-
modo in foetu et semine insit animus et determinaverit potestate inesse, non actu».
39 Genesis 1,28 appears to have been very popular with Lutherans and used by them as a rhetor-
ical tool to rebut the Catholic ideal of religious celibacy. About this see: Kathleen Crowther,
“ ‘Be Fruitful and Multiply’: Genesis and Generation in Reformation Germany”, Renaissance
Quarterly 55.3 (2002), 904–935.
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far analysed. They all were worried that thinking that the human soul was drawn
from the potentiality of matter was inconsistent with the soul’s incorporeality and
immortality. According to Hawenreuter, this problem could be solved as follows:
To the first argument it is replied that the soul can certainly be separated
from the body and be without it; but this does not happen according to
the nature of the soul created in the beginning by God, according to which
the soul would never be separated from matter and the body. Rather, this
disintegration [of the natural bond between body and soul] is the price of sin,
as is said in Paul’s letter To the Romans, 7.23.40
According to Hawenreuter, the soul is not separable from the body, insofar as it is in
its natural state: no form in nature can exist without its matter. As a consequence
of sin, however, the bond between the soul and its body has been destroyed and
the soul can exist in an unnatural state of separation from the body. In the cases
of Peucer and Horst, a supernatural and unknowable way of transmission of the
soul was the only way to conceive of the transmission of original sin in mankind,
while maintaining the natural incorporeality and immortality of the soul. Instead,
on Hawenreuter’s account, original sin is propagated through the natural process
of transmission of the intellective soul, from man to man. What is beyond nature,
Hawenreuter explained, is the fact that the intellective soul can exist without the
body; this would not have been possible before the fall.
6.6. Conclusions
Lutheran professors of arts and medicine, who worked in the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries, considered nature and the soul to be God’s doing. This idea was
essential to Philip Melanchthon, who sponsored it through the creation of a new
educational systematWittenberg. According toMelanchthon,however, natural phi-
losophy could only helpman recognise the hand of a divine architect behind nature
whereas the certainty about this truth could only be obtained by faith and trust in
40 Goclenius, Psychologia, 374: «Ad primum autem argumentum respondetur, posse quidem ani-
mumamateria et corpore separari et absque eo esse; sed id non fieri secundumnaturamanimi
a principio aDeo creatam, secundumquamnunquamamateria et corpore animus fuisset sep-
aratus. Verum hanc dissolutionem esse stipendium peccati, ut D. Paulus ad Rom. 7., v. 23».
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the teaching of the ChristianGospel. Also knowledge of the source and destiny of the
human soul was to be found in the Scriptures. For Melanchthon, the soul was most
assuredly made by God for an eternal life. But the exact way in which God brought
about the individual souls of men remained hidden from the human understand-
ing.
Such uncertainty about the precise origin of the soul shaped the discussions of
most early-modern Lutherans and ensured that they could explore very diverseways
to conceive of human animation. According to Ludwig Hawenreuter, God devised
and fosterednature, so that thehuman soulwould come intobeing through the seed
of the parents, as it happened to all other animate species. Jacob Schegk and Bruno
Seidel thought it impossible for an incorporeal form like thehuman soul to bedrawn
from the potentiality of matter, that is, from the seed of the parents. Therefore, they
thought that the individual souls of men were created directly by God ex nihilo. As
they could see difficulties with both traducianism and creationism, Caspar Peucer
and Gregor Horst opted for a third way: the soul was transmitted from the parents
to their offspring, albeit in awondrousway,which included the cooperation ofGod’s
action and surpassed the laws of natural generation.
The variety of theories presented by the authors I have taken into exam suggests
that Lutherans were not expected to conform to one specific view about the origin
of the soul. The very fathers of the Protestant reformation,Martin Luther and Philip
Melanchthon, remained either silent or uncertain about the origin of man’s soul.
However, concerns about the transmission of original sin in mankind led many
Lutherans to believe that Luther’s and Melanchthon’s caution also meant that the
truth of creationism could be doubted. The idea that God created each individual
soul anew and ex nihilowas deemed inconsistent with one fundamental conviction:
after the fall, the human soul is irremediably sinful.
Lutheran theology, at the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seven-
teenth century, doesnot seemtohave prescribed one single doctrine about the origin
of the soul. However, traducianism became increasingly popular among Lutheran
professors of arts and medicine at the time. German Catholics, such as the Ingol-
stadt Jesuits, issued official documents in which traducianism was singled out as
the rival theory, which was defended by Luther, and creationism was considered to
be defining of their religious camp. The extent to which Lutherans regarded them-
selves committed to traducianism is less clear and further study on the interplay
between Lutheran theology and discussions on the origin of the soul seems to be
promising, in at least twoways: itmight help us understand the emergence of early-
modern theories of animation and it might shed new light on the formation of a
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Lutheran confessional identity at the turn of the seventeenth century. In the mean-
time, I would like to draw the following conclusions.
First, scholarly attempts to identify sixteenth-century traducianism as a dis-
tinctly Lutheran affair is helpful only to a certain extent. In fact, to the best of my
knowledge and as I hope to have shown, traducianismwas not implied by Lutheran
theology.
Second and more in general, the idea of identifying rigid blocks, such that one
can link specific philosophical opinions to determinate religious affiliations, might
make us miss two important aspects involved in psychology in the age of confes-
sionalisation and in the formation of different confessional identities. The case of
sixteenth-century disputes on the origin of the soul shows, on the one hand, that
the emergence of such identities was not necessarily a consequence of official state-
ments of doctrine, but rather the result of the conflict between confessional camps.
Asofficial statementson thepart of the Ingolstadt Jesuitswere issued,whichascribed
traducianism toMartin Luther, a specific theory concerning the origin of the human
soul became more and more defining of the Lutheran camp. It seems then as if the
formation of the Lutheran identity in this case was nurtured more by the Jesuits’
opposition to the Lutherans than by official statements on the part of the Lutherans
themselves. On the other hand, the very fact that the controversies about human
animation contributed – in whatever way they did – to the emergence of denomina-
tional parties offers some further corroboration to the following idea: thediscussions
about the origin of the soul I examined in this study can be fruitfully considered as
part, and not as a consequence, of the formation of intellectual groups of different
confessional affiliation.
chapter 7
Final Conclusions
7.0. Summary of the Research Conducted in This Thesis
In this thesis I have addressed the interaction between the transformations of psy-
chology and the process of confessionalisation in the sixteenth century. My enquiry
started by the observation that ideas regarding the soul also were part of Martin
Luther’s fierce attacks on theRomanpapacy, aswell as of his ensuing efforts to devise
a new theology based on the notion of salvation by faith alone (or sola fide).
Salvation sola fide meant to Luther chiefly two things. First, that man’s deeds
were ineffective as for his salvation, which could instead be achieved through faith
in Christ only. Second, that this faith in Christ could be obtained only by hearing the
Gospel and the law of God as they were revealed in the Scriptures. As an immediate
consequence of this belief, Luther began questioning the role of the Pope as an
intermediarybetweenGodandman. In the opening sectionof this thesis I referred to
Luther’s mockery of everything papal, including important doctrines regarding the
soul. As we have seen, especially in To the ChristianNobility of the GermanNation (1520),
Luther ironically said that the Pope was free to decree that the soul was the form of
the body and that philosophy could demonstrate the immortality of the intellective
soul as much as he was free to say that he was the emperor of the world and God on
earth.
As a result of Luther’s satirising comments, I wondered in which way his ideas
impacted on doctrines of the soul among authors who embraced the Lutheran faith.
The two doctrines criticised by Luther in his To the Christian Nobility of the Ger-
man Nation were precisely the decisions made during the Council of Vienne (1311–
1312) and the Fifth Lateran Council (1512–1517). But – I asked in first part of the
present work – did Luther and his followers limit their critics to these two doc-
trines?
Moreover, Luther’s attacks on theRomanChurch later resulted in themovement
known as Reformation. Thismovement, in turn, triggered the process of confession-
alisation: the transformation by which western Christianity became divided into
three main confessional groups (Lutheranism, Catholicism, Calvinism) and many
minor ones. But, how did this process interact with psychological doctrines about
the human soul and the soul-body relationship that were of immediate theological
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relevance? Did sixteenth-century confessionalisation give birth to something like a
Lutheran way of looking at the soul, or to a Lutheran psychology?
In the preceding chapters I followed these research questions by lookingmainly
at one specific case of the development of psychology in the age of confessionalisa-
tion: the works on the soul produced by Philip Melanchthon and by several authors
who embraced Melanchthon’s new faith and considered his Commentarius de anima
and Liber de anima as their preferred framework for the study of the soul. Further-
more, because many important ideas found in the works of these authors are the
outcome of controversies, I have taken into account the relevant writings by some of
Melanchthon’s and his followers’ foes.
Well then, what does the study conducted so far tell us about psychology in the
ageof confessionalisation?Did thepsychologicalworkswrittenbyMelanchthonand
his followers result in something like a Lutheranway of looking at the soul?Howdid
their psychologies interact with the emergence of Lutheran confessional identity?
In order to provide some answers to the main questions I asked in this thesis,
let us first recapitulate the principal elements that emerged from the preceding
chapters.
7.1. ἐνδελέχεια and the Attempt to Embody
the Vegetative and Sensitive Souls
Some of the works on the soul I have considered in this research are characterised
by an attempt to provide an operational account of the lower powers (vegetative and
sensitive) of the human soul: an account of the soul that does not try to define the
essence of the soul but rather the operations the soul performs in the human body.
True, this view can be found in several medieval commentators on Aristotle’sDe
anima. After all, Aristotle himself had stated that in order to know what the soul is,
one had to look at its properties. Yet, in the texts I examined, this view took on a new
meaning,which I showed tobe rooted in PhilipMelanchthon’s understanding of the
relationship between knowledge obtained through God’s Gospel and that obtained
through philosophy. While Melanchthon agreed with Luther that the essence of
the human soul in its immaterial and immortal nature could only be knowable
through the Gospel, he thought that a philosophical understanding of some of the
soul’s operationswas nonetheless possible, or evennecessary. It is for this reason that
Melanchthonand someofhis followers strove tograsp theworkingsof the vegetative
and sensitive souls in the human body.
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Chiefly in Philip Melanchthon’s books on the soul, but subsequently also in
the psychologies written by Rudolph Snellius and Otto Casmann, this endeavour
to embody the lower souls became interwoven with the diffusion of the concept of
‘ἐνδελέχεια’, as a new way of looking at the corporeal soul of man.
To be precise, at the timeMelanchthon worked on psychology, the term ‘ἐνδελέ-
χεια’ was all but new. Whether this term or rather the similar one ‘ἐντελέχεια’ was
the definition of the soul found in Aristotle’s De anima had been a humanist dis-
cussion already in the Italian Quattrocento. In its humanist fashion, this discussion
addressed the opinion expressed by Cicero, in his Tusculan Disputations, according to
which Aristotle had defined the soul as ἐνδελέχεια or continuous agitation of the
body.Outstandinghumanists, suchasArgyropulos andPolitian,marshalled all their
philological skills to determine whether Cicero’s reading of Aristotle’sDe animawas
correct. But when this discussion reached Melanchthon the choice between ἐντε-
λέχεια or ἐνδελέχεια stopped being a philological one: in accepting Cicero’s use of
ἐνδελέχεια to define the soul as a movement of the body, Melanchthon said: ego non
rixor de vocabulo.
Melanchthon’s use of ‘ἐνδελέχεια’ didnot stemsomuch fromaphilological anal-
ysis of Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations vis-à-vis Aristotle’s De anima. What Melanch-
thonwas pursuingwas away of describing the vegetative and sensitive souls ofman
in terms of the actions they performed in the human body. As he was trying to har-
monise Luther’s idea that the soul’s essence was unknowable with a philosophical
account of the soul’s operations, Melanchthon appropriated the humanist debate
on Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations and gave it a doctrinal significance. The result was
a philosophical account of the soul as ἐνδελέχεια, which, to Melanchthon meant a
movement of the body or of the bodily spirits.
In the first chapter of this thesis, I showed that the diffusion of the debate on
Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations in northern Europe was in many cases determined
by Melanchthon’s discussion in his Commentarius and Liber de anima. Some Protes-
tant authors endorsed Cicero’s use of ‘ἐνδελέχεια’, whilst other authors, mainly Veit
Amerbachandhis Jesuit followers at Ingolstadtmaintained that the soulwas a perfec-
tio or ἐντελέχεια. In both cases, however, the choice between the stand taken by these
authors in the debate was not of a philological nature, but amounted to accepting
or refusing Melanchthon’s doctrine. This doctrine was the result of Melanchthon’s
attempt to make Luther’s views on philosophy and the Gospel compatible with a
philosophical account of the soul.
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7.2. Spirits and the Spiritualising of the Human Soul
On the one hand, I have showed that Melanchthon thought that the lower soul
of man (encompassing the vegetative and sensitive operations) corresponded to the
bodily spirits or to an agitation ormovement of thebodily spirits.On the otherhand,
I pointed to the fact that Melanchthon used the word ‘spirit’ in other contexts of
his psychology and to indicate entities very different to the bodily spirits and their
ἐνδελέχεια.
True, Melanchthon made room for a philosophical/operational account of the
lower soul in the context of his Lutheran faith. However, he did not renounce to
integrate this faith in his books on psychology. Melanchthon conveyed his Chris-
tian views about the soul through his Commentarius and Liber de anima. He did it by
ascribing to human beings a higher soul that was altogether different from the bod-
ily spirits. Thishigher soul –which included the operations of intellect andwill –was
provided with innate notions of civic morals, an idea that has been showed to have
servedMelanchthon’s confessional efforts of disciplining the Lutherans in Saxony.
Therefore, Melanchthon used ‘spirit’ to refer to man’s intellect and will too.
For Melanchthon, these operations should not be ascribed to the bodily spirits or
ἐνδελέχεια, but to an immaterial and immortal substance, which could only be
grasped through the teaching of the Christian Scriptures. Melanchthon called this
substance: spiritus intelligens.
What is more, Melanchthon also used ‘spirit’ in yet another way in his Liber de
anima: spirit was also the Holy Spirit. To make matters worse, the Liber de anima
explained that the interaction of all these (bodily, intelligent, and Holy) spirits was
central to man’s choices and behaviour in his mortal life. As I explained in the
second chapter of this thesis, this(if awkward) interaction was part and parcel of
Melanchthon’s doctrine of salvation by faith alone, intended as the renewal of the
soul on the part of the Holy Spirit and as the presence of the Holy Spirit itself in the
soul of the believers.
Melanchthon’s overlappinguses of ‘spiritus’made someofhis adversaries – chiefly
Julius Caesar Scaliger – worry that ‘spirit’ was either too vague a term or even a
category dangerously lending itself to a materialistic interpretation of the soul,
because it indicated an item too similar to the bodily spirits. Scaliger’s criticism of
Melanchthon’s doctrine of the soul as ‘spiritus’ wasmatched by asmuch appreciation
on the part of some Protestant authors who drew on theWittenberg reformer’s psy-
chology. Especially Melanchthon’s followers Rudolph Snellius and Otto Casmann
thought that, pace Scaliger, it was clear enough that the point Melanchthon wanted
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to make in his books about the soul was the following one: man’s higher soul is an
immaterial spirit, a substance completely different to all thingsbodily, including the
vegetative and sensitive souls.
I think Snellius and Casmann were in some respect right. What Melanchthon
was trying to say, albeit uneasily, was that each human being had two souls: one, the
ἐνδελέχεια, virtually corresponded to the bodily spirits; the other, the spiritus intelli-
gens, was knowable only through the Scriptures and corresponded to an immaterial
and immortal substance, provided with innate notions ofmorals. InMelanchthon’s
psychology, much effort in embodying the lower powers of the soul was balanced
by a spiritualising of man’s intellect and will. This spiritualising was both ontolog-
ical (man’s higher soul was in fact a spiritual substance) and epistemological (man’s
higher soul could not be known bymeans of human rational understanding).
Snellius and Casmann defendedMelanchthon’s views for many reasons. Impor-
tantly, they thought that Melanchthon’s doctrine of the soul was preferable to Aris-
totle’s and held water, despite Scaliger’s criticisms, because it was more in keep-
ing with their Christian faith. According to Snellius and Casmann, Melanchthon’s
psychology mirrored what the Holy Scriptures taught about the human soul, viz.,
that the soul was a spiritual and immortal substance. Especially Otto Casmann
drew onMelanchthon’s definition of the soul in a move that in my opinion pushed
Melanchthon’s spiritualising tendency even further.
7.3. The Christologising of the Human Soul
Otto Casmann devoted an entire section of his Psychologia anthropologica to rejecting
Scaliger’s criticism of Melanchthon’s psychology, hence to defending the latter’s
conception of the soul as spiritus intelligens. Casmann also referred to the spiritus
intelligens as anima logica and thought that this spiritual entity defined man and
even more than the possession of rationality made human beings differ from lower
animals. Casmann preferred to look at man as a being possessing a spirit (or anima
logica) rather than rationality, because he thought that man had to be defined in his
relationship to the Christian divinity.
In the third chapter of this thesis, I explained this point by taking into consider-
ation Casmann’s criticism of some views defended by the Spanish physician Francis-
cus Vallesius. According to Vallesius, lower animals shared withmen the possession
of some degrees of rationality. Casmann argued against this view. But whilst part
of his criticism of Vallesius addressed specific points of the latter’s arguments, Cas-
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mannalsobasedhis counterarguments ondeeper philosophical convictions. Accord-
ing to Casmann, animals could not be granted the same type of rational thinking
possessed bymen, becauseman’s rational thinking implied the possession of a spirit
or anima logica. This anima logica, in its turn, involved a determinate ontological set-
up that Casmann based on Christology.
Philip Melanchthon had explained that Christ was composed of two natures
united in one person and that these twonatures formed a hypostasis, or hypostatical
union. Melanchthon added to this that the same hypostatical relationship hold-
ing between Christ’s two natures also existed between man’s body and soul. As I
pointed out in the sixth chapter of the present work, also Melanchthon’s follower
Bruno Seidel used the notion of hypostasis to identify the type of unity taking place
betweenman’s body and soul. But Casmann interpretedMelanchthon’s conception
in a very specific way. According to Casmann, the well-known Christian teaching
that man was created in God’s image and likeness had to be understood as follows:
man’s ontological structure has to mirror Christ’s. For this reasonman’s possession
of rationality did not identify the specificity of human beings as much as Christ’s
divine nature did not suffice to characterise the person of Christ as a whole. There-
fore, according to Casmann, just as Christ’s entire person had to be understood as
a relationship between two natures, so the specificity of human beings had to be
found in a hypostatic union between a body and a spirit, or anima logica. The differ-
ence between anima logica and a the rational soul (which anima logica nonetheless
encompassed) is that the latter only indicated a biological difference between man
and beasts. The former, instead, pointed to man’s more profound ontological iden-
tity as a being created in God’s image and likeness, whichmirrored the nature of the
second person of the Christian Trinity: Christ.
Casmann defended Melanchthon’s notion of the soul as ‘spiritus intelligens’, but
I think he also brought Melanchthon’s spiritualising views of man’s higher soul to
a different level. According to Casmann, that man was a spiritual being meant that
man was defined by a relationship to the Christian divinity.
7.4. The HumanNature as the Subject Matter of the
De anima and the Anatomical Knowledge of the Body.
A New Project and Its Unintended Consequences
As I showed, especially in the fifth chapter of this thesis, a tendency to rearrange
the mutual articulation of psychology and anthropology in the context of natu-
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ral philosophy is perhaps the most shared element among the works I considered
for the present research. Bruno Seidel, Gregor Horst, Rudolph Snellius, and Otto
Casmann wrote books on the soul that drew on Melanchthon’s psychology in sev-
eral respect. Certainly, all of them agreed with Melanchthon on one specific point:
the science of the soul should not address the soul as a general principal of life in
plant, animals, and humans. The scientia de anima rather had to consider the soul as
a special part of its enquiry, which more properly addressed the human nature as a
whole.
As I have documented, Melanchthon’s Commentarius de anima and Liber de anima
differed from most of their medieval and contemporary books on the soul in that
they assigned a new subject to the scientia de anima. According to Melanchthon, the
book calledDe anima should address the entirety of human nature, which included
both man’s soul and man’s body. Some of Melanchthon’s followers at Wittenberg
and elsewhere in Germany and the Low Countries followed suit.
This transformation canbe captured already by looking at the titles and subtitles
of their works. Bruno Seidel entitled his 1594 book on the soul Commentarius de corpore
animato ac potissimum quidem de corpore et anima hominis. The subtitle of this work
states that the Commentarius is meant to make Aristotle’s teaching about the soul
easier to understand, by integrating the doctrines of those who studied the fabrica
of the human body (like Galen and Vesalius) as well as the ideas of some of Aristotle’s
commentators, chiefly Philip Melanchthon’s. Two years later, the Dutch Rudolph
Snellius also published a In Melanchthonis de anima, vel potius de hominis physiologia
libellum, which title already suggests that Snellius looked at Melanchthon’s Liber
de anima as a book on the nature (physiologia) of man. Snellius better explains his
intentions in the prolegomenon of his work on the soul: the De anima receives its
name from the most noble part of man, viz., the soul. However, a more opportune
name for the book traditionally called ‘On the Soul’ should be ‘OnHuman Physiology’.
As a consequence, Snellius also divided his book into two parts, as he believed that
the entirety of the human nature consisted of a soul and of a body.
Even more radically than Seidel and Snellius, Gregor Horst and Otto Casmann
included their psychologies in books that explicitly referred to the human nature
in their titles. Horst used the teaching about the soul he had heard in Wittenberg
to write a De natura humana libri duo, quorum prior de corporis structura, posterior de
anima tractat. AndOtto Casmann defendedMelanchthon’s doctrine of the soul in his
Psychologia anthropologica, sive anima humana doctrina; a book which together with a
separate treatise on the human body (the Somatotomia) should form a bigger science:
anthropologia.
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On the one hand, these authors further developed and gave a more system-
atic set-up to Melanchthon’s own ideas regarding the science of the soul. On the
other hand, Melanchthon’s ideas were the result of his efforts to harmonise a tra-
ditional philosophical discipline, the science of the soul, with Luther’s ideas of sin
and grace. As I have showed, Luther believed that the soul and the body ofmanwere
both affected by the original sin and that both were also the subject of divine grace.
Because of this, Luther deemed Aristotle’s psychology inadequate to properly under-
stand the soul’s nature. As we have seen, Luther’s Disputatio de homine rejected both
the idea that the soulwas the formof the body and the traditional conception ofman
as ‘animal rationales’. According to Luther, these notions grasped the human nature
only in itsmortal state. However, Luther explained,man should be understood from
a Christian point of view. To Luther’s mind, this meant essentially two things: man
should be considered not primarily as a rational being, but as God’s creature, that is,
as the subject of sin and grace. As a consequence of this, Luther taught, an adequate
consideration of man should be about the body as much as about the soul.
Philip Melanchthon sought to find a new balance between Luther’s ideas and
a philosophical account of the soul, which Melanchthon considered indispensable
for the education of the Lutheran youth. In his Commentarius de anima and Liber de
anima, Melanchthon conveyed Luther’s teaching by addressing the entirety ofman’s
nature, both the soul and the body. In the new shape it obtained at the hand of
Melanchthon, Luther’s emphasis on the entirety of man’s nature was received by
professors of arts and medicine such as Seidel, Horst, Snellius, and Casmann. In
this sense, the transformation of the scientia de anima into a new discipline called
anthropologia found its trigger in Luther’s understanding of man from a Christian
point of view.
But the shift of the subject matter of the scientia de anima, from the soul to the
human nature, also implied two further elements of novelty: first, the introduction
of anatomy in psychology; second and as a result of this change, the emergence of
new ways of looking at the human body.
On the one hand, Melanchthon’s use of anatomy in the science of the soul was
motivated by his strive to study the vegetative and sensitive operations of man by
looking at their workings in the bodily organs. For this reason, he, as well as Seidel,
Horst, Snellius, and Casmann relied on the anatomical works of Galen and Vesalius.
On the otherhand, these authors consideredhumananatomy important for another
very crucial reason. Precisely because their books addressed the human nature as a
whole, they also included large sections devoted to an explanation of man’s body
basedon the latest anatomical findings. But as they includedmaterial taken fromthe
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works of Vesalius, Fabrici d’Acquapendente, and Realdo Colombo, the books on the
soul I considered also proposed newways of looking at the body. In the psychological
works of Melanchthon, Seidel, Horst, Snellius, and Casmann, the human body was
no longer considered in the Aristotelian sense, viz., as potentially living matter
predisposed for the soul as its actualising form. The body we find in the works of
these authorswasof course conceivedas the seat of the soul. Yet it couldbe considered
independently of the soul and it amounted chiefly to an orderly arrangement of
organs as they were discovered through dissection of cadavers. In some cases – most
clearly in the works of Melanchthon and Snellius – the arrangement of the bodily
organs was compared to mechanical devices, like windmills, clocks, and automata.
In the fifth chapter of this thesis I pointed to a further interesting element
involved in the transformations of psychology I just summarised. On the one hand,
the scientia de anima became anthropology, that is, a discipline that considered man
to possess two natures: a soul or spirit (the subject of psychology) and a body (the
subject of anatomy). This change in the renaissance science of the soul was trig-
gered by Melanchthon’s own interpretation and effort to enforce central points
of his Lutheran faith. On the other hand, the disciplinary set-up resulting from
Melanchthon’s and his followers’ endeavours, as well as their view of human nature
as composed by two natures became ideas accepted across different confessions or
even independently of religious motives. That man had two different parts (a spirit
and a soul) and that the science that studied them, anthropology, was accordingly
divided into two branches (psychology and anatomy), all this evolved into a standard
disciplinary framework, independent of its initial religious or even denominational
character.
7.5. The Soul and Its Controversial Origin
As Ihave explained throughout this thesis,Melanchthonand someofhisWittenberg
and northern European followers insisted on two intertwined points: first, man’s
higher soul was a spiritual substance; second, this substance could not be known by
the natural philosopher.
These two points implied that knowledge of the origin of the human spirit also
remained hidden fromman’s natural understanding. Surely, Melanchthon pointed
out, themost important task of natural philosophy is makingman recognise – even
from a rational point of view – that nature is the work of a divine architect. For this
reason, natural philosophy could by nomeans doubt thatman’s soul was created by
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God. What was impossible for natural philosophy, Melanchthon admonished, was
obtaining precise knowledge of themode of this creation. DidGod create the human
spirit anew in each individual, as ‘creationism’ taught?Or didhe rather create it only
in the firstman, leaving its transmission to the process of natural procreation, as the
theory of ‘traducianism’ proposed?
Notwithstanding his efforts to find a provisional answer in the Scriptures, Me-
lanchthon concluded that man’s natural understanding could not work out this
long-vexed question once and for all. Melanchthon’s message was so powerful at
Wittenberg, that authors who followed his teaching opened their discussions on the
origin of the soul by quotingMelanchthon’s words regarding the unknowability of
the soul’s origin. In theworks of Peucer, Seidel, andHorst,Melanchthon’s admonish-
ment that the youth should not enquire into things that only God can know played
the role of a cautionary remark. Beforemaking up their minds between creationism
and traducianism they informed the reader that their answers would be as limited
as man’s natural understanding.
As I have showed in the sixth chapter of this thesis, Melanchthon’s idea that the
origin of the soul was unknowable did not only serve as a cautionary remark. Per-
hapsmore importantly, it made possible for his Lutheran followers to defend a vari-
ety of different opinions on human animation. Melanchthon’s students defended
creationism, traducianism, or middle-ground positions between these two alterna-
tives. Because Melanchthon and Luther too had been either unclear or silent about
the origin of the soul, sixteenth-century Lutherans were not expected to conform
to one specific doctrine. I demonstrated this by looking also at the works Luther-
ans who considered Aristotle’s De anima, rather than Melanchthon’s books on the
soul, to be the ideal framework for their psychological works. But also in the case
of these authors – particularly Jacob Schegk (a creationist) and Johannes Ludwig
Hawenreuter (a traducianist) – their undoubted affiliation to the Lutheran faith did
not imply any uniformity for what concerned their doctrines about human anima-
tion.
Despite the fact that Lutherans did not follow one specific doctrine regarding
the origin of the soul, confessional controversies encouraged several Lutherans to
take a clearer stance. In fact, Catholic authors (especially the Jesuit of Ingolstadt)
began to condemn traducianism as the opinion defended by Luther. In the wake of
these attacks and amidst growing concerns that creationism could not adequately
explain the transmission of original sin throughmankind, traducianism appears to
have enjoyed increasing popularity among Lutherans, at the turn of the seventeenth
century.
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7.6. Psychology and Confessionalisation: A Conclusion
On the basis of the main points I just recapitulated, what conclusions can we draw
about psychology in the age of confessionalisation?
Luther’s reform initially implied a blanket rejection of all things Catholic and
scholastic, including the decrees of the Council of Vienne and the Fifth Lutheran
Council regarding the human soul. Luther ridiculed the idea that man’s intellec-
tive soul was essentially and per se the form of the human body and the belief
that the immortality of man’s soul could be demonstrated philosophically. But did
Luther’s criticism result in a newway of looking at the soul on the part of those who
endorsedhis newChristian faith? Asmanyprofessors of arts andmedicine converted
to Luther’s reform, did they also devise something like a Lutheran doctrine of the
soul?Or, did psychology contribute to shaping Lutheran theological doctrines?How
did psychology and Lutheran theology interact with each other? And what does this
interaction tell us about the more general relationship between psychology and the
process of sixteenth-century confessionalisation?
Already by looking at the sixteenth-century discussions on the origin of the
soul that I just recalled, one may very well incline towards thinking that Luther’s
attacks on scholastic doctrines of the soul did not result in a homogeneous Lutheran
psychology. Lutheranswere not expected to defend one specific doctrine of the soul’s
origin. In fact, it seems they were not expected to do psychology in one specific way
at all.
For instance, Hawenreuter and Schegk – whose Lutheran affiliation is unques-
tionable – produced commentaries on Aristotle’sDe anima that resembled very little
Melanchthon’s Commentarius and Liber de anima. True, as two committed Lutherans,
Hawenreuter and Schegk wrote works on the soul in view of what they believed was
the Christian truth. However, they thought that the science of the soul was a disci-
pline including natural philosophy andmetaphysics and that its subjectmatter was
the soul, which pace Luther they considered to be the form of the human body. To
these observations, it may also be added that in the texts I examined I could find no
case in which Lutheran authors explicitly referred to official confessions (as in, offi-
cial statements of doctrine). From this perspective, it may be concluded that in the
years between Luther’s reform and the publication of Descartes’Meditations of First
Philosophy, there never was one Lutheran psychology.
However, I think that there is a sense in which the categories of ‘Lutheran’ and
‘confession’may fruitfully be used to understand the transformations of psychology
I have described in the present work.
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In effect, what I have been trying to suggest throughout this study is that Me-
lanchthon and some of his followers wrote books on the soul that did share some
common elements. What is more, I have tried to demonstrate that these elements,
which roughly correspond to theviews I summarised in this conclusive chapter,were
in many respect connected to central points of Melanchthon’s Lutheran faith.
As I have mentioned onmany occasions in the course of the preceding chapters,
the connection between Lutheran theology and psychological views taking place in
the works of Melanchthon and his followers is not necessarily one of dependence of
theories about the soul upon theological doctrines. Instead, what I tried to show all
the way is that Melanchthon, Peucer, Seidel, Horst, Snellius, and Casmann, they all
looked at psychology as a crucial part (and not as a logical/deductive consequence)
of their new Christian faith. Moreover, I have tried to characterise this interplay
between religion and psychology in the age of confessionalisation in at least two
specific ways.
In a first way, as it emerges from the cases of Melanchthon’s and his Wittenberg
followers’ works on the soul, psychology was used as a means to create Lutheran
orthodoxy and to enforce it. These authors wrote books that by treating the soul also
triedboth tomake specific theological points and todisciplineuniversity students in
the direction of one specific understanding of the Christian faith. On the one hand,
believing that the human soul had to be defined on Scriptural bases, as a spiritus
endowedwith innate ideas of civicmorals, or stressing on all possible occasions how
much the essence of the soul could not be known by man’s natural understanding;
all these doctrines never were requested by Lutheran theology. Not all Lutherans
defended themandvery probably, if one dug into additional sixteenth-century texts,
the same views might be found in other confessional contexts. On the other hand,
when Melanchthon and his followers maintained these ideas they did it to create
something like a religious orthodoxy or as an important part of such effort.
In a second way, psychology was perhaps unintentionally the vehicle through
which confessional identities could emerge or strengthen themselves. As it surfaces
in the case of sixteenth-century controversies on the origin of the soul, the identifica-
tion of traducianismwith Luther andhis followers served the Ingolstadt Jesuits’ goal
of distancing themselves from their contemporary Lutherans. In an us-and-them
dynamic the Jesuits of Ingolstadt identified Catholicism with the creationist doc-
trine and blamed Lutherans for their alleged defence of traducianism. As for every
action there is a reaction, concerns grew among Lutherans that Catholic creationism
was inconsistent with a sound explanation of the original sin and its transmission.
Whether the Ingolstadt Catholics were right in thinking that traducianismwas the
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Lutheranopinion isnot too important.What counts is that througha controversy on
psychology groups defined themselves and profiled others according to confession.
Also in this second way, psychology was integral part of the formation of Lutheran
orthodoxy.
To sum up, there never was a Lutheran psychology, either in the sense of one
single way of doing psychology on the part of Lutheran authors, or in that of a
set of theories about the soul logically derived from Lutheran theology. Instead,
there was a Lutheran psychology meant as the effort to create one specific Christian
orthodoxy by means of works on the soul and as the consolidation of a confessional
identity through psychological controversies. From this point of view, psychology
was a crucial part of the process of sixteenth-century confessionalisation.
The variety of ways in which psychology was done within single denomina-
tions (for instance, within Lutheranism) should notmade us conclude that the cate-
gories of ‘confession’ and ‘confessionalisation’ are useless. On the contrary, precisely
because, as I hope to have showed, psychology was an important part of the efforts
and circumstances through which confessional orthodoxies emerged, the study of
theway inwhich sixteenth-century authors used psychology in view of confessional
purposes appears to be a vast field of further research. How did Lutherans who did
not follow Melanchthon used psychology to promote their Christian faith? How
did psychological controversies contribute to shaping streams within single confes-
sions?Howdiddiscussions about the soul promote the formationof broaderdenom-
inational identities?
Of course, religious and theological matters were not the only concerns of six-
teenth-century authorswho dealt with psychology.Nor should one reduce the com-
plexity of sixteenth-century psychology to one historical factor alone. As I recalled in
the introduction to this thesis, thehuge amount ofmaterial about the soul produced
in the sixteenth century is such that scholars are still far from knowingwhat to take
in considerationwhen it comes to Renaissance psychology and how to go along a lit-
erary production in which it seems difficult to find any order. In this light, tracing
the transformations of sixteenth-centurypsychology only to confessional controver-
sies would be hasty, to say the least. Yet, I hope the case-studies I presented in this
work can show that the vastness of thematerial regarding sixteenth-century discus-
sions about the soul can fruitfully be considered fromthepoint of viewof psychology
in the age of confessionalisation.
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Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift bestudeert de interactie tussen psychologie en datgene wat door-
gaans confessionalisering wordt genoemd. Hiermee bedoelen we het proces waar-
door het West-Europese Christendom uiteenviel in drie grote stromingen: luthera-
nisme, katholicisme en calvinisme.
Historici van de filosofie enwetenschapshistorici besteden sinds enige tientallen
jaren veel aandacht aan de verhouding tussen religie en wetenschap. Langzamer-
hand zijn historici opgehouden te geloven in de grote 19e-eeuwse verhalen over ‘het
conflict tussen religie en wetenschap’ of ‘de oorlog tussen wetenschap en religie’.
Zo komen ze meer en meer tot de overtuiging dat de geschiedenis van filosofie en
wetenschap enerzijds en de religiegeschiedenis anderzijds elkaar niet noodzakelij-
kerwijs hoeven uit te sluiten. Sinds deze benadering gangbaar is geworden, hebben
wetenschappers in detail de velewijzen bestudeerdwaarop door de eeuwenheen een
hele waaier van disciplines – waarondermetafysica, natuurwetenschap, astronomie,
astrologie en geneeskunde – beïnvloed zijn door religieuze ideeën en vice versa. Inte-
ressant is daarbij dat de vraag welke transformaties de psychologie doormaakte in
de tijd van de confessionalisering tot nu toe nauwelijks aan bod is gekomen. Dit
ondanks het feit dat de psychologie zich bezighield met thema’s die in het cen-
trumstonden vande confessionele debatten die uiteindelijk leidden tot de scheiding
tussen de drie genoemde stromingen. Het gaat hierbij om voor de hand liggende
thema’s zoals onsterfelijkheid, vrije wil, zonde en genade.
De geringe wetenschappelijke aandacht voor de interactie tussen psychologie en
confessionalisering is des te meer verbazendwekkend gezien het volgende feit: een
van de belangrijkste impulsen voor de 16e-eeuwse confessionalisering was Martin
Luthers nieuwe begrip van het christelijke geloof. Luthers opvatting dat mensen
alleen verlost kunnen worden door het geloof (sola fide) ging hand in hand met een
zeer scherpe kritiek op sommige van de meest fundamentele ideeën van de kerk
van Rome. De meeste van deze ideeën zijn direct gerelateerd aan de menselijke ziel.
Om precies te zijn, Luther verwierp niet alleen het idee dat de ziel de vorm van het
lichaam was (een doctrine die was vastgelegd in de constitutie Fidei catholici van het
Concilie van Vienne [1311–1312]), maar hij bekritiseerde ook de tijdens het Vijfde Con-
cilie van Lateranen (1512–1517) vastgelegde opvatting dat filosofie de onsterfelijkheid
van de ziel zoumoeten bewijzen (en daartoe dus ook in staat was).
Maar leidde Luthers kritiek tot een typisch lutheraans perspectief op de mense-
lijke ziel? Ontwikkelden Luthers volgelingen een nieuwe benadering van de psycho-
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logie? Waren de relatie tussen ziel en lichaam enerzijds en de (al dan niet-)bewijs-
baarheid van de onsterfelijkheid van de ziel de enige twee psychologische issues
waarover lutheranen en rooms-katholieken elkaar in de haren vlogen? In hoeverre
had de 16e-eeuwse confessionalisering invloed op de psychologie? Kortom, hoe zag de
psychologie er in de tijd van de confessionalisering eigenlijk uit?
Dit proefschrift is een poging tot een antwoord op deze vragen, die ondanks hun
historische importantie te lang veronachtzaamd zijn. Ik concentreer me daarbij op
een specifieke groep auteurs die hun ideeën in nauwe samenhang met Luther zelf
ontwikkelden en die gemakkelijk onder een noemer te brengen zijn. Om precies te
zijn, ik focus opdepsychologie zoals die ontwikkeldwerddoor auteurs die zich lieten
inspireren door de boeken over de ziel geschreven door Philip Melanchthon (1497–
1560) – Luthers meest trouwe strijdmakker (aan de universiteit) in Wittenberg.
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit vijf casestudies die allen inzoomen op de interactie
tussen de religieuze denkbeelden van deze auteurs en hun ideeën over de ziel zoals
die te vinden zijn in hun commentaren op het werk vanMelanchthon of in werken
die anderszins door Melanchthon zijn beïnvloed.
In de eerste casestudy (hoofdstuk 2), laat ik zien dat Melanchthons interpetatie
van Luthers opvattingen over de wijze waaropwe kennis kunnen verwerven door de
Schrift en door de filosofie een belangrijke ontwikkeling in de psychologie initieer-
den.HoewelMelanchthonhetmet Luther eenswas dat de essentie vandemenselijke
ziel gezien haar immateriële en onsterfelijke natuur alleen gekend kanwordenmid-
dels de Schrift, verdedigde hij ook de opvatting dat niettemin een filosofisch begrip
van sommige zielsfuncties mogelijk of zelfs noodzakelijk was. Dit denkbeeld resul-
teerde in een poging om tot een functionele beschrijving te komen van de lagere
(vegetatieve enwaarnemings-)vemogens van de ziel. Deze beschrijving poogt niet de
essentie van de ziel te definiëren – hier volgtMelanchthon Luther –maar de functies
te beschrijven die de ziel uitoefent in samenhang met het menselijke lichaam. Niet
alleen bij Melanchthonmaar ook in de werken van zijn volgers Rudolph Snellius en
Otto Casmann ging deze poging gepaard met een discussie over het concept ‘ἐνδε-
λέχεια’, oftewel de continue beweging van de lichamelijke geesten, als een nieuwe
manier van kijken naar het materiële karakter van demenselijke ziel.
In de tweede casestudy (hoofdstuk 3), zet ik uiteen dat Melanchthon bepaald
niet huiverachtig was – pace Luther – om het geloof te integreren in zijn boeken
over psychologie, die een filosofisch-functionele beschrijving van de lagere ziel ont-
wikkelen. Daarbij schreef Melanchthon aan de mens een hogere ziel toe die funda-
menteel verschilt van de lichamelijke geesten. Melanchthon beschrijft deze hogere
ziel als een immateriële en onsterfelijke spiritus intelligens. Deze spiritus was volgens
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Melanchthon uitgerust met aangeboren kennis van de moraal, een opvatting die
naar ik laat zienMelanchthonhielp omhet lutheraanse kamp te disciplineren.Maar
Melanchthon gebruikt het woord spiritus ook nog op een andere manier in zijn psy-
chologie: de term spiritus refereert ook naar de Heilige Geest. Om alles nog veel ver-
warrender temaken, verdedigdeMelanchthon ook de opvatting dat al deze ‘geesten’
(lichamelijk, immateriëel en de Heilige Geest) van cruciaal belang zijn voor het pro-
ces waarmee demens belangrijke keuzesmaakt in zijn aardse leven. Inmijn analyse
laat ik zien dat de interactie tussen al deze geesten een integraal bestanddeel is van
Melanchthons doctrine van verlossing door het geloof alleen (sola fide), die door hem
gezien wordt in termen van de vernieuwing van de menselijke ziel door inwerking
van de Heilige Geest en in termen van de aanwezigheid van de Heilige Geest zelf in
de ziel van de gelovigen.
In de derde casestudy (hoofdstuk 4) bestudeer ik de wijze waaropMelanchthons
concept van spiritus intelligens werd gerecipieerd door Otto Casmann in de context
van diens discussie met de Spaanse arts Franciscus Vallesius over de vraag of dieren
ook over een vorm van rationaliteit beschikken. Ik beschrijf Casmanns transforma-
tie vanMelanchthons concept daarbij als een ‘christologisering van de psychologie’.
Casmann verdedigt Melanchthons concept van spiritus intelligensmaar ondertussen
radicaliseert hij deze ook. Volgens Casmann betekent het feit dat de mens een spi-
ritueel wezen is dat de menselijke ontologische structuur een spiegeling moest zijn
van de hypostatische unie van de twee naturen van Christus (menselijk én godde-
lijk).
In de vierde casestudy (hoofdstuk 5) onderzoek ik hoe Melanchthons poging
om Luthers begrip van zonde en genade te verenigen met een filosofische doctrine
over de ziel resulteerde in twee diepgaande transformaties die de psychologie van
Melanchthon en zijn volgers significant doen verschillen van de meeste middel-
eeuwse en renaissance studies over de ziel. Aangezien Luther de opvatting huldigde
dat zonde en genade zowel de geest als het lichaam van de mens betreffen, trok
Melanchthon de conclusie dat een waarlijk christelijk begrip van de mens niet mag
stilstaan bij alleen de ziel, maar ook kennis van het lichaam zou moeten omvatten.
Op basis van deze doctrine transformeerden Melanchthon en zijn volgers het tra-
ditionele format van boeken over de ziel tot studies van de menselijke natuur in
zijn geheel (geest én lichaam). Dit had als resultaat dat hun boeken voor een groot
gedeelte bestonden uit beschrijvingen van het menselijk lichaam, geïnformeerd
door up-to-date anatomische kennis. Als een tweede belangrijke transformatie die
de psychologie vanMelanchthon en zijn volgers doet verschillen van demeestemid-
deleeuwse en renaissance werken over de ziel bespreek ik het proces dat ertoe leidde
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dat psychologie anthropologie werd, dat wil zeggen een discipline die de twee natu-
ren van demens bestudeert, lichaam (object van de anatomie) en geest (object van de
psychologie). Hoewel deze transformatie direct het gevolg was van Melanchthons
poging om lutheranisme en filosofie te verenigen, vond deze nieuwe taakomschrij-
vingvandepsychologie / anthropologie endevisie opdedubbelenatuurvandemens
die hierachter zat, ook ingang ver voorbij de confessionele grenzen en zelfs voorbij
de limiet van het religieuze domein zelf.
In de vijfde casestudy (hoofdstuk 6) ga ik in op de wijze waarop enerzijds Me-
lanchthonenzijnvolgelingenenanderijds andere lutheranenen rooms-katholieken
traditionele vraagstukken (quaestiones) aangaande de oorsprong van de ziel behan-
delden: is de ziel door God ex nihilo geschapen (creationisme) of wordt de ziel gegene-
reerd door de ouders (ex traduce). Deze laatste positie wordt in de literatuur ‘traduci-
anisme’ genoemd. In deze casestudy laat ik zien hoe Melanchthons overtuiging dat
er geen filosofische kennis in de strikte zinmogelijk is van de essentie van de ziel ook
een grote impact had op zijn behandeling van deze vraagstukken. Ondanks het feit
dat Melanchthon grote moeite doet om een provisorisch antwoord te vinden in de
Schrift, concludeert hij dat het natuurlijke verstand van demens nooit een definitief
antwoord zal kunnen vinden. Ik laat vervolgens zien dat Melanchthons voorzich-
tige benadering van het vraagstuk van de oorsprong van de ziel een heel interessante
uitwerking kreeg in de teksten van auteurs die in zijn voetsporen werkten, zoals
Bruno Seidel, Caspar Peucer en Gregor Horst. In hun teksten gaven Melanchthons
voorzichtige opmerkingen aanleiding tot een grote variëteit van opvattingen over
de oorsprong van de menselijke ziel. Melanchthons volgelingen verdedigden zowel
creationisme als traducionisme, en allerleimiddenposities tussen deze twee alterna-
tieven. Omdat Melanchthon hetzij onduidelijk was hetzij zweeg over de oorsprong
van de ziel, werd van 16e-eeuwse lutheranen niet verwacht dat ze zich aan een speci-
fiek antwoord op deze vraag zouden houden.
Hiernaast kom ik in deze casestudy nog tot een andere conclusie die van belang
is met betrekking tot de interactie tussen psychologie en confessionalisering in de
16e eeuw. Ondanks het feit dat lutheranen in het algemeen niet een specifieke doc-
trine aangaande de oorsprong van de ziel huldigden, werden sommige lutheraanse
auteurs door confessionele uiteenzettingen met rooms-katholieken en calvinisten
ertoe aangezet omeenduidelijker standpunt te verwoorden.Zokonhetgebeurendat
rooms-katholieke auteurs (metnamede Jezuïeten aandeuniversiteit van Ingolstadt)
het traducianisme verwierpen als zijnde de opinie van Luther. Onder de invloed van
deze aanvallen en dankzij de groeiende bezorgdheid dat het creationismeniet op een
adequatemanier de overdracht van de erfzonde zou kunnen verklaren, lijkt het erop
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dat het traducianisme aan het begin van de 17e eeuw een steeds grotere populariteit
genoot onder lutheranen.
Op basis van deze vijf casestudies kom ik tot de volgende conclusies. Het moge
duidelijk zijn dat Luthers aanvallen op de scholastieke opvattingen over de ziel niet
resulteerden in een homogene lutheraanse psychologie. Van lutheranen werd niet
verwacht dat ze een specifieke opvatting over de oorsprong van de ziel verdedigden.
Sterker nog, van lutheranen werd überhaupt niet verwacht dat ze op één bepaalde
manier aan psychologie deden. Vanuit dit gezichtspunt kunnenwe dus niet spreken
over de lutheraanse psychologie, hoogstens van verschillende lutheraanse benade-
ringswijzen.
Aan de andere kant concludeer ik dat er twee manieren zijn waarop categorieën
als ‘lutheraans’ en ‘confessie’ gebruikt kunnen worden om de transformaties bin-
nen de psychologie te begrijpen die ik in deze dissertatie heb bestudeerd. Ten eer-
ste,Melanchthon en zijn volgelingen deelden bepaalde gemeenschappelijke psycho-
logische opvattingen die samenhangen met centrale elementen van Melanchthons
theologie. Hoewel deze opvattingen niet werden voorgeschreven door de luthe-
raanse theologische orthodoxie, kunnen we wel zien dat Melanchthon en zijn vol-
gers deze doctrines ontwikkelden in een poging om zoiets als een orthodoxie tot
stand te brengen.
Ten tweede concludeer ikdat (wellichtniet intentioneel) de psychologiehet vehi-
kel was waarmee confessionele identiteiten konden worden gevormd en versterkt.
Door controverses over filosofische visies op de ziel werden bepaalde psychologische
ideeën karakteristiek voor specifieke confessionele groepen. De casus van 16e-eeuwse
discussies over de oorsprong vande ziel vertoont een ‘wij tegenhen’-dynamiekwaar-
bij de Jezuïetenuit Ingolstadt het creationisme als de rooms-katholieke positie iden-
tificeerden en de lutheranen beschimpten omhun zogenaamde verdediging van het
traducianisme. Met andere woorden, door controverses over psychologie profileer-
den religieuze groepen zich als een bepaalde confessie. Ook op deze tweede manier
was psychologie een integraal onderdeel van de formatie van een lutheraanse ortho-
doxie.

Summary
In this thesis, I look at theway inwhichpsychology interactedwith the so-calledpro-
cess of confessionalisation, that is, the transformation throughwhichWesternEuro-
pean Christianity became divided into three main denominations: Lutheranism,
Catholicism, and Calvinism.
Historians of philosophy and science over the last few decades have devoted
much attention to the relationship between religion and science. Especially since
nineteenth-century narratives of ‘the conflict between religion and science’ or ‘the
warfare of science and religion’ stopped being the dominant historiographical par-
adigm, historians have looked more favourably at the idea that the history of phi-
losophy and science and the history of religion are not necessarily two mutually
contrasting affairs. As this new approach gained momentum, scholars have anal-
ysed the way in which a wide array of disciplines – such as, metaphysics, physics,
astronomy, astrology, medicine, etc., – interacted with religious ideas through the
centuries. Interestingly enough, the way in which psychology underwent multiple
transformations in the age of confessionalisation has hitherto been neglected. This,
despite the fact that, due to its obvious proximity to ideas of ‘immortality’, ‘freewill’,
‘sin’, and ‘grace’, psychology dealt with subjects of central interest for the confes-
sional controversieswhich ledWesternEuropeanChristianity to divide into (at least)
three main groups.
The paucity of available scholarship on the interplay between psychology and
confessionalisation is all the more surprising when one observes the following fact.
One of the main triggers of sixteenth-century confessionalisation corresponds with
Martin Luther’s newunderstanding of the Christian faith. Luther’s idea that human
beings were saved through faith alone also involved a harsh criticism of some of the
most fundamental ideas at the basis of the official theology of the Roman Church.
Among the ideas that Luther attacked some concerned directly the human soul.
Notably, Luther rejected that the human intellective soul was the form of the body
(as had famously been declared in the constitution Fidei catholicae of the Council of
Vienne [1311–1312]), and that philosophy could prove the immortality of the human
soul (as instead was stated by the Fifth Lateran Council [1512–1517]).
But in the wake of Luther’s criticism did there follow anything like a ‘typically
Lutheran way’ of looking at the soul? Did Luther’s followers develop a new way of
doing psychology? Were the soul-body relationship and the philosophical demon-
strability of the soul’s immortality the only two points on which a good Lutheran
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should part company with his fellow Catholics who wrote about psychology? Did
the process of sixteenth-century confessionalisation affect psychology and if so, how
exactly? In short, what was psychology like in the age of confessionalisation?
In this thesis I provide an answer to these questions, which despite their impor-
tance have been neglected for too long. I do so by considering one specific tradition,
or group of authors, which developed in close connection with Luther’s views and
which lends itself to the identification of some common features. Therefore, I have
focused on the way psychology developed at the hand of authors who looked at the
books on the soulwritten by PhilipMelanchthon (1497–1560) – the reformer and clos-
est ally of Martin Luther at Wittenberg – as their preferred intellectual platform to
deal with psychology.
I have conducted my study by means of five case studies in which these authors
developed their ideas concerning the soul in connection with their religious views.
In the first case study (Chapter 2), I show that Melanchthon’s fresh interpre-
tation of Luther’s teaching concerning knowledge obtained through God’s Gospel
and through philosophy involved an important development in psychology. Whilst
Melanchthon agreed with Luther that the essence of the human soul in its immate-
rial and immortal nature could only be known through the Gospel, he thought that
a philosophical understanding of some of the soul’s operations was non only pos-
sible but even necessary. This idea resulted in an attempt to provide an operational
account of the lower (vegetative and sensitive) powers of the human soul: an account
of the soul that does not try to define the essence of the soul but rather the opera-
tions the soul performs in the human body. It is for this reason that Melanchthon
and some of his followers strove to grasp the workings of the vegetative and sensi-
tive souls in thehumanbody. Chiefly in PhilipMelanchthon’s books on the soul, but
subsequently also in the psychologies written by the Protestant Rudolph Snellius
and Otto Casmann, this endeavour to embody the lower souls became interwoven
with the diffusion of the concept of ‘ἐνδελέχεια’, or continuous movement of the
bodily spirits, as a new way of looking at the corporeal soul of man.
In the second case study (Chapter 3), I explain that, one the one hand, Melanch-
thonmade roomfor aphilosophical/operational accountof the lower soul in the con-
text of his Lutheran faith. On the other hand, he did not renounce to integrate this
faith in his books on psychology. He did so by ascribing to human beings a higher
soul that was altogether different from the bodily spirits. Melanchthon conceived
of this higher soul as an immaterial and immortal substance called spiritus intelli-
gens. This intelligent spirit was provided with innate knowledge of civic morals, an
idea which I show to have servedMelanchthon’s efforts of disciplining the Lutheran
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camp.What ismore,Melanchthonalsoused ‘spirit’ inyet anotherway inhispsychol-
ogy: spirit was also the Holy Spirit. To makematters worse, Melanchthon explained
that the interaction of all these (bodily, intelligent, and Holy) spirits was central to
man’s choices andbehaviour inhismortal life. Inmy analysis, I argue that this inter-
action between spirits was part and parcel ofMelanchthon’s doctrine of salvation by
faith alone, intended as the renewal of the soul on the part of the Holy Spirit and as
the presence of the Holy Spirit itself in the soul of the believers.
In the third case study (Chapter 4), I show that Melanchthon’s notion of spir-
itus intelligens was adopted by the Protestant Otto Casmann, in the context of a
discussion with the Spanish physician Franciscus Vallesius, concerning the pres-
ence of reason in brute animals. By analysing this dispute, I also point to the fact
that Melanchthon’s notion of spiritus intelligens underwent a transformation at the
hand of Casmann, which I call ‘Christologising of psychology’. Casmann defended
Melanchthon’s notion of the soul as ‘spiritus intelligens’, but I argue that he also
broughtMelanchthon’s spiritualising views ofman’s higher soul to a different level.
According to Casmann, the idea that man was a spiritual being means that man’s
ontological structure has tomirror the hypostatic unity of the two natures of Christ.
In the fourth case study (Chapter 5), I demonstrate that Melanchthon’s attempt
to balance Luther’s understanding of sin and grace with a philosophical account of
the soul resulted in two very profound transformations,whichmadeMelanchthon’s
and his followers’ psychologies differ frommostmedieval and Renaissance books on
the soul. As Luther thought that sin and grace concerned both the soul and the body
ofman,Melanchthon considered that a properly Christianunderstanding of human
beings could not regard the soul alone, but should also include knowledge of the
body. For this reason,Melanchthon and thosewho followed his teaching remoulded
their books about the soul into studies of the entirety ofhumannature (both the soul
and the body). As a consequence of this they devoted large parts of their psychology
to an account of the humanbody based on the latest anatomical knowledge available
at the time. In the fifth chapter of this thesis I point to a further interesting element
involved in the transformations of psychology. On the one hand, psychology became
anthropology, which considered the two natures of man: a soul or spirit (the subject
of psychology) and a body (the subject of anatomy). This change in the Renaissance
science of the soul was triggered by Melanchthon’s own interpretation and effort
to enforce central points of his Lutheran faith. On the other hand, the new set-up
of psychology resulting from Melanchthon’s and his followers’ endeavours, as well
as their view of human nature as composed of two natures, became ideas accepted
across different confessions or even independently of religious motives.
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In the fifth case study (Chapter 6), I look at how Melanchthon and his follow-
ers, on the one hand, as well as other Lutherans and Catholics, on the other, treated
traditional questions regarding the origin of the human soul: is the human soul
created by God ex nihilo (creationism), or rather generated by the parents ex traduce
(traducianism)? In this study I argue that Melanchthon’s idea that philosophical
knowledge of the soul’s essencewas not attainable impacted onhis conception of the
origin of the soul as follows.Notwithstandinghis efforts to find aprovisional answer
in the Scriptures, Melanchthon concluded that man’s natural understanding could
not solve this questiononce and for all. In this thesis, I argue thatMelanchthon’s cau-
tionary approach to the question of the origin of the soul played out in a very inter-
estingmanner in texts produced by authorswho followedhim, such as Bruno Seidel,
Caspar Peucer, and Gregor Horst. In their cases, Melanchthon’s idea that the origin
of the soul was unknowable did not only serve as a cautionary remark. Perhapsmore
importantly, it made it possible for them to defend a variety of different opinions on
human animation.Melanchthon’s students defended creationism, traducianism, or
middle-ground positions between these two alternatives. BecauseMelanchthonhad
been either unclear or silent about the origin of the soul, sixteenth-century Luther-
ans were not expected to conform to one specific doctrine. In this study, I also make
another point, which is of particular interest for our understanding of the interac-
tion between psychology and confessions in the sixteenth century. Despite the fact
that Lutherans did not follow one specific doctrine regarding the origin of the soul,
confessional controversies encouraged several Lutherans to take a clearer stance. In
fact, Catholic authors (especially the Jesuits at the University of Ingolstadt) began
to condemn traducianism as the opinion defended by Luther. In the wake of these
attacks, and amidst growing concerns that creationism couldnot adequately explain
the transmission of original sin through mankind, traducianism appears to have
enjoyed increasing popularity among Lutherans, at the turn of the seventeenth cen-
tury.
As the result of these five case studies I conclude what follows. As the dispute
concerning the origin of the human soul shows, one may very well incline towards
thinking that Luther’s attacks on scholastic doctrines of the soul did not result in
a homogeneous Lutheran psychology. Lutherans were not expected to defend one
specific doctrine of the soul’s origin. In fact, it seems they were not expected to
do psychology in one specific way at all. From this point of view, there never was
something like a Lutheran psychology.
On the other hand, I conclude that there are two ways in which categories such
as ‘Lutheran’ and ‘confession’ may fruitfully be used to understand the transfor-
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mations of psychology I have described in the present work. First, as it emerges
from Melanchthon’s and his followers’ works on the soul, these authors did share
common psychological views that pivoted on central points of Melanchthon’s the-
ology. These views were not implied or requested by Lutheran orthodoxy. Yet, when
Melanchthon and his followers maintained their psychological ideas they did it so
as to create something like a religious orthodoxy.
Second, psychology was (perhaps unintentionally) the vehicle through which
confessional identities could emerge or strengthen themselves. Through controver-
sies on philosophical views about the soul, psychological ideas became characteristic
of specific confessional groups. The case of sixteenth-century discussions about the
origin of the soul witnesses to a dynamic of ‘us-and-them’ whereby the Jesuits of
Ingolstadt identified Catholicism with the creationist doctrine and blamed Luther-
ans for their alleged defence of traducianism. Through a controversy on psychology
groups defined themselves and profiled others according to confession. Also in this
secondway, psychologywas an integral part of the formation of Lutheran orthodoxy.
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